TELOS

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a quarterly journal of radical thought

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NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

A recent emigrée from Russia, where he traveled widely as a mining engineer and an academic, VIKTOR ZASLAVSKY now teaches sociology at Memorial University in Newfoundland. A frequent *Telos* contributor and himself a recent emigrée also — this time from Hungary — FERENC FEHER teaches literature at La Trobe University in Melbourne, Australia. GUIDO NERI teaches philosophy at the University of Milan, Italy. Unemployed, JOEL WHITEBOOK presumably engages in considerable social and theoretical criticism in New York City. JEAN COHEN, a regular *Telos* editor, will be teaching sociology at Bennington College in Vermont this fall. FRANK ADLER, another *Telos* editor, teaches political science at Antioch College. AUGUST THALHEIMER has been dead since 1948. KARL KLARE teaches law in Boston, Mass. NICOLAS TERTULIAN teaches philosophy at the University of Bucharest. SERGIO AMATO, currently doing research in Amsterdam, normally teaches intellectual history at the University of Florence. WILLIAM M. BERG, ALBERT W. LEVI and STEVEN S. SCHWARZSCHILD all teach at Washington University. THOMAS RUDEBUSH is a political science graduate student at the University of Chicago. BERNIE FELS is a slightly discontent academic. SEYLA BEN HABIB teaches philosophy at Yale University and is doing research in Germany. ROBERT EHRLICH teaches social science at the University of California, Berkeley. DOUGLAS COLLINS teaches French literature at the University of Missouri. PAUL BREINES, *Telos* review editor, teaches history at Boston College. SUSAN WHEELER is a graduate student at Trent University in Peterborough, Ontario. WILMA IGGERS teaches German literature in Buffalo, N.Y., and is currently on leave in Germany. JOSE RODRIGUEZ-IBANEZ teaches social theory at the University of Madrid. STUART EWEN teaches communications at Hunter College in New York City.

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INTRODUCTION

With the failure of the various reform efforts in Eastern Europe and the increasing realization that not only do these societies have nothing to do with socialism, but they are not even remotely moving in that general direction, the question of their nature, internal dynamics and future possibilities becomes a crucial one. As new social formations, they exhibit conflicts and legitimating internal relations which cannot be readily understood by merely projecting categories derived from the experience of Western capitalist societies. Thus, Viktor Zaslevsky, in the first of a series of contributions on the nature of the USSR, carefully analyzes the importance of the Stalin cult in Soviet social life — both for maintaining the legitimacy of the party's rule in general and shoring up a part of the Brezhnev regime in particular. In recording his own observations, Zaslavsky shows how the cult is not only fueled by the party apparatus, but also finds spontaneous expression in the working classes themselves for whom the memory of a strong, powerful figure serves many stabilizing functions.

Along similar lines, Feher describes "Kadarism" as a new socio-political formation paralleling Krushchev's model in a context where, instead of having super-power status, the country in question is heavily dependent on Russia. In fact, Feher sees the Hungarian regime characterized by essentially pragmatic economies and politics wrapped in a Machiavellian package that could and would develop along Titoist lines if the USSR loosened its grip. Unlike Hungary, where Kadarism has taken on all the characteristics of a benign dictatorship, such is not the case in Czechoslovakia. Neri briefly recapitulates recent events there and convincingly argues that, no matter what form the Prague Spring may have taken, it had absolutely no chance of succeeding.

The last issue, in honor of Habermas' 50th birthday, was to include several additional contributions. Inasmuch as they came too late, however, their publication was postponed until now. Thus, this issue includes two pieces, by Joel Whitebook and Jean Cohen, which critically evaluate different aspects of Habermas' work. Focusing on the present ecological crisis, Whitebook questions whether Habermas' theoretical framework can successfully deal with it, and raises some problems with the foundation of the whole enterprise. Similarly, Cohen traces Habermas' departures from the Marxian critique in order to generate a more empirically grounded analysis of late capitalism. After carefully reconstructing Habermas' early work on the decline of the public sphere, she especially questions Habermas' resurrection of the classical concept of politics as a solution to the present decisionistic mode of political administration.

Referring to recent discussions concerning the state and fascism, Frank Adler re-examines classical Marxist interpretations and points out how, despite its age, August Thalheimer's account, almost half a century old, remains one of the soundest. Since Thalheimer's classical article had never been translated into English, al full translation of it is also included in this issue.

In the "Notes" section, Karl Klare reinterprets contemporary American jurisprudence from a critical Marxist perspective and, speaking as a practicing lawyer, shows how his peers can engage in their professional activities as political praxis. Having had access to the Lukács archives in Budapest, Nicolas Tertulian relates some of the more interesting evaluations of contemporary thinkers to be found in Lukács' unpublished correspondence. In his conference report, Sergio Amato discusses the present revival of Otto Bauer and Austro-Marxism in Austria, while providing a comprehensive bibliographical panorama of literature on the subject. Responding to Levi's analysis of Wittgenstein's ethics as rooted in his homosexuality, Rudebush and Berg struggle to redeem Wittgenstein by showing how and why ethics must be more autonomously rooted in linguistic practices. Schwarzschild, on the other hand, suggests that the roots of

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Wittgenstein's peculiar ethics are not related to his homosexuality, but in his ambivalently accepted Jewishness. Levi's rejoinder to both replies convincingly indicates why he remains fundamentally unconvinced and firm in his original position. The section closes with a bitter indictment of academic micro-politics by Bernie Fels, especially relating to the function of leftist intellectuals as the enforcers of the new austerity programs.

Various reviews deal with McCarthy's new book on Habermas, Lasch's work on narcissism, Gombin's history of the radical tradition, Lacapra's evaluation of Sartre, Poster's analysis of the family, a series of new books on Kraus, and Schiller's relatively old work on communications.

Tim Luke *Paul Piccone*

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THE REBIRTH OF THE STALIN CULT IN THE U.S.S.R.*

by Viktor Zaslavsky

> "Stalin? - exclaimed Brecht, in contemptuous response to my objections. - In fifty years from now the communists will even have forgotten who he was." H. Pachter

Some fifty years have passed since the day of that conversation[1] and Brecht proved himself a poor prophet. Krushchev too, shortly before dying, lamented not having dared to publish, while still in power, a series of documents on Stalin's crimes and, particularly, the acts of the inquiry commission on Kirov's assassination. Krushchev claimed that if he had done it, the Stalin cult in the 20th century would have been a closed chapter. Actually, it isn't likely that the publication of these documents would have changed things. Today, the Stalin cult is in full bloom and its restoration is one of the distinctive traits of Soviet society in the Brezhnev period.

For the Soviet citizen, the rebirth of the Stalin cult is an everyday reality. There is hardly a worker who has not had to participate in meetings, either open or closed to the public, where official speakers of local party organizations openly exalt Stalin while professing that the slight violations in legality he sometimes committed in his last years were determined by the difficulty of the political situation and cannot possibly affect the overall evaluation of his role as the brilliant father of the people. Similarly, any Moscow intellectual can refer to similar occasions for orations from higher ranking officials. For example, during the latest reunion of the writers' union, ostensibly organized in celebration of Armed Forces Day but actually dedicated to the fiftieth anniversary of Stalin's death, one of the chiefs of the general political Administration of the Armed forces delivered a similar speech. Moreover, historians and sociologists still remember that the 1973 project, one of the last volumes of the *History of the CPSU*, was sharply criticized, simply because of allusions to some negative moments in 1947-49 Soviet history. On that occassion, Trapeznikov, one of the higher directors of the ideological apparatus, confirmed that "Soviet history does not contain and never has contained negative pages."

The Stalinist Cult in Literature

In any case, students of Soviet society need not limit themselves to sources of information accessible only to specialists, party functionaries or intellectuals of the opposition. In order to gain a concrete grasp of the

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*Originally published in *Mondoperaio*, No. 2, 1978, pp. 97-105. Translated from the Italian by Eleni Mahaira-Odoni.

1. H. Pachter, "On Being an Exile," *Salmagundi* (1969-70) No. 10-11, p. 19.

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ideological value of a political idea, we need to examine the transformations it undergoes by passing through mass media as well as dominant popular stereotypes. Literary narrative constitutes an irreplaceable source of knowledge about mass political orientations because of its timely reaction to changes in mass political attitutes and also, because it has traditionally had a particularly important function within the Soviet society. The total centralization of all spheres of activity, including literature, allows for a sufficiently exact evaluation of advances made in the process of restoring the Stalinist cult, even on the basis of a limited number of examples.

For example, let's take I. Stadnjuk's novel, *The War,* published in 1974 with a circulation of about 6 million copies. When describing the scene of the unforeseen disappearance of Stalin and of his "comrades in arms," the author does not fail to observe that all those present "were left petrified in solemn silence, unable to believe they were facing, in flesh and bones, the Chief and his comrades in arms." The comrades, named in succession, are Molotov, Malenkov and Beria. While adding still another couple of million victims to the list of disappearances in the Lager of Stalin and Beria, how could the publication of new documents impede the official authors of the regime from describing today, "the sincere love, the faith and deep devotion of the people who, like a resplendent wave, were sweeping away the platform of the Mausoleum" where Stalin stood, he "who had dedicated himself entirely to the building of socialism?" Nor would it be easy during Stalin's life, which did not shine for modesty, to find him represented like an intellectual Titan who, "pen in hand, sits at the table and writes, plunging his gaze in the granary of his own wisdom, freely and generously shaping his supple thoughts, filling them with energy, passionately singling out new principles and new ties with the multiformity of scientific concepts and with the manifestations of reality, carrying each phrase to the finish of crystalline clarity."[2]

We could also cite at length from the novel *The Siege,* also published with a printing of several million copies. To be exact, we must acknowledge that the author A. Cakovski, the chief editor of the *Literaturnaja Gazeta,* did not need to change his personal convictions. In his first novel, *Morning Has Already Come* and *Cvan Cer Goes on Watch,* published when Stalin was still alive, Cakovski was already singing high hymns praising the Guide and Leader of Peoples. That year, the 25th anniversary of the dictator's death, was celebrated by adapting *The Siege* for screen and by decorating Cakovski with the Lenin prize. Additional useful material on "re-Stalinization" can be obtained from the first editions (mid 'sixties) and second editions (late 'sixties and early 'seventies) of the memoirs of Soviet military chiefs.[3]

Two Levels of Mystification

In official Soviet literature we can clearly single out two lines with respect to

2. I. Stadnjuk, "Vojna" (Part II), *Molodaja gvardija* (1974), No. 5, p. 50.
3. M. Geller, *Koncentracionnyl mir i sovetskaja literatura* (London: Overseas Publication Interchange, 1974), pp. 222-223.

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attitutes toward the victims of Stalinist terror. The first one maintains that there were no innocent victims and therefore, praises Stalin for not having "rubbed elbows with the enemies." For example, in a recent publication signed by Yuri Zukov, *Pravda*'s well-known commentator on foreign politics, Stalin has been eulogized for having made "the only correct choice under the dramatic circumstances of his time." In order that the reader has no doubts concerning the times he is speaking of, Zukov's memoirs are subtitled "Chronicle Pages from the 1930's."[4] And the poet S. Smirnov, one of the initiators of this line, has memoralized Stalin's funeral with the following famous verses: "And so, as he rises above the crowds, Our Own, He did not go alone: The souls of the down-trodden citizens like a funeral wreath follow on."[5] Striking here is the analogy with Eichmann to whom the following words have been attributed: "When I die, six million Jews will lie with me in the Grave."

The other line of interpretation on victims of the terror seeks to provide an "objective" evaluation of Stalin's role. Its authors, while praising the dictator's parts in creating the Soviet State and his annihilation of both real and imaginary opposition to the power apparatus, still disapprove of Stalin's deed of 1937-39 when many "honest" comrades were also eliminated. They explain, however, that these were excusable errors, deviations, lack of information and personal weaknesses of a leader whose character became partially deformed, as a result of the "supreme historical responsibility" that fell upon him. In any case, they argue, innocent victims were rehabilitated (though posthumously), justice has been done and all must be forgotten for, in the history of Soviet society "there are no negative pages."

Insistence on the themes of pardon and forgetfulness is typical of recent works by Yuri Bondarev whose previous novel, *The Silence,* marked at the time and important movement in the anti-Stalinist cult struggle. Today instead, Bondarev, who in the meantime became secretary of the writer's union and has been honored with all possible awards, recounts the parable of two old men on retirement who are about to share a two-room apartment provided by the State to celebrate the event, the old men drink toasts in the kitchen "staring fixedly into each other's eyes, then, go quiet for a minute and suddenly they both burst into tears. One had once been the inquisitioner and the other his victim, condemned to many years of Lager."[6] Another example of forgetting and hushing can be found in the recent memoirs of Kalinin's son where Enukidze, Postysev, Stalin and the other Soviet leaders of the nineteen twenties and thirties are usually depicted like one single large family.[7] The difference between butchers and victims seems to the author so negligible that he does not even mention it, to avoid casting a shadow over the friendship and compatibility of the group.

4. Y. Zukov and R. Izmailova, "Nacalo goroda. Stranicy iz chroniki 30-ch godov," *Znamja* No. 2 (1977), p. 154.
5. S. Smirnov, "Svidetel'stvuju sam," *Moskva* No. 10 (1967), p. 29.
6. Y. Bondarev, "Stranicy iz zapisnoj knizki," *Znamja* No. 6 (1976), p. 115.
7. A. Kalinin, "Iz vospominanija syna," *Znamja* Nos. 1 & 2.

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Many representatives of the older generation of victims of the Stalinist Gulag had never really believed in the miracle of their own liberation and had often predicted "Stalin's return." But, to many Russians born during the 1930's, such a return seemed unlikely. Many among them, including this author, had been among the select audience of Khrushchev's long report on Stalin in 1956 and had afterwards struck down with their bare hands the huge plaster statues of Stalin decorating every single room. Later, in 1961, some of them had stood on watch night and day in Red Square, afraid to miss the moment when Stalin's remains were to be removed from the mausoleum.

So why is a figure so steeped in blood and filth put back on a pedestal? Why the fresh descriptions of the boots and "the moustache between which a kind of smile hovered"? What social processes of the Brezhnev period have made the rebirth of the Stalinist cult possible? An exhaustive answer to these questions would require a detailed analysis of the entire structure of contemporary Soviet society, with particular attention to the organization and distribution of power, as well as the political culture of diverse social groups. Given the complexity of the subject, this article will be limited to a preliminary analysis.

The Cult within the Apparatus

A widely held point of view attributes the rebirth of the Stalinist cult to the psychology and dispositions of the group now in power. In fact, the political careers of many of today's leaders started during Stalin's time. He was the one to promote Brezhnev to Central Committee membership; it was in Kosygin's company that Stalin was last seen in public; Gromyko, the present minister for Foreign Affairs, was then a vice-minister, while Episev, the current chief of the central political Directorate of Armed Forces, was charged with the vice-ministry of State Security; Ustinov, current defense minister, was minister of armaments. The list could go on. It is well known, however, that gratitude to the leader is a rare quality among politicians and hardly influences the course of events. Many members of the group in power have much to be grateful for to Khrushchev but this hasn't stopped them from prohibiting the mere mention of him through the press — a prohibition still in effect today. Personal sympathy with and approval of many aspects of Stalin's policies on the part of current leaders have favored but did not determine the planning and realization of the rebirth of the ex-dictator's cult.

What has been happening becomes much more intelligible when we examine the organization and the structure of power in the Soviet Union. Soviet society is a mono-organizational system[8], codified in a constitution that declares that the CPSU is "the force that directs and guides society." In concrete terms, this means that the party's bureaucratic apparatus, which has become one with state power, dominates society by organizing and directing the activity of individuals who operate under conditions of total atomization. The party apparatus is not in any way equal to the sum of individuals carrying

8. T. Rigby, "Stalinism and the Mono-Organizational Society," in R. Tucker (ed.), *Stalinism: Essays in Historical Interpretation* (New York, 1977), pp. 53-76.

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out various tasks at any given moment. The apparatus represents the totality of social roles, norms, relations and laws, including the laws of self-reproduction and self-preservation. In turn, the functioning principle of this apparatus — defined as democratic centralism, modified in the sense that the eligibility of directing organs, is substituted by cooptation — inevitably leads to domination by the highest, "personified" echelon" of the apparatus over the entire party apparatus.[9]

The birth of "the personality cult" — through the concentration of power in the hands of a restricted number of people who choose the Leader among themselves and confer upon him an *ad hoc* manufactured charisma — is the natural result of the single-party system and of ideological dictatorship in an industrialized society. The personal qualities and the good intentions of one leader or another do not change the situation. The Lenin cult, despite his personal opposition, was born and gained strength during the last years of his life, reaching its peak in the unprecedented decision to erect a mausoleum for preserving his embalmed remains. The history of the Stalin, Khrushchev and Brezhnev cults has demonstrated the mechanisms of cult birth as well as the extremely high probability, if not inevitability, of such developments. The absolute power of the apparatus finds its most adequate incarnation in the personal power of the Leader who acts in the name of the apparatus and executes its will.

The Champion of the New Class

From this viewpoint, Krushchev, who was elevated to power by the will of the apparatus but who, at a certain moment, "betrayed" its interests when he tried to limit its dimensions and power by introducing the principle of regularly rotating intermediate cadres, fully deserved his sentence, namely, to be forgotten. Relieved of his duties and reduced to the status of a non-person while he was still alive, he remains "untouchable" in death as well, in the Soviet press and literature. In effect, the restoration of the Stalinist cult was caused not so much by the desire of the apparatus to destroy all traces of the principal achievement of Khrushchev's life — the denunciation of Stalinist crimes — as by the vital necessity to reinforce its own hegemonic position, partially shaken in the Khrushchev era.

By demystifying Stalin, Khrushchev exploited cleverly the identification of the apparatus with the sum of individuals constituting it. Honestly or not, he equated Stalin's repression aimed against apparatus members with repression against the apparatus of the party itself; this presented him with the practical advantage of attributing the entire responsibility for these events to Stalin alone. In any case, anyone studying the situation, who might try like Khrushchev to maintain that Stalinist terror "broke the backbone of the party by eliminating it as the leading class,"[10] would inevitably end up psychologizing the historical process by ascribing to Stalin's will and character the main causes for social transformations occurring in the Soviet Union. In

9. C. Castadoris, "The French Left," *Telos* 34 (Winter 1977-78), p. 55.
10. R. Tucker, *Soviet Political Mind*, rev. ed. (New York, 1971), p. 135.

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truth, whatever Stalin's personal interest in wiping out this or that stratum of the apparatus, there is no doubt that he enormously strengthened the role of the party's centralized apparatus as a socially dominant force, one that could take legislative power, executive power and control functions into its own hands.

Stalin encouraged the reinforcement of all these fundamental structures of power which remained unchanged even after his death. Consequently, the apparatus never managed to renounce Stalin's authority and cult so that, today, it seems logical for official authors to define the critique of the personality cult as an "undue preponderance of ethico-moral problems over national and state problems."[11] In effect, every attack on the Stalinist cult, every attempt to reduce its role in the creation of the Soviet state carries with it a demand for society's democratization and a charge against the monopoly of the apparatus over the adoption and the enactment of decisions. If the attempt on the part of some social forces to escape the apparatus' control has been considered an extremely dangerous crime, the demolition of Stalin's cult can only lead to an increase in this type of "crimes." A Soviet criminologist said so in plain words: "The liquidation of the consequences of the Stalinist cult and the desecration of state authority has given rise among the young to a negative attitude toward all authority, has produced false opinions with respect to discipline and democratic institutions and has sanctioned demagogy; in the last analysis, this could only translate in forms of indifference and nihilism toward the state, in morally dubious actions and in open violations of legality."[12]

The desire to preserve society's organizational structures and the existing system of power distribution forces the apparatus into adopting stabilizing measures, including the restoration of the Stalinist cult. In explaining the conduct of the Soviet apparatus, it is hardly necessary to resort to sentimentalist arguments, such as the personal devotion of certain leaders to Stalin's memory, or to arguments of an ideological order. When faced with similar norms and limitations as his Soviet colleague, a Western bureaucrat would more or less act in the same manner.[13]

Anyhow, whatever the politics of Soviet leaders, it cannot be argued that they are determined by purely egoistic motives for self-preservation. In principle, relations between the party-state and society at large cannot be analyzed on the basis of interests and actions of one segment alone. It would be simplistic to explain the rebirth of the Stalinist cult only through the effective actions of an apparatus that imposes its will and wishes over the masses. We also need to examine how the Soviet people and, especially, the workers, react to this type of policy.

11. V. Calmaev, "Otbleski plameni," *Moskva* No. 2 (1978), p. 187.
12. *Preduprezdenie pravonarusenij sredi nesoversennoletnich* (Minsk, 1969), p. 12.
13. The failure of Yuri Bukharin's (Larin) efforts to obtain his father's rehabilitation, for example, cannot be attributed to the ideological positions of the present Soviet leaders. In the eyes of today's population, Bukharin is not so much an ideologist as Stalin's principal political adversary. His rehabilitation would be in clear contrast with the policy of restoring the Stalinist cult and was refused precisely for this reason.

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The Myth of the Good Czar

Like *The War* and *The Siege*, numerous other novels praising Generalissimo Stalin were also published in very large editions that were immediately exhausted. Cakovski's novel is available only on the black market at a much higher price than the original. To obtain these works from a lending library, one must be put on a waiting list for several months. Almost everywhere, the film *The Siege* has been breaking box office records. In this case, what Nadezda Mandelstam termed "a morbid interest in the personality of the Kremlin hermit"[14] is still alive in the Soviet Union. However, the fact that a very considerable number of Soviet workers would give a very positive opinion on Stalin's personality and record has been confirmed, not only from data on the enormous public success of pro-Stalinist literary and cinematographic works, but also from results of research conducted by some Soviet sociologists.

There is little doubt that the intense propaganda of the Stalinist cult, conducted through mass information media, has produced results. Still, it would be methodologically wrong to explain the political orientation of a social group by relying exclusively on the intensity of the ideological influence to which it is subjected. The ideological system operating on the political consciousness of a class or social group cannot be considered a product totally autonomous from the real experience of the group's activity. The roots of Stalin's vast popularity can be understood only by studying the concrete characteristics of the experiences, whether direct or historically acquired, of Soviet workers.

Thanks to official Soviet sources (Khrushchev's report to the XXth Congress and some publications of the early 1960s) together with Western radio broadcasts and, to a certain extent, the samizdat, knowledge of the Stalinist terror, however incomplete or distorted, is sufficiently widespread among the Soviet population. But this does not in any way change the fact that among part of the workers and peasants Stalin's image can still remain alive as that of a disciplined yet kind leader who aimed, even through cruel means, at the creation of an egalitarian and just society, even though his will may have often been distorted by his collaborators. It is not difficult to recognize in this attitude a residue of the faith in the "good czar" — the cornerstone of the traditional political culture of the Russian peasant. This is hardly surprising when one considers that, at the beginning of the 1930s, peasants constituted 80 percent of the population while those in *kolkhoz* were only 16.4 percent.[15] Therefore, a considerable part of the Soviet working class is made up by "first generation" workers. Still more important is the fact that this image of Stalin can be confirmed by the personal experiences of many representatives from this working stratum.

Research on the role played by mass terror in the industrialization process, in the struggle against unemployment and the growth in workers' social mobility remain among the most urgent objectives for students of Soviet society. It must

14. N. Mandel'stam, *The Times and the Wolves. Memoirs.* (Milan, 1971), p. 177.

15. V. Mejer, "Rost blagososotojanija sovetskogo naroda," *Ekonomika i organizacija proizvodstva* No. 5 (1977), p. 53.

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be noted that, in addition to millions of victims, the terror caused millions of "beneficiaries," i.e., individuals who derived advantages from it.[16] Thus, the annihilation of the kulaks as a class was carried out with the help of the peasants themselves who were to receive for collective use the possessions of the exiled kulaks. One of the principal economic and socio-psychological aspects of the terror was its levelling character, which greatly contributed to strengthening the legitimacy of the Stalinist regime.[17] It is true that the greatest weight of terror was borne by peasants and workers who were deprived of their freedom and used as a source for a slave-type labor force. Much more openly, however, the terror struck, sometimes the population's richer strata (well-to-do peasants in the early 1930s) and later the privileged strata (party functionaries in the mid 1930s). The terror augmented social mobility, struck down re-emergent class barriers and functioned as a socio-psychological mechanism by creating the sensation of a certain "negative" equality, or even of protection for individuals against the arbitrariness of local authority. At the end of the 1960s, when various enterprises began massive layoffs of superfluous workers in order to effect economic reform, the workers often had a taste of "justice" from Stalin's times when factory administration "lived in fear" — in this case, when the administration was able "to do as it pleased."

A reaction of this type should not be surprising. With the atomization of the working class and in the absence of a workers' democracy, of rights to association and strike, the existence of a strong central power justifiably seems like a guarantee of the workers' economic rights against the arbitrariness of local administration. Therefore, the support of the Stalinist cult by specific sectors of the working class, especially those less specialized, is determined not only by the romantic cult of power and greatness of the State, but also by the absolutely rational understanding of their own interests and of their own position within the existing power structure of society.

The Working Class and Chauvinism

The rebirth of the Stalinist cult among workers also is connected with certain structural modifications recently developing within society and, in particular, with the rapid increase in the number of so-called special regime, or "closed," enterprises. As I have already shown,[18] the Soviet regime has found in these enterprises an extremely effective means for combatting dissatisfaction among specialized workers. Closed enterprises dispel the danger of a workers' movement forming during the present phase when mass terror can no longer be used as a means. But in this way, the reinforcement of society's militaristic and chauvinistic tendencies becomes inevitable.

The mechanism is simple. When joining a special regime enterprise, the worker realizes that he is voluntarily renouncing his already scarce socio-political rights (including his right to quit the job). Even though the

16. S. Cohen, "Bolshevism and Stalinism," in R. Tucker (ed.), *Stalinism, op. cit.*, p. 28.
17. V. Zaslavsky, "The problem of Legitimation in Soviet Society," in A. Vidich and R. Glassman (editors), *Problems of Legitimation in the 20th Century* (Beverly Hills, 1979).
18. V. Zaslavsky, "Regime and Working Classes in the USSR," *Mondoperaio* No. 6 (1978).

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worker "exchanges" his rights for concrete material advantages, a step of this kind still requires some form of self-justification on his part. This is not hard to find. In fact, whatever they may produce, the real *raison d'être* of these special regime enterprises consists in their participation, real or fictitious, in secrets of capital importance to the state. Working at the firm, the worker fulfills his duty to defend his country from potential aggressors and receives supplementary compensation precisely equal to the "particular importance" of his work for the very existence of the Soviet Union. This situation, reminiscent of wartime, justifies limitations imposed on the worker's rights and induces him to accept them willingly. Moreover, it is fairly easy for the worker to identify with such convictions insofar as the memory of the anti-Nazi-fascist war, which cost innumerable lives, has been exploited by the mass media in order to continue feeding the sensation of danger in which the Soviet Union still finds itself.

This explains the phenomenon poignantly described by Hendrik Smith in a chapter — "The Second World War Was Only Yesterday" — in his *The Russians*.[19] In fact, even after 35 years, the war continues to be the *main* theme in Soviet literature, cinema and television. By this time, however, the concatenation of images on "war-victory-generalissimo Stalin" is inevitably taking form spontaneously. Ruthlessly distorting historical facts, pro-Stalinist literature depicts Stalin as the wise commander who, after preparing the country for war, led it to victory. It exploits the myth of national grandeur and the hero cult. The quintessence of such stereotypes reappears in the following verses, published back in 1968, where the author proposes to build some sort of an immense World War II museum: "Oh visitor, experience your dependence On the country, on everything Russian. There, in the middle, lies our Generalissimo, with all his great marshals."[20]

Thus, the objective position that workers of closed enterprises occupy within the structure of Soviet society, the character of their work, the subjective evaluation of their own possibilities and goals, all determine the workers' "predisposition" to accept willingly and to internalize the stereotypes of chauvinist propaganda.

The Cult among the Young

Stalin's popularity among workers of the younger generation requires particular attention. In the history of Soviet society we can single out two successive phases: the phase of the social revolution which ended at the close of the 1950s and the stationary phase whose beginning roughly coincides with Brezhnev's rise to power. Among many deep transformations taking place during this later phase, we only cite one here, i.e., that society *has lost view of its final objective*. In the ideology of the revolutionary period, this goal was identified with the construction of a classless communist society, while the tension generated by this goal was among the principal elements of massive popular consensus during Stalin's regime. In 1920, Lenin had already

19. H. Smith, *The Russians* (Milan, 1977), pp. 415-46.
20. *Molodaja gvardija* No. 12 (1968), p. 212.

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envisoned the possibility of constructing communism within 20 years.[21] After him, Stalin pledged the advent of communism as soon as the Soviet economy was capable of producing specific quantities of steel and oil. In the Stalinist period, faith in a happier future was as typical of an average person's outlook as fear is today. The sense of continuous movement, of development and of rapid transformations during the period of the social revolution made such predictions appear realistic.

The promise contained in the party's ambitious 1961 program, adopted under Khrushchev and still operating today — to build communism by 1980 — was nothing but a clumsy attempt to resurrect the romantic spirit of the revolutionary phase at a moment when, having reached relative maturity, society had already entered a stagnant phase in its existence. The adoption of so concrete a program contributed significantly to discrediting the idea of communism as a practically realizable objective.

A. Levitin-Krasnov has brought into sharp relief the mood of Soviet youths by describing it as a "profound disillusionment toward the communist ideals whose faith had kept alive the three preceding generations. The young do not struggle against communism, do not discuss or curse it; something much worse has happened to communism: they laugh at it."[22] In the eyes of young workers who started working in the 1960s the future of the country takes the shape of a monotonous chain of five-year plans: the eighth and ninth have already passed while the tenth is about to conclude without effecting substantial transformations in living conditions. the loss of the final objective becomes all the more striking at the level of individual consumption which is unable to compensate even partially for it by transforming Soviet citizens into satisfied consumers.

Under these circumstances, many youths long for a life with some meaning, some goal. But in a society greatly lacking positive programs, where individual creativity is repressed by the regime, the young look back with nostalgia to the end of the social revolution inseparably linked with Stalin's name. The tragic paradox of Soviet society lies in the fact that Stalinism — however one defines it as a social phenomenon — has coincided historically with the period of social revolution. The romantic idealization of this period, reinforced by the memory of real possibilities for rapid social mobility for workers at the time, provides fertile ground for cultivating the rebirth of the Stalinist cult among today's young workers.

The Dependence of Intellectuals

The problem of the intelligentsia's position with respect to the rebirth of the Stalinist myth also must be analyzed. It is widely known that in the second half of the 1960s part of the intelligentsia constituted a decisive opposition, individually as well as a group, against all attempts to rehabilitate Stalin. At times, the action taken by specialists caused the repeal or the modification of

21. V. Lenin, *Socinenija*, izd. 5-e, t. 41, p. 318.

22. A. Levitin-Krasnov, "Pis'ma o russloj, molodezi," in V. Belocerkovski (ed.), *SSSR. Demokraticeskie al'ternativy* (Achberg, 1976), p. 235.

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measures already approved by the Central Committee — an extraordinary fact, never to recur after the initial years of Soviet rule. For example, the 90th anniversary of Stalin's birthday was not celebrated, the order to publish reports of it in newspapers was revoked and the provision designating Stalin's theoretical works as university level subject matter was abrogated.[23] Symbolic of that period was an article for the 15th anniversary of Stalin's death written by Lydia Cukovskaya and distributed in the *samizdat*. It demanded public condemnation of informers, assassins and provocators of the Stalinist period for, as she contended, the "complicity of silence" had come to an end.[24]

Today, when Stalin's reputation has reached dimensions unimaginable at the end of the 1960s the opposition has been considerably weakened. What has happened in these ten years to the class of Soviet specialists, many of whom by the very nature of their own function, cannot help but oppose Stalinism insofar as it is a system that totally represses freedom and individual initiative? The most serious change of recent years consists in the *overproduction of special scientists* who, at the beginning of the 1960s, were 10 percent of the entire Soviet population while today they are almost 20 percent, far above the number of peasants. According to calculations by sociologists, by 1990 special scientists could reach from 30 percent to 35 percent.[25]

Within Soviet society, therefore, specialized scientists are the fastest growing group; this leads inevitably to the devaluation of diplomas and an increase in competitiveness made harsher by the unbalanced territorial distribution of specialists, itself a consequence of the domestic passports system operating in the country. Situations of this kind generally slacken the radicalism of the new middle class, which gradually finds itself highly dependent in relation to the leading class.[26] In the Soviet Union, where the state is the only supplier of labor, it can deprive the possibility of professional work to anyone who proves himself politically disloyal when faced with an overproduction of special scientists. In recent years there have been numerous well known instances of internationally known scientists stripped of their jobs, their titles and their academic appointments.

However, overproduction of specialized scientists and increased competition for adequate jobs have another consequence. A significant number of scientists display a tendency to accept the new Stalinsit cult because of their sympathy with the anti-Semitism that Stalin made state policy in the late 1930s. As M. Agurski has observed, "in the eyes of most people, Stalin is the one who fought for the national Russian cause, against all alien influence."[27] Pragmatic anti-Semitism, as a means for slowing down competitors, has become one of the distinctive traits of Soviet special scientists of the 1970s. Under Stalin, employment within the party apparatus, the Armed Forces, state

23. *Politiceskij dnevnik* tt. 1-2 (Amsterdam, 1972), 1975.
24. L. Cukovskaya, *Otkrytoe solvo* (New York, 1976), pp. 39-46.
25. M. Rutkevic and F. Filipov (editors), *Socialnaja struktura razvitogo socialsticeskogo obscestva v SSSR* (Moscow, 1976).
26. A. Oberschall, *Social Conflict and Social movements* (Englewood Cliffs, 1973), pp. 165-70.
27. M. Agurski, "Dvulikij Stalin," *Vremja i my* No. 18 (1977).

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administration, the diplomatic service, foreign trade and various other sectors, was totally closed to the Jews. This caused overconcentration in other available sectors, particularly in the theoretical sciences, teaching, culture, planning and at medium-level management of some industrial sectors, which consequently became a prliminent and convenient target.

In today's USSR, it has become very hard to distinguish where the official anti-Semitism ends and where the pragmatic anti-Semitism of a scientist fighting his rival begins. It is not surprising, therefore, that as these strata of scientists find expression through their own "organic ideologists," the latter should rapidly rise to careers within the country's highest ideological institutions. This is exactly how V. Misin, a philosophy instructor in a provincial city, became one of the highest directors at the Philosophy Institute of the Academy of Sciences; he published a book justifying on a theoretical level the necessity for introducing severe cutbacks on the percentage of Jews working in science, technology, education and cultural sectors. Similarly, P. Palievski, founder of "The Fatherland," a cultural circle open only to individuals of "pure Russian origin" and one that defined Osip Mandelstam's poetry "a Jewish excrescence on the pure body of Russian poetry,"[28] has recently become one of the directors of the Institute for World Literature.

Submission and Repression

There is little doubt, however, that a significant number of scientists still follow the internationalist, democratic traditions of the old Russian intelligentsia and continue to feel historically responsible for what happens in the country. In their case, neither spontaneous, pragmatic anti-semitism nor its offical support are in any way involved. And, the exaltation of a tyrant who, beyond the destruction of liberties and democratic ideals, is also responsible for so many massacres can only fill them with moral indignation and resistance.

Nonetheless, in the middle of the 1970s, among these intellectuals dissatisfaction and protest go hand in hand with social passivity and political conformism. Clearly, age and health conditions do not permit the few surviving intellectuals of the older generation the intensive social activism of the past. It is not difficult to imagine the sentiments stirred by the current pro-Stalinist campaign; we cite here the famous internationalist journalist Ernest Henri who dealt the first blow at the most vulnerable point of the myth of Stalin-the-Brilliant-commander: in a famous 1965 letter to Ilya Ehrenburg distributed throughout the country in millions of copies, Henri demonstrated the dictator's responsibility for the defeat of the German workers' movement, for the destruction of the Soviet leadership, the USSR's failure to prepare for war and the colossal war losses. The sense of futility and hopelessness among the old generation and, quite simply, the human weariness are easily understandable. But the fact that the social activism of the intermediate and younger generations of Soviet intellectuals has been so weakened since the middle 1970s, has gradually stirred thoughts of a return to "the complicity of

28. N. Mandel'stam, *Vtoraja kniga* (Paris, 1972), p. 656.

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silence." In order to grasp how and why this incongruence between the emotions and the mass behavior of a social group arises and becomes consolidated, we need to evaluate realistically the present and future possibilities of the regime to limit and repress the political activity of the population. In this connection, it must be noted that the position of Brezhnev's regime today on intellectual opposition has grown increasingly harder. The overproduction of specialized scientists which generates a form of hidden unemployment provides the leading group with an effective means for reducing dissenters to silence.

In the 1970s, however, newer and more effective means have become available. The first among these, well known in the West, is the voluntary and-or forcible emigration of many active intellectual critics who were catalysts in the democratization movement and the anti-Stalinist struggle. The fate of the famous Soviet historian A. Nekrik, whose essay "June 22, 1941" was banned from all USSR libraries and who lost his job and was practically expelled from the party, is one of the most telling examples. It is no accident that, in an article by the Soviet writer L. Kopelev, the current "cultural landscape" of Soviet society has been compared to a moonscape strewn with sterile, cavernous craters or gaps left behind by the flight of emigrants.[29]

The second means for exerting pressure on the intellectual opposition has almost gone unnoticed in the West. Since 1976, according to a new regulation any specialized scientist under 50 years of age can be recalled to serve as a reserve officer for a period of up to two years. In practice, this amounts to a form of exile since, following a few days of preparations, these people are usually sent to some remote spot in Siberia where they'll spend two years under rigid military discipline, isolated from family, friends, work and hometown. This is a very effective tool because arbitrariness is couched in the absolute "legality" of military authority actions and eludes negative reactions from Western public opinion which becomes mobilized only when a dissident is brought to trial.

Finally, we must emphasize the psychological climate of Soviet society in the middle 1970s as marked by the gerontocratic character of its leadership. In the last six or seven years, not one month has gone by without the habitual Western press release on the "serious illness" of one or another Soviet leader. In fact, the average age of Politbureau members today hovers around 70 years. The last two Politbureau candidates were 67 and 77, which is even more absurd for a country where retirement is generally obligatory between the ages of 55 and 60. Faced with this state of affairs, Soviet intellectuals must consider these two problems. First, it is clear that the present leadership can only initiate policies for maintaining the status quo through any available means. Secondly, in all probability, a change of guard within the leadership cannot occur in stages but, instead, all at once. Under the circumstances, the belief in the futility of immediate opposition has gained ground among intellectuals for it would be

29. L. Kopelev, "O novoj russkoh emigracii," *Samosoznan Sbornik statej* (New York, 1976), pp. 60-61.

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very dangerous and promises few possibilities for success; hence, the necessity of wait-and-see tactics. In this context, the pro-Stalinist campaign is commonly attributed to the "hard" wing of the leadership and is equated somewhat with the actions of the Chinese "gang of four" faction in the wake of Mao's death.

It is hard to say to what extent hopes for a sudden change in the present leadership might be justified. The history of countries with one-party systems provides examples of extremely stable and durable leadership groups. Theoretically, nothing could prevent Brezhnev from reaching Tito's age, for example, while still holding his position. In any case, we can state that the rebirth of the Stalinist cult must not be attributed only to the actions of a single group or even to the party bureaucracy as a whole to maintain their monopoly on power. The origins of re-Stalinization must be located in the peculiar structure of Soviet society, in the social psychology of groups comprising it and in the particular historical moment that forges temporary coalitions among groups of diverse interests to support or, at least, not to obstruct specific policies. The present historical moment can be defined as the moment of "accepted atomization." While the leading group tries to consolidate and intensify the atomization of society, other social groups, unable to see different prospects or the possibilities for opposition, accept this atomization in exchange for a few real or even illusory privileges. The rebirth of the Stalinist cult is a logical aftermath of Soviet social evolution in the Brezhnev era.



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KADARISM AS THE MODEL STATE OF KRUSHCHEVISM

by Ferenc Feher

Is there such a thing as "Kadarism"? Is Kadar's regime in Hungary different from that of Ulbricht, Honecker, Zhivkoff, Georghiu-Dej, Ceausescu, Gomulka, Gierek, Novotny, Husak or Hoxha? Or is "Kadarism" nothing but a journalistic catchword?

Two problems encumber any attempt to answer these questions. The first is that it is *strictly forbidden* in all Eastern European countries to identify *any* regime with its actual leaders.[1] In Kadar's case, the failure to designate the regime by his name is not primarily a matter of "modesty," but rather of shrewd calculation. To give his name to the system would be to admit a deviation toward "national communism" and would bring the regime into conflict with Russia. The second difficulty has to do with defining one "ism" through another, in this case defining "Kadarism" through "Krushchevism."

Thus, a preliminary definition of "Krushchevism" is required. "Krushchevism", in fact, could not be realized in any social unit of wider dimensions — least of all in Russia. Krushchev had neither the power nor the intention of calling into question tradition and orthodox ideology. Hence, there was only a "genuine Leninism" and a call for the "return to Leninist norms" while "Krushchevism" could not be officially recognized.[2] "Krushchevism" conformed with "Leninism" on (1) the sacrosanct one-party system and dictatorship as the system of social regulation; (2) exclusive ownership of an over-centralized and bureaucratized state as the regulative *locus* of economic transactions; and (3) Russian hegemony over all other national aspirations as well as in the interests of other Communist, socialist or radical movements. As in Lenin's or Stalin's time, Russia was identified with the "general interest of socialism."

Within this Leninist framework, "Krushchevism" did have its own distinct features. Krushchev abolished the Gulag. Although today this deed no longer inspires socialists as it did previously, it was more than a general amnesty. It meant an open acknowledgement that the political dictatorship installed by Lenin ended, under Stalin's byzantine tyranny, in an unbearable system with dangerously explosive elements. Krushchev's efforts to demolish

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1. Not even the omnipotent Stalin dared to *openly* establish a cult designated by his name. A great deal of confidential "party gossip" circulated concerning Stalinism as the new doctrine of communism, but with the tyrant's death it remained largely what it had always been, i.e., gossip.

2. Krushchev's regime could not, of course, initiate a "return to Lenin." Lenin's five-year rule was a victorious Jacobin dictatorship, an *administration by a revolutionary elite in an emergency situation*. It was a dictatorship with no intention of extending its control over all social life. Even if less and less so, it tolerated *dissenting opinions within* the ruling elite. Krushchev inherited from Stalin an industrial state based on a "dictatorship over needs" and the Soviet Union as a world power could not return to Leninism, but had to generate its own strategy and policies. Cf. my "The Dictatorship over Needs," in *Telos* 35 (Spring 1978), pp. 31-42.

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"the cult of personality" and to create an "industrial" and an "agricultural" party were both incomplete attempts to establish a viable equilibrium between the principle of dictatorship and the unbearable social tension arising from mass terror.

Economically, Krushchevism amounted to an attempt to rationalize the system.[3] First, Krushchev's rationalism emphasized the production of consumer goods, even though the "theoretical priority" of the sector producing the means of production remained an iron "law" of "socialist construction" which has never openly been questioned although it is merely the embellished ideology of forced Russian industrialization. This shift in economic emphasis was not due to inferior planning nor fiscal maneuvering. It was an acknowledgement of the private person *as a consumer*.[4] Secondly, Krushchev freed the natural sciences from ideological jurisdiction. This "emancipation" was not only in the interest of the ruling bureaucracy, but also furthered the goals of the technical intelligentsia. In a broader sense, it promoted what could be called a "second Russian Enlightenment" through the gradual rehabilitation of critical thought which had been severely crippled by decades of the quasi-religious cult of state doctrine. Finally, the new economic rationalism rejected the Stalinist notion of two world markets and facilitated a rapprochement with the West — a move which had both economically and culturally positive effects.[5]

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3. During this century there have been two similar, but entirely irrational systems, i.e., those of Hitler and Stalin. Economically, Nazism was based on a system of world wars and the direct usurpation of other nations' natural wealth. This not only threatened the Nordic race with possible extermination, but also led to economic shortcuts which tended to deprive the "superior race" of the material privileges for which it waged its wars. Although it is a recurring dream of many ultra-conservative tycoons, the introduction of a *system of serfdom* into industrial capitalism is an impracticable economic policy. The regime was so rigid that even in *military matters* it often opted for purely ideological decisions. In the classic example, trains deporting Jews to concentration camps were given priority in a situation in which the army critically needed all available modes of transportation. In a sense, Stalin's regime was also based on warfare, with its internal campaigns against various groups and national Russian minorities. These regularly recurring wars of extermination can only be attributed to a "rationality" based on collective terror and popular subjugation. It is precisely for this reason that the thesis concerning the "constant intensification of class struggle" was so crucial for Stalin. The abolition of this thesis during the 20th Congress was the precondition of Krushchev's political existence. Class struggle in the Stalinist sense was an internally directed *ideology of war* which, when used against prisoners of German concentration camps after 1945, against Ukrainians and Jews, lost all semblance of a "revolutionary rationality." The question of economic rationality during Stalin's decades cannot be discussed here. For an excellent discussion of these issues, see Alvin W. Gouldner, "Stalinism: A Study of Internal Colonialism," in *Telos* 34 (Winter 1977-78), pp. 5-48. Regardless of whether or not Stalin invented the centralized Russian economy, his wars of extermination were in no way indispensable to maintaining such an over-centralized economy. Furthermore, the well-known Russian agricultural catastrophe attests to the system's "rationality." Finally, in terms of its own efficiency, Stalin's regime dangerously resembled that of Hitler's. Essentially, Krushchev put an end to a basically fascist system and sought a return to rationalism.

4. Of course, the Western New Left ridiculed Krushchev for his consumerism. However, for 200 million Russians, this policy change substantially improved their daily lives.

5. Another feature of "Krushchevism" worth mentioning is the contradictory development culminating in the policy of "peaceful coexistence." It was contradictory in that it ended the tragic Cold War period and simultaneously introduced, by virtue of Krushchev's dealings with

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Kadarism is Krushchevism, with the difference that Hungary is not a superpower. That Hungary is not a "superpower", however, is crucial to its viability as the model state of Krushchevism, and it is *Kadarism* in that the existence of Kadar's regime is contingent on the physical presence of its leader. This is true of all modern societies in which civil society is subordinate to the state, whether in the form of open dictatorship or in very conservative, authoritarian systems. What made 'Kadarism" possible? It resulted from a *social experiment* characterized by its *deliberate Krushchevism* and *lack of confidence in its viability*. No one would have predicted in 1957 that Kadar's would become the third oldest regime in Eastern Europe (after Tito's and Hoxha's) and that it would survive 22 years of crises and upheavals.

Kadar's leadership group emerged from a generation of communist militants for whom sacrosanct orthodox theory was often subordinate to the requirements of emergency situations, and many of its political solutions were discovered by chance. Recruitment for the Kadarist faction in 1955-56 was slow because, unlike Imre Nagy's group, its participants tried to avoid factionalism at all costs. The Kadarists recruited only from those "reformers" who sought *continuity* with the past, in spite of the fact that many of them were victims of show-trials during the Rakosi period. "Continuity" meant loyalty to Russia as the leading power within the "socialist bloc" and within the communist movement, and it implied the primacy of party prerogatives over all of social life. The Kadarists clearly understood that what was fomenting in Hungarian society was not the result of isolated mistakes of irresponsible or cruel leaders. Rather, they saw the need for restructuring the political system in order to secure its survival.

The experiment succeeded because the regime was completely annihilated — if only for 10 or 12 days. In 1956, Russian military intervention only *formally* restored the original state of affairs. In reality, the Kadarist leadership was for the first time compelled to engage in social engineering and experimentation. Within the ruling bureaucracy, many party members remained loyal to Nagy or hesitated in joining the new leadership. Another faction hesitated or even resisted Krushchev's "de-Stalinization" and retained a "Rakosist" position. As a result, not only the top party leadership, but also the party apparatus so crucial to the regime, was forced to follow Krushchev. The political survival of the entire regime hinged on the validity of the 20th Congress line and on Krushchev's authority as First Secretary. Not only was the Kadar regime inextricably bound to Krushchev, but Krushchev's own political fate depended largely on the outcome of the Hungarian events. Weak leadership unable to control events or forced to resort to Stalinist terrorist tactics to restore order would have meant the immediate removal of the First Secretary whose authority was already considerably weakened in the eyes of the party apparatus. Thus, by a

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Kennedy, arbitration by the two superpowers over all world affairs. This, in turn, fueled latent Sino-Soviet tensions to open hostility, and provoked violent criticisms by various radicals.

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process of elimination a choice was made[6] and a solid principled alliance gradually developed between Krushchev and Kadar. As a result, during its crucial formative years, Krushchev supported the Kadarist experiment under unexperienced and politically weak leadership.

The development of a "model Krushchevism" in Hungary was facilitated by the country's small size; a climate conducive to agricultural production; a small population[7]; a uniform language, and a total lack of raw materials essential to industrial development. All of this contributed to halting forced industrialization. Krushchev could support the Hungarian experiment only because it was limited by "natural" factors.[8]

Furthermore, Hungarian Krushchevism succeeded because of the country's military weakness and its insignificant role in Russian foreign policy. The fact that there was no Hungarian army presented a reduced risk of rebellion. Because many of those executed after 1956 were rebellious soldiers and army officers, the Russian leadership could not rely on the Hungarian military as an armed ally. When consolidation later proved successful and the military was disciplined, the Hungarian leadership resisted the all-too-energetic development of the military and armament industry threatening revolution. With this reduction of military expenditures, the foundations for the Hungarian Krushchevite experiment were laid.[9]

The most fundamental factor was, however, the following: Kadarism could be Krushchevism because *there was no other Krushchevite* country. This is true in a double sense. The Hungarian party's ambivalence toward Russia, Hungary's greater proximity and stronger ties to the West and its consequent "chauvinism" toward the "uncivilized, barbarian" Russians — these facts and others attest to a liberalism connected with Krushchev's legacy. This explains the Hungarian resentment toward surveillance and active intervention by the Russian Politbureau in crucial political affairs. Conversely, however, Hungarian loyalty to Russia is not simulated. It arises from the realization that "liberal," Krushchevite" Hungary owes its existence to other non-liberal countries. It is therefore crucial that the Hungarian population constantly bear in mind the

6. We know now from the memoirs of Michunovits, the former Yugoslav ambassador to Moscow, that during crucial negotiations in early November in Brioni the Russian leaders were uncertain whether to choose Ferenc Münnich, a "founding father" of the Hungarian Communist Party and a cynic who would not have been interested in any social experiment, or Kadar. The resistance of Yugoslav leaders who were unfamiliar with both, but trusted Münnich less, tipped the balance in favor of Kadar.

7. With its 10 million people, Hungary is the smallest of the COMECON countries in Eastern Europe.

8. Thus, with the limited means at its disposal, the Russian leadership could not aid Poland as successfully because Poland, with its 30 million inhabitants, presented an entirely different constellation of natural and social conditions (poorly developed agriculture, large population, etc.).

9. Additional factors contributing to the experiment's success include the absence of national minorities. "Krushchevite" Hungary never knew these minority problems (as did Rumania, for example, with its Hungarian and German minorities) and could therefore embark on an unprecedented experiment. The *national problem* as such, however, does generate a social tension evidenced by the subtle, nonvocal resistance of the Hungarian population against Russian domination during national festivals and historical anniversaries.

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presence of this simultaneously reassuring and threatening environment. Consequently, the need to maintain this awareness essentially defines the role of Hungary's ideological apparatus. The Kadar regime's existence relies heavily on the active and effective usage of propaganda to "remind" the Hungarian population of its isolated, unique status within the eastern bloc. In Hungary it is primarily, though not exclusively, the intelligentsia which must constantly be warned of the danger lurking outside.

What is the structure of Kadarism? Among other things, the regime is predicated on a genuinely Machiavellian conception. This does not mean that its leaders are ruthless, immoral or unprincipled, but rather that the Kadarist leaders have independently rediscovered and implemented certain fundamental principles of Machiavellian government. They revived the maxim: "For it must be noted that men must either be caressed or else annihilated; they will revenge themselves for small injuries, but cannot do so for great ones; the injury therefore that we do to a man must be such that we need not fear his vengeance," as well as the following: "[Cruelties] well committed may be called those . . . which are perpetuated once for the need of securing one's self, and which afterwards are not persisted in, but are exchanged for measures as useful to the subjects as possible. Cruelties ill committed are those which, although at first few, increase rather than diminish with time. . . . Whence it is to be noted that in taking a state the conqueror must arrange to commit all his cruelties at once, so as not to have to recur to them every day."[10] It is as if Machiavelli foreshadows the difference between Stalinist and Kadarist systems. Stalin's "ill committed cruelties" did escalate to the point where the system's henchmen were themselves endangered. By contrast, the Kadarist reprisals[11] could be followed miraculously by the superficial tranquility of the mid-sixties only because of the system's truly Machiavellian features. The Kadarist organs of repression confirmed the first Machiavellian thesis when, by escalating terror and intimidation in 1957-58, no one dared resist — not even in the form of a confession of belief in the defeated revolution. The answer to the question "resistance or repentance?" could mean either life or death during trials. However, despite opposition by police organs, the political leadership sought to diminish the number of "well committed cruelties." The initial granting of partial and personal amnesty from 1960 onward was followed by the unexpected and sensational declaration of general amnesty in 1962, six years after a revolution was suppressed through unusually cruel measures. By comparison to other European regimes — for example Spain under Franco who never granted general amnesty, or Greece, which proclaimed partial am-

10. Nicolò Machiavelli, *The Prince* (New York, 1950), p. 9 and p. 34.

11. The three-year reprisals led to at least 2,000 to 3,000 executions, the imprisonment of tens of thousands and the internment of ten times as many as the above combined. In numerical terms, the reprisals were second only to events in the wake of Greek Civil War in post-war Europe. The data cited in the *White Book* on counterrevolution published by the Hungarian government obviously falsifies the number of victims executed by classifying them in other categories. In calculating orders of magnitude, I rely on personal testimonies and recollections.

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nesty only 20 years after the civil war, — the Kadar regime is to be praised for this stroke of Machiavellian brilliance. Its success can be measured by the level of mass intimidation experienced and accepted by the people. The Hungarian population has become aware of the regime's capabilities and has learned that reasonable arrangements with it presuppose explicit obedience. The Kadarist system is one based on effective, i.e., *rational*, and ongoing repression.

Rational repression as the basis of Kadarism has superficially changed the character of the Hungarian police state. Unmistakable efforts by the Hungarian leadership to reduce overt police repression are indicative of a post-20th Congress development common to most Eastern European countries: "show trials" with victims prepared to testify against themselves are now relics of the past. "Socialist legality" has changed the character of Hungarian police repression and police officials may not exercise physical force against "political criminals." Furthermore, the regime takes almost excessive precaution to ensure its own safety; a strictly supervised resolution of the Kadarist Central Committe prohibits interrogation of *anyone* by police officials regarding any member of the Central Committee without prior consent of that body. According to official reports by the Minister of the Interior, cases of "anti-state" agitation constitute only a small percentage of convictions and, in this regard, Hungary is at an advantage *vis à vis* the rest of Eastern Europe.

This, however, merely documents the rationality characterizing repression in Kadar's Machiavellian-Krushchevite police state. The regime still adheres to the principle that the party's political objectives define legaliy and not vice versa. There is not even a semblance of independent court jursidiction: courts are mere executive party organs and political punishments are decided retroactively by political bodies as for example in the case of Imre Nagy and his colleagues. Another example of politically motivated legislation occurred in 1972, when Kadar gave in to pressures from the so-called "workers' opposition" against the liberalism caused by economic reform. Among the main targets of the resumed large-scale police activities were some "unorthodox" leaders of collective farms who compromised certain regulations in order to make the farms profitable. Although many politically important economic advances in agriculture could not have been made without these leaders and their activities (which were not only known by political authorities, but even retroactively legalized), the policy change turned a former virtue into a crime. That the legal system is entirely manipulated by political decisions manifests itself in the various legal prerogatives of the police. These prohibit parallel investigations by defense lawyers and criminalize not just public criticism of police activities, but all "unauthorized discussion of such activities." So-called "police supervision" means in practice that the police may indefinitely detain a person on the grounds of certain "suspicions." The Kadar regime itself unequivocally states that "normal" police activity and the party's leading role go hand in hand: police persecution is part of the regime's normal functioning.

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Kadar's Machiavellianism was not altogether premeditated. The regime came to power by a *coup d'etat* against a whole nation and suffered a doubly bad conscience for it. It felt remorse toward the population, the majority of which enthusiastically declared its allegiance to the revolution, and towards Russia for "vacillating" with regard to principles such as belonging to the Warsaw Pact, a cornerstone of loyalty. Initially, the Kadarists believed in a possible reconciliation between the popular will and political restoration "guided" by the Russian army. It seemed that the Kadarists merely intended to punish organizers of pogroms and certain advocates of a capitalist restoration. There were lengthy negotiations with the Imre Nagy group concerning a possible coalition of that group with the Kadar government. When Russian leadership "corrected" these ideas,[12] however, the Kadarists realized that reconciliation with both the captive Imre Nagy group and other active organizations was impossible. It was then that the Kadarists embarked on a Machiavellian path which became increasingly appropriate for the Hungarian situation.[13]

Kadar's economics can only be understood in terms of the Russian revolutionary model. The regime derives its strategy from the exigencies of the political superstructure. Thus, post-revolutionary Hungary experienced the termination of so-called *extensive* economic development and the transition to intensive development.[14]

The economic policy of the Kadarists was not clearly defined from the beginning, but was elaborated *en route*. Nevertheless, one principle underlies all economic policy, i.e., that economic strategy must enable the political system to operate without major disturbances and obvious dysfunctions. During Stalinism and under the leadership of Matyas Rakosi, Hungary was the classic example of forced industrialization: a small country robbed by two peace treaties (1918 and 1946-47) of almost all its natural resources and compelled to develop heavy industry (e.g., steel production without coal and

12. A few days before the abolition of the Budapest Workers' Council (the center of resistance against the "workers' state"), Malenkov secretly visited Budapest. One does not need mystical powers to surmise the topic of discussion between him and the all too hesitant Hungarian leadership.

13. Kadarist Machiavellianism is efficient compared to Gustav Husak's cynical and amatuerish administration which alternates between intimidation and reconciliation. Husak, intellectually a far better-prepared candidate for First Secretary and a man of exceptional courage (he was one of the very few who survived the torture cells of Czech Stalinism without a false confession), failed entirely in his Kadarist assignment. The very fact that he could not make his separate peace with the most vulnerable and corruptible stratum, i.e., the oppisitional intelligentsia, documents his failure, despite the employment of certain crude "Kadarist" techniques.

14. By "extensive industrial development" I follow the well-known Hungarian economist, F. Janossy. It is roughly the period which Prebrazhensky described as "primitive socialist accumulation" characterized by heavy investment in industry (primarily that sector producing the means of production) and the forced relocation of the peasant population into centers of industrialization. There are natural limits to that expansion, as Rosa Luxemburg suggested, with regard to the limits to capital accumulation (lack of available peasant manpower, the danger of a total collapse of agriculture). The intensive phase begins when industrial growth is realizable only through rationalization and the introduction of new technology.

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iron). As a result, a population stripped of its national resources came to despise Sztalivaros, the "Hungarian Stalingrad," as the symbol of the tragic failure of a misconceived socio-economic strategy and of the system as a whole. The inviolable "law" of Kadarist economic strategy advocated a gradual and continuous growth of both *per capita* production and real income, while avoiding social "complications" at all costs. In this regard, Kadar has even outdone Krushchev, the born improvisor. Of course, Kadar's economic policy runs into problems in the short run, and becomes most vulnerable in long-term planning. The most striking example of problems with long-term planning is the housing policy. Since post-war Hungary required heavy investments whose amortization was very slow, the Kadarist economic strategy sought to minimize budgetary allowances for "indirect amenities." An alleged plan to increase rents in order to finance housing maintenance so badly needed in Hungary's industrial centers was vetoed by Kadar for fear of a possible workers' revolt similar to that of 1956. By thus sparing the monthly budgets of workers from further expenses, Kadar displayed a sharp political sense. Yet, certain issues cannot be tabled *ad infinitum*, for indefinite postponement generates considerable tensions and the possibility that problems may no longer be solved at all later.

Two political objectives of post-revolutionary Hungarian economic policy should be emphasized here: to increase the population's net income, and to acknowledge the need for certain fashionable consumer goods, such as cars. The first goal is directed at the gradual abolition of certain "protectionist" features of the state common to many Eastern European countries.[15] It is politically impossible to carry out such a project, although a limited development in this direction would encourage the development of a new political subject capable of accepting the political primacy of the state while simultaneously waging economic warfare against it by taking advantage of remaining loopholes. If the political leadership acknowledges annual increases in net income as an economic law, then it must tolerate, if not legitimate, "moonlighting" or what Hegedüs and Markus have labelled "the second economy." The second economic goal forces the state not only to tolerate consumers, but also to support them. This Kadarist policy cannot be implemented without relapses. Thus, during periods of growing neo-Stalinist "reaction," the party press and the leader himself must launch into vehement invectives against "immoderate consumerism."[16]

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15. For a discussion of the protectionist character of Eastern European states, see my "The Dictatorship over Needs," *op. cit.* The "comfort of unfreedom" within these societies discourages people from acting independently and forces individuals into total dependence on the omnipotent totalitarian state.

16. The liberal Kadarist policy of consumerism has often been criticized by the European and American Left as a "return to capitalism." Such criticism is not only highly ironic (considering the long-term scarcity experienced by the Hungarian economy) and inherently romantic for its insistence on an untenable, orthodox Marxist vision of eliminating markets, but most importantly it misses one significant point. The options for wage-workers in Eastern European countries are not either domination over production or consumerism. Rather, the consumerist permissiveness serves as a compensation for the total exclusion of the population

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Another factor contributing to the success of Kadarism was its agricultural reform policies.[17] When the Hungarian peasantry seemed to have won the revolution immediately after 1956, the Kadar government, in order not to have to forcibly "pacify" each village separately, nullified a series of Rakosi's decrees. "Natural taxation", essentially a form of legalized extortion of the total annual agricultural and livestock production which consequently caused mass starvation in both urban and rural Hungary, was revoked. During 1958, completing socialist collectivization was of primary concern both internationally and domestically. Two alternatives were discussed in the Hungarian Central Commttee: either collectivization commensurate with the state's economic capacity and credit supply, or collectivization by force. In a typically Kadarist manner, the question was resolved through compromise. Hence, the agricultural reforms reflected the primacy of political imperatives and were implemented with measured, but effective, doses of physical violence and intimidation. The Kadarist mode of repression was thoroughly rational: in order to "popularize" the collectivization program, Kadarists corrupted well-known and expert peasants in order to thus indirectly reach the rural masses. Instead of exploiting the then-collectivized peasantry, Hungary's political leadership understood that a reconciliation with the peasantry and a recognition of its needs and aspirations would be indispensable to the system's preservation. This crucial reconciliation in 1961 made significant concessions to the peasantry, particularly with regard to creating a private sphere of autonomy within the "household economic unit." With the "official" acknowledgement of the domestic domain, the individual becomes exempt from certain "collective" duties so that he could allocate time and energy to attend to household responsibilities. Hungary has not experienced food supply shortages, as have most other Eastern European countries since the early sixties. This can be directly attributed to the recognition of a private "economic" sphere within the collective framework. Furthermore, Kadarism encouraged a program of private enrichment among the peasantry. Some prosperous agricultural cooperatives had small industrial enterprises, both as sources of added income and as repositories of otherwise unavailable repair services, while others launched into commercial activities.

As a result of this ingenious policy, the Hungarian peasantry now possesses certain inviolable social privileges. The previously mentioned workers' opposition to economic and ideological liberalization in 1972-73 exploited the collective envy of the urban population toward the privileged peasantry. The agricultural population responded with a modified strike: production of some goods was halted, thus creating a shortage for the first time in a decade. For fear of a revival of 1956 events, the regime intervened and revoked its new

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from public political participation, their poverty and subjugation.

17. The following is based on the account presented by Ferenc Donath's *Reform es forradalom* (Budapest, 1977), pp. 160-170. Once a prime defendant in a show trial during the fifties, Donath survived to become Secretary of State under Imre Nagy's second government, only to be indicted and to survive again. A leading Communist party expert in agricultural questions and an oppositional politician, Donath is the best possible source in this area.

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measures, thereby restoring to the peasantry its previous social and economic standing.[18] With this restoration, the peasantry was once again pacified.

An entire constellation of typically Hungarian economic factors led to economic reform.[19] An overcautious Kadarist policy in the past had prevented any imminent danger of economic failure. While a rapprochement with the West was out of the question, Hungary relied heavily and without hesitation on Russian aid. The decision to introduce economic reforms in Hungary was a result of the internal composition of the Kadar regime. These reforms were precipitated by the government's desire to promote "consumerism" domestically — thus, the call for major structural rationalization — and popular pressures demanding higher living standards as a compensation for total political servility. Since the Kadarists were experienced in "resolving" conflicts of interest (for example, in the question of agricultural reform and unequal income distribution between urban and rural sectors of the population), they again followed their deeply pragmatic instincts. The 1966 reforms acknowledged the legitimacy of "socialist market relations." Such a position, of course, violated theoretical Marxist orthodoxy (much more so than, for example, Lenin's NEP), but the Hungarian leadership at that time had exclusively practical concern. In the perhaps most crucial issue of the worker's codetermination and collective ownership of production units, the Kadarists rejected all proposals in favor of liberalizing factory management.[20] Thus, from the very outset, Kadarist leadership refused to make concessions to workers' participation in the public productive sphere.

Kadarism as the model state of Krushchevism must be analyzed in terms of its *unique political structure* within the Leninist framework of a one-party system and the dictatorship over needs. Closely watched and highly praised by Kremlinologists, the Kadar government has succeeded in preventing open

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18. Although Donath's contention that a "truly socialist" transformation took place in Hungarian agriculture may not be true, substantial changes did occur. One of these is their higher living standard, and another is their participation in questions regarding production. By contrast, industrial "production strategy" is still decided entirely by central political authorities. Still, the question of property remains relevant to the peasantry, for it does not exercise the right of disposal over property.

19. Questions of economic reform can only be answered with respect to particular instances. Thus, the German Democratic Republic, prosperous even by Western standards, has avoided economic reform as a result of numerous interacting circumstances — the economic priority it enjoys in the COMECON since the 1953 uprisings, its highly trained and technologically most advanced industrial manpower in the whole Socialist Bloc and the advantages of inter-German trade agreements with its Western counterpart. Other countries, on the other hand, desperately need to rationalize in order to save their poorly functioning economics and yet they resist reform out of a nationalistically motivated hostility toward *any* reform. The first resorts to economic reforms out of sheer necessity, i.e., in order to prevent total political collapse. Novotny's Czechoslovakia in the mid-sixties resisted the liberal innovations introduced by the 20th Congress and, as a result, simply collapsed economically. The second is exemplified by Yugoslavia. With its policy of close affiliations with the Common Market, certain principles of economic reform became inevitable and irrevocable. Finally, Hungary represents the third type.

20. Andreas Hegedüs, for instance, suggested the introduction of a shareholders' system in factories in order to at least symbolically acknowledge workers as collective owners.

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social conflict by means of its unofficial tolerance towards existing pressure groups such as the so-called "ideological intelligentsia", which has been thoroughly corrupted and co-opted by state power. Also, some arch-conservative Hungarian church leaders provide some opposition to the existing government, although they have also made substantial concessions to the system's political interests by advocating them in sermons. Leading technocrats, some of them party members, constitute yet another opposition group with independent concerns regarding income and self-realization in the production process. A further pressure group is comprised of influential peasants and leaders of collecive farms. Even certain factions of the political bureaucracy may form an oppositional contingent. The greatest irony, however, lies in the fact that in this alleged "socialist workers' state," factory workers are the least acknowledged pressure group. Of course, in exceptionally dangerous situations involving industrial workers, painstaking efforts are taken to pacify the discontented as, for example, in 1970, when Kadar made a personal appearance in Györ to prevent an imminent uprising.

The once-haphazard methods of aborting social conflicts have developed under Kadarism into an intricate and sophisticated system of manipulation and oppression. Negotiations take place through semi-official emissaries and never in the presence of official authorities. The latter appear on the scene only when an agreement has been reached and formal sanctions are necessary. Again, there is a Machiavellian wisdom in this strategy, for it precludes the very possibility of public embarrassment and protest.

The Kadarist political apparatus is predicated on the systematic depoliticization of everyday life. For the bitterly disillusioned Western New Left, this represents a major compromise. For the Hungarian population, however, it is a welcome relief. Historically, the real alternatives during the fifties were not collectivism versus atomistic individualism, but between two types of atomism. Forced atomization relying on brutal manipulation under Stalinism has been replaced by subtle manipulation under Kadarism. By creating a private sphere for economic and cultural pursuits, Kadarism has depoliticized the Hungarian population. The price of certain consumer goods, Western entertainment, literature and television programs is political anonymity.

To further the goal of depoliticization, Kadarism wages a systematic propaganda campaign on behalf of the family. For career functions, divorce is not merely a private issue between spouses, but is subject to official approval. Premarital and extramarital sex are tolerated as inescapable evils, while offical propaganda continues to advocate Victorian ethical standards for film, literature and television. However, the Kadarists' Machiavellian instinct for survival prevents them from overstepping the bounds of "tolerable repression." Hence, abortion is still available to the unmarried and to the poor despite some regulations, and birth control devices are readily accessible. Despite these concessions, however, the nuclear family as a

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principle remains unassailable.[21]

With regard to the system's political structure, Hungary under Kadarism has undergone a development different from that of many other Eastern Bloc countries. While it is true that, in the final analysis, the Politbureau and-or Secretariat of all Eastern Bloc countries decide while the Central Committees merely sanction these decisions *a posteriori,* the post-20th Congress history of Eastern European countries has revealed surprising variations from this norm. In Russia, for example, the Central Committe historically has played and continues to play an exceptionally important role in the political decision making process, while the Yugoslav Central Committe has never contradicted Tito to this date.

In November, 1956, at the beginnings of Krushchevite Hungary, the Central Committe had to assume a leadership role to compensate for weak political leadership. Kadar did not enter office with a preconceived master plan and therefore had to develop and elaborate policies and strategy in the process. Kadar gained firm control over the Hungarian Central Committe only after the disbandment of the Tancsics Circle, the hotbed of arch-Stalinist opposition. Having established his authority within and outside the party, Kadar proceeded to shift political power over to the Politbureau. Initially regarded as a sort of Quisling by the population and as a dubious "revisionist" by most politicians, Kadar was later popularly acclaimed as a shrewd politician. He has been able to maintain the delicate political balance in Hungary only by conscientiously applying the principle of tolerance toward pressure groups. The typical "lobbies" within communist Central Committees ("army groups," "Leningrad groups," "Department I groups," etc., in the case of the Russian CC) are all recognized as legitimate power centers and *not divergent political factions.* Kadar would not, of course, tolerate organized factions within the Central Committe. In this regard, Kadar follows a Kadarist strategy even within the power centers of his own system.

Of course, ideological pragmatism is no Hungarian invention. However, unlike most other Eastern Bloc countries, Hungary does not stage ideological purges for ideology's sake. Whenever administrative measures are taken on ideological issues, their purpose has been to avenge previous political wrongdoings which have not been handled "properly." In some cases, ideological purges become necessary as a concession by "liberals" to their more adamant conservative counterparts, or they signal a general warning against "loose talk." The expulsion of the "Budapest School" from Hungarian cultural life was motivated by a number of factors. There was pressure to seek revenge for the Korcula protest against the Czech invasion. Kadar felt compelled to make some concession to the then victorious "workers' opposition" and this symbolic act served as a general warning for an overly self-indulgent Hungarian intellectual class. This policy, however, is

21. When Agnes Heller and Mihaly Vajda published their article on "Family Structure and Communism" — subsequently translated in English in *Telos* 7 (Spring, 1971), pp. 99-111 — dealing with new alternative forms of family life, the then Prime Minister threatened "to take the pen out of their hands."

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indicative of an ideological indifference bordering on cyncism. It is an integral feature of the New Kadarist ethics, which tolerates any and all beliefs not publicly professed. In exchange for the freedom to condemn in private official ideology, the state subject is asked only to act in accordance with party policy. Of course, once one has overstepped the limits of ideological propriety, official retaliation follows quickly and harshly. Kadar's regime, perhaps the most tolerant of all governments in the Eastern Bloc, is also undoubtedly the most cynical.

Now restored to power after its temporary defeat in the years 1972-75 [22], Kadarism faces a serious dilemma and three possible alternatives. The dilemma, of course, is that Kadar, now close to seventy years of age, is nearing the end of his political career. The regime's first option would be to proceed as usual as long as Kadar still lives. The second possible alternative would be a Stalinist relapse. While the potential for such a development is clearly present, one should not underestimate the potential for violent opposition by the population.[23] Since the Russian leadership reacts sensitively to dangers in Eastern Europe, it is even likely that it will intervene to suppress overzealous advocates of its own cause. The third alternative is just emerging and has assumed different forms. The tradition of intellectual resistance beginning with the Korcula protest and followed by the illegal publication of books abroad has contributed to the development of the Hungarian *samizdat*, a "modestly" free press dedicated to the articulation of public opinion. Until recently, this was even tolerated by the authorities. A further indicator of an emerging third alternative is the recent revival of the question of economic reform. In an interview with *Svenska Tagbladet,* Rezso Nyers, a former secretary and present member of the Central Committee, called the re-emergence of reform a necessary step toward the solution of problems and the realization of the regime's objectives. According to Nyers, economic goals could not be attained without the introduction of pluralism through social reform. By this Nyers does not mean a multi-party system, but rather things such as the granting of autonomy to trade unions. This suggests a kind of "Tito-ization" of Kadarism insofar as certain social sectors would be acknowledged as being legally and *de facto* independent, i.e., not subject constitutionally to party arbitration or intervention. (Nyers, of course, is a spokesman for the technical intelligentsia, party functionaries, selected working class strate, etc.) What stands in the way of a Hungarian "Titoism," however, is one crucial constitutive element, i.e., national independence.

22. Kadar's reinstatement can be explained by various factors. When Russian leaders ratified the Helskini agreement, they needed a liberal like Kadar. Furthermore, the second Polish uprising persuaded them to act cautiously in order not to provoke further rebellion. Finally, there were unconfirmed rumors that the Eurocommunists (in particular the Italians) demanded that Kadar be present at the European Communist Conference before they would attend themselves.

23. One could even find a precedent for this. In October, 1964, when Krushchev was overthrown by the Brezhnev-Suslov-Kosygin coup, Kadar was informed of the event during negotiations with Gomulka. Obviously still in shock, Kadar delivered an impromptu speech upon his return to Hungary which was actually a eulogy for the overthrown leader. Allegedly, tens of thousands of letters addressed to the Hungarian Broadcasting Company threatened that if Kadar were dismissed from office for that speech, a general strike would break out.

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THE CZECH CRISIS*

by Guido D. Neri

Of the European countries that came under communist party rule in the late 1940's, Czechoslovakia was one that had experienced both an exceptionally high rate of industrial development and progressive forms of bourgeois democracy. On the other hand, Czechoslovakia was the country that had suffered most under Stalinist domination, on which the model of Russian socialsim had been imposed most forcefully, and where political repression had been inflicted with the greatest brutality. Paralysed by the socio-political events of 1948 to 1953, Czechoslovak society reacted little to the liberalizing influences coming from post-Stalin Russia. Unlike Poland and Hungary Czechoslovakia experienced neither uprisings nor the formation of political working class organizations; the intellectuals found themselves quite isolated from the rest of society and the old Stalinist leadership ran no risk at all of being overthrown. As a result, destalinization in Czechoslovakia could not begin until about 1962-1963. It was provoked by a general social crisis which manifested itself most explicitly as an economic crisis.

Despite the limitations that the intellectual movement of 1956-58 faced in a repressed society, it was during these years that the foundations of alternative ways of thinking were being laid — ways different from those which had guided the first phase of socialist "realization." Criticism of the economic system led to an examination of civil and political rights. At issue was the total discrimination the political regime exercised over the individual's choice of work, education and place of residence. Criticism was also directed at censorship and distortion of information, and at the regime's dogmatism and servile imitation of Russia. The very nature of Czech socialism and the role of the working class within it began to be fundamentally questioned.

In 1958, the political leadership temporarily silenced these stirrings of opposition within the party. Still confident in itself and in its success, in 1960 it promulgated a new constitution whereby the Czechoslovak Popular Democracy became a socialist republic. According to communist philosophy of history, this was to be taken as a sign of a new stage reached through an *irreversible* process.[1] But already at the beginning of the 60's the latest crisis of Czech socialism was becoming evident even to its optimistic leadership. The crisis involved "objective" indicators of production and, as such, could not be ignored by Czech leaders.

After a relatively long period characterized by high rates of development, especially in the industrial sector, the economy had begun to show signs of recession. In 1961 the rate of industrial development had dropped a couple of

*English translation by Teresa Jackson.

1. The new contribution, among other things, aimed at freeing the country from what Novotny then described as "the pseudo-democratic principles of the division of powers." Cf. G. Golan, *The Czechoslovak Reform Movement* (Cambridge University Press, 1971), p. 5.

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points and for the first time since 1953 the gross national product did not meet the planned objective. Even more significant (and typical of the Russian development model) was the critical state of agriculture, which necessitated heavy importation of food, thus seriously burdening the balance of payments. The situation worsened in the next few years, so much that abandonment or revision of the five year plan approved in 1961 was suggested.

The crisis altogether implicated the economic plan which, in imitation of the Soviet Union, had placed enormous emphasis on the development of heavy industry and had downgraded the status of agriculture. The model itself foresaw, and in fact brought about, the migration of masses of workers from the country to the large industrial centers. This resulted in considerable changes in the composition of the urban proletariat which in the preceding decades had supplied the most militant members of the working class movement. The almost total nationalization of industry and local crafts accompanied the often forced collectivization of the land (where the average age of the active population, in the sixties, was quite high). Incapable of coming to grips with the economic crisis by using the traditional means of control, the political leadership in 1964 agreed reluctantly to test the "new system" developed by Ota Sik and other Czech economists who for some time had criticized the government for hypercentralism, fetishization of the plan, preserving technological backwardnew, favoring voluntarism and coercion in agricultural production, etc.[2]. The new combination of plan and market (destined to remain for the most part theoretical) could on the other hand be presented by the more optimistic leaders as the most suitable model for the economic era in which the construction of communism would commence and authoritarian administration would wane.[3] Novotny and his group, however, expected to be able to replace the old economic model with a more efficient one without significantly altering the structure of political control. But on this point there arose immediate difficulties for the intellectuals and technical experts. Sik himself was always aware of the resistance that the "New Principles" met with when confronted with the system of accumulated powers and interests revolving around the old centralist system. His reservations were shared by sociologists, political scientists and other intellectuals who had been charged with producing analyses and proposals for change.

Despite offical restrictions hindering debate on the nature of the crisis of Czechoslovak socialism, and despite the 'enlightened' character of proposals put forward, there was a definite rebirth of the social sciences during the mid-sixties. Research carried out by various teams of investigators began to reveal the shapes which Czech society had taken on throughout almost 20 years of socialist "realization." Since the content of these analyzes and proposals have in part been analyzed before[4], I shall restrict myself to outlining some of their

2. For the economic crisis, the criticisms of the economists (like R. Selucky and E. Loebl) and the principles of the "new system," cf. Golan, *op. cit.*, p. 14, 26-27, 30, 50ff.

3. Golan, *op. cit.*, p. 56-57.

4. For overall analyses, besides Golan's book, cf. V.V. Kusin, *The Intellectual Origins of the Prague Spring* (Cambridge university Press, 1971) and H. Gorden Skilling, *Czechoslovakia's Interrupted Revolution* (Princeton University Press, 1976). Cf. also G. Fusi, "Sulla Stratifica-

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most characteristic aspects. Sociological research by Pavel Machonin and his team on social strata showed that, contrary to offical propaganda, the working class did not govern the country at all. This research revealed that key positions of power were in the hands of a small political bureaucracy while the leadership of the productive apparatus (the lower ranks of the administration) was occupied by a strata of managers and technicians very far removed in terms of skills, life-style and cultural interests, etc., from the working class. The sociologists concluded that what was taking shape in their country was the formation of a society stratified according to the complexity of the division of labor and skills and that, in this respect, Czech society was like all advanced industrial societies.

Political scientists like Mlynar and Lakatos criticized policies which continued to advocate leveling and uniformity. Taking the ideology of the Krushchev era as their reference — that of the "people's state" — they asked for and formally obtained recognition of the articulated and pluralistic nature of socialist society. In such a society, they argued, once class conflicts had been abolished what became significant were the conflicts of interests among different non-antagonistic social groups, interests linked to the division of labor and to ineradicable cultural differences, consumption patterns, etc. Government should not try to repress these differences and conflicts but try to harmonize the varying aspects in the interest of society as a whole. Following this line of argument, they asked that mass organizations be represented politically at both central and local levels in order to allow genuine "self government of the masses," and that, correspondingly, a clear delineation of the Party's areas of control be made.[5]

The task of giving a so-called philosophical framework to all the analyses and proposals coming from the various academic disciplines (economics, sociology, law) and from the scientific branches of the Party, was undertaken by a commission headed by Radovan Richta. The result was the famous report entitled "Civilization at the Crossroads." Richta and his collaborators saw the socialization of the means of production and the elimination of class conflicts as accomplished facts. But the "phase" of socialism which had been so far attained, they thought, was not in itself capable of overcoming the stratification typical of every industrially developed society. Basing itself on a broad and labor-intensive model of development, even "socialism" forced important social sectors to endure manual labor while socialist society experienced general poverty. They reasoned that civilization was therefore at a turning point resolvable by a rapid transition to communism. The method favored to bring about this change was the scientific-technical revolution (a notion already developed by Krushchevian ideologues and used in the famous program of realized communism for 1980). This notion satisfied the demands not only of Czech economists for intensive development using high technology, but also the demands and ambitions of numerous intellectuals for recognition of their directive function, and also the popular demand for greater demo-

zione Sociale in Cecoslovacchia," in *Aut Aut* No. 140, 1974; and G.D. Neri, "Variazione Ideologiche del Socialismo Realizzato," in *Aut Aut* No. 145-146, 1975.

5. For the different positions of Mlynar and Lakatos, cf. Golan, *op. cit.*, p. 152, 160.

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cratic control (to which Richta replied by coming up with a complex model of cybernetic democracy).

However important for knowledge were the numerous concrete results which emerged from this and other research groups during the second half of the sixties, the general theoretical framework being developed necessarily remained secondary to the strongly ideological categories advanced from time to time by the political authorities. These were in their turn divided between the conservatism of those who, in order to block any kind of reform, declared that the dictatorship of the proletariat had not yet been fully accomplished, and the "enlightened absolutism" of those who opportunistically acknowledged the need for reforms and commissioned research on more democratic institutions, but were not prepared to see the "directive role" of the Party reduced in the least. This limitation profoundly affected the analyses and proposals of the Czech reformers. Aspects of the crisis were identified — economic, institutional, technological, etc., — but the historical and structural roots of the crisis were not examined. And since the fundamental issue of the relation between the Party and its own members (the Party and "its" class) could never be brought into light, what happened was that the various alternative models for the development of the means of production, for greater worker control and for political democracy maintained a highly elitist stamp. In the meantime, what was "forgotten" was the general terror inflicted on the whole society in the first period of socialist construction — a terror which lasted until Stalin's death and even beyond, and which had disintegrated the working class in precisely the period of its supposed final historical victory.

As it is known, there is a close relaiton between the political trials against Slansky and other communist leaders and the brutal repression of "sabotage" in the factories (workers were among those most subject to police repression during those years.)[6] Through the use of terror against "nationalist" and "Titoist" deviation, the demand was made explicit — upon order from Moscow — for unconditional faith in the Russian model of development and for respect for the most ambitious production plans. The social consequences of political terror were not examined until 1968, following Novotny's fall, when a Party Inquiry Commission was set up to investigate the trials and the subsequent too lenient rehabilitations.

The Commission's so-called "secret report" which could not be published in Czechoslovakia after the Russian invasion, was later published in the West.[7] Following are a few extracts: "The production mechanism of the political trials was a blatant example of manipulation of the whole society by the ruling group. It was a universal manipulation; the police manipulated those under arrest, but also the judiciary apparatus and the political functionaries; the political authorities manipulated the police and vice versa, and everyone... manipulated the people... The authorities invited the people to denounce, to

6. For statistical data cf. *Il Rapporto Proibito*, (Sugar, 1970), p. 91.

7. Cf. J. Pelikan's preface to the *Rapporto Proibito, op. cit.* According to Pelikan, the fact that this report also revealed the part that the Soviet authorities played in the trials, "was one of the causes of the armed invasion of Czechoslavakia" (p. 12).

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unmask the enemy...Pressure to do this was so concentrated and strong, this atmosphere of spy mania had such a strong influence that the majority of the people were persuaded to comply. As a result of this, within the mind of the people themselves, lies became the truth. This contrast concealed the germ of a deep social crisis which was to show itself as soon as the lies were revealed. The trials contributed considerably to the decline of values in society. They considerably lowered th value of human life. But other values too — honor, sense of responsibility, especially political responsibility, comradeship, friendship, the struggle for justice and truth were trodden underfoot. [...] This fact constitutes one of the most serious causes of the social crisis...and of lack of faith in the political regime." The trials affected a considerable group of citizens. They were not only people who were unjustly condemned or unjustly punished, but also their friends and relatives. This was another source of discontent and social crisis."[8]

It would not be an exaggeration to say that the whole population had been directly or indirectly crushed by the political terror of the early fifties. And just as Novotny's group, closely involved with the trials, had never wanted to analyze the past, the Party in power found itself confronting a legitimation crisis. The Party's continuous affirmation of its inalienable "leadership role" made the crisis even more obvious.

At least one segment of the Czech intelligentsia showed itself capable of going beyond partial analyses and reformism. Without waiting for the changing of the guard they had the courage to speak the truth. These intellectuals emerged one by one from both academic and literary backgrounds and did not constitute an organic group. Their radical analyses, which were linked to those of the 1956-58 period and had had the time to grow throughout the sixties into a real form of opposition, were articulated at first almost entirely within the Party. What separated them most from the more enlightened (yet compromising) reformist ideology was their complete conceptual independence from the mystified offical "philosophy of history." It was clear to these thinkers that socialism should not be considered an already realized and irreversible "stage," objectively guaranteed by the nationalization of the means of production and by its codification in a constitution. Nor could socialism be a stage from which the subjective dimensions of the "new man" would ineluctably spring forth. On the contrary, they saw that "the fall of perhaps a whole population into fear, political indifference and civil resignation, into the futile cares and narrow desires of everyday life, into a dependency on figures of authority who grew more petty every day," created conditions in a country which "no longer had any citizens."[9] They saw that instead of new men arising, there were already signs of regression and barbarism.[10] despite the diffusion of certain material comforts and a Western type of lifestyle. They feared that en-

8. The passages are taken from Chapter 5 of Part 1 of the *Rapporto Proibito,* on the *Consequenze Sociali dei Processi Politici* (p. 209ff).

9. L. Vaculik, paper presented at the IV Congress of Czechoslovakian Writers (1967), printed in G. Pacini, *La svolta di Praga e la Cecoslovacchia Invasa* (Roma, 1973), pp. 206-7.

10. Kundera, *ibid.,* p. 122.

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trenchment of this life in Czech society would change people's basic character so that "instead of a people advanced and capable of resistance," they would end up a people easily dominated.[11] Precisely on the event of the "realization of communism," within a people renowned for their "natural" democratic tendencies, the seeds of fascism and anti-Semitism might even take root.[12] In this situation, only fools could believe that the working class was capable of maintaining its built-in immunity as an autonomous "race," not to mention any political capacity to lead.

The radical intellectuals' attitude towards their country's working class had nearly always been free from the myth of its "class instinct" and its "innate and automatic progressiveness."[13] While warning the working class of the dangers of official propaganda[14], they also avoided the opposite illusion — quite common among the reformist intelligentsia — of claiming the leadership role which the workers imagined themselves to have. From the beginning of the Prague Spring, the revolutionary intelligentsia began to reestablish a network of relations with the working class from which it had been estranged for decades. On the one hand, it insisted on the vital interest of the workers "in free and truthful information, in the destruction of mystified false consciousness" (and therefore in a renewed workers-intellectuals alliance), but it also emphasized that without the active participation of the working class, the intellectuals were unable to transform the process of renewal into a "wider movement capable of changing the general structure of society."[15]

The radical intellectuals revealed the crisis of Czech socialism to be not only a national and moral crisis, but also a crisis within the working class itself. But despite the depth of the radicals' analyses, these thinkers were politically limited. I have already referred to the non-homogeneous character of this "radical" tendency. It never succeeded in crystallizing itself as a political program clearly distinct from the general reformist movement. The differences in professional and political experience (acquired during a period in which a public exchange of ideas and information was impossible) could not be resolved in the few months of the Prague Spring. During the tense summer period and especially after the occupation, the need to make an immediate political choice revealed a line of demarcation.[16] The choice was between siding with the strong national resistance movement, whose main forces were within the worker and student organizations, and accepting the compromise with the occupation forces and the conservative minority within the Party, a compromise which soon became total capitulation.

11. Vaculik, *ibid.*, p. 215.

12. K. Kosik, *La Nostra Crisi Attuale* (Roma, 1969), p. 57ff.

13. *Czechoslovakia. The Party and the People.* Edited by A. Oxley, A. Pravda and A. Ritchie. London, 1973, p. 171 (from an unsigned article published in "Literarni Listy," July 18, 1968).

14. Vaculik, referring to the Czech workers, wrote: "they lost the same thing we lost. But on top of this they made the mistake of thinking they could have control over power." *Ibid.*, p. 171.

15. K. Kosik, *op. cit.*, p. 102.

16. Cf. Kovanda's article "Czechoslovak Workers' Councils (1968-69) in *Telos* 28 (Summer, 1976). On the growth of the workers' movement in the period immediately following the occupation, cf. also G. Neri, "Sul Significato del '68-69 in Cecoslovacchia" in *Aut Aut* No. 148, 1975.

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It is difficult to explain briefly why the Czech intelligentsia was able to have such an important role in the formation of public opinion. An adequate explanation requires accounting both for the role of intellectuals in Czech and Slovak history from the time of the national uprising, and for the specific position of intellectuals within the communist system. The Party, in recruiting intellectuals in the immediate post-war period from among the progressive youth, especially those who were already members, had sought to turn them into official exponents of its own policies. To do so it gave them privileges (they alone were permitted to maintain relations with the public sphere) while requiring total political submission. After 1956 the discontent arising from this submission was transformed into a more or less open form of rebellion. The intellectuals' position of ambiguous privilege with respect to the non-communists became one of the main sources of this rebellion from then on, and especially during the sixties, as the division between members and non party members became increasingly absurd within society as a whole.[17] The absurdity of this division was heightened by the knowledge that both members and non party members were dominated in almost the same way by a superior authority. On these grounds, intellectuals going through an identity crisis met with the more progressive party cadres who were sensitive to the profound need for change felt by the population. In 1968 they joined together to push for a process of democratization by which the communist movement might confront its legitimation crisis. Thorough reform of the political trials, with the rehabilitation and, when possible, compensation of the victims (one of the main achievements of the Dubcek era), laid the foundation for a recovery of legitimation. Nonetheless, political and institutional obstacles arose from which not even the new Dubcekian leadership could free itself. If, for example, the project for a new Party statute had been formulated guaranteeing increased rights and scope of minority action, the Party's relation with society as a whole might have changed. The major issue of controversy involved the "leadership role" of the Party — a role which was written into the constitution of the Republic and which in practice implied the intangibility of its political predominance. Despite the good will displayed by the new leadership in interpreting its role as a right which had to be constantly earned rather than simply held[18], many (members and non-members) were not satisfied with good intentions and demanded that forms of opposition be legally recognized.

That which the Western Left mistook for a regression to formal democracy (thus revealing its own dependence on the Third International's philosophy of

17. D. Hamsik in *Gli Scrittori e il Potere* (Tindalo, Roma 1970) perfectly describes the absurd situations arising from discrimination against non-party intellectuals (cf. especially p. 26ff).

18. On this point, cf. the Czechoslovakian Communist Party's *Action Programme* of April, 1968, drafted with the contribution of many reformist intellectuals in *La Via Democratica al Socialismo* (Editori Riuniti, Roma 1968), especially p. 39ff on the "function" of the leadership. On the debate concerning both party democracy and legitimation of the opposition inside and outside the National Front, cf. G. Golan's two books. In addition to the one already cited, see also *Reform Rule in Czechoslovakia* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973).

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history) was in fact a process of liberalization deeply rooted in the needs of the whole population, a process recalling the 1956 experiences in Poland and Hungary and whose theoretical expression constitute a fundamental premise (even if still unrecognized) for the present socialist movement.

In the face of the party's unwillingness to carry through and institutionalize the democratization process, a number of Czech citizens — among them also many intellectuals who had been Party members — began to promote autonomous organizations and supported "direct action initiatives" in the spirit of Vaculik's 2000-word document. This document and the many mass initiatives which were undertaken at the beginning of the summer provided Russia and the other Warsaw Pact countries with a pretext for armed repression of the Czechoslovak movement. Thus, several of the protagonists of the Prague Spring and many outside commentators asked themselves if greater "responsibility" and gradualism might have been better able to guarantee the survival and success of the reformist movement. In this same spirit, Dubcek and his colleagues, under pressure from Moscow, spent a difficult and wearying autumn and winter of 1968-69 trying to mediate. The outcome of this mediation confirms the weakness of the gradualism thesis. Today, many of those who held this thesis have become more convinced that a self-imposed limitation of the movement would have done nothing but block everythin new and meaningful represented by the Prague Spring, thus limiting not only the experience of one generation, but the whole socialist movement in our time.[19]

Meanwhile, another judgement has been advancd by the actors and historians of the Czech experience — that of its non-repeatability. The violent repression that put an end to the Czech experience quite clearly revealed a tragic contradiction. It is impossible to initiate a process of democratization in Czechoslovakia requiring the participation and enthusiasm of the whole population without laying the basis for a genuinely democratic structure, guaranteed through institutions. Yet, such a radically democratic transformation is incompatible within the international political framework and especially with Russian power politics. But, independent of this, the political consequences of the invasion, i.e., the existence of a regime visibly supported by the military strength of a foreign power, make it highly improbable that a process similar to that of the Prague Spring in which the Communist Party maintains a protagonist role will repeat itself. The Czechoslovakian Communist Party does not seem to be able to resolve its legitimation crisis. As for the "clandestine communists," today many of them are drawing conclusions which are consistent with their 1968 positions. They are willing to fight alongside and on equal terms with those who have no party affiliations and with representatives of other political, cultural and religious tendencies.[20] Opposition movements

19. Cf. the significant statements made by Z. Mlynar in *L'Espresso,* August 20, 1978, p. 27-28. On the non-repeatability of the Czechoslovak experience, cf. also H. Gordon Skilling's important book, *op. cit.,* Note 4, p. 852.

20. This does not mean that all communists today in opposition have given up the prospect of a new Prague Spring in which the Party would maintain a leadership role, etc. In the same sense, not everyone has ceased considering those societies of "real socialism" as "phases," however

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of the 70s such as Charter 77 linked to the name of the philosopher Jan, Patocka, a non-communist and a non-Marxist, have a new profile. The first attempts to establish links among the opposition movements of other socialist countries (analogous to the movement in Poland) are significant phenomena of a new historical phase in which the movement for a socialist society can hope to reach its objectives only if it is prepared to undertake a radical questioning of its own history as well as its own *philosophy* of history, its own conception of humanity and reality.

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incomplete or deformed, and as still being in "transition" to socialism. Positions such as these were heard even at the last Manifesto Conference (January 4-7, 1979).

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THE PROBLEM OF NATURE IN HABERMAS

by Joel Whitebook

The way Habermas has elaborated the tradition of Critical Theory makes his contribution difficult to evaluate. While he has undoubtedly rectified some of the most glaring theoretical defects of his predecessors, he has also markedly altered the spirit of their project. He has gained the theoretical advantages of his own position at the price of breaking with Adorno, Horkheimer and Marcuse on fundamental issues. This does not mean that these theoretical advances could have been achieved in a different manner, nor that the spirit of the early Frankfurt School ought to be preserved. It means that Habermas' theory so differs from his predecessors' as to seriously raise the question of continuity.[1]

Two standard criticisms are usually raised against the early Frankfurt School: (1) their pessimism could only lead to resignation; and (2) the foundations of Critical Theory were never clarified so that the resulting critique of society was itself never justified. With respect to both these problems, Habermas' theory represents an advance. As for the first point, Habermas argues that the pessimism of the early Frankfurt School was not simply the result of a sober examination of historical forces, but, insofar as it resulted from tacit (and incorrect) theoretical presuppositions, was assumed at the outset. Concerning the second point, Habermas develops a transcendental argument to provide the epistemological and normative foundations for Critical Theory. It is here that his theoretical advances often result in blunting the thrust of the early Critical Theorists' vision. Given their analysis, a solution to the historical impasse of our time — however unlikely — requires reconciliation with nature. While providing a superior theoretical grounding for Critical Theory, Habermas' transcendentalism necessarily precludes any reconciliation with nature. Theoretical rigor is obtained at the expense of the original utopian ideal.

During its exile, the Frankfurt School sought to comprehend the new and deeply disturbing world situation. They located the cause of disparate phenomena such as European fascism and the American culture industry in the same over-riding historical tendency: i.e., the Enlightenment. While the Enlightenment's goal of improving "man's estate" through the progressive replacement of myth by reason and the conquest of nature may be laudable, its strategy is flawed: the domination of outer nature necessitates the domination of inner nature, i.e., the recasting of man's instinctual organization so that he becomes capable of exercising the type of renunciation necessary for the transformation of external nature: "The

1. See Axel Honneth, "Communication and Reconciliation," in *Telos* 39 (Spring, 1979), pp. 45-61.

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subjective spirit which cancels the animation of nature can master a despiritualized nature only by imitating its rigidity and despiritualizing itself in turn."[2] This thesis explained the re-emergence of barbarism and was the source of the early Frankfurt School's pessimism.

By the middle of this century, the goal for which the domination of nature had been undertaken, the creation of the material preconditions for a free society, was being achieved. But, because of the concomitant reification of the "subjective spirit," those preconditions could not result in a more humane social order. Generalizing from this, it was argued that the attempt to create a free society was inevitably a self-vitiating enterprise. *To the extent that the material preconditions for a free society have been created, the subjective conditions necessary for its realization will have been distorted.*

Given this analysis, the pessimism of the early Critical Theorists can be challenged in several ways. One, and by far the most difficult option, consists in trying to make plausible a non-regressive reconciliation with nature. In fact, this seems to be the only way out as long as one accepts their main thesis. It entails developing a new mediation between society and the natural world, e.g., a "new science" that does not approach nature as a purposeless object of domination. This process of reconciliation would have to be non-regressive in two ways. First, it would have to avoid slipping back into pre-rational, e.g., mythical, forms of thought.[3] Second, it could not regress behind the present level of technical proficiency or else one of the conditions of a satisfactory solution, the material prerequisites for a new society, no longer would obtain. Adorno and Horkheimer accepted these conditions for a satisfactory solution to the "riddle of history," but were skeptical about the possibility of their fulfillment. Marcuse, on the other hand, has hinted at the possibility of such a solution by means of a "qualitative physics" and a new sensibility. Unfortunately, his discussion has never gone beyond mere suggestions and he has not grappled with the ensuing difficulties.[4]

A second alternative would be to challenge the main thesis. This is the strategy followed by Habermas. Thus, the basic error of the earlier Critical Theorists was that their philosophy was (at least implicitly) *monistic*.[5]

2. Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno, *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, trans. John Cumming (New York, 1972), p. 57.

3. According to Horkheimer and Adorno, however, myth already contains the dialectic of enlightenment *in nuce* and the enlightenment notion of rationality is not without mythical elements.

4. William Leiss attempts to defend Marcuse on the criticisms that have been raised against his notion of a new science. However, as D'Amico has pointed out, Leiss' defense tends to be more textual than substantive. That is, by the time Leiss is through reconstructing Marcuse's position on the necessity of a new science, it appears indistinguishable from Habermas' so that Leiss never takes up the substantive questions about a new cognitive mediation between society and nature in an adequate fashion. See "Appendix," *The Domination of Nature* (New York, 1972) and Robert D'Amico's review of that work in *Telos* 15 (Spring, 1973). Murray Bookchin, on the other hand, argues that we already have the makings of a new science in ecology. However, while his argument is extremely suggestive, Bookchin has yet to show that his position can avoid the theoretical difficulties that confront such an approach and which are discussed below. See Murray Bookchin, "Toward an Ecological Philosophy," *Philosophica: Ecology and Philosophy*, ed. F.J. Van Damme, 13 (1974).

5. Wellmer observes that, their criticism of Marx notwithstanding, Adorno and Horkheimer

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According to Habermas, while there is an intimate connection between the domination of external and internal nature, the two processes do not *follow the same logic*. Horkheimer's and Adorno's failure to differentiate satisfactorily between the two led to the fateful impasse. To correct this situation and to avoid those mistakes, Habermas introduces his dualistic framework: while the logic of instrumental rationality governs the domination of external nature, the logic of communicative rationality governs that of internal nature.

The most notable difference between the two logics is that, whereas the former *aims at reification*, for the second, reification is a *possible but pathological outcome*. The domination of external nature aims at the reification of the object in order to render it susceptible to instrumental manipulation. Taking modern science as its most refined example, instrumental rationality can in principle be reconstructed as a formal, deductive system. This degree of formal rigor can be achieved because science abstracts from the existing intersubjective communication in scientific practice, and can thereby methodologically bracket the ambiguities inherent in ordinary language communication. Apel attempts to criticize scientism precisely by returning to this suppressed dimension of "the *a priori* of communication" underlying science.[6]

Instead of the application of technical *rules* to heterogeneous objects, the appropriation of internal nature involves the transformation of drives through the internalization of intersubjective *norms*. The proper *telos* of this process is not reification, but autonomy, individuation and socialization, which means the ability to maintain one's identity by simultaneously identifying with and differentiating oneself from other subjects in a social, i.e., communicative, context. Reification — e.g., the rigid compulsions of a neurotic — is a possible outcome of this process, but in this case it is a pathological rather than the desired one. As it moves in irreducibly plural, i.e., "dialogical," milieu of ordinary communication, communicative rationality can never attain the same degree of formalization as instrumental rationality.[7]

Because they fail to differentiate sufficiently between the domination of inner and outer nature, Horkheimer and Adorno do not have the conceptual apparatus necessary to formulate an adequate notion of an emancipated self. Or, to put it differently, were they confronted with the emancipated self presupposed by their argument, they would have to disavow it. Horkheimer and Adorno, of course, know that the self is formed through the domination of

here 'instrumental reason' becomes the category by which both dimensions of the world-historical process of civilization are conceived, namely the transformation of external nature (technology, industry, domination of nature) as well as the transformation of internal nature, individuation, repression, forms of social domination)." Cf. Albrecht Wellmer, "Communication and Emancipation: Reflections on the Linguistic Turn in Critical Theory," *On Critical Theory*, ed. John O'Neil (New York, 1976), p. 245.

6. See Karl Otto-Apel, "The A Priori of Communication and the Foundation of the Humanities," *Man and World* 5 (1972).

7. Habermas' more recent work, however, indicates that he now holds that a higher degree of formalization is possible in this domain than he previously believed.

were the heirs of his monism: "...the latent reductionism...of Marx's philosophy of history has survived in the philosophy of the Frankfurt School, although, as it were, with inverted signs. This comes to the fore, I believe, in Adorno and Horkheimer's *Dialectic of Enlightenment*. For

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inner nature and that prior to its achieving a degree of instinctual mastery it does not make sense to speak of a self: "man's mastery of himself . . . grounds his selfhood." However, since they conceive of the domination of inner nature on the model of instrumental rationality, *the telos of which is reification*, all self-formation must be equivalent to reification. Given their argument, a non-reified self is a logical impossibility.

Not only do they fail to formulate a positive notion of the self, but insofar as it imposes its tyrannical unity on the manifold of instinctual contents, Horkheimer and Adorno tend to view the self as the "enemy": "Men had to do fearful things to themselves before the self, the identical, purposive and virile nature of man was formed and something of that recurs in every childhood. The strain of holding the I together adheres to the I in all stages: and the temptation to lose it has always been there with the blind determination to maintain it."[8] As the self *per se* is taken as the agent of repression, it can no longer be what is to be emancipated. Instead, what is to be emancipated becomes the repressed inner nature, which is tyrannized by the self. It can be granted that the self will be impoverished and rigidified to the extent that it denies its inner nature, and that an emancipated self will have reconciled itself with its own natural substrate. Nevertheless, emancipation is something that is undertaken for the sake of the self, and not for the sake of our biological endowment, as Horkheimer and Adorno imply.

Because he loosens the connection between the domination of internal and external nature and grants a degree of relative autonomy to the communicative level, Habermas can conceptualize moral progress. Whereas for Horkheimer and Adorno, technical progress necessarily entails moral regression, Habermas can envision simultaneous progress on both levels.[9] Unfortunately, his conception of progress leaves much to be desired from the viewpoint of those who retain some identification with the old Frankfurt School. The problem revolves around the question of *disenchantment*. The New Left and the counter culture more or less self-consciously sought the basic re-enchantment of the world in a variety of forms,[10] and, while he does not thematize this point, Habermas is a thoroughgoing disenchanter. In this respect, he differs considerably from his predecessors. He counsels an end to utopian excesses, a recognition of the progressive features of modernity and the attempt to achieve a just and rational society from within the modern *Weltbild*. Indeed, an emancipated society for Habermas consists in the completion, and not the transfiguration, of the modern project.

The theoretical advances of Habermas' position and his doctrine of nature

8. *Dialectic of Enlightenment, op.cit.*, p. 33.

9. Habermas, however, does admit that moral regression is a *logical possibility* in his scheme. Under extraordinary circumstances, regressions can occur which go behind the nodal points of both ontogenetic and phylogenetic development. However, he does not include in his theory *a systematic tendency toward moral regression* — as at least one tendency — in modern society. Although this subject would require empirical argumentation, Habermas' position strikes me as *prima facie* questionable. If Horkheimer and Adorno saw only regression and erred on the side of pessimism, Habermas' progressivism is too unambiguous.

10. See Serge Moscivici, "The Reenchantment of the World, *Beyond the Crisis*, ed. Norman Birnbaum (New York, 1977).

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stem from the same source, namely, his transcendentalism — or "quasi-transcendentalism," as he calls it. Through reflection on the evolution of the species, Habermas claims to have determined the categorial frameworks — instrumental and communicative — within which the basic modes of human knowledge and action develop. He then employs those categorial distinctions to elucidate the here-to-fore unclarified foundations and status of critique. While Habermas' account grounds Critical Theory with an increased theoretical rigor, it also condemns nature to being exclusively an object of domination. A consequence of his analysis is that nature can only be known as an object of possible technical control.

Habermas' transcendentalism can best be understood by comparing it with Kant's the classical prototype of transcendental theorizing. While both share a similar *desideratum*[11], the means by which they seek it differ significantly. The feature that most distinguishes Habermas' transcendentalism from Kant's is that, whereas Kant's transcendental subject is *singular*, Habermas' is *plural*. Kant sought to determine the conditions of the possibility of objects and knowledge of experience through an investigation of the synthetic acts of a transcendental consciousness. To achieve the same end, Habermas examines the *a priori* interest structures that inform the dimensions within which the human species evolves and which also govern the various forms of human knowing and acting. And, inasmuch as modes of scientific activity have been differentiated in the course of evolution which represent methodologically rigorous means of pursuing these interests, transcendental reflection can also proceed through an examination of the methodological *a prioris* of the various scientific domains. "I do not assume the synthetic achievements of an intellectual ego nor in general a productive subjectivity. But I do presuppose, as does Peirce, the real interrelationship of communicating investigators, where each of these subsystems is part of the surrounding social systems, which in turn are the result of the socio-cultural evolution of the human race."[12]

The unity of Habermas' plural, transcendental subject can be clarified by considering the conditions of the emergence of the human species.[13] At some

11. Both thinkers want to (1) criticize the positivism of their day, in large part (2) to avoid the skepticism that inevitably accompanies it. Where Kant had the classical British empiricists as the object of his critique, Habermas concerns himself with the contemporary varieties of scientism (including Marxist), especially as they affect our conception of the social sciences. The transcendental critique of positivism, in both cases, proceeds through (3) a *reflection* on the conditions of the possibility of knowledge which is meant to serve the dual purpose of (4) exposing the dogmatically held assumptions of positivism and of validating the fundamental principles of our knowledge in the various epistemological regions. Ultimately, Habermas' transcendental reflection, like Kant's, seeks to determine the objects of possible experience in order to establish the scope and validity of our knowledge.

12. Jürgen Habermas, "Some Difficulties in the Attempt to Link Theory and Praxis," *Theory and Practice*, trans. John Viertel (Boston, 1973), p. 14.

13. It is interesting to note that, evolutionarily, the very fact which made human intelligence and language physiologically possible, larger brains and heads, also necessitated the extended period of dependency which makes the acquisition of culture possible: "Language and culture... select for bigger heads. Bigger heads mean greater difficulty in parturition. Even today, the head is the chief troublemaker in child birth. The difficulty can be combatted to some extent by expelling the fetus relatively early in its development. There was therefore a selection for such early expulsion. But this, in turn, makes for a longer period of helpless infancy — which is, at the same time, a period of maxium plasticity, during which the child can aquire the

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point in time, and strictly in accordance with the laws governing the evolution of pre-human nature, a unique event occurred, namely, the emergence of man as a *zoon logikon*. With that event, a qualitatively new type of law, the law governing *logos,* was introduced into the course of what had thereby become socio-natural evolution. Man's lack of a specialized instinctual endowment and the resulting period of extended dependency and maturation made the use of language for communication both possible and necessary for the species. Is it not plausible, as Habermas maintains, that the laws which were introduced in to the course of evolution with the emergence of man as the *zoon logikon*, and which constitute conditions of the possibility of human association, also constitute the fundamental norms of that association? "The human interest in autonomy and responsibility is not mere fancy, for it can be apprehended a priori. What raises us out of nature is the only thing whose nature we can know: language. Through its structure, autonomy and responsibility are posited for us. Our first sentence expresses unequivocally the intention of universal and unconstrained consensus."[14] We can see in this passage the convergence of Habermas' epistemological and normative concerns. For transcendental investigation reveals not only conditions of the possibility of the evolution of the species, but also the norms that Habermas employs as the basis of his communicational ethics.

While the norms of human communication and association are "posited" with the first sentence, they need not be realized in any given empirical instance of communication nor in any given language game. The point is that they are counter-factually presupposed in all communication in that tacit reference must be made to them for communication to take place.[15] Indeed, even the ability to violate them, as in the case of lying, presupposes their existence. Moreover, the actual realization of those norms, which are counter-factually presupposed but not empirically instantiated in actual communication, would at last be realized in fact. Thus, regarding the unity of Habermas' plural subject of thought and action, it is transcendentally unified and empirically diverse. With respect to the conditions of the possibility and anticipated goal of evolution, the subject is unitary. But that presupposed and anticipated unity may be more or less of an actuality at any point in empirical history.

Habermas thus holds that Hegel is correct against Kant in maintaining that, with respect to the realm of history, and as opposed to the realm of nature, it is impossible to locate unambiguously a transcendental subject outside of history, who stands over the object it constitutes. Instead, the genesis of the transcendental subject occurs in the very realm that comprises its object domain, i.e., the realm of history. An examination of human evolution from

complex extra-genetic heritage of the community." Quoted in Theodosius Dobzhansky, "Evolution and Transcendence," *The Problem of Evolution: A Study of the Philosophical Repercussions of Evolutionary Science*, ed. John Deely and Raymond Nogar (New York, 1973), p. 98.

14. Jürgen Habermas, *Knowledge and Human Interest*, trans. Jeremy Shapiro (Boston, 1971), p. 314. See also C.H. Waddington, *The Ethical Animal* (Chicago, 1960).

15. See Jürgen Habermas, "On Systematically Distorted Communication," and "Towards a Theory of Communicative Competence," *Inquiry* 13 (1970).

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the perspective of language is the only type of theory, so it is argued, that is adequate to the "peculiar relation between subjectivity and intersubjectivity between the 'transcendental' and the 'empirical'." Inasmuch as it can be simultaneously its own meta-language, ordinary language is the only phenomenon available to us which contains at the same time an empirical and a transcendental moment.[16]

But if Hegel is correct in his move from a philosophy of consciousness to a philosophy of spirit (which Habermas interprets linguistically), Marx, in turn, is right, against Hegel's idealism, in insisting that "nature is the absolute ground of mind": "The seal placed on absolute knowledge by the philosophy of identity is broken if the externality of nature, both objective environmental and subjective bodily nature, not only seems external to a consciousness that finds itself within nature but refers instead to the immediacy of a substratum on which the mind contingently depends."[17] To be sure, Habermas must "reconstruct" Marx, by bringing out the latent transcendentalism in Marx's own position, in order that Marx's materialism does not degenerate into a bad objectivism. Yet, Habermas' modification of the traditional transcendental project follows from his basic acceptance of Marx's materialistic critique of philosophy.

For Habermas, after Hegel's last heroic effort, and Marx's critique of Hegel, it has become apparent that philosophy cannot fulfill its traditional ambition of, as it were, getting behind reason's back and securing its own foundations. Philosophy, in short, can no longer be practiced as a "philosophy of origins" (*Ursprungsphilosophie*).[18] Habermas is quite willing to accept a degree of "unavoidable circularity"[19] with respect to foundational questions, and simply attributes this to the finitude, i.e., the material groundedness, of the human mind. Despite the impossibility of ultimate foundations, Habermas is nevertheless satisfied that, in the course of evolution, mental structures developed which — owing to their having emerged through a process of natural selection — somehow "fit" the world. The task of theory is not to deduce the validity of those structures in a way that would require an ultimate standpoint, but to explicate that "fit."

Yet, if Habermas' transcendental claims are not philosophical *strictu sensu*, what is their exact status and how does he arrive at them? This is where we encounter the unique terrain of Critical Theory, as Habermas conceives it, which lies somewhere "between philosophy and science": "Representations and descriptions are never independent of standards. And the choice of those standards is based on attitudes that require critical consideration by means of arguments, *because they cannot be either logically deduced or empirically demonstrated.* Fundamental methodological decisions, for example such basic

16. Wellmer, "Communication and Emancipation," *op.cit.*, p. 251.
17. *Knowledge and Human Interest, op.cit.*, p. 26.
18. See "Appendix," *Knowledge and Human Interests, op.cit.*, and Theodor W. Adorno, "Metacritique of Epistemology," *Telos* 38 (Winter 1978-79).
19. See Habermas, "Some Difficulties in the Attempt to Link Theory and Praxis," *op.cit.*, note, p. 285.

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distinctions as those between categorial and non-categorial being, between analytic and synthetic statements, or between descriptive and emotive meaning, *have the singular character of being neither arbitrary nor compelling. They prove appropriate or inappropriate.* For their criterion is that the metalogical necessity of interests, *that we can neither prescribe nor represent, but with which we must come to terms.* Therefore my first thesis is this: the achievements of the transcendental subject have their basis in the natural history of the species."[20] Habermas seems concerned to avoid two equally unacceptable alternatives. He does not want to assert that the validity of fundamental norms can be demonstrated with the rigor sought by "traditional theory." Yet, he is equally opposed to the skeptical contention that these concepts are arbitrary, in the sense of either being the mere products of convention or of biological adaptation *in any simple sense.* While the validity of these principles may not be demonstrable in a completely compelling fashion, there are nevertheless "good reasons" for their acceptance.

To the extent that these transcendental structures "have their basis in the natural history of the species," they possess a certain facticity and can be examined through empirical anthropology. If, however, these transcendental structures were *only* the products of evolution, then a naturalistic interpretation of reason — with its inescapable skepticism — would be unavoidable. Reason would simply be an "organ of adaptation for men just as claws and teeth are for animals," and no claims for its autonomy could be made. Habermas argues that, although reason has its genesis in natural evolution, at some point in that process, reason transcends the conditions of its genesis and achieves a degree of autonomy.

Methodologically, the theory that elucidates and justifies the transcendental interest structures within which the species develops, although it contains an empirical moment, cannot simply be an empirical theory. The employment of a strictly empirical theory for the purposes of an "anthropology of knowledge" would involve a logical dilemma. For empirical anthropology is a "founded science," which is itself constituted within "the framework of the objectifying sciences," and cannot therefore be used as a "founding science" to establish that framework.[21] This dilemma has its origins in the fact that the knowing subject, which constitutes nature as an object of knowledge, is itself a product of nature.[22] In other words, the difficulty arises from the fact that the constituted constitutes the constituter. An anthropology of knowledge, if it is to avoid a vicious circle, cannot simply be an empirical theory, but must contain a "reflective" moment as well.

To take account of this state of affairs, Habermas makes a three-fold distinction between objective nature, subjective nature and nature in itself

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20. *Knowledge and Human Interest, op.cit.,* p. 312. Emphasis added.
21. See Habermas, "Some Difficulties in the Attempt to Link Theory and Praxis," *op.cit.,* pp. 21-22.
22. See Jürgen Habermas, "A Postscript to *Knowledge and Human Interest,*" *Philosophy of the Social Sciences* 3 (1975), pp. 164-165.

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(*natura naturans*).[23] Nature in itself can be further differentiated into (evolutionarily) pre-human nature and something similar to the Kantian *Ding-an-sich*. Thus, pre-human nature produces the human species in the course of natural evolution, and that created species possesses a subjective nature which constitutes objective nature as an object of possible experience and knowledge. The particular makeup of the species is such, according to Habermas, that objective nature is constituted as an object of possible technical control. Furthermore, knowledge of objective nature is, in a Kantian fashion, knowledge of a system of apperances, and something like a *Ding-an-sich* must be posited as lying behind our apprehension of objective nature. Unlike the Kantian *Ding-an-sich,* however, Habermas' is not a quasi-object affecting our receptive apparatus. Rather, it is simply a theoretical posit which must be made to indicate the externality, contingency and facticity of nature which conspire to confound any arbitrary interpretations we seek to impose on it.

Habermas must posit the existence of a pre-human nature and a *Ding-an-sich* to take account of the fact that, as McCarthy puts it, "cognition appears to be bound on both sides by contingent conditions."[24] Leaving aside the question of the *Ding-an-sich,* a serious difficulty intrinsic to Habermas' attempt to synthesize materialism and transcendentalism arises concerning pre-human nature. Does the "materialist" claim that pre-human nature produces subjective nature, as McCarthy asks, not throw Habermas back into a pre-critical ontology that violates his transcendental posture? The question re-emerges at the level of philosophy of biology, where Habermas needs to, but cannot, account for the transition from pre-human to human nature.[25] In both cases, he wants to say more than can legitimately be said from within the confines of his position.

The terrain that Habermas wants to stake out for his transcendental-foundational discourse thus lies somewhere between empirical science and first philosophy. *He wants to oppose the objectivistic misconception of the sciences through reflection on the conditions of the possibility of the various sciences. He does not, however, want to have to move to the topos of traditional* first philosophy, *with all of its attendant dilemmas. But can this middle ground be maintained?* This, in turn, rests on the successful differentiation between empirical and transcendental anthropology. The following question, however, can be asked of *any given empirical theory*, e.g., Gehlen's that Habermas might employ for transcendental-foundational purposes: *By what right does it gain its transcendental status?* The claim is, of course, that in the course of anthropological research certain 'reflexively traceable rules" have been discovered that function as transcendental frameworks within which the different modes of thought and action are constituted.[26] With our sensitivity to historicist concerns, however, we want to inquire into the status of those

23. See *Knowledge and Human Interests, op.cit.*, p. 268, and Thomas McCarthy, *The Critical Theory of Jürgen Habermas* (Cambridge, Mass., 1978), pp. 115ff.
24. McCarthy, *The Critical Theory of Jürgen Habermas, op.cit.*, p. 125.
25. See Habermas, *Knowledge and Human Interests, op.cit.*, p. 41.
26. Habermas, "A Postscript to *Knowledge and Human Interests,*" *op.cit.*, p. 165.

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theories that claim to have discovered the invariant features of human history. Are they not themselves historically specific, fallible theories that can be superseded at any time?[27]

To put the question in more explicitly Hegelian terms, we can ask Habermas the question Hegel posed to Kant: What are the conditions of the possibility of discovering the conditions of the possibility of knowledge? Habermas' criticism of the objectivist understanding of science is that objectivism dogmatically assumes the validity of first-order scientific knowledge without reflecting on the presuppositions of that knowledge. However, we can ask Habermas, in turn, why reflection should stop at the level of transcendental anthropology and not proceed further? More traditional transcendental philosophers at least claim to carry reflection to a point where it becomes theoretically self-evident that a terminus has been reached. Indeed, the presence of such a terminal point for reflection can be taken as a hallmark of transcendental philosophy in the strict sense. In light of this consideration, does Habermas' failure to carry reflection beyond the level of transcendental anthropology, which certainly does not contain a self-evident point of termination, not constitute an objectivism of the second order — a transcendental objectivism as it were? In short, is Habermas himself not guilty of "arbitrarily arresting reflection?"[28]

Habermas would doubtless answer — and here his acceptance of the Marxian critique of the limits of philosophy is fully visible — that the questions presuppose that the traditional ambitions of first philosophy can be fulfilled, a presupposition that we have seen he denies. If we are seeking the sort of theoretical satisfaction promised by "traditional theory," Habermas admits he cannot provide it. It must be understood that, if philosophy is taken as that mode of theorizing that adheres to the standards of rigor that Habermas says cannot be met, then his claims about the unrealizability of those standards must in some sense be "extra-philosophical"; one cannot offer a strict philosophical proof of the impossibility of philosophy. The status of Habermas' claims concerning the impossibility of *first philosophy* self-avowedly suffers from the same limitations as what they assert.

To Habermas, "coming to terms" with the transcendental standpoint — a

27. While I have not considered Habermas' more recent theory of "reconstructive science," which has tended to replace transcendental anthropology as his foundational theory, the same sort of objections could be raised against it as well. See McCarthy, *The Critical Theory of Jürgen Habermas, op.cit.*, pp. 278-279.

28. Habermas, "A Postscript to *Knowledge and Human Interests*," *op.cit.*, p. 165. Transcendental philosophy's goal of providing validation of our fundamental epistemological principles, as Hegel so brilliantly saw, seems to involve the dilemma of requiring, as he put it, that one be able to swim before entering the water. The act of claiming validity for epistemological principles is already a claim to knowledge, albeit of a very peculiar sort. As such, its own standards must themselves already have been validated which is, in principle, impossible. At the heart of every transcendental philosophy in the strict sense there must therefore be a theoretical device to overcome this dilemma. Thus, for example, Kant's transcendental deduction is meant to be a unique form of argumentation which can avoid the problem of self-reference. And, Husserl's phenomenological *epoché* is designed as a propadeutic to place one in a privileged position from which basic epistemological principles can be clarified. There exists no such theoretical device in Habermas; he seems to want the advantages of transcendental philosophy without confronting the dilemmas.

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phrase with almost therapeutic overtones — means that, while the epistemological and transcendental grounding of the sciences cannot be accomplished with the rigor traditional philosophy sought, they can nevertheless be accomplished in some sense. If Hegel is correct about the *aporetic* character of the *Erkenntnisproblem*, "then the critique of knowledge can no longer claim to fulfill the intention of First Philosophy. But it is not at all clear why abandoning this should entail abandoning the critique of knowledge itself."[29] With Wittgenstein, Habermas shares the "therapeutic" intention of disabusing us of the with for a fully satisfying *first philosophy*. Against Wittgenstein, however, Habermas does not want to embrace the skeptical consequences of either remaining silent about the most important question of accepting a plurality of incommensurable language games. Habermas' point is, rather, that a self-consciously less ambitious, quasi-transcendental grounding provides us with plausible, if not completely compelling, foundations for our knowledge. And while this type of theorizing may not offer the satisfaction held out by *first philosophy,* it does nonetheless avoid the despair of skepticism.

To "come to terms" with the transcendental standpoint is to see the essential rightness of this position and the "impossibility of getting beyond these transcendental limits."[30] It is somewhat ironic, however, that Habermas, who is often accused of hyper-rationalism by the hermeneuticists, requires so large an element of judgment at the very base of his scheme. The way in which one "comes to terms" with the transcendental standpoint ultimately bears a closer resemblance to aesthetic taste or Aristotelian phronesis than to emphatic philosophic proof. While Habermas' transcendental scheme is meant to serve a theoretical function of grounding our knowledge, which is analogous to traditional *Ursprungsphilosophie*, the scheme itself is not grounded in as emphatic a fashion as one generally finds in *first philosophy*.[31]

The practical implications of Habermas' philosophical scheme become clear in his colleague Apel's article on "The Conflicts of Our Time and the Problem of Political Ethics."[32] Apel explicitly locates his concerns in the context of the planetary ecology crisis and inquires into the prospect of a "philosophically grounded political ethics" that is adequate to that crisis. The major difficulty that such an ethics must confront results from the unprecedented power and global expansion of modern science and technology. A dilemma occurs in that at the same time as the global effects of modern science and technology make political ethics more necessary than ever, the hypostatization of scientific rationality as the only valid mode of rationality, i.e., scientism, appears to preclude the formation of such an ethics. Consequently, the desideratum for communications theory is to dissolve the blockage to rational ethics caused by the hypostatization of scientific rationality and the formulation of a positive doctrine of ethics.

29. Habermas, *Knowledge and Human Interests, op.cit.*, p. 9.
30. *Ibid.*, p. 311.
31. McCarthy, *The Critical Theory of Jürgen Habermas, op.cit.*, p. 109-110.
32. Publication forthcoming in *Political Theory at the Crossroads,* ed. Fred Dallmayr.

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While their particular theories differ in some details, Apel and Habermas agree that a transcendental critique of the pragmatic dimension of language can accomplish *both these tasks simultaneously.* With respect to the dehypostatization of scientific rationality, such a critique demonstrates that the language of science, as a specialized form of language, presupposes the general structures of communication as such. The argument is that scientific rationality is not the ultimate form of rationality, but is a specialized language game abstracted out of ordinary language and, as such, presupposes a more fundamental form of rationality embedded in ordinary language. Unlike the romantic attack on science, the point is not to disparage the achievements of *science,* but to criticize *scientism,* i.e., the grandiose claims made for the specialized form of rationality embodied in modern science.

The same critique which removes the obstacles to a rational ethics also indicates what direction a positive doctrine of ethics should take. Not only is scientific rationality derivative from and bound by a more fundamental form of communicative rationality, but communicative rationality also has a normative dimension within it which can become the basis for an ethical doctrine. It can be shown, so the argument goes, that the conditions of the possibility of communication are, in part, normative. The individual's ability to use language, i.e., "communicative competence," presupposes the existence of certain norms that need not be realized in any given act of communication. Communication itself presupposes the existence of certain norms that need not be realized in any given act of communication. Communication itself presupposes their existence. In language, Apel and Habermas claim to have located that *sui generis* phenomenon which, while factually given, nonetheless has a normative dimension. Thus, it is the only realm where the problem of the "is" and "ought" can be overcome. Communicative ethics promises to eliminate the impasse of recent ethical theory by removing the scientistic obstruction to normative theory and by locating language as the field where the fact-value problem can be resolved.

Although communicative ethics may hold promise for overcoming scientistic impediments to normative theory and for formulating positive ethical doctrines in certain contexts, its adequacy to the unprecedented ethical problems raised by the ecology crisis remains questionable.[33] This is due to the fact that, to use the terminology of traditional ethical theory, communicative ethics is *thoroughly anthropocentric.* As opposed to all forms of *naturalistic* ethics *anthropocentrism* holds that man is the only locus of value and the only being that commands respect in the universe. Communicative ethics represents a variation on the anthropocentric theme in that it maintains that man, by virtue of his communicative capacity, is the only value-bearing being that can be identified. Thus, communicative ethics, as a form of anthropocentrism, rules out any conception of nature as an "end in itself." This is to be expected. Habermas' transcendental stance prevents the sort of direct access to nature

33. See Hans Jonas, "Technology and Responsibility: Reflections on the New Tasks of Ethics," *Philosophical Essays: From Ancient Creed to Technological Man* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1974).

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that would make any claim for nature as an end-in-itself possible. As with Kant, theoretical transcendentalism and ethical anthropocentrism go hand in hand.

In addition to his acceptance of modern science and modern philosophy's focus on subjectivity, there are good reasons why Habermas and most contemporary philosophers want to exclude the idea of nature as an end-in-itself from ethical theory. The dignity and rights of the moral and legal subject have been secured by severing the subject from the realm of natural existence. Because they are characterized by self-consciousness or language, subjects are considered qualitatively different from the rest of natural existence. This is why they command respect and ought to be treated as ends-in themselves. It is often feared that anything that threatens to disturb this distinction — *which the concept of nature as an end-in-itself certainly does* — also threatens the dignity of the subject.

However, the dignity of the subject — the discovery of which, as Hegel continually stresses, is one of the momentous achievements of modern philosophy — *is attained at the price of denying all worth to nature.* Habermas appears willing to accept this arangement. Given the main thrust of his philosophy, Habermas would be unwilling to tamper with the constellation on which the dignity of the subject has traditionally rested, even for so grave an issue as the ecology crisis. Whatever solution he formulates must leave that constellation intact. For a variety of reasons — e.g., his adherence to the basic posture of modern philosophy, his desire to "save the subject" from the multiple threats of vulgar Marxism, mainstream scientism and the monism of the early Frankfurt School, his suspicion of *Naturphilosophie* owing to the pernicious role it has played in German intellectual history, etc. — Habermas is unwilling to entertain the concept of nature as an end-in-itself, regardless of how tempting it might be for an ecological ethics.[34] The "Good-for-nature" must somehow be derived from the "good-for-man."

While no one would want to violate the dignity of the subject, the following question must nevertheless be raised: *Can we continue to deny all worth to nature and treat it as a mere means without destroying the natural preconditions for the existence of subjects?* Likewise, can the work of nature be secured without devaluing the dignity of the subject? Hans Jonas has argued that the gravity of the ecology crisis and the fact that the biosphere "has become a human trust" require a rethinking of the "givens" of modern philosophy so that nature will no longer be condemned to being a mere object.[35] And from within the Critical Theory camp itself, Apel has argued similarly that the "unchecked onslaught of technology upon nature [which] threatens to destroy the life space of all living creatures" should prompt a reconsideration of the "objective-teleological conceptions" that were denigrated with the "triumph of mechanistic thought."[36] Unfortunately, Apel does not pursue this line of

34. "Technology and Responsibility," *op.cit.*, pp. 10-11.

35. "The Conflicts of our Time and the Problem of political Ethics," *op.cit.*, pp. 3-4.

36. By introducing a dualistic framework to overcome the shortcomings of his predecessors, Habermas is following Lukács earlier in the century. Whereas Habermas introduces his dualistic

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thought far enough. If he did, it would produce serious difficulties for his and Habermas' scheme of cognitive interests and their communicative (i.e., anthropocentric) approach to ethics.

Several of the consequences that followed from Kant's transcendentalism also appear to follow from Habermas': a dialectics or philosophy of nature becomes impossible and nature can only be validly apprehended as an object of the natural sciences.

Kant's "Copernican Revolution" is seen by the proponents of transcendental philosophy as having established inviolable standards for philosophizing. Among the central components of this "revolution" is the insight that, due to the fact that the *a priori* structures of knowing constitute the objects of knowledge, our access to those objects is *necessarily oblique*. Any theory that does not take this obliqueness sufficiently into consideration and does not deal adequately with the constitutional moment of knowing in its philosophical construction is *theoretically naive*. A "dialectics of nature" that purports to know the movement of nature in itself, independently of the *a priori* structures of knowing, makes precisely the sort of claim to direct access to the "othersidedness" of nature which the transcendental turn rules out. From the standpoint of transcendental philosophy, a "dialectics of nature" is theoretically naive.[37]

Moreover, for both Kant and Habermas, the knowledge that can be validly claimed of nature within the framework of transcendental philosophy is the type of knowledge contained in modern science, i.e., knowledge of nature as a thoroughgoing mathematical manifold, devoid of meaning, value and purpose. Although Kant himself does not lay great stress on the pragmatic possibilities of a mathematicized science, Habermas argues that nature thus constituted is essentially an object of possible technical control. This, however, concerns the *constitutional features* of modern science, and not the subjective motives of the practicing scientist. However gratuitous the intentions of any given scientist may be, Galilean science is — by virtue of its mathematical character, nomological form, experimental method, etc. — *constitutionally instrumental* and at least *potentially technological*. While it would be mistaken

framework to correct the monism of Horkheimer and Adorno, Lukács introduced his to correct the monism of Engels and the Second International. In both cases the goal is to "save the subject." Despite their intentions, Horkheimer and Adorno did not have the categories needed to formulate an adequate notion of subjectivity and Habermas introduces the distinction between instrumental and communicative rationality for that reason. Likewise, Lukács, who was concerned to save the subject in the face of the "reification of consciousness" — a reification which ran counter to the expectations of Marxian theory, criticized the monism of Engels' dialectics of nature. Lukács, who came out of neo-Kantian milieu, argued that dialectics did not pertain to the realm of nature, but only to the realm of history. Nature could be properly treated by natural science. Marxism, insofar as it treated subjectivity as an epiphenomenon of the quasi-natural (*Naturwüchsig*) process of production, Lukács argued, could not adequately deal with the problem of the reification of consciousness. See Georg Lukács, "Reification and the Consciousness of the Proletariat," *History and Class Consciousness*, trans. Rodney Livingstone (Cambridge, Mass., 1971); Alfred Schmidt, *The Concept of Nature in Marx*, trans. by Ben Fowkes (London, 1971), pp. 51ff.; and Andrew Arato, "Lukács' Theory of Reification," *Telos* 11 (1972), pp. 41ff.

37. See Alfred Schmidt, "Appendix," *The Concept of Nature in Marx, op.cit.*

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to make too immediate an identification between Galilean science and modern technology, it is nevertheless the case that the technological revolution was one of the innermost possibilities of a mathematized science.

Habermas does not shy away from the consequences of his position: "The resurrection of nature cannot be logically conceived within materialism, no matter how much the early Marx and the speculative minds in the Marxist tradition (Walter Benjamin, Ernst Bloch, Herbert Marcuse, Theodor W. Adorno) find themselves attracted by this heritage of mysticism."[38] The "resurrection of nature" refers to the transformation of our relation to and knowledge of nature such that nature would once again be taken as purposeful, meaningful or as possessing value. It would mean the undoing of the de-teleologization of nature that occurred with the rise of Galilean science. Just as Habermas believes the ethical and legal principles of modernity are somehow "timeless," he also believes that there is something unsurpassable about modern mathematical science.

For Habermas our relation to nature, insofar as nature is taken as an object of cognition, can only be one of *instrumental control.* This is not a contingent fact over which we might exert any influence. On the contrary, it derives from the invariant features of our anthropological endowment, which constitutes nature as an object of possible experience. Modern science and technology represent humanity's most refined and sophisticated means of pursuing its interest in instrumental control — an interest rooted in the makeup of the species.[39] If this argument is correct, then a qualitatively new relation to the natural world, and a new science corresponding to it, such as Marcuse envisages, are indeed impossible.

Two strategies can be adopted to challenge Habermas on this claim: (1) I have tried to show where Habermas' transcendental scheme, on which this objectification of nature rests, is vulnerable. The point is to question the thesis that an insurpassable instrumental relation to nature is rooted in our species endowments and is therefore inevitable.[40] (2) Habermas' claims can also be questioned with respect to the philosophy of science. While he does not seek to provide us with a detailed philosophy of science, his theory of research-guiding interests purports to adumbrate the various domains of scientific research and the constitutive principles operative therein. If it could be shown then that a

38. *Knowledge and Human Interests, op.cit.,* pp. 32-33. See also "Technology and Science as 'Ideology'," *Toward a Rational Society: Student Protest, Science and Politics,* trans. Jeremy Shapiro (Boston, 1970), pp. 85ff. While I shall continue to use the term "resurrection of nature," only because it has already entered the literature, it *prejudices the discussion.* It prejudges the issues whether we can *rationally* get beyond Galilean Science by insinuating that all such attempts are necessarily quasi-religious.

39. Habermas, "Technology and Science as 'Ideology'," *op.cit.,* p. 87.

40. Murray Bookchin makes an even stronger claim: he argues that not just biology, but the science of ecology itself constitutes a major anomaly for Galilean Science. The generalizing tendencies of deductive-nomological science will always violate the specificity of "eco-systems," each of which is a unique entity. It is therefore necessary, to use Habermas' language, to enter into a quasi-communicative relationship with each of them. It should be pointed out that Bookchin raised the critical and reconstructive aspects of ecology long before the Three Mile Island incident when the Left was totally blind to the issue. See Murray Bookchin, "Ecology and Revolutionary Thought," *Post-Scarcity Anarchism* (Berkeley, 1971).

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particular branch of scientific practice could not be accounted for satisfactorily by Habermas' theory — that the principles presupposed by that science contradicted his transcendental scheme — then that branch would constitute an anomaly for Habermas' philosophy of science. Biology may very well constitute one such anomaly.

It should be recalled that Galilean science is as much a program for the "mathematical march of mind"[41] through the universe as it is a completed product. And this march has proceeded much further in the realm of inanimate matter than in the realm of vital phenomena, where some of the most elementary steps have yet to be taken. One may ask whether this is a contingent state of affairs that awaits a "Newton of a blade of grass," or whether there are good reasons to believe that the program cannot be executed. Or, one might make the stronger assertion that even if life had been exhaustively treated in mechanistic terms, it would not have thereby been explained, but explained away. Just as an explanation of mind in terms of the brain would be an explanation of mind in terms of non-mind, so an explanation of life in terms of mechanism would be an explanation of life in terms of non-life.

Proceeding through an examination of biology is the most fruitful way to criticize Habermas on these matters and has decided advantages over other approaches. Unlike Marcuse's, for example, this approach is not forced to confront the imponderable task of creating an "alternative science" *ex nihilo*. Furthermore, it involves exploring an avenue that remains immanent to modern science. But by beginning from a position immanent to science, this approach would at least be in no *immediate* danger of contradicting the current standards of intersubjective rationality.

The surrender of nature to the domain of instrumental reason is even more thoroughgoing in Habermas than in Kant, who at least evinced some uneasiness with the "mechanization of the world picture" and wrote the third critique as a result. Curiously enough, Kantian as Habermas is, there is no analogue to the *Critique of Judgment* in his *opus*; it is as though he perceives no pressing problem. Kant, it will be recalled, was faced with the following dilemma: after having demonstrated that nature, as an object of possible experience, was a causal nexus through and through and therefore contained no room for purposefulness, he had to account for the seemingly teleological phenomena that confronted the scientist in his investigation of nature. Prominent among these was, of course, the apparent purposefulness of "organized beings," i.e., living things. Kant's solution was to introduce the distinction between "determinant" and "reflective" judgments.[42] Owing to the nature of the human mind, purposefulness has to be assumed, as a *heuristic*, in the investigation of vital phenomena. The concept of purposefulness cannot, however, appear in satisfactory scientific theories in their final form, but have

41. E.A. Burtt, *The Metaphysical Foundations of Modern Science* (Garden City, N.Y., 1954), p. 33.

42. See Immanuel Kant, *The Critique of Judgement*, trans. James Meredith (Oxford, 1973), pp. 18ff.

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to be jettisoned along the way. The concept pertains, in other words, to the logic of discovery and not to the logic of validation. Whatever one makes of Kant's critique of teleological judgment — and it is a highly perplexing theory indeed[43] — the fact remains that he attempts to account for the apparent purposefulness that manifests itself at the subhuman level.

The questions examined by Kant concerning the nature of living phenomena were again taken up by the vitalists at the end of the last century and have come down to us in the contemporary controversies over the role of systems theory in biology. The vitalists maintained that there is an "extra something," a vital element, in living things which made them *in principle* not susceptible to an exhaustive treatment in mechanistic terms. Against this contention, the mechanists argued that, as this vital element has never been observed, it is a "metaphysical" posit which deserves no place in modern science. The assumption of a vital principle, they further argued, is unnecessary for biological research and, *given sufficient time*, an exhaustive treatment of life in purely mechanistic terms will be forthcoming.[44] The claims of contemporary reductionists are, for the most part, of a programmatic nature and to date, biology remains largely an autonomous science: "Indeed, no serious student, reductionist or anti-reductionist, questions the truth of this [i.e., that major biological theories have yet to be reduced] and that biology remains at present an autonomous science is not a matter of dispute."[45] The interesting question for the philosophy of biology is whether there is good reason to believe the reduction can in fact be accomplished.

A major focus of the current debate concerning reductionism is the adoption of systems theory by biologists in recent years. There can be no question as to the impact of systems-theoretical approaches on contemporary biology.[46] However, while there can be no questions concerning the advantages gained by the adoption of systems theory for biological research, how to interpret the philosophical significance of this development remains controversial. The controversy revolves around the status of systems theory as a mode of rationality. Three basic positions are discernable in the debate:

(1) The first position, which is the most prevalent among neo-empiricist philosophers of science, holds that systems theory at last provides the sophisticated methodology required to complete the reductionist program and the incorporation of biology into a unified physio-chemical science.[47] In this

43. See Hegel, *Logic*, trans. William Wallace (Oxford, 1975), p. 88. *History of Philosophy*, Vol.III, ed. and trans. E.S. Haldane and Frances Simson (New York, 1968), pp. 467-468, and *Aesthetics*, Vol.I, trans. T.M. Knox (Oxford, 1975), pp. 57-78.

44. See Ernst Cassirer, *The Problems of Knowledge: Philosophy, Science and History since Hegel*, trans. William Woglom and Charles Hendel (New Haven, 1974), pp. 188ff.

45. Ronald Munson, "General Introduction," *Man and Nature: Philosophical Issues in Biology*, ed. Ronald Munson (New York, 1975), p. 8.

46. As one eminent biologist has noted: "What finally produced a breakthrough in our thinking about teleology was the introduction of new concepts from the fields of cybernetics and new terminologies from the language of information theory." See Ernst Mayr, "Teleological and Teleonomic: A New Analysis," *Evolution and the Diversity of Life* (Cambridge, Mass., 1976), p. 348.

47. The *locus classicus* of this position in Arturo Rosenbleuth, Norbert Wiener, Julian Bigelow, "Behavior, Purpose and Teleology," *Philosophy of Science* 10 (1943).

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case, no claims are made for systems theory as a unique mode of rationality, but it is simply viewed as a sophisticated form of mathematical-functional analysis. The sophistication of systems theory, it is argued, is equal to the complexity of those phenomena — e.g., organismic, teleological, self-organizing, etc. — which were formerly held to uniquely characterize life and to be resistant to exhaustive analysis on mechanistic assumptions alone.[48]

(2) The second position, which is espoused by the more enthusiastic systems theorists, is that systems theory represents a third position that can overcome the old opposition between vitalism and mechanism. It is mtaintained that systems theory can account for the same "vital" phenomena which vitalism sought to explain, but, in accordance with mechanism, it does not have to appeal to any "metaphysical" or "mystical" entities.[49] In contrast to the first position, it should be stressed that — while it may be a *physical* theory — systems theorists do not consider their theory as either *mechanistic* or *reductionistic*. On the contrary, as an emergentist theory of hierarchical wholes, systems theory is considered an alternative to both reductionism and mechanism.[50] To use the language of Critical Theory, it is considered an alternative to instrumental reason. Whereas the first position maintained that systems theory could be employed to reduce biology to physics and chemistry, here biology's employment of systems theory is adduced as evidence for the autonomy of the biological sciences.

(3) The third position, which harks back to the older *Naturphilosophie*, is the most speculative of the three and the least fashionable today. While it admits that vital phenomena may be *amenable* to a systems-theoretical treatment, it maintains that such treatment cannot do complete justice to living things; after systems theory has, as it were, cast its theoretical net, certain distinctive features of life, so the argument goes, will remain beyond its theoretical reach. It is argued that systems theory remains within the framework of Galilean science insofar as it accepts the constitution of nature as a mathematical manifold. Indeed, instead of presenting some sort of transcendence of Galilean Science as proponents of the second position often contend, systems theory, by virtue of its increased mathematical sophistication, simply represents its most sophisticated refinement to date. The argument is that essential attributes of life cannot be adequately apprehended in spatio-temporal terms alone, and that life already represents an anomaly for nature conceived of as only *res extensa*. Thus, Jonas argues that, although living things can be treated in purely external terms -- as

48. This attitude is evident in Ernst Mayr's suggestion that we should, in light of current knowledge, return to Aristotle's biological texts and replace the term *eidos*, wherever it appears, by the term "DNA formula." "Teleological and Teleonomic," *op.cit.*, p. 400.

49. Ludwig von Bertalanffy, *General System Theory* (New York, 1968), pp. 144-156.

50. See Ervin Laszlo, *Introduction to Systems Philosophy: Toward a New Paradigm of Contemporary Thought* (New York, 1972), p. 49. Cf. Marjorie Grene, "Aristotle and Modern Biology," *Topics in the Philosophy of Biology*, ed. Marjorie Grene and Everett Mendelson (Boston, 1976), p. 8: "What is finalistic about information theory? Admittedly, both teleological explanation and cybernetic information both resist a one-level Democritean approach. But that does not make them equivalent."

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objects among objects — they must also be understood *from the inside.*[51] Essential attributes of vital phenomena elude a purely external approach: living form cannot be reduced to cybernetic information, inwardness cannot be understood as spatial interiority, and concern for existence cannot be explained in terms of self-regulating systems. Moreover, Jonas maintains that it is only because we are "peepholes into the inwardness of substance," and can know ourselves from the inside, that we can understand biological phenomena on analogy to our own experience as living beings. The proper understanding of biological phenomena, in other words, presupposes a certain communality of life.

Returning to Habermas, if the entire realm of human cognition can be *exhaustively* subdivided, as he claims, in terms of the three knowledge-constitutive interests -- instrumental, communicative and emancipatory -- then our question becomes: where are the biological sciences to be located within his scheme? We know that Habermas emphatically denies the possibility of conceptualizing nature -- presumably including living nature -- under the categories of communicative rationality: "Nature does not conform to the categories under which the subject can conform to the understanding of another subject on the basis of reciprocal recognition under the categories that are binding on both of them."[52] If the only two possible alternatives available in this case are communicative and instrumental rationality, and if the domain of communicative rationality is exclusively reserved for speaking subjects, then it follows that the biological sciences must be assigned to the domain of instrumental rationality. Our only possible cognitive relation to other living beings in this scheme is one transcendentally oriented to technical domination. Moreover, it must be assumed that, in order to preserve his scheme of cognitive interests, Habermas would have to subscribe to the reductionist program for biology -- a position which is problematic on both empirical and theoretical grounds. He would have to maintain that, through the application of systems theory, the apparently teleological features of living things could be accounted for, and biology thereby fully incorporated into a unified physical theory -- i.e., into instrumental reason. And, the claims of the more naive systems theorists notwithstanding, it is obvious from his discussions with Luhmann that Habermas has no illusions about the "non-instrumental" character of systems theory.

Habermas thus divides the *scala natura* -- albeit from the side of epistemology and methodology -- at the level of human intentionality or communicability. While everything on the subhuman level, including life, is assigned to the realm of instrumental reason, the domain of human communicability remains the last preserve in an otherwise mechanized universe. Habermas is, in short, an anti-reductionist for the human sciences and a reductionist for the life sciences. He is not basically in disagreement with the neo-empiricist program for a unified science as long as that program

51. See Hans Jonas, "Is God a Mathematician? (The Meaning of Metabolism)," *The Phenomenon of Life: Toward a Philosophical Biology* (New York, 1966).

52. Habermas, *Knowledge and Human Interest, op.cit.*, p. 33.

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is contained to the realm of non-speaking nature and is interpreted in transcendental-instrumental rather than a realistic fashion. Today there is nothing particularly unusual about this stance. On the contrary, it is more or less the strategy adopted by most contemporary anti-positivist philosophers, e.g., phenomenologists, ordinary language philosophers, action theorists, etc., who are concerned to "save the subject."[53]

Habermas, however, crosses over the "ontological hiatus" between speaking nature and non-speaking nature in a way which, on his own terms, is literally *illicit*. In a discussion of ethology, he maintains that we are to understand the seemingly teleological behavior of animals by reasoning "privately" from human intentionality.[54] Similarly, in a response to the question whether Darwinian theory belongs to the empirical-analytic sciences and is for that reason constituted with an interest in technical control, Habermas answers: "Since the evolution theory has a methodological status which is quite different from a normal theory in, say, physics, I think that the categorical framework in which the evolution theory has been developed since Darwin presupposes some references to a pre-understanding of the *human* world and not only of nature. The whole concept of adaptation and selection presupposes some elements which are more characteristic for the human sciences than for the empirical-analytic sciences, strictly speaking. So in my opinion, the evolution theory is no example of empirical-analytic science at all. But as far as bio-chemical theories about mutations go into evolution theory, we have, of course, a usual empirical-analytical theory. However, this is not what is characteristic for the design of evolution theory. This is only a component of the evolution theory. Modern genetics is not dependent on the evolution theory framework. Modern genetics is, I propose, a strictly objectifying theory which makes no use of concepts inherently related to our pre-understanding of what social life or cultural life is."[55] How one should interpret this passage is, unfortunately, unclear. Either Habermas is saying that evolutionary theory is an immature and inferior theory to the extent that it still contains anthropomorphic elements such as the concept of adaptation, in which case he must be committed to the controversial thesis that evolutionary theory can be reduced to molecular biology. Or, he is saying that those anthropomorphic elements are uneliminable and must be understood "privately," in which case one does not know how to locate Neo-Darwinian theory, for example, in his scheme of knowledge-constitutive interests.

While the idea of privative reasoning may make sense in the context of Aristotelian metaphysics, *where a continuity of being is presupposed,* in Habermas' case, where *no such continuity is assumed,* it strikes me as peculiar. Earlier it has been shown that Habermas' attempt to combine materialism and transcendentalism leaves a radical hiatus between pre-human and human

53. See Richard Bernstein, *Praxis and Action* (Philadelphia, 1971), Chapter 3.

54. See Jürgen Habermas, *Zur Logik der Sozialwissenschaften* (Frankfurt, 1970), pp. 162ff., and McCarthy, *The Critical Theory of Jürgen Habermas, op.cit.*, pp. 151ff.

55. Boris Frankel, "Habermas Talking: An Interview," *Theory and Society* 1 (1974), pp. 44-45.

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nature. This hiatus cannot be legitimately crossed until an adequate account of the production of human nature by pre-human nature has been provided. Here, however, we find Habermas traversing that hiatus, albeit in a backward direction. Two questions thus arise: How can he methodologically justify this kind of private reasoning which appears to violate the fundamental division of his philosophical construction? And, does this type of reasoning not presuppose that there is some continuity between non-speaking and speaking nature — some "communality of life" — by virtue of which "private" reasoning can legitimately take place? And once we can reason privately in a backward direction, what is to prevent us from reasoning in a forward direction and conceiving of pre-human nature as *incipient spirit*? This notion of incipient spirit might, in turn, form a basis for an ecological ethics from a naturalistic perspective.

Habermas has nowhere discussed "ecological ethics." It would therefore be fruitful to construct what his position might be given the main tenets and constraints of his theory in general. More specifically, how, given his thoroughgoing anthropocentrism, which rules out the possibility of nature as an end-in-itself, might he argue for the protection of the natural environment? How, in other words, would he think a resolution to the environmental crisis without appeal to anything like "the resurrection of nature"?

At the most general level, the point would have to be that an end to the disharmony between man and man would entail an end to the disharmony between man and nature. A solution to the ecology crisis would therefore follow from a solution to the "social question" and it would not be necessary to develop a qualitatively new relationship to the natural world. Were this in fact the case, a communicative ethics, inasmuch as it would provide us with the proper principles for adjudicating the conflicts between humans, would be sufficient for deriving an ecological ethics. The proper norms for regulating the relation between society and nature would somehow follow from the communicatively conceived idea of the human good life without reference to nature as an end-in-itself. It would have to be shown that the preservation of the natural environment ("the good-for-nature") was somehow entailed by the communicatively conceived good-for-man.

Put in somewhat more concrete socio-historical terms, Habermas might argue as follows. *The ecological crisis is, at its roots, caused by the strain that the incessant expansion of the economy — which enlists science and technology for its purposes — places on the natural environment.* Habermas, drawing on a well-known line of classical social theory stretching from Aristotle through Hegel and Marx to Weber,[56] observes that "traditional societies," in which the

56. See Aristotle, "Politics," *The Basic Works of Aristotle*, ed. Richard McKeon (New York, 1941), Book I; Karl Polanyi, "Aristotle Discovers the Economy," *Trade and Market in Early Empires*, ed. Karl Polanyi *et.al.* (Chicago, 1957); Joel Whitebook, "Pre-Market Economics: The Aristotelian Perspective," *Dialectical Anthropology* 3 (1978); G.W.F. Hegel, *The Philosophy of Right*, trans. T.M. Knox (Oxford, 1965), Paragraphs 189ff.; Karl Marx, *Grundrisse*, trans. Martin Nicolaus (London, 1973), pp. 471ff.; Max Weber, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, trans. Talcott Parsons (New York, 1958), pp. 59ff., and *Economy and Society*, Vol.I, ed. Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich (New York, 1968), pp. 311ff.

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economy is *embedded* in a larger ethico-institutional matrix, always placed intrinsic limits on economic and technological growth: "The expression 'traditional society' refers to the circumstance that the institutional framework is grounded in the unquestionable underpinning of legitimation constituted by mythical, religious or metaphysical interpretation of reality — cosmic as well as social — as a whole. 'Traditional societies' exist as long as the development of subsystems of purposive-rational action keep within the limit of the legitimating efficacy of cultural traditions. This is the basis for the 'superiority' of the institutional framework which does not preclude structural changes adapted to a potential surplus generated in the economic system but does preclude critically challenging the traditional form of legitimation."[57] With the rise of modern, capitalist society, the economy becomes disembedded from the ethico-institutional framework — i.e., the differentiation of the market — and economic activity becomes "denormatized" or "emancipated." The result of this process, as Aristotle had already apprehensively predicted, is that a new dynamism is unleashed in the economy in which growth, including the expansion of human needs, tends toward the unlimited: "It is only since the capitalist mode of production has equipped the economic system with a self-propelling mechanism that ensures long-term continuous growth (despite crises) in the productivity of labor that the introduction of new technologies and strategies, i.e., innovation as such, has been institutionalized.... Capitalism is the first mode of production in world history to institutionalize self-sustaining economic growth."[58]

The disembedding of the economy and its subsequent expansion tends to dissolve the traditional frameworks in which it was formerly situated, and which served to legitimate the social order as a whole. And, interestingly enough, the very thing that served to undermine the previous forms of legitimation itself becomes — after bourgeois consciousness "grew cynical" — the new principle of legitimation: in advanced capitalist society, institutionalized economic and technological progress becomes the new principle of legitimation, which is a peculiar principle of legitimation indeed. Viewed from the perspective of not only the philosophical tradition, but of traditionalism in general, this amounts to something like a huge "category mistake." Economic and technological progress belong to the realm of the *technical*, not the *practical* or the *normative*, and therefore cannot properly serve as legitimating, i.e., normative, principles. Thus, it is Habermas' contention that (late) capitalist society, through the hypostatization of science and technology into ideology, has for the first time in history attempted to suppress the normative dimension of sociation. Due to this state of affairs, questions bearing on the character of good life are not submitted to public political debates about the "good life," but are left to the administrative decisions of technical experts.

Contemporary modes of positivist and neo-positivist thought contribute to this suppression of the normative dimension in that they maintain that

57. Habermas, "Technology and Science as 'Ideology'," *op.cit.*, p. 95.
58. *Ibid.*, p. 96.

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questions of value lie beyond the purview of rational adjudication and can therefore only be decided by extra-rational means. The theoretical level, where it is held that questions of value cannot be rationally discussed, and the practical level, where what were traditionally ethico-political questions are answered through technical means, thus serve to reinforce each other in advanced capitalist society. Communication theory, as I have tried to show, seeks, through its critique of scientism and its reinstatement of the legitimacy of practical reason, to defend the possibility of rational discussion of the good life and the goals of social development. And, if this renewed normative political discussion were translated into a program of action which eventuated in a radical transformation of society, one of the results of that transformation would presumably be the resubordination of the economy — as well as of scientific and technological activity — to the collectively conceived idea of the good life. The economy, in short, would become "re-embedded." However, in contrast to pre-modern societies, where the institutional framework in which the economy was embedded *ultimately rested on tradition,* here the institutional framework would be grounded in a *rationally formed consensus.*

It is important to stress that, as opposed to Marcuse, it is not incumbent on Habermas, given the strategy outlined, to formulate a new mode of mediation bletween society and external nature, i.e., a "new Science," nor does he think such a science possible. Habermas maintains that modern science and the outlook toward the natural world sedimented in it are rooted in the anthropological endowment of the species and therefore cannot be transcended.[59] The impossibility of a New Science does not, however, present a difficulty for him. He contents that the pernicious effects of modern science and technology, presumably including those on the environment, do not derive from modern science and technology *per se,* but modern science and technology *in conjunction with the chrematistic forces of the market.* Modern science and technology are not themselves intrinsically expansionistic and rapacious, but are driven by the *chrematistic* forces of the capitalist economy. In a different socio-economic context, where their use was detached from the requirements of capitalist accumulation and directed toward the realization of a clearly conceived vision of the good life, the destructive aspects of modern science and technology could be contained and their beneficial aspects could be selectively chosen.

I have tried to show how, given the perspective of a communicative ethics, a solution to the ecology crisis might possibly be conceived. Most importantly, if a solution to the crisis in the social sphere would entail an end to the lethal stress that that sphere places on the biosphere, there would be no need to go beyond the limits of an anthropocentric framework. One need not, that is, envision the "resurrection of nature." Nature will remain objectified from the constitutive standpoint of modern mathematical science — which means that it will remain constituted as an object of instrumental control — and no rational possibility for taking nature as an end-in-itself will exist. *The major difference will pertain to the socio-economic context within which nature is objectified and not to the*

59. *Ibid.,* p. 87.

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way in which nature is objectified. This solution is certainly plausible and internally coherent, and, moreover, is not in danger of violating some of the most fundamental principles of modern rationalism, and thereby risking an irrationalist regression, as are some of the more radical proposals for the ecology crisis. However, despite these advantages, two questions must be examined. First, with respect to ethical theory, can imperatives with strength adequate to the unprecedented tasks posed by the ecology crisis be obtained on anthropocentric premises? Could, for example, binding imperatives which oblige us to protect species from extinction be formulated on purely anthropocentric grounds? Secondly, even if it could be shown *theoretically* that it is not necessary to move from the standpoint of anthropocentrism to formulate solutions to the environmental crisis, a question would still remain at the level of social psychology. For it is difficult to imagine how the conflict between society and nature is going to be resolved without a major transformation in our social consciousness of the natural world — e.g., a renewed reverence for life.

In conclusion, I would like to step back and consider the larger issues at stake in this discussion. These issues concern the deep ambivalence toward modernity that can be traced throughout the history of the Western revolutionary movement. On the one hand, one often finds left radicals speaking as if they, and not the powers that be, were the true defenders of the values of the modern Enlightenment — e.g., autonomy, conscience, individuality, tolerance, etc. – and that the goal of a revolution would be the completion of the Enlightenment's program rather than its abnegation. In this case, the current social crisis is seen as resulting from an uncompleted modernity which is, for that reason, at war with itself. On the other hand, left radicals also speak at times as if modernity itself were corrupt through and through, and what is therefore required is a transvaluation of contemporary values and a radical break in the historical continuum. In this case, the values of the Enlightenment are viewed as in no sense valid, and are seen as nothing more than the ideological rationalizations for a thoroughly corrupt social order. Needless to say, these positions represent ideal types and one rarely, if ever, finds them in their form.

Habermas, who is far less ambivalent than his predecessors at Frankfurt on this score, is a primary example of the first problem. He seeks to criticize modern *bourgeois* society in terms of its own ideals in order to facilitate a process of political enlightenment which could, in turn, lead to the transformation of that society. In this approach, Habermas, like the younger Marx assumes that valid norms of sociation have already been recognized, and what is required is a program of immanent critique.[60] The modern state, which attempts to legitimate itself through appeal to rational norms, is an inadequate instantiation of intrinsically valid principles, and the fact that it is in conflict with itself presents the point of entry for critique. Habermas goes so far as to argue — the thesis of one-dimensional society notwithstanding — that social criticism is *easier* in *bourgeois* society than in previously existing societies.

60. See Albrecht Wellmer, *Critical Theory of Society*, trans. John Cumming (New York, 1971), pp. 80ff and 99ff.

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This is due to the fact that *bourgeois* society is the first to attempt to legitimate itself through reference to rationally validated norms rather than to dogmatic tradition.[61] We can see here that one of the unsolved questions of the early Frankfurt School — i.e., where do standards of critique come from? — is answered for Habermas: the standards are the "de-ideologized" norms of bourgeois society itself.

The norms of *bourgeois* society do, however, have to be "de-ideologized," and this "de-ideologization" is one of the many theoretical tasks that communications theory is designed to accomplish. Habermas is truly Hegelian in that he holds that values possessing a truly universal, trans-historical validity were *recognized* during the period of the *bourgeois*-democratic revolutions. To be sure, these norms were enlisted by the bourgeoisie to rationalize the capitalist order. However, it is not so much, as the traditional Marxist interpretation has it, that the bourgeois presented its own particularistic values as universal, but that it adopted and distorted genuinely universal values for its own purposes. Intrinsically valid norms rode into historical recognition, so to speak, on the back of the emerging capitalist order. The *desideratum* is, therefore, to detach the instrinsically valid norms from their ideological functions, which means to disassociate "bourgeois right" from its economic interpretation. By reinterpreting the content of "bourgeois right" in terms of human communication, rather than on the contractual model of economic exchange as the modern natural right theorists had, Habermas hopes to separate its rational kernel from its ideological husk.[62] It should therefore not be surprising that the values which Habermas claims are counter-factually presupposed by all human communication are precisely the central values of the bourgeois-democratic revolutions. Communications theory, it appears, marches to the tune of the *Marseillaise*.

As opposed to the critique that rejects modernity as a whole, Habermas' strategy has one distinct advantage: it does not have to enlist standards whose validity has not already (at least tacitly) been recognized. Once the values of bourgeois society have been "de-ideologized," social theory has critical norms at its disposal which are immanent in, and in principle, generally recognized by, the existing order. It has a foothold in the world, on the basis of which it can proceed immanently. Political theorists from Hegel to Arendt have recognized how difficult, if not impossible, it is to make successful appeal — as the proponent of our second position would have to do — to standards that are totally external to the established mode of *Sittlichkeit*.[63] For in that case no implicit consensual basis exists for political argumentation and the establishment of such a basis itself appears to be a theoretical impossibility.

Habermas then can be located in the mainstream of the Enlightenment

61. *Ibid.*, p. 99.

62. See Jürgen Habermas, *Legitimation Crisis*, trans. Thomas McCarthy (Boston, 1975), p. 105.

63. See Hegel, *Philosophy of Right, op.cit.*, remark to Paragraph 93, remark to Paragraph 139, addition to Paragraph 94 and addition to Paragraph 138, and Hannah Arendt, *On Revolution* (New York, 1965), pp. 158ff and 205ff.

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tradition. Accordingly, rational autonomy (*Mündigkeit*) — to be subject to laws of our own making rather than to the compulsions of inner or outer nature — constitutes the fundamental value that animates his project, as it did for such classical *Aufklärers* as Kant and Freud. Also, in accordance with the classical conception of the Enlightenment, Habermas views the "disembedding from nature" — i.e., the conquest of the external environment and the mastery of inner drives — as the process through which the goal of rational autonomy can be achieved. Shapiro has made clear the extent to which the Habermasian version of Critical Theory is conceived of as the culmination of the Enlightenment: "emancipatory thought, of which critical theory is one part, is not just a current in the history of ideas, or an ideological reflection of class struggle, but part of the process of socio-cultural evolution itself. Critical theory is a component of what could be called the emancipatory subsystem of socio-cultural evolution, whose differentiation into a separate subsystem marks a turning point in world history. This differentiation occured in the context of the industrial and democratic revolution at the end of the 18th and the beginning of the 19th centuries. From the viewpoint of intellectual history, it can be dated as beginning with Kant, whose critical philosophy founded the distinctive emancipatory method that was developed in the Hegelian and Marxian dialectic. The specific function of the emancipatory subsystem is the control and direction of the evolutionary process itself. It articulates and makes reflexive the capacities for such control that are given in human nature but emerge autonomously only with the emancipatory subsystem. If the main obstacle to human freedom and rationality is the embeddedness in the past, then we can say that the emancipatory subsystem is a cultural learning mechanism for trying to solve the problem of escaping from and overcoming embeddedness."[64] Let it be stressed that the conception of emancipation articulated in this passage remains thoroughly within a disenchanted world view. The goal of emancipatory process is the completion of the disembedding of humanity from nature, and the assumption of scientific and rational management, by that disembedded humanity, over the course of evolution. Not only does this conception reject the resurrection of inner or outer nature, but the goal of this process, the disembedding from nature, is exactly what is viewed as the difficulty by proponents of the second position.

Habermas' vision lacks at the same time the pessimism as well as the utopianism of the earlier Critical Theorists. He does not assess the historical situation as being nearly so irremediable as they did, and is not compelled, therefore, to go to such radical lengths in thinking a solution. Thus, on the side of human nature, one finds none of the erotic or aesthetic utopianism in Habermas that was so characteristic of the early Frankfurt School. He takes rational autonomy as a perfectly adequate idea of selfhood, and feels no need to formulate an alternative emancipatory concept such as a new sensibility. Likewise, as we have repeatedly seen, since his quarrel is not with Galilean Science as such, but with its hypostatization into the "proportion of a life form,

64. Jeremy Shapiro, 'The Slime of History," *On Critical Theory, op. cit.*, p. 157.

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of a 'historical totality,' of a life world,"[65] it is not incumbent on him to argue for an alternative science. All of this becomes very clear in Habermas' "discussion" with Marcuse, where Habermas tries to draw out the systematic interconnections within their respective positions. It is obvious that Habermas perceives a necessary connection in Marcuse between his sensuous conception of reason, erotic and aesthetic utopianism and his call for a new science, and believes that, by moving to the standpoint of communicative rationality, these necessary connections can be broken and the more dubious aspects of Marcuse's theory avoided.[66]

As Habermas has often been criticized for his thoroughly disenchanted stance toward the natural world, Shapiro tries to defend himself on this count by arguing that the disembedding of humanity from nature is somehow equivalent to the resurrection of nature: "The dialectic of history is resolved through the completion of the self-transcendence of nature that occurs when embeddedness in nature is overcome and human beings bring the historical process under control. *This self-transcendence is at the same time the 'resurrection of nature,' because it ends the conflict of nature with itself* that was manifest in the embeddedness and the abstract contradiction between universality and its limits."[67] It is difficult to see how the state of affairs described in this passage can be construed as the resurrection of nature. On the contrary, the situation described above is perfectly compatible with a totally disembedded and denaturalized humanity standing over against a thoroughly reified nature and manipulating it for its own purposes. This would represent the pinnacle of domination rather than its opposite. While the conflict between humanity and nature might no longer occur *within* nature, it would not, for that reason, be any less a conflict. Habermas' position may very well be correct, and we may have to give up the idea of the resurrection of nature as a romantic illusion, but in that case, let us at least be perfectly clear about what is at stake.

The genealogy of the second view I enumerated above can be traced to the more messianic and eschatological traditions rather than to the modern, bourgeois Enlightenment. Indeed, instead of conceiving of an emancipated society as somehow constituting the fulfillment of modernity, the advocates of this position tend to see modernity, "this nullity [which] imagines that it has attained a level of civilization never before achieved," as the original evil which is to be extirpated. The dissolution of more organic forms of solidarity and their replacement by a ubiquitous bureaucracy, the decay of great cities and the simultaneous urbanization of the countryside,[68] the atomization of the individual, the substitution of formal for substantive justice, the ever-increasing danger to the earth's life-support systems, the constant threat of major war, not to mention the general banality of everyday life — these, and not the nobler sentiments of the Enlightenment are held to comprise the

65. Habermas, "Technology and Science as 'Ideology'," *op.cit.*, p. 90.

66. See Herbert Marcuse, Jürgen Habermas, Heinz Lubasz, Telman Spengler, "Theory and Politics: A Discussion," *Telos* 38 (Winter 1978-79).

67. Shapiro, "The Slime of History," *op.cit.*, pp. 149-150. Emphasis added.

68. See Murray Bookchin, *The Limits of the City* (New York, 1974), Chapter 3, and "The Myth of City Planning," *Liberation* 18 (Sept.-Oct., 1973).

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essential reality of modern society. It is argued, therefore, that a social revolution must involve a radical hiatus in history so that a new social order can be established which differs from the existing historical constellation. Central to the new constellation would of course be a renewed relation to the natural world which would close the schism between society and nature that was opened with the rise of modernity and the methodical conquest of nature. Since this position entails such a radical discontinuity in history, it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to identify "objective tendencies" striving in the direction of the type of society which is envisioned.[69]

In this context, it is interesting that Wellmer explicates the difference between Habermas and the early Frankfurt School in terms of the question of historical continuity. For Horkheimer, Adorno and Marcuse, liberation "as the negation of instrumental reason... would be the resurrection of external and internal nature as well as the beginning of a new history of man. While in Marx's theory there is a tendency to blur the historical *discontinuity* which would separate a liberated society from the universe of instrumental reason, the philosophy of the Frankfurt School is in danger of losing the historical *continuity* which alone would make socialism a *historical* project: liberation becomes an eschatological category."[70] Because he introduces the categorical distinction between instrumental and practical reason, Habermas can determine the proper amount of discontinuity, as it were, between capitalism and a free society. Against Marx, who tends to see socialism as continuous with capitalism on the technical level insofar as he sees a socialist society as the nearly automatic outcome of the development of the forces of production, Habermas insists on the need for a practical enlightenment and the formation of a new conception of the good life. And, against the early Frankfurt School, Habermas appreciates the sedimented norms of bourgeois society so that the gap between capitalism and socialism does not have to be so radical as to be impossible. *Habermas, in short, asserts the enlightenment heritage of practical reason against its legacy of technical reason in order to achieve the fulfillment of the former.*

The second version of raicalism we are examining, as it tends to view modernity as corrupt *in toto*, cannot locate points within the modern social order on which to base itself. It must, of necessity, seek values completely outside of the existing "reality principle" in terms of which to legitimate itself and to oppose the established order. Rather than understanding the values of the bourgeois order of reason existing in an irrational form, this position views those values simply as the rationalizations for a system of domination. We are all familiar with contemporary attempts to ground radicalism in myth, art, fantasy, eroticism, play and even insanity, all of which, more or less self-consciously, derive from the sort of assumptions we are discussing. And some of our most creative cultural commentary and artistic productions have undeniably come from this sort of *avant gardism*. However, the attempt to

69. See Walter Benjamin, "Theologico-Politico Fragment," *Reflections*, trans. Edmund Jephcatt and ed. Peter Demetz (New York, 1978).

70. Wellmer, "Communication and Emancipation," *op.cit.*, p. 245.

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uncover the *promisse de bonheur* in marginal phenomena has the unfortunate tendency of degenerating into a position which identifies marginality *eo ipso* with progressiveness, in which case only the spiritual or material lumpen can become the agent of enlightenment.

In the 1960s one was more readily disposed to see the Enlightenment as the root cause of the contemporary social crisis and to recognize progressive tendencies in a much wider variety of cultural phenomena. The events of the intervening years, however, must have prompted every thinking person to reflect on his attitude toward the heritage of the West. Recent events in Iran, Cambodia, and Jonestown, to mention but a few, have dramatized the frailty of that tradition, the amount of resentment against it, and the very real danger of massive historical regression. Moreover, many of the cultural phenomena which seemed so progressive in the past have subsequently revealed their reactionary undersides. In this context, a program such as Habermas,' which envisions the fulfillment of that tradition, despite its many difficulties appears as the appropriate item on the historical agenda. And yet, at the very same time, one is plagued by the sense that the vision, however laudable, is inadequate to historical reality. One's "partiality for reason" notwithstanding, it is often difficult at the level of political reality to discern the cunning of reason at work in the historical events we witness daily. It may be that the scope and depth of the social and ecological crisis are so great that nothing short of an epochal transformation on the scale of world views will be commensurate with them. While talk of an epochal transformation may sound grandiose, it must be remembered that they have occurred before — e.g., with the emergence of the Greek *polis*, the rise of Christianity and the Reformation — and, however unsettling the prospect may be, we cannot rule out the possibility that we are in the midst of such a transformation today.

BOOKS FROM TELOS PRESS

FOR SOCIALISM by Gustav Landauer

INTRODUCTION by Tim Luke and Russell Berman

From his protest against Bebel's exclusion of the anarchists from the Second International in 1893 until his murder in 1919 by the reactionary troops suppression the Bavarian revolution, Landauer remained a tireless critic of all forms of bureaucratism and an advocate of a decentralized, libertarian socialism. A friend of Buber, Landauer had a great influence on the anarcho-socialist trends of the early Zionist movement and the development of the *Kibbutz*. Originally published in 1911, *For Socialism* is a critique of an official Marxism that had become an obstacle to emancipation.

Translated by David J. Parent

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WHY MORE POLITICAL THEORY?

by Jean Cohen

The red thread running through Habermas' political writings is the attempt to redeem the promise of the classical concept of politics to provide practical orientation to the "just and good life," without relinquishing the rigor of scientific analysis. In the light of the definitive separation, since Max Weber, of the social sciences from normative reflection, Habermas' theory confronts the question of how, within a political situation, we can obtain clarification of what is practically necessary and at the same time objectively possible.[1] This question reflects the concern to challenge the positivism of the social sciences as well as both the ideology of advanced capitalist societies to which this positivism corresponds so well, i.e., the tendential separation of politics and morality, the scientization of the former and the relegation of the latter to the residual realm of irrational choices. The emergence of technocratic ideologies that reduce normative, practical choices to the decisionistic judgement of social engineers, complements the subordination of political questions to the logic of administrative science in the service of the vastly extended state apparatus. From *Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit,* to *Legitimation Crisis,* Habermas has attempted to respond to these developments.

What distinguished Habermas' response to the transformation of politics into administration from the neo-Aristotelians such as Arendt, Rotter and Strauss or his predecessors in the Frankfurt School is his effort to steer between their alternative concepts of freedom and the theoretical assumptions on which these are based. Habermas moves between an essentially anti-modern and elitist concept of freedom as pure, interest-free interaction between individuals liberated from socio-economic and administrative concerns (i.e. freedom as pure politics) and a notion of freedom derived from a philosophy of history which totalizes the past through the rationalizing logic of the domination of nature. The latter focuses primarily on a reconciliation with nature that restores unity between subject and object, abolishes domination, and reestablished communication between internal and external nature — i.e., freedom as happiness.[2] Against the former position, Habermas maintains that it is not the task of a revised concept of politics to challenge the intrusion of private interests into public life, but rather to analyze the internal structure of "the social" from the standpoint of normative consideraions. Against the latter, he argues that it is not the

1. Jürgen Habermas, "The Classical Doctrine of Politics in Relation to Social Philosophy," *Theory and Practice* (Boston, 1973), p. 44.

2. In "Hannah Arendt's Communications Concept of Power," *Social Research* Vol. 44, No. 1 (Spring 1977), Habermas criticizes Arendt for developing a concept of freedom as interest-free interaction. On the other hand, in a discussion with Herbert Marcuse in *Telos* 38 (Winter 1978-79), pp. 124-153, he criticizes the identification of freedom as the realization of happiness.

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domination of nature as such, but its uncontrolled character and the extension of a logic of rationalization to other spheres which must become the concern of political reflection.

Thus, Habermas remains within the Marxian tradition insofar as he insists (against Arendt) that the "social question", so strikingly formulated by Marx in terms of an analysis of the objective possibilities for a satisfactory organization of the processes of production and distribution, cannot be omitted from a consideration of the possibilities of political democratization. But Habermas must turn elsewhere in order to develop a normative concept of politics adequate to modernity which could be counterposed to administration. For Marx's very success in formulating the "social question" was at the price of an instrumentalist concept of power that all too easily reduced political practice to administration and translated into a technocratic, apolitical, or statist utopia for the future.[3]

It is precisely the emergence of civil society as a concern for political practice, together with the administrative state, that served as the basis for the scientizaion of politics. Yet, neither the dissolution of civil society nor the abolition of the state is advocated by Habermas. Rather, his concern is to "renormatize" and democratize the state by opening the ends of political and economic practice to rational and ethical reflection, i.e., participation of a reactivated public able to freely form its political will. According to Habermas, the clarification of what is practically necessary and objectively possible, of how to interpret norms and values, interests and needs in relation to technological possibilities, can be achieved only within institutionally secured public spaces that allow for the articulaion of all needs, interests and values.

Given the pervasive presence of the normative concept of the public sphere in Habermas' work, it is odd that there has been so little discussion outside of Germany.[4] Most commentators focus on the *conclusion* of *Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit* regarding the *decline* of the bourgeois public sphere, rather than on the analysis of the genesis and role of the public realm within the institutional articulaion of civil society and the state. But to take Habermas at his word regarding the decline of the public realm, while by-passing his analysis of its structure, is to miss the really important innovations in his early work. His institutional analysis of the public sphere and its functions as a mediation between civil society and the state provides the basis for both an alternative to the resigned political conclusions of

3. For a discussion of this point cf. Jean Cohen, "System and Class: The Subversion of Emancipation," *Social Research*, Vol. 45, No. 4 (Winter 1978), pp. 789-844.

4. For three rare accounts, see Peter U. Hohendahl, "An Introduction to Habermas' *The Public Sphere*," *New German Critique* No. 3 (Fall, 1974), pp. 45-49; Ebehard Knoedler-Bunte, "The Proletarian Public Sphere and Political Organization," *New German Critique* No. 4 (Winter, 1975), pp. 51-77; and Dick Howard, "Politics in Search of the Political," in *Theory and Society* Vol. 1, No. 3 (Fall, 1974), pp. 271-306. This concept of the "public sphere" is discussed by McCarthy in his *Critical Theory of Jürgen Habermas* (Cambridge, 1979), pp. 11-16 and 381-385. But even McCarthy has devoted too little space to its elaboration.

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Adorno and Horkehimer and an important corrective to Habermas' own analysis of late capitalism.

Accordingly, in the attempt to develop a new crisis theory for late capitalism, the institutional analysis in *Strukturwandel* of what integrates civil society is sacrificed to a somewhat streamlined Marxian version of liberal capitalism and inadequate assessment of political crisis tendencies in late capitalism. Habermas developed *two* basic strategies in formulating a political theory of modern capitalism. The first, elaborated in *Strukturwandel der Oeffentlichkeit,* is to reopen the analysis of the modern objective spirit (the state, civil society, and their mediations) by thematizing the practical dimension of political institutions and uncovering existing emancipatory norms by which to orient praxis. But this approach, combined with a non-dynamic model of the institutions of late capitalism rendered the original institutional bases of the uncovered norms abstract. The second approach, exemplified by *Legitimation Crisis,* responds to this earlier drawback and attempts to provide a new crisis theory for a dynamically conceived model of late capitalism. Yet, a systemic crisis theory of late capitalism had to sacrifice a critique which could situate its norms in the objective spirit of the society it analyzes. This dilemma — immanent critique without objective dynamics vs. a crisis theory unable to situate its norms — results from Habermas' adherence to the thesis that modernization involves processes of rationalization which undermine traditional modes of social integration and preclude the reemergence of substantive traditions in new forms.[5] In short, the assumption that reason, embedded in alienated, formal institutional systems, succeeds in pushing back substantive modes of social integration prevents Habermas from analyzing both particular traditions and institutions, and general principles which would permit a reconciliation between immanent critique and systemic crisis theory.

Habermas' political writings have always been grappling with the Marxian legacy his 1960 essay, "Between Philosophy and Science: Marxism as Critique" opens with the subheading, "Four facts against Marx."[6] These "facts" refer to historical developments withing 20th century capitalist and anti-capitalist "socialist" systems which were not anticipated by Marxian theories: 1. the changed relation between state and civil society, 2. the rise in the standard of living that seems to prevent the direct articulation of emancipatory interests in economic terms, 3. the legalization and pacificaion of class struggle, and 4. the Russian Revolution and the Soviet system which "...is far removed from the realization of a truly emancipated society and indeed at times has regressed again from the constitutional rights attained under capitalism to the legal terror of party dictatorship."[7]

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5. Cf. Andrew Arato, "Understanding Bureaucratic Socialism," *Telos* 35 (Spring 1978), pp. 73-88.

6. J. Habermas, "Zwischen Philosophie und Wissenschaft: Marxismus als Kritik," *Theorie und Praxis* (Berlin, 1969), p. 163. For some reasons, this sub-heading has been omitted from the English translation.

7. J. Habermas, "Between Philosophy and Science: Marxism as Critique," *Theory and*

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In discussing the first 'fact,' he concludes that, given the market's political mediation, state and society no longer stand in the classical relation of base and superstructure. Thus, an approach which isolates the laws of motion of civil society becomes anachronistic as soon as politics is no longer dependent on the economic base. This precludes the possibility of critical theory which relies on political economy and applies such categories of value theory as commodity and fetishism to a cultural critique. While accepting the critique of ideologies in the context of the culture industry, Habermas is referring to the Frankfurt School's hidden orthodoxy. Despite their differences, the line of development from Lukács to Marcuse presupposes the critique of political economy, the class theory and the theory of revolution, and turns to culture to account for the failure of the original critique. For Habermas, however, the critique of political economy can no longer be the basis for an analysis of late capitalism.

Unlike Lukács, Adorno, Horkheimer and Marcuse, Habermas departs from their combination of a hatred for bourgeois institutions and a peculiar brand of Marxist orthodoxy. The latter prevented a fresh analysis of the institutional reproduction of social life (civil society and the state) and led them to concentrate on "the esoteric fabric of aesthetic reflection."[8] Despite Lukács' optimism regarding the future, the tendency to identify objectification with alienation is common to them all. Accordingly, any solution to the problem of alienation implied the abolition of the institutions of modern civil society. Moreover, the hatred for "bourgeois" institutions led to the projection of either a romanticized absolute subject (the proletariat as an identical subject-object), or of absolute spirit itself (art) as the bearer of reason and reconciliation. Thus, even when critical theorists lost faith in the proletariat, the project of totalization and the concept of emancipated subjectivey were not altered.

It is this notion of subject as the totalizer of a torn world and the representation of universality, which Habermas abandons. This distinction between labor and interaction indicates not only a critique of Marxian productivism and of all ontologies of labor, but also a rejection of the concept of a subject which represents universality and institutes "substantive" social relations in place of rigid forms of bourgeois society.[9] The Hegelian notions of

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Practice, op.cit., pp. 195-198.

8. *Ibid.*, p. 203. This analysis should not be confused with that of Perry Anderson's in *Western Marxism* (London, 1976). Habermas clearly recognizes another line of development within "Western Marxism" moving through Neumann, Kirchheimer and Pollock — all of whom devoted much space to analyzing political and economic structures in advanced capitalism. Moreover, whereas the thrust of Habermas' criticism is to point beyond both Marxist orthodoxy and unncessary pessimism, Anderson criticizes the Frankfurt School purely in the spirit of a vindication of Trotskyist vulgar Marxism.

9. Habermas rejects this notion of subjectivity in several places. Cf. "Zur Philosophischen Diskussion um Marx und den Marxismus," *Theorie und Praxis, op.cit.*, p. 320 for a critique of the Lukácsian version and pp. 299-302 for a critique of the Sartrean concept of subjectivity. See also "Introduction: Some Difficulties in the Attempt to Link Theory and Praxis," *Theory and Practice, op.cit.*, p. 13.

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substance becoming subject, the dialectic of labor, the telos of totalization and reunification of subject and object, were recurring motifs in the work of Lukács and the Frankfurt School and formed fitting counterparts to the image of reified and administered objective reality. Habermas' Marxism, however, takes as its point of departure Hegel's categories of objective spirit and the fundamental self-formative activities which constitute it: labor, language and interaction.[10] His focus on intersubjectivity, interaction, and the institutional structures that could secure them democratically indicates a approach which rejects the negative assessment of objective institutions as from his predecessors. In short, the search for a universal subject capable of constituting itself and overcoming reification need no longer underlie an approach which rejects the negative assessment of objective institutions as totally reified structures of domination. The focus on happiness is thus replaced by a concentration on the problem of *political democracy* and on the analysis of institutions permitting individual autonomy and democratic interaction. Habermas' focus on intersubjectivity and the institutional forms, principles, and modes of legitimation necessary for the realization of freedom promised by formal democracies does not suffer embarassment for lack of a revolutionary agent.[11] The task of his political theory is not to find such an agent, but rather to initiate a process of reflection on norms and to analyze objective contradictions and possible areas of tension and struggle. As Honneth has indicated,[12] Habermas' philosophical presuppositions, unlike those of his predecessors, do not preclude in principle a relation between "theory" and "praxis." Habermas' approach must face difficulties insofar as his analysis seems to have closed itself off from precisely these traditions and institutions whose critical explication could enlighten *any* emerging social movements.

As early as 1958, Habermas attempted to develop a normative concept of democracy based on the principles of formal law and popular sovereignity in order to rectify deficiencies in the Marxian analysis.[13] As he recently stated, "It is my impression that a tendency to underestimate certain functions of bourgeois or formal law (devised to guarantee liberties) was present in Marx and perpetuated by the earlier Frankfurt theory."[14] This concern is guided by

10. J. Habermas, "Between Philosophy and Science: Marxism as Critique," *Theory and Practice, op.cit.*, p. 217.

11. Thus, McCarthy and others are quite wrong in reproducing the common objection to Habermas to the effect that his critical theory finds itself in a "familiar embarrassment," i.e., the absence of an identifiable "agent of social transformation." Cf. McCarthy, *op.cit.*, p. 385-366. Such attempts had led either to complicated philosophical justifications of the Leninist party or to pessimistic evaluations of the effect of critique to be limited to "...the diffuse dissemination of insights individually gained in the style of the 18th century enlightenment." Cf. J. Habermas, "Zum Begriff der politischen Beteiligung 1958," in *Kultur und Kritik* (Frankfurt, 1973), "Introduction: Some Difficulties in the Attempt to Link Theory and Praxis," *op.cit.*, p. 31.

12. Axel Honneth, "Communication and Reconciliation: Habermas' Critique of Adorno," in *Telos* 39 (Spring, 1979), pp. 45-61.

13. J. Habermas, "Zum Begriff der politischen Beteiligung 1958," in *Kultur und Kritik* (Frankfurt, 1973), pp. 9-61.

14. Marcuse, Habermas, Lubasz, Spengler: "Theory and Politics: A Discussion," in *Telos* 38

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the notion that, without formal democracy based on universalistic principles and legal guarantees, there can be no substantive democracy. However, Habermas rejects the tendency of modern political science to limit the meaning of democracy to the formalism of the political apparatus or to the legalism of "rules of the game." His attempts to distinguish between the limited (bourgeois) and the universalistic elements in the principle of formal law and to apply the category of individual rights to socialism, are among his most significant contributions to Marxian political theory.[15]

One can interpret *Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit* as an attempt to articulate the *historical* and *structural* conditions under which a normative concept of democracy was generated and institutionalized. This examination of the bourgeois public sphere seeks to provide an alternative model of mediation between state and civil society which avoids both the political reductionism of Marx and the anti- democratic pluralism of Hegel. As a study of 18th and 19th century institutions which articulate the underlying normative principles of civil society and the state, *Strukturwandel* attempts to identify those political and social forms which once secured individual autonomy and public freedom and advocates the radicalization and adaptation of these forms to contemporary conditions. Well aware of Marx's discovery that the modern legal systems serve particular interests, Habermas tries to avoid the conclusion that the formulation of political will rests simply on the dynamic of class interests, and that this constitutes the sole mediation between state and civil society. On the other hand, Hegel's recognition of the importance of meanings, values, norms, ethical life, etc., to the formation of social identity and an ethical political community, took the form of an analysis that privileged those institutions and traditions which could effectively *integrate* civil society and the state over those which could assure political democracy. The Hegelian approach offered a multi-leveled analysis of the mediations between state and society that could secure social integration in spite of the system of needs. But Hegel sacrificed the concepts of participatory democracy and citizenship to a system of pluralistic representation that supplanted opportunities for direct political interaction by advocating participation in non-political organizations.[16] Habermas' analysis of the bourgeois public sphere counters the organicist corporativist solutions to the mediation of state and civil society with a democratic model of interaction. Based on a reconstructed version of the liberal concept of public opinion, the democratic model rescues the truth content of public opinion from the limits of its socio-economic presuppositions.[17]As in the *Philosophy of*

(Winter 1978-79), p. 148.

15. Again, this attitude connects Habermas to Neumann, Kirchheimer and Pollock. Cf. Franz Neumann, *The Democratic and the Authoritarian State* (New York, 1957); Otto Kirchheimer, *Politics, Law and Social Change* (New York, 1969), and Friedrich Pollock, "State Capitalism: Its Possibilities and Limitations," in *The Frankfurt School Reader* (New York, 1978).

16. For Habermas' assessment of Hegel's theory of the state, cf. *Strukturwandel der Oeffentlichkeit* (Berlin, 1962), pp. 144-158.

17. Habermas reveals the source of the contradiction in Hegel's attempt to ground his state in

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Right, Habermas' text unfolds the internal principles of modern civil society and prescribes the mediations necessary to preserve the achievements of modernity while overcoming its contradictions. Accepting the Hegelian critique of the liberal model of modern society (which Marx shared), Habermas attempts to develop an "immanent utopia" and thereby proceeds in the opposite direction. For his assessment of the bourgeois public sphere as it mediates state and society rests on a concept of power and political praxis radically different from those of Hegel and Marx.

The possibility of a democratic alternative to the authoritarian organization of political life —one which does not sacrifice the gains of modernity nor capitulate to elitist doctrines of political rule — emerges from Habermas' reinterpretation of the concept of political praxis and power advanced by Arendt, and from his application of this concept to the institutions of the bourgeois public realm.[18] For this reason, it is necessary to reconstruct not only Habermas' concept of the public sphere, but also his analysis of the institutional articulation of modern society.

Habermas locates the emergence of the bourgeois public and the separation of state and civil society not in liberal capitalism, but rather in the framework of 17th and 18th century absolutism. Despite the regulative activity of the mercantilist state in trade, production and labor, and despite its role in integrating production and consumption into a national market network;[19] the developing system of contracts, private law and private enterprises remained distinct from the political apparatus. Although intervention by the state into private systems was always possible, it presupposed a distinction between private and public spheres. In other words, the duality of the state and civil society predates the distinction between state and economy in *laissez-faire* capitalism. This is crucial to the understanding of both the bourgeois public sphere and future alternatives. For it means that the presence of an independent private sphere does not hinge on an unregulated capitalist economy, and a future repoliticization of the economy need not entail the abolition of the private sphere and liberties guaranteed thereby. Accordingly, one can distinguish between three variants of the public sphere, all of which are relevant to the historical context of absolutism and the emergence of bourgeois publicity. The first is the representative public sphere which refers to the demonstrative display of monarchical might and power before the populace. Similar to the "public power" of feudal lords, such public displays do not reflect the populace's interests, needs, will or

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reason and freedom while abandoning the norm of democratic political interaction in his ambivalence toward public opinion. He states that Hegel restricted political interaction to the few within the state, depriving the private individual of access to public spaces and transforming the principle of publicity from a crucial power to a mechanism of integration from above. In short, he substituted participation in the corporation, a private interest group sanctioned by the state, for participation in a democratic polity. Cf. J. Habermas, *Strukturwandel der Oeffentlichkeit, op.cit.*, p. 147.

18. *Ibid.*, pp. 20, 33, 300.

19. *Ibid.*, pp. 38-39. See also Karl Polanyi, *The Great Transformation* (Boston, 1944), pp. 43-55.

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power but bear witness to the glory of the master.

Although this form of "public sphere" is fully elaborated with the consolidation of absolute monarchy, the term "public" acquires another meaning in relation to the state administrative apparatus. Increasingly, "public power" refers to an objectified state apparatus *vis-a vis* the monarch and the "private sphere" comprised of those not occupying public office. The emergence of the absolute state and the localization of public power in offices of state administration corresponded to the radical separation of politics and morality and to the constitution of a social sphere of exchange, commerce and production. However, as Habermas maintains, it was precisely this *"denormatization" of the state and the constitution of civil society as a private sphere which permitted the development of a third type of public sphere — the normatively grounded, critical bourgeois — in the interstices of the official public and new social spheres.* The latter became the basis for a new critical synthesis between ethics and politics.

The bourgeois public sphere originated in a variety of voluntary associations — literary clubs, salons and cafes — which proliferated in the private social sphere of the 17th and 18th century absolutist society. The literary public was the first "institutional" realm in which discussion was pursued independently of the constraint by the market and the state. It had as its presupposition the specifically modern forms of subjectivity and autonomy generated within the bourgeois nuclear family. Indeed, the bourgeois public sphere attained its own specificity through psychological emancipation within the intimate sphere (the family as a freely chosen community) and through economic emancipation by the market. Just as the commodity owner understood himself to be autonomous (to the extent that his action was not governed by obedience to others), the independence of each family member rested on an understanding of the family as an intimate community free from social force.[20]

Thus analysis of the origins of the bourgeois public sphere implies an assessment of the *structures* of modern civil society that goes beyond the reductionist and one-sided vision of Marx as well as the unwelcome alternative provided by Hegel. Similarly, Arendt's conception of publicity does not spare his social realm either. With the exception of a few extraordinary but short-lived events, according to Arendt, the rest of modernity in the West signalled the decline of the free public sphere altogether.[21] The emergence of civil society as a system of needs, of the market and the system of social labor as a publically relevant private sphere has, according to Arendt, blurred the distinction between private and public and destroyed the dignity of both. Habermas, however, realizes that Arendt's restriction of public life to the heights of political deliberation excludes all "social levels" and her elimination of social and economic issues from genuine public dialogue, reveals an anachronistic bias toward the rigid dichotomies of

20. *Ibid.*, p. 64.
21. Hannah Arendt, *The Human Condition* (Chicago, 1958), p. 50.

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public and private, *polis* and *oikos,* typical of Greek society.[22] Her one-sided identification of modern "politics" with the administrative apparatus of the state, and of the social sphere with the economy, neglects the unique forms of bourgeois public that emerged within that social space.

In effect, Habermas shows that it was not the emergence of the social sphere that destroyed the possibility of freedom, since the separation of state and civil society allowed for the emergence of new forms of autonomy and satisfaction. Rather, he locates the decline of public freedom in the repoliticization of civil society from above and the abolition of the independent social sphere in late capitalism. Indeed, the migration of the "reproduction of life" from the household to society, and the emergence of the economy as a crucial sphere of public interest, triggered the critical functions of the bourgeois public sphere. It was the very public-relatedness of the social sphere that became the terrain of a struggle between government authorities and the emerging bourgeois public over control of that sphere. Accordingly, Habermas reconstructs the "other side" of modern politics and socio-economic organization that entailed emancipatory movements *vis à vis* the anachronistic model presupposed by Arendt. Habermas' model of the social sphere is thus *broader* than the system of needs and labor, and yet free of Hegel's corporatist solution. His analysis is systematic rather than historically comprehensive, insofar as it deals with the institutional structures that allowed for the emergence of autonomy, privacy, individuality, and public freedom as universal ideals.

Accordingly, the core institutions of modern society — the bourgeois family, civil society, the literary and political public — are analyzed both in terms of the "increment in freedom" which these structures institutionalized as well as their limits. Habermas' strategy is to articulate the institutional gains of modernity (universal norms) and to preserve them. Thus, insofar as the norms of "humanity" and "intimacy" based on free individual choice are located in the intimate and not, as in the Greek model, in the public sphere, there is an emancipatory moment inherent in the bourgeois family.[23] It is within the family seen as a sphere free from social force that "The three moments of free will, community of love, and education come together to form the concept of humanity.[24]

The literary public, gathering in cafes, salons, and clubs, retains the universal principles of free will and humanity that first grew within the small family, adding to them its own principle of reason generated through the discussion of enlightened assembled private persons, as the sole tribunal of legitimate judgement. The uniqueness of the *bourgeois* as opposed to the *Greek* public, is that it consists of *private persons publically assembled in the social sphere* already individuated via the family and the market. Unlike

22. J. Habermas, "Hannah Arendt's Communicative Concept of Power," *Social Research,* Vol. 44, No. 1 (1977).
23. Habermas, *Strukturwandel, op.cit.,* pp. 60-69.
24. *Ibid.,* p. 64.

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Marx, Habermas does not restrict the genesis of "bourgeois" norms to the sphere of circulation. For the presupposition of the discussants' parity abstracted from status considerations, derives from the nature of the literary public which makes the power of reason its guiding principle.

The politicization of the literary public through the press, political clubs and voluntary associations, turned the bourgeois public sphere into the critical form before which the state must justify its laws and finally, into the sole legitimate source of law. The criteria of generality and rational formality as norms of law thus derive as much from the politicized public gathering in the social sphere as from the market structure. Habermas, to be sure, echoes Hegel and Marx in arguing that the sphere of circulation together with private law and protected contract relations generated the norms of personhood, reciprocity, justice, and equality. But the communicative process of interaction of a politically functioning public of private persons, distinct from the official apparatus of the state, was the primary source of the politically relevant norms of universality of public law, and the right to participate in forming the political will.

More important, however, is the demonstration that only in connection with the politically functioning public and the normative concept of public opinion related to it, do universal principles attain a democratic thrust. The concept of enlightened public opinion as the locus of popular sovereignity was introduced by the physiocrats and Kant. Previously, it meant little more that the mass of private opinion of individuals which political authorities would do well to consider, but which had no normative power. Even Rousseau linked the general will to a mystical, unreflective concept of public opinion.

On the other hand, the interactive model of public opinion (developed by Kant and his physiocratic predecessors) posits that the reasoning and interactive process of discussion between autonomous persons in a context free from domination remains the sole guarantee of a democratic and ethically ordered political order. Following Kant, Habermas links the *formal legality of the state with the presence of enlightened critical public opinion* as the central criteria for the establishment of public freedom. The public sphere thus replaces Hegel's corporations as the space in which political education in the Greek sense takes place, thus enabling the individual to act as a citizen.[25]

To be sure, Habermas is well aware that the entire private sphere is plagued by a fundamental ambivalence *vis à vis* the unviersal principles it generates. Tension arises between the self-understanding of the participants as simply individuals and the identification of autonomous individuality with property-ownership and education. Just as the equality and justice rooted in the market collided with the inequality and injustice in labor, so too the

25. Habermas' later discursive model of truth, his reformulation of the Weberian concept of legitimation, and his famous "linguistic turn" clearly have their roots in the normative concept of the bourgeois public realm whose guiding principle is the attainment of a rational consensus based on the unconstrained formation of enlightened public opinion.

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concept of the family collided with its real economic base — property. The ambivalence of the family lies in its dual role as an agent of society and as a sphere emancipated from society — an ambivalence expressed in the contradiction between the hierarchical position of family members and the claims of human intimacy. The same ambivalence distorted the literary and political public spaces, insofar as the admission criteria, education and ownership, were clearly not accessible to the population as a whole. However, if ideology is not simply a socially necessary illusion, then the exclusiveness of the press, salons, clubs, and the contradictions of the family and the economy, do not detract from the fact that the norms of autonomy, universality of access, plurality of institutions for political participation, autonomy and democracy, were at least institutionalized as principles. The point is not to abandon the universal principles that distinguish the bourgeois from the Greek public, but to extend their possibilities to those excluded.

Indeed, the thrust of Habermas' analysis of the contradictory institutionalization of the bourgeois public sphere is to show that, despite its ideological functions, its principles were included in the constitutions, culture and at times the political process of 19th century liberal capitalist societies. The institutionalizaiton of the bourgeois public sphere through the establishment of constitutional democracies was contradictory precisely for the reasons indicated by Marx: the economic relations of civil society presupposed by the public realm and the state, to which it became attached in the form of parliaments, were neither just nor free of domination. With the establishment of formal democracy, the politically functioning public became an organ of the state itself, claiming to ensure the connection between law and public opinion, and to bind the state to a system of norms resulting from a rational consensus rather than arbitrary political will. This claim of representative government to reign without domination was, as Marx pointed out, the ideological linchpin of the modern state. It conveniently concealed the non-public organs of the state — bureaucracy, army, police — behind the fiction of domination-free self-rule of sovereign, enlightened public opinion.

Yet, the principles of the public sphere were objectified in the constitutions of formal democracy and supplied the surplus meaning required for the legitimacy of self-claimed democratic states.[26] Habermas identifies three groups of fundamental rights, articulated in the constitutions, meant to secure the normative presuppositions of the public realm: 1. The rights

26. Habermas, *Strukturwandel, op. cit.*, pp. 101-112. Habermas locates another source of the "surplus meaning" of formal democracy in the contradictory institutionalization of natural law theories in the French and American constitutions. Through a complicated reconstruction of the works of Hobbes, Rousseau and Kant, he demonstrates that the notion of the "social contract" as the origin and basis of the social and political order implies that the legitimacy of that order rests not only on the formality of its laws, but also on the original interaction context of free individuals assembling, rationally calculating their interests, and constituting a polity based on free consensus. In short, the principle of the social contract is conceived as an act of founding that roots the legitimacy of the formally democratic constitutional states in the inherently radical democratic norm. Cf. J. Habermas, "Natural Law and Revolution," in *Theory and Practice, op.cit.*, p. 85.

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referring to freedom of opinion, speech, press, association and assembly specifically reflect the principle of the public as a politically relevant sphere of private persons, 2. the rights protecting the intimate sphere, i.e. those of personal freedom, restricting search and seizures and, 3. the rights securing civil society, i.e., those protecting private property and equality before the law. Finally, the principle of publicity of parlimentary debates was meant to ensure the influence of public opinion on its representatives. Accordingly, the incorporation of these principles in the objective constitutions of formal democracies established immanent standards according to which the institutions of the state are still forced to legitimate themselves. Even Marx, according to Habermas, envisioned the realization of these principles on an egalitarian basis through the revolutionary activity of the excluded working class.

However, "The dialectic of the bourgeois public sphere did not turn out as anticipated by early socialist expectations. The expansion of political equality to all social classes occurred in the framework of class society itself.[27] The thesis of the decline of the public realm with its democratization is well known. The transformation of the family with the loss of its socializing and economic functions, the massification of culture and the substitution of passive consumers for the literary public of enlightened participants, the bureaucratization of parties and the transformation of the press from the genuine expression of public opinion to the instrument of organized particular interests moulding "public opinion" through advertising techniques — these are familiar Frankfurt School theses which Habermas more or less reproduces. His discussion of "mass society" differs from that of Adorno and Horkheimer not in terms of his conclusions but in its stress of the structural change in the relation between state and civil society as the root of the previously discussed institutional transformations. What he calls the "refeudalization" of civil society (or the acquisitions of public authority by private, collectively organized social powers that has accompanied state interventionism) accounts for the simultaneity of the democratization of political life and the structural decline of the public sphere, its loss of a critical function, and the severance of public opinion from practical power. The assumption by corporations of responsibility for "public services," the collective organization of interest, and the tendency toward the repolitization of private law, and not simply the "intrusion of ignorant masses into the public realm," are the forces that undermine political freedom.

The most significant aspect of this analysis of the changed relation between state and society is the argument that the entire institutional framework of modern society has been radically altered. Both the appropriation of political power by collectively organized private groups and the assumption of social tasks once privately handled by the executive bureaucracy allows for the integration of state and society without the detour of the functioning public

27. Habermas, *Strukturwandel, op.cit.*, p. 158.

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realm. With the powerful collective organization of private interests and the shift of competence from parliament to the executive which operates independently of norms, the official public space is reduced to the competition of a plurality of interest groups *no longer making universal claims*. Moreover, the unmediated penetration of particularistic group interests into the public domain prevents the very thematization of the compromise material itself. [28]

Thus, the claim of the public sphere to be the organizing principle of the state is now purely ideological. The norms once inherent in the constitutions of formal democracies are no longer immanent in the institutional articulation of welfare state systems. This loss of immanence results only *secondarily* from changes in ideology. It is due above all to the alleged destruction of the private sphere through the penetration of the state and the growth of semi-political corporate bodies within civil society. Once the line between public and private is blurred, the principles of the old constitutions become mere formulas. *Here then, we are confronted with the central contradiction in Habermas' political writings, one which is exacerbated rather than resolved in his later work.* The assertion that the principles of the bourgeois public sphere still inform political life in late capitalism and the demonstration that the institutional articulation on which these principles were based has been eradicated. The hope of *Strukturwandel der Oeffentlichkeit* was that an immanent critique could thematize the emancipatory and utopian content of the norms immanent to the formally democratic state and thereby make possible political praxis according to concrete criteria. But Habermas maintains that there is a radical discontinuity between late capitalism and its predecessors insofar as the institutional loci of the norms of these constitutions have been radically altered, rendering the norms increasingly irrelevant to the rationalized and reified institutions of the welfare state. It is crucial to understand that, despite all the subsequent changes of theoretical strategy in his later writings, Habermas never abandoned the thesis that the repoliticization of civil society destroyed the immanence of emancipatory norms. If his crisis theory of late capitalism reprents a break with the static vision of decline of the Frankfurt theorists, the one-dimensionality thesis remains to haunt his political analysis and to block the road back to immanent critique.

Correspondingly, it is not surprising that Habermas can offer only an abstract alternative to the present organization of late capitalism, for on the basis of his original analysis of the decline of the public realm, he can neither situate his utopia of political freedom nor identify a dynamic pressing toward its realization. Moreover, the "utopian" model of his early writings for a democratically organized polity is strangely at odds with the thrust of his discussion of the bourgeois public sphere. The analysis of the institutions which the former presupposed indicate that a clear distinction between public

28. *Ibid.*, p. 214. See also Otto Kirchheimer, "Changes in the Structure of Political Compromise," in *Politics, Law and Social Change, op.cit.*, pp. 131-159.

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and private is essential to a freely functioning democratic public life.

Habermas explicitly follows the logic of emancipation inherent in his immanent critique only regarding the family. Having indicated that the problematic moment of the family is not its privacy as such, but rather that it is burdened with societal tasks — providing for economic welfare through property or labor — he argued that a truly emancipated intimate sphere would be realized if the family were to be freed from economic functions, and from the control of society, and rendered truly private. Only then could the emancipatory moments of the intimate sphere become unambiguous. Accordingly, the emancipation of the other moments of the private sphere — civil society, the public — would entail not their abolition, but their liberation from restrictions placed on them by the imperatives of capitalism. In other words, one would have to envision a "socialist civil society" — i.e., a social sphere independent of the state which allows for need articulation, public assembly and the generation of power which could control whatever centralized forces remained in the hands of the state. The prerequisite of an institutional articulation that could preserve the gains of modernity while countering its new forms of domination requires precisely a revised distinction between public and private, and the protection, through formal law, of both.

Habermas' alternative, however, contradicts the most important lessons to be learned from his study of the public realm. For instead of following the above strategy, he advocates the merger of civil society with the state. He maintains that "...in an industrially advanced society, private autonomy can be maintained and assured only as the derivative of a total political organization."[29] The distinction between human rights and political rights is seen as untenable; material guarantees must step into the place of formal negative rights to assure distributive justice in the division of the social product and political freedom. He thus reinterprets the three sets of fundamental rights objectified in modern constitutions in terms of positive political rights that must be secured within the framework of the state. Accordingly, the structure of personal autonomy and of the political public sphere must change. He argues that in a new emancipated social organization, people would be individuated in the public space, instead of a public composed of already individuated people.[30] This new type of public would be located within the collectively organized party and interest group organizations. The only guarantee against the drawbacks of corporativism provided in this ambiguous model is the retention of universal impersonal law by the state, and the thematization of the expansion of the productive forces as the potential general interest of all groups. But these guarantees are rather weak in the face of the threat of statist domination and corporativist appropriation of political power that follows from the few elements of Marxist orthodoxy that Habermas inherits.

It is clear that Habermas assumes that the alternative facing modern

29. Habermas, "Natural Law and Revolution," *op.cit.*, p. 117.
30. Habermas, *Strukturwandel, op.cit.*, p. 157.

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industrial society is between the control of social production and distribution by collectively organized quasi-public particularistic interest groups or the control of the economy through the planning mechanisms of a democratically organized state.[31] In opting for the latter, however, he was unable to uncover a dynamic pointing to the democratization of the state. Indeed, the residually statist bias of his analysis undermines his discussion of democratic norms.

His analysis of the new technocratic ideologies extends rather than counters the thesis regarding the loss of normative immanence. In "Technology and Science as 'Ideology'" he argues that the legitimation needs in all formally democratic states are now satisfied in part by ideologies that detach society's self-understanding from the frame of reference of communicative and symbolic interaction and replaces it with a scientific model. The new institutional situation of the welfare state and technocratic ideology correspond to one another insofar as each tends to sever the criteria for justifying the organization of social life from normative claims. Technocratic ideology serves administered politics in a doubly effective manner. First, as the leading productive force, technology and science prescribe the paradigm for the mode of organization of behavior in large organizations. Second, by providing legitimations that cast off ideology-cum-utopian truth content and repressing ethics as a category of life, technocratic ideologies foster adaptive behaviors required by administrative forms of domination.

Thus, the thesis embraced earlier is now propounded in an even more emphatic form through a curious appropriation of Weber's category of rationalization: i.e., that the increased rationalization of modern society in the context of state intervention, destroys both the power of tradition and of the market to supply normatively based legitimations for the state.[32] This means that the mode of immanent critique must be abandoned as inappropriate to contemporary conditions.

Accordingly, Habermas follows out two interconnected paths, already alluded to in 1968, to rescue the critical project from the implications of his assumptions. The first, which ultimately led to the theory of communicative competence, was to return to philosophy to secure the universal principles that are no longer anchored in the institutional reality of objective spirit. The second was to develop a new crisis theory of late capitalism, linked to a theory of evolution that presupposed an additional logic of rationalization carrying emancipatory potential on the level of moral development and socializaion. In other words, the response to the supposed tendencies of modern society that threaten ethical interaction, was to try to ground at least the possibility of practical reason, and then to identify possible breaks in the structure of late capitalism.

The groundwork for the former is laid in the unfolding of a second process of rationalization that could counter the effects of the one-dimensionality

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31. *Ibid.*, p. 271.

32. Jürgen Habermas, "Technology and Science as 'Ideology'," in *Toward a Rational Society* (Boston, 1970), pp. 101-102.

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thesis that is on one level accepted despite his criticism of Marcuse. Habermas argues that rationalization as the extension of subsystems of purposive rational action could be rendered harmless if restricted to its proper domain and accompanied by a process of rationalization at the level of communicative interaction. The latter would entail the removal of restrictions on public discussion of the suitability and desirability of action-orienting norms. It would involve a process of generalized reflection such that: "A rationalization of social norms would, in fact, be characterized by a decreasing degree of oppressiveness. . . a decreasing degree of rigidity. . . , and an approximation of a type of behavioral control that would allow role distance and the flexible application of norms that, while well intentioned, would be accessible to reflection. Rationalization measured by changes in these three dimensions. . . would furnish the members of society with the opportunity for further emancipation and progressive individuation."[33] As Honneth has pointed out,[34] by expanding the self-constitutive process of the human species to include interaction as well as labor, Habermas could get beyond the identification of historical development with the expansion of instrumental reason, and unfold a philosophical approach that did not foreclose the elaboration of emancipatory dynamics (the second process of rationalization) internal to historical processes. However, Habermas' acceptance of a Frankfurt version of the rationalization process *vis à vis* the normative and institutional articulate of late capitalism (instrumentalization and destruction of norms) vitiated the gains implied by the abandonment of the corresponding philosophy of history.

The fundamental shift signalled by *Legitimation Crisis* regarding the earlier analysis of welfare state capitalism is its presentation of a dynamic system susceptible to crises. In the place of immanent critique, Habermas resuscitates the mode of defetishizing critique based in Marx's theory of the crisis. Clearly, his intent is to come to grips with the developments in institutions and ideology that point to objective possibilities for emancipaion. Although the revised theory of the crisis is able to point to systemic contradictions and potential conflicts in late capitalism, Habermas is unable to present his central thesis convincingly: i.e., that the crisis tendencies of modern capitalism point to a reactivizaiton of a democratic public realm. This is not because his theory cannot locate addressees, but because it rests on a new Weber-Marx systhesis that posits capitalist development as the tendential destruction of traditional and even normative integration, and sees social change only on the level of system crises. In short, the assumptions underlying Habermas' attempt to develop a political crisis theory for late capitalism seem to thwart his own hopes for a progressive outcome of the crisis.

Due to fundamental transformations in the structure and ideology of late capitalism, Habermas maintains that the theory of the crisis can no longer

33. *Ibid.*, p. 119.
34. Axel Honneth, "Adorno and Habermas," *Telos* 39 (Spring 1979), pp. 45-61.

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take an economic form alone, nor accomplish its task in the framework of a single critique of a single institutional sphere. Accordingly, "Crises in social systems are...produced...through structurally inherent system imperatives that are incompatible and cannot be hierarchically integrated... only when members of a society experience structural alterations as critical for continued existence and feel their social identity threatened can we speak of crises."[35] Hidden in this difficult language is a dual concern. Habermas wants to preserve the mode of critical reconstruction of the reproductive logic of a social system initiated by Marx, while reintroducing the political dimension lost by Marxism. He thus reconstructs the central categories of Weberian *political* sociology: power, rationalization, and legitimation, and integrates them to a revised Marxian framework to unfold a theory of crisis.

An adequate concept of crisis must grasp the connection between "system integration," or the specific steering mechanisms and organizational principles of a society, and " social integration," or the legitimating normative structures and principles in terms of which needs and interest are interpreted as well as motivations generated within the symbolically structured life world. Yet, despite his assertion that Marx's productivism was rooted in the lack of an adequate distinction between labor and interaction, and despite his own distinction between social and system integration, Habermas insists that insofar as *19th century capitalism* is concerned, Marx developed an adequate crisis theory. In one of his earliest essays on Marx, Habermas justifies choosing the critique of political economy as the mode to criticize liberal capitalism on the ground that the objective crisis of liberal capitalism centers around an economy whose fetishistic social relations affect both the participants in the process of production and the science which analyzes these relations.[36] The crucial argument, however, appears in "Technology and Science as 'Ideology'." Here Habermas maintains that the critique of bourgeois ideology could take the form of the critique of political economy because the institutional framework of society found its locus in the relations of production, and its legitimacy in the ideology of equivalent exchange.[37] He argues that because of the separation of state and civil society and the institution of the market as a self- regulating mechanism, the capitalist system was able to legitimate itself without calling to the "heights of cultural tradition."

In this model the market alone provides the necessary legitimation for liberal capitalism. Habermas strengthens this argument by linking it to a Weberian theory of rationalization such that tradition no longer can provide legitimations for the economic or political order. With the growth of subsystems of purposive-rational actions, traditional structures are subordinated to universal principles of instrumental rationality that call into question the cultural validity of intersubjectively shared tradition.

35. Jürgen Habermas, *Legitimation Crisis* (Boston, 1975).
36. Habermas, "Between Philosophy and Science: Marxism as Critique," in *Theory and Practice, op.cit.*, p. 221.
37. Habermas, "Technology and Science as 'Ideology'," *op.cit.*, p. 100.

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Accordingly, traditional world views and objectifications are reshaped into subjective belief systems robbing them of their ability to legitimate the political order. The second form of rationalization, in the medium of symbolic interaction contributes to the emasculation of tradition. Yet, in the abstract, it contains emancipatory potential. Capitalism, however, solves the problem of the breakdown of tradition by providing its own legitimations from the market system rather than from the cultural system.

In *Legitimation Crisis* the efficacy of the value form as an integrating mechanism is limited to the bourgeois. Habermas conceeds, in short, that the loyalty of the masses is maintained more through a mixture of traditionalistic ties, fatalistic willingness to follow, lack of perspective, and naked repression, rather than through the convincing force of bourgeois ideologies.[38] The rationalization process succeeds *vis à vis* the population in denuding traditional worldviews of their legitimating functions apparently only in late capitalism.

The difficulty with this synthesis is, however, that Habermas *has already demonstrated* that, even for the bourgeois, the state *certainly* was not legitimated solely through the market. As he has argued, the liberal state drew some of its crucial legitimations from the institutions of the public sphere. Whereas the market ideology can, in its own peculiar manner, satisfy the claim of justice, the claims of political freedom and fraternity were rooted in the principles of the bourgeois public realm. Moreover, although various strata in civil society could attain *social identity* as classes because of the separation of civil society and the state, and could be grasped through the systemic analysis of the relation of wage labor capital, the maintenance of *national identity* remained the task of the state. But Habermas addresses the role of national identity in social integration for the first time in *Communication and the Evolution of Society,* and there, only in passing.

Nevertheless, his earlier political writings did not exclude a consideration of the role of tradition in social integration and in the constitution of national identies. For the rich concept of the private sphere does not exclude a plethora of legitimating and integrating structures beyond the market as essential to the maintenance of the social order as does the Marxian model of liberal capitalism. To return to the Marxian mode of liberal capitalism with its narrow concept of civil society and social integration, along with the rationalization theorem, prevents an analysis of traditions as well as a critical questioning of institutions that might yield immanent norms. Indeed, the very thesis of the crisis potential of late capitalism rests on the assumption that traditions, worldviews, and bourgeois ideologies have all been deactivated. The corresponding attempt to account for social identity in systemic terms prevents the important distinction between system and social integration from fully developing.

The supersession of liberal by "organized state regulated capitalism"

38. Habermas, *Legitimation Crisis, op.cit.,* p. 22.

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requires a new theory of the crisis. It cannot be an economic theory in the old sense because the interventionist state *openly* has assumed responsibility for steering the system to avoid breakdowns by partially taking over integrative functions from the market and acquiring and expanding the burden of legitimation. Since the market no longer appears as a self-regulating mechanism, the function of legitimation cannot be restricted to it. Insofar as the state partly replaces the market mechanism compensating for its dysfunctions, economic crisis tendencies stemming from the still unresolved contradiction between socialized production and private investment are displaced onto the political system. The state's strategies to deal with the crisis are contingent upon a planning capacity limited by free private investment policies and by the need to maintain the capitalist system in the face of competing claims made by individual capitalists and the unseen population. The key crisis potentials or rationality deficit of the administration, however, lie not simply in its inability to steer between contradictory imperatives, but rather in the need to depoliticize its interventionist and planning role to avoid criticism of its presupposed goals. In other words, the state must refetishize the steering function in order to defuse its now openly thematized responsibility for economic growth and stability.

But rationality deficits in administrative steering do not directly threaten social identity due to what Habermas calls the new class compromise.[39] State interventionism does repoliticize class relations by creating a quasi-political wage structure and quasi-corporatist mechanism of interest reconciliation. But this repoliticization from above serves to immunize the original class conflicts and filter dysfunctional effects of the averted crisis over a constantly changing variety of interest groups, transforming everyone into a potential victim. The "crisis of crisis management" is only a necessary and not sufficient moment of a full political crisis because the failure of the state to satisfy the interests of all competing groups does not of itself result in a challenge to social identity or legitimacy. It does not directly trigger political confrontation between clearly recognized antagonists. Rather, state interventionism leads to the social atomization of classes.

But there is another reason why "system crises" displaced from the economy to the state do not become crises of identity. Because normatively based ideologies of equivalence exchange become the "one-dimensional" technocratic ideologies, the administrative system is uncoupled from normative claims altogether. Because of this change, a crisis theory in the old sense with the claim of simultaneously functioning as a defetishizing critique and as an immanent critique that opens norms to reflection and provides an orientation to practice is no longer possible. Since images of "the good life" are no longer immanent to the steering mechanisms of late capitalism, a critical theory cannot content itself with identifying steering problems in the hope that crises at this level could trigger crisis of identity. In addition, it must

39. *Ibid.*, pp. 37-40.

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address the mechanisms that generate mass loyalty and establish the requisite structures that secure social identity. Thus, instead of reducing the concept of political crisis to the "crisis of crisis management," Habermas broadens the concept of the "political" beyond adminstration to include the normative dimensions necessary for meaningful legitimation. He argues that during the course of capitalist development, the political system shifts its boundares not only into the economic system but also into the socio-cultural system. Thus, a "political crisis" must involve both a rationality deficit and a deficit of legitimation. It must, in short, question the normative structures through which needs, social identities, and motivations necessary for social integration are secured.

The assumption that norms must still direct social action, and that the administrative system, despite its ideology, still rests on normative structures (provided by the socio-cultural system) for social integration and legitimation is essential to the theory of legitimation crisis. Underlying the theory of a legitimation crisis is the presupposition that the administrative generation of meaning is impossible, and that the administrative manipulation of cultural affairs has the unintended consequence of thematizing norms previously fixed by tradition. Such a crisis would be an identity crisis resulting "from the fact that the fulfillment of governmental planning tasks places in question the structure of the depoliticized public realm and thereby the formally democratic securing of the private autonomous disposition of the means of production."[40] Accordingly, Habermas' distinction between the communicative genesis, the employment, and the acquisition of power is developed into a crisis theory. This theory hinges on the idea that expanding the administrative use of power threatens the genesis of power and legitimacy, triggering demands for participation in will formation.

Now, remember, the Weberian analysis of the mode of legitimation appropriate to modern society — rational legal authority — must be reinterpreted in terms of the normative concept of political power. Indeed, Habermas challenges the formalistic, decisionistic, and psychologistic aspects of Weber's concept of "rational legal authority" as the principle of legitimacy of the modern state. On the one hand, he argues that the legitimacy of the formally democratic state cannot rest simply on the formality of its procedures, for these also require legitimation. Formal law and rational legal authority draw legitimacy by referring to the potential rational will and consensus of all. On the other hand, Habermas' asserts that it is possible to separate generalizable interests from the particular, and distinguish between a rational and a mere *de facto* consensus. But this fact challenges Weber's linkage of legitimacy to non-rational beliefs (irrational value choice) with the claim that there is a relation between legitimation and truth. In one sense, this claim relates back to the communicative concept of power tying the

40. *Ibid.*, p. 46.

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source of legitimacy in any society to an implicit consensus. Accordingly, all legitimate authority makes practical truth claims regarding the correctness of the norms and values in whose name it is exercised. Insofar as "rational legal authority" is concerned, the claim that there is a relation of legitimation to "truth" derives from the presupposition, underlying even technocratic legitimations, that the state, as the bearer of public morality, may institutionalize only generalized, universal interests. Revising the psychologistic basis of legitimation assumes that once the genesis and not only the validity of norms is questioned, their legitimacy requires a rational rather than an empirical or traditional basis. Once the "level of justification" or the kind of reason accepted as the basis of legitmacy becomes the criteria of "generalizable interests," then the truth claims no longer rest on the content of specific norms, but on the process of reflection and the procedures of justification themselves.[41]

Obviously, Habermas' interest in developing a truth-related concept of legitimation is to provide a safeguard against irrationalism and a means for re-establishing the link between politics and morality. The communicative ethic, elaborated as a principle of universalization which, unlike Kantian morality, does not rest on the repression of needs and interests, provides a counterfactual model of ethically oriented interaction. It is, however, grounded not in the objective institutions of modern society but in a linguistic theory (universal pragmatics). This structure roots the discursive redemption of normative validity claims in the intersubjectivity of speech and in a theory of evolution that tries to show that the movement of reality is toward an ever closer approximation of this ethic. Linking legitimation in modern society to practical truth claims and elaborating a communicative ethic is Habermas' way of indicating the direction that an emancipatory outcome of a legitimation crisis must take.

While the concept of an undistorted speech situation guaranteeing the truth claims of legitimation is actually a counter-factual idea, it is crucial to Habermas' argument that legitimation crises today must reactivate the public realm. In short, it is the basis for maintaining that political crises which challenge the state's exclusive proprietorship of public life would trigger claims for political participation based on universal principles as well as particular interests. We can now grasp the theorem of political crisis presented by Habermas, along with its limits. For a political crisis to occur there must be a breakdown in the efficacy of formally arranged democratic institutions to elicit mass loyalty without participation, to conceal the contradiction between administratively socialized production and private appropriation, to marshall the motivations assuring the requisite civic and familial privatism, and to justify structural depoliticization.

Whereas state interventionism improves the management of economic crises, it increases the likelihood of a legitimation deficit. Assuming

41. Jürgen Habermas, *Communication and the Evolution of Society* (Boston, 1979), pp. 183, 185.

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responsibility for crisis management renders the state vulnerable to the programmatic demand that it has placed on itself. Thematizing the steering problems formerly left to the nature-like play of the market simultaneously suspends the ideological support of equivalence exchange and places in question the structure of the depoliticized public realm. With every penetration from above by the state into socio-cultural life, the political system risks thematizing new issues formerly withheld from the public — educational curricula, city planning, health insurance, etc. The partial recoupling of the economic system to the political and the moving of the political system into cultural areas disturb the reservoir of automatically accepted traditions necessary for legitimation. Administrative steering itself, irrespective of its success or failure in satisfying needs and in crisis management, thus produces unsettling effects. But these legitimation deficits would lead to political crisis and reactivate the public realm only if accompanied by a motivation deficit — that is, a gap between the motivations required by the state, educational, and occupational systems, and those provided by the socio-cultural system. A legitimation crisis must be based on a motivation crisis.

This brings us to the fundamental shift from the analysis in *Strukturwandel* and in *Legitimation Crisis*. Although Habermas retains the thesis of the structural change and decline of the bourgeois public sphere, he now presents the changed relation between state and civil society, or state interventionism, as the major potential threat to legitimation. State interventionism, in other words, is now a threat to the separation of administrative decision-making from the motives of citizens, and even more significant, as a contributing factor to the decline of traditions and ideologies essential to the legitimation of depoliticization. The main presupposition underlying the likelihood of a motivation deficit is that "bourgeois culture was never able to reproduce itself from itself and legitimate capitalist society, but rather was always dependent on remnants from previous cultural traditions."[42] But changes in the socio-cultural system triggered by changes in the social structure combine to undermine these traditions. Accordingly, Habermas tries to show that the key motivational syndromes of civic and familial privatism (political abstinence combined with orientation to career, leisure, consumption), crucial to the legitimacy of depoliticization, are breaking down due to the erosion of the organic context in which these traditional attitudes were produced and the impossibility of administratively regenerating them; the undermining of specifically bourgeois ideologies; the inability of bourgeois culture to rely on its own secular motivations; and the continued relevance of bourgeois cultural structures.

The first and second of these propositions rest on the previously described concept of rationalization. Again a thesis reappears that maintains the capitalist development of subsystems of purposive-rational action —

42. Habermas, *Legitimation Crisis, op.cit.*, p. 77.

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incompatible with traditional world views — destroys the efficacy of tradition, religion and nationalism to provide motivations that could serve the purposes of legitimation. Habermas cites the scientization of professional practice, the expansion of the service sector, the administrative regulation of areas of social intercourse previously regulated informally, the commercialization of culture and the scientization of child rearing as all indicating the spread of purposive-rational action into the zones of communicative action. Thus, cultural traditions allegedly are losing their character as world views, philosophy is denuded of metaphysical pretension, and the "atheism of the masses" becomes a threat even to the old utopian contents of tradition.

Bourgeois ideologies are also threatened. Both achievement ideology and possessive individualism are being undermined with the changed relation between state and civil society. The shift from the market to the educational system as the locus for the equalization of opportunity, and the increased importance of the public infrastructure and collective commodities make the interpretation and satisfaction of needs on an individual level more and more difficult. Moreover, the secular motivations generated within bourgeois culture: science, post-auratic art, and universalistic morality, while ambivalent, contain explosive ingredients *vis-à-vis* privatism. The latter is the most significant, insofar as it is in the development of moral structures that Habermas bases his argument for the likelihood of a progressive outcome to legitimation crises.

According to Habermas, although the binding force of universal value systems in liberal capitalism derived from the market ideology and the non-interventionist, formally democratic state (both of which have crumbled as the foundation for legitimacy in late capitalism), the *memory* of universal morality cannot simply be erased. Thus, the conflict between the universal structures that still have imperative force and the political-economic structures of late capitalism could be resolved either by moving from bourgeois formal law to a new political universal morality based on a communicative ethic, or by uncoupling the socialization process from the cultural system. The latter possibility would mean the 'end of individuality' as we know it, for normative structures would no longer be internalized by individuals through their socialization but rather identity-constituting socialization would be severed from norms and truth claims altogether.

Habermas argues that such a possibility cannot be discounted at this point. In order to provide another alternative, he maintains that cultural systems follow an independent evolutionary logic of moral development. On this basis, he attempts to demonstrate that his "partiality for reason" is not arbitrary, but rests on the possibility of a "non-contingent transition" from modern formal law to the state of post-conventional morality. But, the theory of evolution and moral development sees a positive outcome for the pending legitimation crises only in the most abstract sense (i.e., it shows that the developmental logic of world views does not in principle exclude continuing a mode of socialization related to norms of the transition to post-conventional

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morality). It is not clear, however, that Habermas can dispense with a third possible outcome to potential legitimation crises — the re-emergence of traditions that could link behavior to norms without allowing for their discursive redemption. Indeed, the thesis that tradition (especially religion) has dried up as a source for legitimation, and that the logic of development of normative structures precludes the emergence of functional equivalents for spent traditions, is unconvincing and would have weight *only* if past traditions were truly spent. But does rationalization and secularization really deactivate tradition and religion as effectively as Habermas seems to think? Is this something that can be argued on the level of systemic crisis theory or, even worse, through a theory of evolution? Or is it rather an assertion that would have to be tested within a series of comparative analyses of historically and culturally specific traditions of particular societies (nationalism, religious traditions, political traditions)?

These objections are not trivial, and imply a second set of even more fundamental questions. As Habermas demonstrated in his earlier work on the public, the principles of individual autonomy, personhood, democracy, freedom, enlightened and critical public opinion, etc., were rooted in social institutions that gave these norms a certain *veritas in re*. The structures of the intimate sphere, civil society, the public realm, the state, and their interrelation were the original loci for the fundamental rights embedded in formally democratic constitutions, as well as the source of legitimacy underlying the state. However, Habermas has argued that these institutions have been so transformed through state interventionism and rationalization as to render the previously mentioned norms increasingly abstract and remote. Bourgeois consciousness, he argues, has become cynical. Worse, the bourgeois values have "gone into retirement," and there are no norms and values to which an immanent critique might appeal with the expectation of agreement.[43] One must pose the question Habermas himself asks, but does not answer: Why does formal democracy have to be retained at all in advanced capitalist societies?[44] What precludes the acceptance of the gradual abolition of these civil and political rights by a populace to whom their relevance is no longer evident? What prevents the administrative system from justifying the abolition of these forms in the name of technical rationality? Why, in short, should the thematization of responsibility by the state for welfare trigger demands for democratic participation in decision making? Why are demands for political power placed in the hands of experts rather than "corrupt politicians and bureaucrats?"

Systematic crisis theory and evolution theories of moral development can, perhaps, reveal structural contradictions in late capitalist societies and point to the abstract principles that would have to be realized for an emancipatory resolution to these contradictions. Elaborating the theory of communication

43. Habermas, *Communication and the Evolution of Society, op.cit.*, p. 97.
44. Habermas, *Legitimation Crisis, op.cit.*, p. 74.

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provides an important antidote to corporatist or pluralist ideologies insofar as it argues for the possibility of a universal morality that does not rest on renunciation or particularistic assumptions. But a different analysis would be needed to assess the holding power of democratic *traditions*, and to analyze the possible institutional bases within late capitalism that could secure individuation, or autonomy, as norms to be radicalized. Otherwise, the questions posed at the end of *Legitimation Crisis* could have no positive response: "If world views have foundered on the separation of cognitive from socially integrative components, if world maintaining interpretive systems today belong irretrievably to the past, then what fulfills the moral-practical task of constituting ego- and group identity?.... Or is a universal morality without cognitive roots condemned to shrink to a grandiose tautology in which a claim to reason overtaken by evolution now merely opposes the empty affirmation of itself to the objectivistic self-understanding of men?"[45]

By asserting that rationalization has abolished those traditions that could provide legitimation and by assuming that state interventionism has really undermined the emancipatory moments of the family, civil society, and the public, Habermas has blocked the analytical path to the very areas that might provide an answer to these questions, namely: the institutions of democratic traditions or national and political cultures of particular societies. The attempt to build a dynamic theory of late capitalism has been bought at the price of a theory that might locate action-orienting, emancipatory norms in objective institutions. Indeed, one must ask whether political, as opposed to economic, crisis tendencies can be adequately assessed on the level of systemic analysis. Marx believed that he could unfold the logic of all capitalist economies through analyzing the crisis potentials inherent in the wage-labor-capital relation. But even insofar as economic crisis theory was concerned, the attempt to translate system categories into statements about social action was not fully successful. It would seem that it is even more problematic to assume that one could unfold political crisis tendencies, that is, legitimation and motivation deficits in the form of an abstract system logic, because social integration is also related to cultural forces that are specific to given societies. Indeed, one must ask whether macrological crisis theory can account on its own for the dynamics of social change, or whether what Foucault would call the 'microtechnics of power' unfolding on micrological levels of institutions must also be considered. To be sure, little can be learned from Foucault concerning the possibilities of emancipation or democracy. Once again we must return to the study of civil society, with all its contradictions, to thematize at the same time the gains and losses of modernity. Both Habermas' early and late work, each in its own way, but neither on its own, are indispensable for this task ahead.

45. *Ibid.*, p. 120.

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THALHEIMER, BONAPARTISM AND FASCISM

by Frank Adler

It is not at all surprising that August Thalheimer's 1930 essay on fascism should have been so enthusiastically rediscovered, reprinted and widely discussed in left-wing European circles during the 1960's. Informed debate on fascism had reached a major theoretical impasse: factually, more was known than ever before, or, at any rate, enough to dismiss as "empirically inadequate" virtually all of the better known traditional interpretations; yet, conceptually, no new theoretical nets had been cast that might have better accounted for the full range of phenomena to be subsumed under the generic term *fascism*. Moreover, to the degree that extremely well-researched, specialized monographs had successfully challenged the old theoretical warhorses, few scholars were inclined to hazard new totalizing formulations lest their own heads in turn be severed on the merciless empirical block.

The one notable exception to this general state of affairs was Ernst Nolte's *Der Faschismus in seiner Epoche* (misleadingly translated into English as *Three Faces of Fascism*). While receiving appropriate criticism for its obvious inadequacies (in particular, the tendency to bracket out of his analysis the structural matrix from which fascism emerged and to which it responded), Nolet's study nevertheless served three critical functions. First, it underscored the necessity for a phenomenological analysis of fascism, one which would not simply understand fascism as a nature-like object, but rather see it as something which subjectively presented itself to the world, unfolding itself through the somewhat less-than-transparent and mediated realms of culture and consciousness in ways poorly grasped, or grasped not at all, by such nonreflective approaches as chronicle-history and social science positivism. Second, it challenged Marxism to overcome its own unfortunate vulgarity; in particular, the predilection to view politics as something essentially epiphenomenal and coercive, rather than autonomous and consensual. Nolte demonstrated that the epochal fixedness of fascism's ideological bearing (its program, symbols and propaganda) had to be understood in its own right and not reduced schematically to class struggle. Third, by questioning the epistemological status of purely structural and otherwise objectivistic approaches, rather than holding out the prospect that these had not yet been but could be salvaged by further research, Nolte helped clear the conceptual air of such stale, patently superficial formulations as those which saw fascism as being somehow encoded in the "national character" of Germans and

1. Thalheimer's major essay on fascism, "Ueber den Faschismus," first appeared in *Gegen den Strom*, 11, 18, 25 January 1930. It was reprinted in W. Abendroth, ed., *Faschismus und Kapitalismus* (Frankfurt, 1967); R. Kuhnl, ed., *Texte zur Faschismusdiskussion* (Reinbek, 1974); and *Der Faschismus in Deutschland. Analysen der KPD-Opposition aus den Jahren 1928-1933*, edited by the *Arbeiterpolitik* (Frankfurt, 1973). See also K.H. Tjaden, *Struktur und Funktion der KPD-Opposition* (Meisenheim, 1964) and "Faschismus und Bonapartismum," *Das Argument*, No. 41. In Italy the essay appeared in R. De Felice, ed., *Antologia sul fascismo* (Bari, 1976). See also R. De Felice, *Le interpretazioni del fascismo* (Bari, 1969).

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Italians, as the necessary culmination of those nations' peculiar historical pathologies, as the prototypical form of middle-class extremism, as a necessary and determinate stage in the organic development of monopoly capital, and as that all-too-convenient spook of Cold War scholarship, "totalitarianism."

Within the context of the aforementioned theoretical impasse, and confronted by Nolte's provocative analysis, scholars of the German New Left (in particular, those affiliated with the journal *Das Argument*)[2] set out to develop what they hoped might emerge as an adequate Marxist interpretation of fascism. To their credit, they realized that this would be no simple task, given the crudities and banalities which had been advanced in the name of Marxism. They realized that such a project would entail not simply an *a posteriori* negation of orthodox communist and social-democratic dogma, starting afresh with a *tabula rasa*, but necessarily had to begin by critically reconstituting the histories of the SPD, KPD, and KPD(O) (the communist opposition) during the Weimer period; reconstituting, that is, the historical context in which Marxism was itself the major antagonist to fascism, in which various Marxist interpretations of fascism had been developed, and in which the practice based upon such interpretations had shown itself to be so tragically misguided. Furthermore, being at the same time German, intelligent, and members of the New Left, these scholars felt the need to both criticize and distance themselves from the docrtinaire rubbish on fascism being produced — or rather recycled — in the GDR[3], based as this was on the old Comintern "agent theory," according to which fascism was simply a dictatorial instrument of "the most reactionary, the most chauvinist and most imperialist elements of finance capital."

This quest for an adequate Marxist interpretation entailed not just a critical re-examination of traditional and rather well-known formulations, but soon led to the rediscovery of more or less forgotten and largely overlooked essays written by independents, non-conformists and heretics. A partial list of such authors would include Friedrich Pollock, Wilhelm Reich, Angelo Tasca, Otto Bauer, Franz Borkenau, Leon Trotsky and August Thalheimer. One of the major themes that emerged from these rediscovered texts was "Bonapartism," an alternative Marxist concept of State power to the better-known, instrumentalist view best expressed in the *Communist Manifesto:* "The executive of the modern State is but a committe for managing the common affairs of the whole bourgeoisie." This narrowly instrumentalist concept of State power, more often than not, had led Marxists to uncritically presume an automatic, unmediated relationship between economic and political dominance: that an economically-dominant class necessarily ruled politically. Accordingly, fascism was *a priori* understood to

2. See *Das Argument*, Nos. 30, 32, 33, 41, 47, 58. Some of these essays appear in English in the *International Journal of Politics*, No. 4 (Winter 1972-73).

3. See B. Blanke, R. Reiche, J. Werth, "The Theory of Fascism in the German Democratic Republic," *International Journal of Politics*, No. 4 (Winter 1972-73); W. Wippermann, "The Post-War German Left and Fascism," *Journal of Contemporary History*, October 1976.

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be the "regime of monopoly capital." However, even before recent monographs on Italy and Germany shot all sorts of holes through such a thesis, rendering the relationship between industrialists and fascists problematic at best, it was obvious that this instrumentalist interpretation could not account for such significant questions as the fragility of pre-fascist regimes, the actual process of fascistization, the mass recruitment and eventual success of fascist movements in some cases but not others, and the conflicts of interest which emerged under fascist regimes between the State, the party and industrial leadership. Bonapartism, on the other hand, based upon Marx's notion of "*die veselbstandigten Machte der Executivgewalt*" (loosely translated as "the process whereby executive power becomes progressively more independent"), appeared as a suggestive first step out of the theoretical impasse, as well as the basis upon which a Marxist interpretation of fascism might be salvaged.

Though his was neither the first nor the only interpretation of fascism based on the concept of Bonapartism, Thalheimer's work, in the 1964 judgement of Wolfgang Abendroth, "remains to this day the best attempt to understand the phenomenon of national socialism from a politico-sociological standpoint."[4] According to Wolfgang Wippermann, another German authority on the subject, "Probably the greatest impact upon the renaissance of the Marxist discussion of fascism in the Federal Republic was made by the works of August Thalheimer."[5] Why was Thalheimer's theory apparently judged more significant than other Bonapartist accounts.?

First, it was the most fully-articulated and analytically-rigorous. Gramsci merely alluded to Marx's *Eighteenth Brumaire* in a 1926 *Unità* article[6] and devoted approximately four pages to bonapartism (or "Caesarism") in his voluminous *Prison Notebooks*.[7] Moreover, in contrast to his characteristically insightful treatment of other themes, Gramsci's analysis of Bonapartism is hopelessly mechanistic, more akin to the orthodox maerialist drivel which he caustically condemned in Plekhanov's *The Fundamental Problems of Marxism* than to the sophisticated "philosophy of praxis" approach bequeathed to him by Labriola. In Trotsky's work, Bonapartism was little more than an amorphous sponge-term applied randomly and rather inconsistently to such diverse phenomena as Tsarism, Stalinism, Giolitti's final government in Italy, and the immediate pre-Nazi governments of Bruening and Schleicher in Germany. Furthermore, Trotsky's concept of fascism, apart from its keen appreciation of the petite-bourgeoisie's supporting role, was in its own way as simplistic as that of Comintern — and for the same reason: it was based upon a closed, unilinear and determinist view of capitalist development, as well as a narrowly instrumental

4. W. Abendroth, *Aufstieg und Krise der deutschen Sozialdemokratis* (Frankfurt, 1964), p. 86, cited in M. Kitchen, "August Thalheimer's Theory of Fascism," *Journal of the History of Ideas* (January-March 1973).

5. W. Wippermann, *op.cit.*, p. 198.

6. A. Gramsci, *La costruzione del partito comunista, 1923-26* (Turin, 1971), pp. 341-44.

7. Q. Hoare and G. Smith, eds., *Selections from the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci* (New York, 1971), pp. 219-223.

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view of the State. Thus, for Trotsky fascism was, as Robert Wistrich notes, organically linked to the last-ditch struggle of moribund capitalism, while the fascist State, for the most part, had little or no independence from big business.[8] Writing of Hitler in 1932, Trotsky claimed: "His tasks are assigned to him by monopoly capital."[9] A slightly less mechanical, yet nonetheless instrumentalist, conception was advanced by Otto Bauer, a major Austro-Marxist leader. While Bauer employed the concept of Bonapartism to account for the relative autonomy of fascism in its ascendant phase, during a subsequent moment of stabilization fascism becomes the same simple instrument of class rule found in the positions of the Comintern and Trotsky: "The leading stratum of the bourgeoisie, the representativeness of monopoly capital and of the large estate, succeeded with extraordinary rapidity after the establishment of the fascist dictatorship in turning the new regime into a tool of their class rule, and in transforming the new masters into their servants.... Even if the fascist dictatorship rules over the capitalist class, it nevertheless inevitably becomes the executive organ of the needs, interests and will of the capitalist class."[10]

Responding to this manifestly contradictory thesis. Mihaly Vajda appropriately asks: "How can a regime carry out the will of a class, if it rules over that class? How can a power system rule over those whom it actually serves?"[11] Here Vajda has put his finger on the major problem which haunts all Marxist interpretations of fascism that attempt simultaneously to reconcile the Bonapartist notion of a State that becomes progressively more independent with the more orthodox, instrumental concept of class rule — a problem that Thalheimer's theory, despite its greater openness and subtlety, ultimately fails to paper over.

A second significant advantage of Thalhaimer's formulation of Bonapartism, though one often overlooked in the recent literature, is its tentative departure from the "equilibrium" or "balance of class forces" concept which had often been viewed by Marxists as the structural precondition for the State becoming independent and superimposing itself over all strata. Common to the formulations of Gramsci, Trotsky, and Bauer, for example, is the image of a Mexican stand-off between labor and capital. A brief textual exegesis is therefore necessary to recapture Marx's understanding of Bonapartism and to distinguish it from this undialectical, positivist concept of equilibrium that derives (yes, once again) from poor old Engels. In hi *Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State* (and elsewhere), Engels describes Bonapartism in France and Germany precisely in terms of such class equilibrium: "As the State arose from the need to hold class antagonisms in chec, but as it arose, at the same time, in the midst of the conflict of classes, it is, as a rule, the State of the most powerful, economically dominant class, which, through the medium of the State,

8. R. Wistrich, "Leon Trotsky's Theory of Fascism," *Journal of Contemporary History*, October 1976, p. 157.
9. L. Trotsky, *The Struggle Against Fascism in Germany*, New York 1971, p. 406.
10. M. Vajda, *Fascism as a Mass Movement* (New York, 1976), p. 124.
11. *Ibid.*, p. 125.

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becomes also the politically dominant class, and thus acquires the new means of holding down and exploiting the oppressed class... By way of exception, however, periods occur in which the warring classes balance each other so nearly that the state power, as ostensible mediator, acquires, for the moment, a certain degree of independence from both. Such was the absolute monarchy of the seventeenth and eighteenth centrues, which held the balance between the nobility and the class of burghers; such was the Bonapartism of the First, and still more of the Second French Empire, which played off the proletariat against the bourgeoisie and the bourgeoisie against the proletariat. The latest performance of this kind, in which the ruler and the ruled appear equally ridiculous, is the new German empire of the Bismark nation: here capitalists and workers are balanced against each other and equally cheated for the benefit of the impoverished Prussian cabbage junkers."[12]

Not only does Engels describe Bonapartism in terms of class equilibrium, he also reduces Marx's mediated relation between class struggle and politics to an *immediate* one, thus — as in his ever-present introduction to *The Eighteenth Brumaire* — fundamentally misrepresenting Marx as a crude positivist. This introduction is vintage Engels, the Engels of *Socialism: Utopian and Scientific* and *Dialectics of Nature;* "It was precisely Marx who had first discovered the great law of motion in history, the law according to which all historical struggles, whether they proceed in the political, relitious, philosophical or some other ideological domain, are in fact only the more or less clear expression of struggles of social classes, and that the existence and thereby the collisions, too, between these classes are in turn conditioned by the degree of development of their economic position, by the mode of their production and of their exchange determined by it. This law, which has the same significance for history as the law of the transformation of energy has for natural science — this law gave him here, too, the key to an understanding of the history of the Second French Republic."[13]

Marx, on the contrary, *never described Bonaparism in terms of equilibrium*; in *The Eighteenth Brumaire,* he carefully distinguished an earlier moment of class struggle from a later and separate moment of political crisis. This is of great bearing both to Marx's own analysis of Bonapartism, as well as applying Bonapartism to fascism. Rather than equilibrium, in each case the proletariat had been defeated by the bourgeoisie at the level of class conflict *prior* to the political crisis whose final resolution was Bonapartism or fascism. Marx makes this abundantly clear in the text's periodization. The proletariat had been defeated in June 1848, the Bonapartist *coup d'état* did not occur until December 1851, and what took place in the interim — comprising both the bulk and essence of the text — was the political self-negation of the French bourgeoisie: the repressive legislation passed by the bourgeois parliamentary coalition (the party of Order) which, flying in the face of the ideals of the February Revolution, undercut its legitimation

12. K. Marx and F. Engels, *Selected Works,* Vol. II (Moscow, 1958), p. 320. See also Vol. I, pp. 604-605.
13. *Ibid.,* p. 246.

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while making it, at the same time, administratively dependent upon executive power (Louis Napoleon, President of the Republic); the disintegration of this parliamentary coalition into separate royalist factions which feuded among themselves and with Louis Napoleon, who grew stronger and more indispensable as the factions became weaker, noisier and progressively isolated; the growing contradiction between the unstable political rule of the parliamentary bourgeoisie and the social tranquility necessary to ensure social reproduction; the severing of organic representational linkages between the bourgeoisie at large and its political and literary agents. "The parliamentary party was not only dissolved into its two great factions, each of these factions was not only split up within itself, but the party of Order in parliament had fallen out with the party of Order *outside* parliament. The spokesmen and scribes of the bourgeoisie, its platform and its press, in short, the ideologists of the bourgeoisie and the bourgeoisie itself, the representatives and the represented, faced one another in estrangement and no longer understood one another."[14]

The *Eighteenth Brumaire* is thus not based primarily on class struggle, as Engels proclaimed in his introduction to Marx's text, but is rather a complex analysis that focuses almost exlusively upon the process by which the French bourgeoisie acts as the unwitting agent of its own political undoing, thereby creating the requisite conditions for executive authority, an external force, to make itself progressively indispensable and independent. In terms of this process, the proletariat is more-or-less politically irrelevant; at best it is a passive contextual factor, not a central actor. Marx says as much in the text; describing the unsuccessful proletarian uprising of June 1848, which took place three-and-a-half years before the Bonapartist coup, Marx claims that "with this defeat the proletariat passes into the background."[15] Rather than project the image of a catastrophic equilibrium, or, on the other hand, one where the bourgeoisie finds itself with its back pinned to the wall by a seemingly invincible proletariat, Marx clearly argues that Bonapartism is the outcome of a hegemonic crisis wherein the proletariat has not as yet constituted itself as a counter-hegemonic force, but the bourgeoisie has nevertheless already negated its own hegemony. Thus, in a later text — *The Civil War in France* — Marx describes Bonapartism as "the only form of government possible at a time when the bourgeoisie had *already lost,* and the working class had not yet acquired, the faculty of ruling the nation."[16]

This is not to suggest that Marx himself offered a fully adequate account of Bonapartism, despite the fact that his was a far more insightful analysis than those who later claimed to have followed his lead. At the end of *The Eighteenth Brumaire* and elsewhere, Marx predicted that Bonapartism, based as it was on internal contradictions, would be inherently unstable and therefore destined to quickly self-destruct. Thus, he could account for neither the liberal transition of the Second Empire in its later period, nor the

14. K. Marx, *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte* (New York, 1975), pp. 102-103.
15. K. Marx, *Eighteenth Brumaire,* p. 23.
16. K. Marx and F. Engels, *Selected Works,* Vol. I, p. 518.

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.at it lasted for twenty years (longer than any previous disconcerting ... egime). Had it not been for the Franco-Prussian War, the post-1789 F...ight very well have lasted a good deal longer. At any rate, it Second...er, fail to perceive is that Bonapartism and fascism are not did ...ecause they are based on internal contradictions, but paradoxically ...ir strength from prisely this fact. The Italian historian Renzo De ... has used the apt term "negative aggregation" to account for this ...liar genius of such regimes: in the absence of an affirmative, aggregative ...d hegemonic force, Bonapartism and fascism can at least guarantee minimal conditions of security for a broad range of fragmented, atomized and seemingly contradictory interests, none of which obtains everything it wants, yet all of which feel themselves protected against something far worse. Furthermore, as Thalheimer notes, but cannot adequately explain, the Second Empire was followed by the reformist, liberal-democratic Third Republic, which lasted from 1871 until the Nazi occupation of France in 1940. Obviously, the bourgeoisie had not definitively lost "the faculty of ruling the nation," nor was Bonapartism the final and most degenerate form of capitalism, as Marx had suggested.

II

So much for the context in which Thalheimer's essay was rediscovered and the theoretical status of Bonapartism within the Marxist tradition. Just who was August Thalheimer and what was the context in which the essay was written?

August Thalheimer, born in 1888, had come up through the ranks of the SPD as a journalist for the party press. During the First World War, he had become a protege of Rosa Luxemburg and a leader of Spartakus. In 1919 he was elected to the central committee of the KPD and, together with Heinrich Brandler, led the dominant "right wing" factions of the party until 1924, when he and Brandler were made scapegoats for the failed 1923 insurrectionary attempt and dismissed from the central committee. Thalheimer then moved to the Soviet Union, teaching at Sun Yat Sen University, writing a book on dialectical materialism and serving as a member of the program committee of Comintern. At the end of 1928, he and Brandler, along with other "rightests" like Angelo Tasca, were expelled from Comintern for the twin sins of opposing Stalin and the disastrous line on fascism which emerged from the Sixth World Congress (July-Septermber, 1928). Thalheimer and Brandler returned to Germany, where they formed the opposition KPD(O) and the opposition journal *Gegen den Strom*. It was in this journal that Thalheimer wrote a number of essays on fascism, including the one for which he is best known, "Ueber den Fascismus" (11, 18, 25 January 1930). When the Nazis came to power, he emigrated to France and then on to Cuba when France fell in 1940. He died in Havana in 1948.[17]

17. M. Kitchen, *op.cit.*, p. 68; J. Dulffer, "Bonapartism, Fascism and National Socialism," *Journal of Contemporary History*, October 1976, pp. 112-113.

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During the 1920's, or at least until the Sixth World Co[illegible] been no single, uniform Comintern position on fascism, retrospective glance at official documents of this period reveals [illegible]re had signs of two interrelated tendencies which would lead to a clo[illegible] rigidification of theoretical debate on this and every other significant[a] Stalin's growing control over the DPSU and Russian hegemony within International. Already official Comintern documents reveal formulations that appear increasingly wooden (no wonder, as they resulted from less and less debate) and reveal as well the increasing use of pejorative "isms" associated with individuals who had demonstrated excessive independence and non-conformity (e.g., Trotskyism, Bordigism, Luxemburgism, Brandlerism, Radekism, etc.). The same schoolboy-type discipline imposed within the CPSU was by 1929 fully exacted upon non-Russian representatives as well. Thus, for example, when in 1928 Brandler returned to Germany without having first asked permission, he was condemned for a major "breach of discipline." Worse still, we learn from Comintern documents (so characteristically rich in nuance and measured in tone) that he had, indeed, "slipped from liquidationism to renegacy."[18]

Nevertheless, the Sixth World Congress clearly represents *the* definitive point of transition between an earlier phase of Comintern history, when relatively open theoretical debate was still possible and when non-Russian communist parties still maintained a relative degree of autonomy, and the better-known later phase, when theoretical debate, like the practice of democratic centralism, was reduced to the simple reaffirmation of positions drawn up by Stalin or his pawns of the moment; when all independent (and some not-so-independent) personalities were either barbarically purged or cautiously bit their tongue (e.g., Togliatti) until a more propitious moment arrived; when the Russians gained total hegemony over the organizational apparatus of Comintern, first monopolizing control over the agenda and regulating the flow of documents, then devitalizing what remained of the rather pathetic vestigial organ (in the fifteen-year period from 1929 to 1943, only one world congress would be held, the Seventh in 1935).

The Sixth World Congress established a rigid periodization which became the basis for all further discussion until 1935. According to this periodization, there had been a revolutionary First Period, which ran from the October Revolution to the failed German insurrection of 1923; a Second Period of capitalist stabilization, which ran from 1923 to 1927; and finally, a fatal Third Period, which began in 1928, the year of the Sixth World Congress. The Third Period would be marked by the final and most extreme contradictions of capitalism which would lead either to proletarian revolution or further imperialist wars between the major powers and ultimately against the USSR. Within this context, fascism was viewed as an instrument of what Dimitrov would later define as "the most reactionary, most chauvinist and most imperialist elements of finance capital." According to this view, correct

18. J. Degras, ed., *The Communist International, 1919-43*, Documents, Vol. II (London, 1971), pp. 564-565.

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communist strategy called for the tactic of "class against class," rather than a "united front," and the struggle against social-democracy which was also in this tumultuous period to be seen as an instrument of finance capital used against proletarian revolution and the USSR (hence the equation of socialism and fascism as instruments of finance capital, better known as "social fascism").[19]

This identification of social democracy as the most insidious class enemy (and consequently, the major target of practical political action) led not only to perverse instances of situational cooperation between communists and national socialists in Germany,[20] but, worse still, prevented the isolation of fascism itself when this was still possible by the formation of a broadly-based, anti-fascist coalition. Comintern would eventually change its line in 1935, but by this time it was too late as National Socialism had already been in power for two-and-a-half years and had methodically consolidated its rule. Commenting on the disastrous theoretical and practical consequences of the Sixth World Congress position on fascism, the Italian communist historian Ciuliano Procacci notes: "The call for a struggle against 'social fascism,' by which all parties from Social Democratic to the Nazi were viewed as part — to use a classic expression — of one 'reactionary mass,' prevented arrival at an analysis of the fascist phenomenon and its peculiar traits; therefore, it prevented the isolation of fascism and the constitution of a front capable of defeating it."[21]

Such a critique of Comintern's social fascism line should not by implication gloss over the theoretical and practical bankrupcy of the socialists. Indeed, just several months before the Sixth World Congress convened, Karl Kautsky suggested that the fascist danger had been greatly exaggerated, as fascism was essentially a peculiarly Italian phenomenon: "I maintain that the Italian fascist dictatorship, like the Russian Bolshevik dictatorship, is nothing more than the result of transitory local circumstances which will not easily present themselves elsewhere. There is a whole series of arguments which lead me to believe that in the more important capitalist countries the tendency toward the maintenance, the re-enforcement and the development of democracy will not be diminished despite the growing animosity of many bourgeois elements."[22]

Indeed, it might be said that theoretical discussion on fascism during the twenties, both in Marxist and non-Marxist circles, reflected at the same time a general state of confusion and a rich array of partially developed insights. Comintern, before the Sixth World Congress, was no exception. While the instrumentalist "agent theory" and the social fascism view had been part of Comintern's pre-1928 discussion, the relative autonomy of fascism from

19. *Ibid.*, pp. 446-550.

20. For example, the so-called "red referendum" of 1931 in which communists and Nazis campaigned to remove the SPD-led government of Otto Braun and Carl Severing in Prussia; also the transport strike of November 1932 in Berlin.

21. G. Proccaci, "Trotsky's View of the Critical Years," *Science and Society,* Winter 1963, p. 65.

22. P. Spriano, *Storia del partito comunista italiano,* Vol. II (Turin, 1969), p. 164.

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monopoly capital and its mass character had been argued as well. To add to the confusion, sometimes both perspectives had been advanced at different occasions under different circumstances by one and the same individual (e.g., Gramsci).[23] If within Comintern proper the major proponents of the agent theory and social fascism had been Zinoviev and Stalin, within both Italy and Germany communists tended to advance the agent theory for agitational purposes and linked socialists to the so-called "anti-proletarian reaction" on the basis of recent "treacheries" (in Germany, the anti-communist repression ordered in 1919 by Gustav Noske, Social Democratic Minister of the Interior; in Italy, failure of the PSI and the socialist-led CGL to support the factory council movement, signing the "pacification pact" with Mussolini, counseling against armed resistance to fascist "punitive expeditions").

Yet, it should also be noted that Comintern's very first statement on fascism (November 5, 1922) indicated not only an accurate grasp of the Italian situation, but also an appreciation of the industrialists' apprehensions vis-à-vis fascism, thus implicitly recognizing that fascism was not simply an instrument of this class: "The Fascists are, primarily, a weapon in the hands of the large landowners. The industrial and commerical bourgeoisie are following with great anxiety the experiment of ferocious reaction, which they regard as black bolshevism."[24] Several months later, in her speech to the Executive Committee of Comintern, Clara Zetkin articulated a point which would be further developed by Gramsci in his 1926 Lyon thesis: fascism was not simply a reactionary terrorist movement, but one which had developed a mass base and which had won a political as well as paramilitary victory. According to Zetkin: "The mistakes of the CP again lie above all in viewing Fascism only as a military-terrorist movement and not as a mass movement with deep social roots. It must be expressly emphasized that before Fascism had won militarily, it had already achieved the victory politically and ideologically over the labor movement."[25]

Yet the Fifth World Congress resolution of July 1924 already prefigured the later instrumentalist and social fascism position, despite the continued allusion to fascism's petit-bourgeois mass base: "Fascism is one of the classic forms of counter-revolution in the epoch when capitalist society is decaying, the epoch of proletarian revolution, particularly where the proletariat has taken up the struggle for power but where, for lack of revolutionary experience, and in the absence of a leading revolutionary party, it has been unable to organize the proletarian revolution and to intensify the insurrection of the masses to the point of establishing the proletarian dictatorship. Fascism

23. Gramsci described the socialists as the "avant guard of the anti-proletarian reaction" in *Ordine Nuovo*, July 5, 1921; he spoke of the "semi-fascism of Amendola-Sturzo-Turati" in *Ordine Nuovo*, September 1, 1924. In his "Lyon Thesis" of January 1926, Gramsci claims that one section of the industrialists were essentially reformists and opposed fascism, yet elsewhere in the text he describes fascism as the capitalists' instrument.

24. Degas, *op.cit.*. Vol. I. p. 377.

25. Cited in John Cammett, "Communist Theories of Fascism," *Science and Society*, Vol. 31, No. 2 (1967), p. 151.

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is the bourgeoisie's instrument for fighting the proletariat, for whose defeat the legal means at the disposal of the State no longer suffice. . . but in its social structure fascism is a petty-bourgeois movement; it has its roots in the middle classes doomed to decay as a result of the capitalist crisis, and partly also in the embittered proletarian elements whose revolutionary hopes were disappointed. As bourgeois society continues to decay, all bourgeois parties, particularly social-democracy, take on a more or less fascist character. . . . Fascism and social-democracy are the two sides of the same instrument of capitalist dictatorship. In the fight against fascism, therefore, social-democracy can never be a reliable ally of the fighting proletariat."[26] As John Cammett correctly points out, this resolution was not only of dubious theoretical value, but was a major tactical blunder as well.[27] At that very moment, Mussolini's regime had fallen victim to the one potentially fatal legitimation crisis of its twenty-year history (the Matteotti crisis), when a broad coalition of communists, socialists, Christian democrats (*popolari*), and liberal democrats was objectively possible. Yet, however counter-productive the Comintern resolution, it would be wrong to attribute major responsibility for this missed opportunity to the PCI, given the abstract legalism of the liberal democrats (Amendola), the socialists' lack of will (Turati), and the Christian democrats' deep-seated distrust of the Marxist parties (Don Sturzo).

In any event, it should be clear that by the Sixth World Congress, the Comintern's analysis had become not only significantly more rigid and less concrete, but led as well to strategic disaster. Despite substantive differences between them, the Comintern's expelled left-opposition (Trotsky) and its expelled right-opposition (Thalheimer and Tasca) jointly condemned the social fascism line ("a combination of Stalinist bureaucratism and Bukharinist metaphysics," claimed Trotsky[28]) and called instead for a united front. Situated within this context, and measured against the writings of his contemporaries, Thalheimer's analysis of fascism is indeed superlative. As opposed to the increasingly crude reduction of fascism to the status of a mere instrument of monopoly capital (a view which Trotsky, for the most part, shared), Thalheimer not only preserved Comintern's earlier theoretical openness (i.e., its appreciation of fascism's relative autonomy and mass character), but further developed and synthesized these insights within the theoretical framework of Bonapartism. Thus, Thalheimer went beyond simply and one-sidedly linking fascism to a petit-bourgeois mass base, but stressed the peculiar social disaggregation of the period and the consequent déclassé nature of the fascist bloc which, to the degree it was composed of atomized elements from all classes, could not easily maintain its tenuous cohesion nor internally generate an organic program. External mediation by an independent executive was thus necessary to not only reconcile the contradictory interests within this bloc, but also to ensure social reproduction

26. Degas, *op.cit.*, Vol. II, pp. 138-139.
27. Cammett, *op.cit.*, p. 153.
28. Wistrich, *op.cit.*, p. 164.

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within a situation of fractured, non-hegemonic class relations, after the bourgeoisie had already politically negated itself. Furthermore, by undermining the Comintern's premise of fixed, unilinear stages of capitalist development and arguing that fascism could be seen as neither the final nor necessary form of bourgeois state power, Thalheimer attempted to demonstrate that the situation was thus open to diverse outcomes which, while historically contingent, were ultimately dependent upon the praxis of competing forces.

III

To what degree can Thalheimer's analysis still represent today the basis for an adequate Marxist interpretation of fascism? Given the enthusiasm which greeted his theoretical resurrection during the sixties, this is hardly a facile question. Here, judgment cannot be nearly so affirmative as was the case in comparing Thalheimer's work with that of his contemporaries...

To the degree that he attempted to relate fascist state power to a particular stage of capitalist development, Thalheimer's analysis appears rather primitive along side of the suggestive 1941 studies on "state capitalism" by Friedrich Pollock and A.R.L. Gurland.[29] These seminal works prefigure Tim Mason's late "primacy of politics" thesis on fascism, as well as Habermas and Offe's analysis of "late capitalism." Thalheimer, by way of contrast, fails to situate fascism within the context of this structural and conjunctural transition from "private capitalism" to its state-administered counterpart. In all fairness to Thalheimer, however, it should be noted that few theorists outside corporatist circles had begun to work in this area until the mid-to-late 1930s, when confronted by The Great Depression, a variety of observers began to sense some epochal affinities between Keynsian economics, soviet planning, Roosevelt's New Deal and corporatism.

To the degree that Thalheimer attempted to relate fascism to national peculiarities, or to grapple with the problem as to why fascism came to power in some capitalist countries and not others, his analysis goes astray of the most significant factor in this regard: the long-term developmental consequences which accrue from incomplete bourgeois revolutions. Though fully articulated in 1966 by Barrington Moore (*Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy*), Marx and Engels had touched upon the idea of a "revolution from above" (modernization promoted by an unholy bourgeois-aristocratic alliance) in their analysis of nineteenth century Germany, as had Gramsci in his critical reflections on the Italian *Risorgimento*. Though Thalheimer hints at a relationship between the "immaturity of bourgeois development" and what has "an outward appearance similar to Italian fascism and French Bonapartism" in such cases as Poland, Spain and South American republics, he nevertheless specifically distinguishes these cases from Italy and Germany on the ground that they represent an as yet immature stage of capitalist

29. F. Pollock, "State Capitalism;" A.R.L. Gurland, "Technological Trends under National Socialism," *Studies in Philosophy and Social Science*, Vol. 9, No. 2 (1941).

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development. Obviously, an unfortunate dose of economism impairs Thalheimer's vision here, as he presumes an immediate identity between economic and political development, the latter being directly dependent upon the former. Thus, Thalheimer fails to notice the paradoxical nature of Germany at the very time he is writing, the incongruence between its advanced technico-productive infrastructure and the antediluvian nature of its political life, a totality which Ralf Dahrendorf characterizes as an industrial-feudal state. Politically, that is, Germany and Italy had more in common with the "immature cases" than Thalheimer can see because his gaze is confined to economic development, as if this alone were an adequate indicator of political development as well.

To the degree that Thalheimer deals with the ideology of Bonapartist-type authoritarian regimes (e.g., the so-called *idées napoléoniennes* in France, the nationalist idea in Italy), his analysis never penetrates the subjective *enracinement* and relative success of such formulae (that is, the cultural matrix from which they emerge and to which they re-enter) as does Nolte. While Thalheimer recognizes that an alternative ideology is necessary to help aggregate a new, socially heterogeneous bloc and to legitimate a new regime, he has nothing to say as to the contents or specific nature of such alternative ideologies.

Furthermore, by repeatedly employing the term "direct dictatorship of capital," Thalheimer perhaps has unknowingly fallen victim to the very same instrumentalist concept of fascism which he attempted to overcome by basing his analysis on Bonapartism and the independence of executive authority. In this regard, his distinction between fascism as *a* direct dictatorship of the bourgeoisie rather than *the* direct dictatorship of the bourgeoisie is not all that enlightening. For if fascism is even *a* direct dictatorship of the bourgeoisie, then the autonomy he underscores in both Bonapartism and fascism becomes problematic at best. This, as suggested earlier, has been the fatal flaw of all more-or-less orthodox Marxist interpretations of fascism which attempt at the same time to reconcile the instrumental concept of class rule with the autonomy of politics characteristic of Bonapartism. This remains the case with more recent orthodox attemps to deal with fascism as well. Take, for example, the case of Nicos Poulantzas who elevates historical ignorance to the status of a methodological principle. On the one hand, he affirms the *autonomie relative* of the fascist state, while claiming — at the very same time — that *grand capital monopoliste* is both the *fraction hégémonique* and *classe régante*.[30]

Finally, it must be noted that Thalheimer's understanding of the transition to socialism lacked the democratic character so distinctive in the current formulations of Eurocommunism. When Thalheimer used the term "dictatorship of the proletariat," he meant just that; using the very same words as Comintern, he spoke of the need to "destroy the petit-bourgeois democratic illusions and hopes held by the petite-bourgeoisie, the peasantry

30. N. Poulantzas, *Fascism and Dictatorship* (London, 1974).

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and portions of the working class." However, a qualitative difference must nevertheless be acknowledged. Precisely because Thalheimer categorically rejected the concept of social fascism and questioned the adequacy of a narrowly instrumentalist definition of fascism — despite the slippages we have noted — he never sank to the perverse level of Comintern in suggesting that fascism in the short run might indeed be progressive and further the revolutionary cause because it demolished "all democratic illusions among the broad working masses."[31] Here, however, Angelo Tasca was far more perceptive: "In this system there is no room for the fatal illusion, long held by the communists, that fascism might do some good by destroying 'democratic illusions.' The Italian communists actually announced in May 1921 that: 'It is true that White reaction is celebrating a few ephemeral victories over an enemy which is paying dearly for its unpreparedness, but is destroying the democratic and liberal illusion and breaking down the influence of social democracy among the masses.' And in the resolution of the Presidium of the Communist International, published in January 1934, the following statement concerning Germany may be read: 'The establishment of an undisguised fascist dictatorship, by dispelling the democratic illusions of the masses and liberating them from the influence of social democracy, is accelerating Germany's advance towards the proletarian revolution.' This is not the place for a detailed criticism of this conception, which the Communist International has never abandoned in spite of all its changes of front, and we need only record that fascism suppresses not only 'democratic illusions,' but the workers' and socialist movement which is subject to them. Fascism is like a completely successful operation: the patient dies and all his illusions are removed."[32]

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31. Resolution on the Situation in Germany: "But because the fascist dictatorship rests on the armed national-socialist gangs and on the Stahlhelm, because it is waging civil war on the working class and abolishing all the rights of the proletariat, it is thereby also destroying social-democratic theories about the possibility of winning an elected parliamentary majority and about the policy of 'the lesser evil," and demolishing all democratic illusions among the broad working masses. It is proving that the State is not a superstructure rising above classes, but an instrument of bourgeois dictatorship, that the State power today is the armed SA gangs, the Stahlhelm, the police, and the officers' mob, who rule in the name of the bourgeoisie and the junkers. The working class is being convinced by experience that the communists were right when year after year they fought against democratic illusions and the social-democratic policy of 'the lesser evil' and of collaboration with the bourgeoisie.... Despite fascist terror, the revolutionary surge in Germany will arise; the revolutionary resistance of the masses to fascism is bound to grow. The establishment of the open fascist dictatorship, which is destroying all democratic illusions among the masses and liberating them from social-democratic influence, is accelerating the rate of Germany's advance towards the proletarian revolution." Degas, *op.cit.*, Vol. III, pp. 261-262.

32. A. Tasca, *The Rise of Italian Fascism* (New York, 1966), p. 348.

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ON FASCISM*

by August Thalheimer

The best point of departure for a study of fascism, it seems to me, is Marx and Engel's analysis of Bonapartism (Louis Bonaparte). While fascism and Bonapartism are not strictly identical they nevertheless are related phenomena with common as well as diverse characteristics.

I shall set out with a quotation from Marx's forward to the *18th Brumaire*: "Lastly, I hope that my work will contribute towards eliminating the school-taught phrase now current, particularly in Germany, of so-called *Caesarism*."[1] Here Marx refers to a fundamental class difference between the ancient and modern proletariat, a difference which consequently renders ancient Caesarism and modern Bonapartism totally diverse phenomena. Marx emphasizes the need for a precise analysis of class relations. However, besides analyzing the class-based, social and historical roots of Bonapartism, Marx goes beyond a simple examination of the presence of determinate classes in a given society to consider the existence of a specific relation between these classes, a specific relation which is historically produced and for that reason may be historically negated. He also analyzes with great precision the political manifestations of Bonapartism: its roots and ideological expressions; its state and party organization. Marx reconstructs in detail how after 1846-49 the French bourgeoisie, faced with the uprising of the working class in the June massacre, surrendered its political existence and delivered itself over to the dictatorship of an adventurer and his gang in order to preserve its social existence. "Thus, by now stigmatizing as 'socialistic' what it had previously extolled as 'liberal,' the bourgeoisie confesses that its own interests dictate that it should be delivered from the danger of its *own rule*; that to restore tranquility in the country its bourgeois parliament must, first of all, be given its quietus; that in order to preserve its social power intact, its political power must be broken; that the individual bourgeois can continue to exploit the other classes and to enjoy undisturbed property, family, religion and order only on condition that their class be condemned along with the other classes to like political nullity; that in order to save its purse, it must forfeit the crown, and the sword that is to safeguard it must at the same time be hung over its own head as a sword of Damocles."[2]

The bourgeoisie is therefore one of the social bases of Bonapartism; in order to preserve its social power in a determinate situation, it surrenders its political power, it subordinates itself to the "executive authority which has made itself an independent power."[3] The other significant social base through which the "executive authority," the dictatorship of Bonaparte and his "gang" grows independent, is the small holding peasant; not the

*Translated by Judy Joseph.

1. Karl Marx, *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte* (New York, 1969), p. 8.
2. *Ibid.*, p. 67.
3. *Ibid.*, p. 131.

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revolutionary peasant who rebels against bourgeois property relations, but the conservative peasant who wants to see that his small holding is preserved and defended against the threatening proletarian revolution. Given its economic and social fragmentation, its lack of autonomous economic and social organization, the peasantry cannot provide for its own protection and defense. "In so far as there is merely a local interconnection among these small-holding peasants, and the identity of their interests begets no community, no national bond and no political organization among them, they do not form a class. They are consequently incapable of enforcing their class interest in their own name, whether through a parliament or through a convention. They cannot represent themselves, they must be represented. Their representative must at the same time appear as their master, as an authority over them, as an unlimited governmental power that protects them against the other classes and sends them rain and sunshine from above. The political influence of the small-holding peasants, therefore, finds its final expression in the executive power subordinating society to itself."[4]

The working class contributes to the rise of Bonapartism in so far as it has launched a revolutionary attack on bourgeois society, instilling fear in the heart of the bourgeoisie, but has not yet proven itself capable of seizing and holding power. One prerequisite of Bonapartism is, therefore, a serious defeat of the proletariat at a time of deep social crisis. On the other hand, Bonapartism is divided among various groupings and parties; the fragmentation of the bourgeoisie, the emergence of conflicts among its constituent elements is again an effect of the defeat of the working class (and consequently of the petit-bourgeoisie). Executive authority appears to the bourgeoisie as the long-desired representative of its common interest, now that its diverse elements are no longer capable of internally constituting themselves as a unified force. Friedrich Engels later emphasized this point in his introduction to *The Civil War in France:* "If the proletariat was not yet able to rule France, the bourgeoisie could no longer do so. At least not at that period, when the greater part of it was still monarchically inclined, and it was divided into three dynastic parties and a fourth republican party. Its internal dissensions allowed the adventurer Louis Bonaparte to take possession of all the command posts — army, police, administrative machinery — and, on December 2, 1851 to explode the last stronghold of the bourgeoisie, the National Assembly."[5]

II.

In his posthumous essay "Power and Economy at the Time of the Founding of the New German Empire" Engels speaks again of the contradiction between the preservation of the social power of the bourgeoisie under Louis Bonaparte and the destruction of its political power. "Louis Napoleon was now the idol of the European bourgeoisie; not only because he had 'saved society' by his *coup d'état* of December 2, 1857 when he destroyed the

4. *Ibid.*, p. 124.

5. Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, *Writings on the Paris Commune,* ed. Hal Draper (New York and London, 1971), p. 24.

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political domination of the bourgeoisie, only to preserve its social domination."[6] Engels characterizes the social dimension of Louis Bonaparte's rule with respect to the bourgeoisie as follows: "As Emperor, he not only subordinated policy to the interests of capitalist profit and stock-exchange swindling, but he conducted his policy quite on stock-exchange lines and speculated on the 'principle of nationality'."[7]

In the *18th Brumaire* Marx further analyzes the mechanism of Louis Bonaparte's domination, its bases and organizational means. There is above all the secret party of Louis Bonaparte, the Society of December 10th. What is its social composition? Initially, it is comprised of the "lumpenproletariat of Paris, organized into secret sections, with a Bonapartist general at the head of the whole." Then déclassé elements of the bourgeoisie: "Decayed roues...gamblers...literati, etc." Further, déclassé members of the nobility. Finally, déclassé members of the peasantry. Marx gathers all of these under name *bohême*. They are déclassé elements from all classes which Louis Bonaparte uses to form his own party organization; they become his confidants, agents, etc. This naturally was no accident but was in the nature of things. The raw materials and the natural instruments by which "executive power renders itself independent" are precisely these parasitic elements of all classes: those who are economically and socially uprooted, those who have been expelled from the process of production. Characteristics which distinguish one class from another are blurred wtihin this social refuse whose members are outcasts having no ideological or other ties to specific classes. In this way, such individuals can rise above their class and wriggle between classes. Yet, this represents the counter-revolutionary, rather than the revolutionary, nullification of class characteristics; the negation of the bourgeois principle of class which nevertheless remains bound to this principle. The thief, for example, completely nullifies bourgeois private property, yet in terms of bourgeois property. He nullifies the property of others in order to establish it for himself, individually. Proudhon's well-known statement: "la propriété c'est le vol," "property is theft," is also valid when reversed: "le vol c'est la propriété," "theft is property." These déclassé elements of all classes then are flesh of the flesh, bone of the bone of private property, of bourgeois society, and are thus capable of destroying the bourgeoisie's political power while at the same time defending the bourgeoisie's social power against those classes, the industrial proletariat and proletarianized portions of the peasantry, which represent the revolutionary nullification of bourgeois society and the social nullification of individual bourgeois property. Economically, these déclassé elements, the parasites of all classes, have a natural tendency to guarantee for themselves a secure livelihood in the governmental apparatus and in that of the Bonapartist party. This accounts for the monstrous growth of the independent executive apparatus. At this point, a close examination of the military branch of the Bonapartist state apparatus would be instructive, since it also displays its own social

6. Friedrich Engels, *The Role of Force in History* (New York, 1968), p. 39.
7. *Ibid.*, p. 39.

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characteristics and thus its own military-organizational characteristics. As Marx wrote: "Lastly, the culminating point of the *idées napoleoniennes* is the preponderance of the army. The army was the *point d'honneur* of the small-holding peasants, it was they themselves transformed into heroes, defending their new possessions against the outer world, glorifying their recently won nationhood, plundering and revolutionizing the world. The uniform was their own state dress; war was their poetry; the small holding, extended and rounded-off in imagination, was their fatherland, and patriotism the ideal form of the sense of property. But the enemies against whom the French peasant has now to defend his property are not the Cossacks; they are the *huissiers* and the tax collectors. The small holding lies no longer in the so-called fatherland, but in the register of mortgages. The army itself is no longer the flower of the peasant youth; it is the swamp-flower of the peasant lumpenproletariat. It consists in large measure of *remplaçants*, of substitutes, just as the second Bonaparte is himself only a *remplaçant*, the substitute for Napoleon. It now performs its deeds of valor by hounding the peasants in masses like chamois, by doing gendarme duty, and if the internal contradictions of his system chase the chief of the Society of December 10th over the French border, his army, after some acts of brigandage, will reap not laurels, but thrashings."[8]

The Bonapartist army is composed of declassé peasant elements for whom military service is a living, a substitute for the lost or unattainable parcel of land. These are mostly career soldiers with many years of service who can be employed for any counter-revolutionary purpose; militarily they are lazy, they would rather live than die for their pay. Severed from their class milieu, they are the natural tool of the "independent executive," which is pushed to consolidate and reinforce its antagonism with the popular masses. Corruption seeps ever deeper, which in large part explains why these soldiers are, at the same time, the most inappropriate instrument imaginable to defend the nation in case of war with a foreign power. Marx's prophesy of the future defeat of the Bonapartist army in 1870-71 was based on a thorough and insightful class analysis of this army.

Finally, Marx specifies the role which Bonapartist tradition, the Napoleon legend, played in the rule of Louis Bonaparte. The force of the Napoleon legend rests on the combination of three factors: first, the national: the glory of the Napoleonic wars; second, the revolutionary: the struggle against European feudalism as well as the defense of peasant holdings which had been gained by revolution against the French feudal lords, the emigrés, who in league with the rest of feudal Europe threatened peasant property; third, the subordination of the bourgeoisie to the revolutionary army and its hero, Napoleon: its loss of political rights and the taming of its lust for exploiting others.

Lastly, Marx develops the internal contradictions of the Bonapartist system which weaken it and determine its eventual dissolution: "As the executive

8. Marx, *Eighteenth Brumaire*, p. 130.

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authority which has made itself an independent power, Bonaparte feels it to be his mission to safeguard 'bourgeois order.' But the strength of this bourgeois order lies in the middle class. He looks upon himself, therefore, as the representative of the middle class and issues decrees in this sense. Nevertheless, he is somebody solely due to the fact that he has broken the political power of this middle class and daily breaks it anew. Consequently he looks on himself as the adversary of the political and literary power of the middle class. But by protecting its material power, he generates its political power anew. The cause must accordingly be kept alive; but the effect, where it manifests itself, must be done away with. But this cannot pass off without slight confusions of cause and effect, since in their interaction both lose their distinguishing features. New decrees obliterate the border line. As against the bourgeoisie, Bonaparte looks on himself, at the same time, as the representative of the peasants and of the people in general, who want to make the lower classes of the people happy within the framework of bourgeois society. New decrees cheat the 'True Socialists' of their statecraft in advance. But, above all, Bonaparte looks on himself as chief of the Society of December 10th, as the representative of the lumpenproletariat to which he himself, his entourage, his government and his army belong, and whose prime consideration is to benefit itself and draw California lottery prizes from the state treasury. And he vindicates his position as chief of the Society of December 10th with decrees, without decrees and despite decrees."[9]

III.

In "The Civil War in France," Marx sums up the character of Bonapartism or "imperialism" (not in the modern sense) as a form of bourgeois state control in a specific phase of bourgeois society. "The empire, with the coup d'etat for its birth certificate, universal suffrage for its sanction, and the sword for its sceptre, professed to rest upon the peasantry, the large mass of producers not directly involved in struggle of capital and labor. It professed to save the working class by breaking down Parliamentarism, and, with it, the undisguised subservience of government to the propertied classes. It professed to save the propertied classes by upholding their economic supremacy over the working class; and, finally, it professed to unite all classes by reviving for all the chimera of national glory. In reality, it was the only form of government possible at a time when the bourgeoisie had already lost, and the working class had not yet acquired, the faculty of ruling the nation. It was acclaimed throughout the world as the savior of society. Under its sway bourgeois society, freed from political cares, attained a development unexpected even by itself. Its industry and commerce expanded to colossal dimensions; financial swindling celebrated cosmopolitan orgies; the misery of the masses was set off by a shameless display of gorgeous, meretricious and debased luxury. That State power, apparently soaring high above society, was at the same time itself the greatest scandal of that society and the very hotbed of all its corruptions. Its own rottenness, and the rottenness of society it had saved,

9. *Ibid.*, pp. 131-132.

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were laid bare by the bayonet of Prussia, herself eagerly bent upon transferring the supreme seat of that regime from Paris to Berlin. Imperialism is, at the same time, the most prostitute and the ultimate form of the State power which nascent middle-class society had commenced to elaborate as a means of its own emancipation from feudalism and which full-grown bourgeois society had finally transformed into a means for the enslavement of labor by capital." [10]

This passage is most significant for its insight into the essence of Fascism. Marx emphasizes here the general international traits of Bonapartism or imperialism. Setting aside the specifically French traits, he treats Bonapartism and imperialism as a typical form of state control peculiar to a determinate phase of capitalist development. According to Marx, it is the "final" or ultimate form of bourgeois state power; it is the most immoral, degenerate and putrid form which state power assumes in fully developed bourgeois society. In other words, it is the form of state control with which bourgeois society will collapse, its last refuge before the proletariat revolution and, at the same time, its downfall because it is testimony to the bourgeoisie's extreme corruption.

Here the reader is taken somewhat aback. Has not Marx's analysis apparently come to a dead end? Must "Bonapartism" or "imperialism" (in the old sense) be the final form of bourgeois state power? The reader will immediately respond: in France did not the Third Republic ultimately replace the Bonapartist system after Sedan and the brief interval of the Commune? In a purely temporal sense, he will argue, Bonapartism is not the "final" or ultimate form of bourgeois state power. In France, at least, this is the bourgeois-parliamentary republic. Moreover, he will ask, if Bonapartism is the ultimate and most corrupt form of bourgeois state power, what then is fascism? Furthermore, in the France of Louis Bonaparte capitalism was still in its laissez-faire phase, and only later did it reach the higher stage of monopoly capitalism. It is certainly more accurate to speak of imperialist rather than pre-imperialist capitalism as "fully developed" bourgeois domination. Where then might Bonapartism be situated? Even if we wish to say that the fascist state form is a modern equivalent of Bonapartism, we cannot ignore the fact that in the most highly developed capitalist countries — the United States, England, Germany and France — fascism does not rule. These countries are bourgeois-parliamentary republics (the crown serving in England as mere decoration). Italy, with its unusually large rural population, its agricultural base still feudal in nature (above all in Sicily), is certainly backward in comparison to those countries from the viewpoint of capitalist development. Other industrially weak, capitalistically backward countries with predominantly rural populations are Poland and Bulgaria. Spain is even more backward.

This bundle of contradictions is, however, well-suited to demonstrate the depth and insightfulness of Marxist analysis in pointing to the key, to the essence of fascism. On the basis of the facts presented above, it is clear that

10. Marx and Engels, *Writings on the Paris Commune*, p. 72.

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Bonapartism cannot be meant as the "final" form of bourgeois society in a purely temporal and formal sense. Nor is it a simple function of the degree of economic development. If this were the case, Marxist analysis could not explain why England, which in comparison to France was certainly a more highly developed capitalist country in the years 1850-1870, was not defined as the country of "fully developed bourgeois domination." The explanation is clear. The decisive factor is the totality of class relations in a given country, in a given society. That is, Bonapartism, the executive authority rendering itself independent, is the "final" and most corrupt form of bourgeois state power. This occurs in a period when the bourgeoisie, after having been gravely threatened by proletarian revolution, and after having exhausted its strength in self-defense, seeks to preserve its social power while all other classes are still defenseless. Bonapartism, then, is a form of defensive bourgeois domination, of fortification against proletarian revolution. It is a form of the direct dictatorship of capital. Its other closely related form is fascism, the common denominator being the direct dictatorship of capital. The form in which it manifests itself is the growing independence of executive authority, the debasement of the bourgeoisie's political power and the political subjugation of all other classes to the executive. Its social content, however, is domination by the bourgeoisie and private owners in general over the working class and all of the other social strata exploited by capitalism.

Bonapartism is the "final" form of bourgeois state power in so far as it is a form of direct capitalist dictatorship, and in so far as this direct dictatorship emerges when bourgeois society, fatally threatened by proletarian revolution, is on the brink of collapse. Fascism is, in substance, the same thing: a form of the direct dictatorship of capital. It is necessary to make one most important correction. It consists only of one little word. Instead of saying that fascism is *the* direct dictatorship of the bourgeoisie, one must say that it is *a* form of such dictatorship.

In its thesis for the second party conference on the Italian situation and the task of the party, the Central Committee of the PCI offers the following definition of fascism: "What is fascism? We have defined it as the attempt to stabilize Italian capitalism; that is, capitalism in a country with a predominantly agricultural economic base, lacking raw materials, foreign markets and a large domestic consumer market.... The forms of capitalist stabilization differ from country to country, according to the economic structure of the different countries and their degree of wealth.... Fascism does not represent a progressive stage for Italian capitalism. It has only developed new forms of industrial organization (trusts, etc.) and banking organization (unification of issuing banks, etc.), but these new forms remain at the service of the traditional political economy of the Italian ruling classes, they are a means by which traditional policy is continued and strengthened under new conditions. Fascism, however, represents a superior form of capitalist state organization, one in which the state coalesces with the leading capitalists and intervenes in the production process after having concentrated

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and mustered its forces."[11]

The fault of this definition is that beyond a consideration of fascism's social content, no attention is given to fascism's specific political form, its character as a specific form of bourgeois state power. The stabilization of capitalism in Italy and Germany has essentially identical economic and social content; the form of state power under which this stabilization is realized, however, is different. This specific form of state power, thus, is that characteristic which distinguishes one from the other. The same holds true for Bonapartism. Our correction is, formally speaking, slight, though of great bearing in terms of substance.

Let us apply this explanation to the past. That fascism is but one species, one mode of the "final form of bourgeois state power," is confirmed by the experience of the Paris Commune. The collapse of Bonapartism was followed by a proletarian revolution, but this was defeated after a short time. The proletariat of Paris succeeded in imposing its power for several months, but could not maintain it. Bonapartism, however, could not be restored. The catastrophic defeat of Bonapartism at the hands of Germany totally destroyed the Napoleonic legend. A further factor in its ruin was the corruption of the system and its internal contradictions which affected, above all, the bourgeoisie. The economic support which Bonapartism conferred upon the bourgeoisie, while denying it political power, contributed in turn to the political strengthening of that class. After having defeated the Commune, the bourgeoisie wanted to and was able to exercise direct political power. Even the peasantry, also strengthened politically, wished to participate in government. Louis Bonaparte had given them war, while they wanted peace. The working class, however, had proven by the Commune uprising that its strength and maturity had grown since 1848. The bourgeoisie understood that after the repeated attempts of the Bonapartist regime, the working class could no longer be held down in an openly dictatorial manner. After the defeat of Bonapartism, the bourgeoisie attempted to rule through a regime with a bourgeois-democratic appearance. Finally, the defeat which the bourgeoisie suffered due to the inefficiency of the Bonapartist army of "replacements," career soldiers, made it clear to the French bourgeoisie that the army had to be reorganized; and so compulsory military service was introduced and the length of service was shortened in order that not only the village lumpenproletariat, but also all those eligible for military service, might be drafted. Without the Bonapartist army, the Bonapartist system could not exist. The result was the bourgeois-parliamentary republic, the state form of a materially and politically strengthened bourgeoisie and, at the same time, a strengthened working class.

Louis Bonaparte's main base of support in the bourgeoisie was not the old banking and finance aristocracy (which had ruled under King Louis Philippe), but rather the young, ambitious industrial bourgeoisie which was still weak, lacking in tradition, political training and solid party organization, a stratum not yet in a position to rule by itself. Louis Bonaparte, the *parvenu*

11. *Lo Stato Operaio*, Vol. II, No. 3 (March 1928), pp. 127ff.

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and adventurer, was a protector well suited to the *parvenu* bourgeoisie. The military collapse of Louis Bonaparte, together with the economic strengthening of the bourgeoisie between 1850 and 1870, created the prerequisites for the political autonomy it gained during the Third Republic. The military thrashing with which Louis Bonaparte's rule ended was a drastic political lesson for the bourgeoisie. (The political value which military defeats possess can also be seen in the case of the German bourgeoisie. If the blows which Bismarckian Germany delivered Louis Bonaparte in 1870-71 finished Bonaparte, France took revenge in World War I in so far as with the defeat which France and the Allies inflicted upon Hohenzollern Germany, the Hohenzollern-Bismarcking regime was topped and the Prussian-German grand bourgeoisie was placed directly in the saddle. Not only defeated generals, but also defeated classes learn their lessons well.)

Forms of direct bourgeois dictatorship are not essentially isolated phenomena; they are bound to a specific complex of class relations and they recur periodically whenever the given complex of relations recurs. This holds true so long as the collapse of any one form of capitalist dictatorship does not lead to the permanent rule of the working class, for this would effectively complete the cycle for the country in question.

This should explain why there was no direct bourgeois dictatorship in England after 1848-49. The bourgeoisie was too strong, socially and politically. The activities of the Chartists in 1848 was only an insignificant episode which revealed the incapacity of the English working class to seriously shake bourgeois society. For this reason as well, speaking of the present, fascism was not victorious in Germany in 1923; on the contrary, it collapsed rather pitifully on the first try, leaving the grand bourgeoisie victorious, their direct political power established in the form of a bourgeois-parliamentary republic. This is also the reason why the fascist form of state power does not prevail in America, England and France.

IV.

Let us now turn to the present form of direct bourgeois dictatorship, the fascist state in Italy. The fundamental features which it has in common with the Bonapartist form of dictatorship are unmistakable: the "growing independence of executive authority," the political subjugation of all classes, including the bourgeoisie, to fascist state control, while at the same time social power remains in the hands of the grand bourgeoisie and the large landowners. Both fascism and Bonapartism aim to be the general benefactor of all classes; for that reason one class is constantly played off against another, the result being a constant shifting of internal contradictions. Even the apparatus of domination bears the same characteristics. The fascist party is a counterpart to Louis Bonaparte's "gang of December 10th"; its social composition consists of ejected elements from all classes: the nobility, the bourgeoisie, the urban petty bourgeoisie, the peasantry and the working class. With regard to the working class, two opposing yet related poles of declassé elements are represented: below, the lumpen proletariat, and above,

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members from the working class aristocracy and bureaucracy, from reformist trade unions and parties. The same holds true for the armed forces. The fascist militia is a social counterpart of the Bonapartist army, both providing a living for declassé elements. In addition to the militia, there continues to exist in Italy an army based on general conscription; this was not the case in Bonapartist France. The existence of such an army, in addition to the fascist militia, responds to organizational exigencies imposed by imperialist military relations. Such exigencies render insufficient a professional or mercenary army, requiring instead a mass army based on the broadest possible obligatory conscription.

The phases of class struggle from which the French Bonapartist and Italian fascist forms of state power emerged are also similar. In both cases an assault by the proletariat failed, resulting in disillusionment on the part of the working class. Meanwhile, the bourgeoisie, exhausted, distracted, and lacking in energy, searched for a savior to strengthen its social power. The governing ideologies are also similar: the "national idea," the sham fight against parliamentary and bureaucratic corruption, feigned opposition to capital, and so forth. The "heroes" of the *coup d'état,* finally, are very much alike. Friedrich Engels highlights the following characteristics of such a "hero," characteristics which qualify him for such a role: "Willing to try anything, he had been a Carbonari conspirator in Italy, artillery officer in Switzerland, debt-ridden aristocratic tramp and Special Constable in England. Always and everywhere a Pretender." [12] The bourgeoisie, Engels continues, sees in him the "great statesman," flesh of their flesh he is, as are they, a *parvenu.* So with Mussolini, son of a mason; in accordance with changing times a *parvenu* from the working class is now more acceptable than a *parvenu* from the lower nobility, as was the case with Bonaparte. Mussolini's activity with the Social Democrats corresponds to that of Louis Bonaparte with the Italian Carbonari. In recent times, passage through Social Democracy has become obligatory for "great statesmen" and saviors of the bourgeoisie. Most recently, even Communism has become one such obligatory passage, as for example in China. Both Mussolini and Louis Bonaparte spent long years suffering in exile, an experience which, in certain individuals, deepens the yearning for power and wealth, sharpens insight, hardens the will and creates the necessary resiliency. Under such determinate objective and subjective conditions are produced hardened and experienced revolutionaries, as well as the cynical counter-revolutionary who, having "swum in all the oceans," becomes an ideal author for a coup d'etat.

There are profound contradictions between the material and social reinforcement of the bourgeoisie and its political subordination, as well as between the illusory protection of the proletariat's material interests and its abandonment to capitalist exploitation. The fascist state, acting as a "mediator" between the bourgeoisie and the working class, must constantly negotiate within the boundaries of these practical contradictions. The same holds true with respect to the peasantry and the petty bourgeoisie. Fascism

12. Engels, *The Role of Force in History, op.cit.,* p. 39.

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and Bonapartism have promised bourgeois society peace and security, yet to demonstrate that they are indispensable as permanent saviors of society, the fascists must make bourgeois society believe that it is constantly threatened. Hence, a permanent state of disorder and insecurity. The economic interests of the bourgeoisie and the peasantry require a frugal economic policy, an "austerity regime." However, the economic interests of the parasites, the members of the fascist party organization and the civil servants on the national and local level, require a steady expansion and enrichment of both the state and party apparatus. For this reason, both sides are injured in turn. Every restraint imposed upon the fascist gang in the interests of "peace and quiet" and bourgeois economy must be counter-balanced immediately by renewed permission for terrorist excess, plundering, etc.

The internal contradictions, together with a national-imperialist ideology, push the dictator toward external expansion, to the point of waging war. Here the Italian dictator encounters two contradictions: an old one, which also faced Louis Bonaparte, that the domestic military force (in Italy the national militia), because of its domestic duties and its social composition, is virtually powerless as an instrument of important conquest against those nations which have not yet deemed it necessary to adopt this most corrupt form of bourgeois state power; and a new one, which results from conflicts between privileged fascist troops and the regular army.

What are the substantial differences between Bonapartism and fascism? In part, they derive from national differences in class relations, historical traditions, etc. Yet they are also rooted in the transformed general character of bourgeois society and the capitalist system. National differences account for the fact that the French dictator, due to the Napoleonic legend and its effect upon the peasantry, must act as an "emperor," while the Italian dictator must content himself with the role of "Duce" and leave the crown untouched; in France the Napoleonic masquerade, in Italy that of the ancient Roman sultan and Caesar, which is certainly more artificial. These, however, are not substantial differences.

More important are the differences which derive from a transition in the general characteristics of capitalism itself. Napoleon III still operated in an era of laissez-faire capitalism, before the bourgeois revolution had taken place in Italy and Germany. The revolutionary claims which Napoleon I had been able to extol for some time, and which Napoleon II later tried to exploit, became counter-productive. During the war in Italy, he initially supported the movement for Italian liberation but soon abandoned it in the interest of his own dynastic conquests in the Franco-German war. He collided directly with Germany's revolutionary interest for national unification and was defeated. The time was not right for the dynastic war of conquest which, driven by the Napoleonic legend and by the internal contradictions of his system, he had to wage: it was, on the one hand, too late, for such a war no longer represented a revolutionary principle; on the other hand, it was too soon, for it could not represent the imperialist principle in the modern sense, since France lacked an adequate economic base. Mussolini's foreign policy, by

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way of contrast, was imperialist in the modern sense, in origin, nature and direction. It is "contemporary," although masked as ancient; from the start, however, it was openly reactionary. The contradictions, first, between its unrealistic goals and its limited means, and second, between the organization and the social structure of the military, must lead to its failure. This will especially be the case as the need to subjugate all social classes in order to live at their expense conflicts with the exigencies of waging an imperialist war.

A further difference, one which is determined by the general development of bourgeois society and the status of the international class struggle, is found in the organizational bases and means of fascist state power. Louis Napoleon's "December gang" was the counterpart of a small, revolutionary secret organization of the French working class. The fascist party is the counter-revolutionary counterpart of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. In contrast to Louis Napoleon's organization, this was a mass organization from the very beginning. In some respects, this renders it more potent, although it also heightens the internal contradictions between the social interests of the masses and the interests of the ruling classes it must serve.

Let us turn briefly to Poland. The fascist dictatorial base of Pilsudski also rests upon the defeat of a revolutionary proletarian insurrection (the Russo-Polish war of 1920) and the weakness, fragmentation, and lack of energy of the Polish bourgeoisie which, even in the interests of stabilization, could not act as a unified group. The social basis of fascist state power in Poland is the counter-revolutionary interests of the bourgeoisie and the large landowners. The fascists knew how to exploit the disappointment of the peasantry over the sabotage of agrarian reform, although their policies expressly served the interests of the large landowners and the peasant elite. The "hero" of the coup d'etat bases himself ideologically on the tradition of the national-revolutionary libertarian struggle and organizationally on the legionnaires and on their disappointment over the outcome of the national liberation struggle — the laziness of the bourgeoisie — and on their economic need to earn a living, a need which these legionnaires cannot satisfy within the sphere of production. In Poland, too, declassé elements of all classes serve as material for the fascist army. The party organization is composed of deserters from all sides, who are led by aides of the marshal, former terrorists and legionnaires.

In the case of Poland, however, one factor must be taken into account that is also of utmost importance in Spain and a host of other countries. While "fascist state power" in these countries maintains an outward appearance similar to Italian fascism and French Bonapartism, its class character differs fundamentally. To illustrate this point, one might look to the extreme cases of regimes and forms of state power in the South American republics where the army is the bearer of the executive made "independent." Common political changes occur, of course, in military putsches which, although outwardly violent, are in no way revolutionary, since they basically change nothing in the existing power and class relations. Here the military dictatorship, the executive power rendering itself independent, does not emerge from fully

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developed bourgeois society, from its over-ripeness, from the stress it undergoes when threatened by proletarian revolutions, and from the necessity of entrenching itself against revolution, but rather from the opposite. It emerges from the immaturity of bourgeois development, the numerical and organizational weakness of the bourgeoisie which still faces feudal, land-holding elements that hinder the formation of a strong bourgeois political organization. The army, rather the officer corps, is the strongest and most highly developed political organization. It exercises the power which the bourgeoisie cannot yet exercise. In the case of both Bonapartism and Italian fascism, the bourgeoisie was no longer in a position to exercise power, given the specific conditions of the class struggles at the times in question. Behind the same fascist exterior (as in Spain) are thus hidden totally different class relations, stages in the class struggle, and stages in the development of bourgeois society. Without a concrete class analysis one commits serious theoretical and practical errors.

Our Italian comrades, if I have been correctly informed, have asked whether the dictatorship of the proletariat must directly follow a fascist form of government or whether it can be followed by some form of bourgeois rule. The answer was given by Lenin at the Second Congress of the Communist International. Responding to the question, whether the crisis which capitalism faced at the end of the war must inevitably lead to socialist revolution, Lenin answered that this could not be resolved theoretically. Such talk was mere verbiage, scholasticism. Only the struggle itself could provide the answer. The task of the Communist Parties consisted of preparing for the struggle in the best possible way. The collapse of Bonapartism provides the same answer. Some form of direct capitalist dictatorship in fully developed bourgeois society will be the "ultimate" or final form of bourgeois state power when the leadership of the working class is strong enough to take advantage of the crisis in the regime to establish a lasting dictatorship of the proletariat. All of this depends on the struggle which will be decided by objective and subjective factors: the effective strength and maturity of the working class, its relations to other classes of working people, the status of the international class struggle and, last but not least, the strength, maturity and effectiveness of the Communist Party of the country in question.

A further question is whether the collapse of Italian fascism can be directly followed by the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat. In France, as we know, the collapse of Bonapartism on September 4, 1870, was followed by a republic which had Thiers, Favre and Co., the Legitimists and Orleanists, the bourgeoisie and the Junkers at its head. Only after these parties had brought themselves to the brink of ruin did the Commune follow on March 18, 1871. The bourgeois-republican interval, during which bourgeois-democratic elements came to power for a short time, is also a possibility, in fact a probability, for Italy. It may last months, weeks or only days; it may assume the form of a coalition government or some other singular form. However, due to historical experience and class relations in Italy, a certain amount of time and experience will be needed to destroy the petty

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bourgeois democratic illusions and hopes held by the petty bourgeoisie, the peasantry and parts of the working class. The Communist Party is not in a position to decide whether such a stage must occur or can be skipped. It is, however, in a position to determine the strength which the working class will possess at the moment of the collapse of the fascist system, as well as how long this stage must last.

A further conclusion that we can draw from past events is that direct capitalist dictatorship in countries other than Poland, Italy and Bulgaria can, and probably will, assume different forms than in these countries. Certain features will be the same, certain will be different; to construct them theoretically would be impossible. The forms of direct bourgeois dictatorship are not arbitrary, they do not exist at any point in the class struggle, with any set of class relations. They are bound to very specific class relations, to a specific point in the class struggle, as mentioned above.

It is fairly common today that the bourgeoisie in highly developed capitalist countries is endeavoring to limit or do away with the parliamentary system and to create stronger political guarantees for bourgeois control. Such trends are visible, above all, in such highly developed capitalist countries as England, Germany and France, where a certain amount of upheaval in the social and economic spheres was brought about by the war. Such endeavors move in the direction of fascism; at a critical juncture they can lead to forms of direct capitalist dictatorship which, however, need not be identical with forms of fascism.

It is necessary to clarify one point. The process by which the bourgeois parliamentary regime is undermined — a process in which the bourgeoisie itself is the main agent — is accomplished gradually. In the *18th Brumaire*, Marx delineates this process in its individual steps. The actual act by which a direct dictatorship seizes power can only occur by a leap, through a putsch or a coup d'etat. The bourgeoisie is merely a passive element in this act, for its role is to create the conditions whereby it can be socially "saved" and politically violated. The rape itself is committed by the hero of the coup d'etat or putsch. When there is a need, an individual or organization is soon found. The appropriate organizations are furthered either actively or passively by the bourgeoisie itself.

Although the Noske regiment was without doubt openly counter-revolutionary, the German government was not fascist in nature. The Noske experiment was not an attempt to create a "growing independence" of executive power. But because it had established a "reign of the sabre," an attempt in this direction followed. The Kapp-Putsch, an attempt on the part of the military executive authority, however, failed.

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NOTES AND COMMENTARY:

LAW-MAKING AS PRAXIS

by Karl Klare

I. *The Promise of Critical Legal Thought*

There has been for some time a recognized crisis in classical Marxist political theory that can no longer, if it ever did, adequately account for the role of the state in advanced capitalism. This crisis has called forth a series of creative but incomplete attempts to conceptualize the advanced capitalist state.[1] There is likewise a long-smoldering crisis in liberal legal theory,[2] which has, in turn, called forth a critical response symbolized by such developments as the creation of the Conference on Critical Legal Studies. One major strand in the emerging attack on liberal legalism is the elaboration of a neo-Marxist legal theory,[3] which is laying foundations for the

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*With minor revisions, this is the text of remarks presented at the First New England Regional Meeting of the Conference on Critial Legal Studies, held in Boston, Feb. 4, 1978. The Conference on Critical Legal Studies is a national organization of law practitioners, teachers, and students. social scientists, and others committed to the development of a critical theoretical perspective on law, legal practice and legal education. The paper was submitted to the "Notes and Commentary" section with the thought that *Telos* readers would be interested in the recent emergence of a serious interest among students and practitioners of law in radical social theory, particularly as legal practice has hitherto been notable for the absence of a sustained commitment to theoretical work. It is a development of some significance that there is a wide-spread acknowledgement in the radical legal community, growing stronger still since this conference, that the community needs to acquire a deeper theoretical base and to devote attention to the issues, themes and arguments of the traditions in critical social thought discussed in journals such as *Telos*. By the same token, the empirical and practical focus of critical legal thought has already enriched and, it is hoped, will continue to enrich the discourse of radical social theory. In particular, the growing literature emanating from the critical legal theory movement, some of which is cited in the text, has already made important contributions to the theory of the state. The context of the remarks that follow was an early attempt to bring together several constitutencies that have much to gain by sharing their work. The Conference on Critical Legal Studies may be reached through its secretary, Mark Tushnet, Law School, University of Wisconsin, Madison, WI 53706.

1. This literature is by now familiar and need not be surveyed here. See David Gold, Clarence Lo, Erik Wright, "Recent Developments in Marxist Theories of the Capitalist State," *Monthly Review*, October 1975 (Part 1) and November 1975 (Part 2); Alan Wolfe, "New Directions in the Marxist Theory of Politics," *Politics and Society*, Winter 1974. The comments on the theory of the state that follow draw on this literature, particularly the work of Ralph Miliband, James O'Connor, Claus Offe, and Alan Wolfe. I have found most useful Fred Block, "The Ruling Class Does Not Rule: Notes on the Marxist Theory of the State," *Socialist Revolution*, No. 33 (May-June 1977).

2. The roots of the current crisis of American legal thought may be traced to the 1930s, when the legal system, like all other aspects of capitalist life, experienced traumatic upheaval. Legalism never fully recovered from the largely successful assaults of legal realism in the 1930s, though serious attempts have been made to repair the edifice of liberal jurisprudence since the Depression. See generally, Lon Fuller, "Reason and Fiat in Case Law," 59 *Harvard Law Review* 376 (1946); Karl Klare, "Judicial Deradicalization of the Wagner Act and the Origins of Modern Legal Consciousness," 62 *Minnesota Law Review* 265 (1978); G. Edward White, "The Evolution of Reasoned Elaboration: Jurisprudential Criticism and Social Change," 59 *Virginia Law Review* 279 (1973). (Note: legal citations begin with the volume number, have the source cited second, and end with the page number of the opening or cited page.)

3. There is a growing body of literature about law written in English that may broadly be said to be within the perspective of the "neo-Marxist" theoretical project. See particularly: Isaac Balbus, "Commodity Form and Legal Form: An Essay on the 'Relative Autonomy' of the Law,"

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creation of a Marxist jurisprudential culture in the United States.[4] My thesis is that because of its concreteness and empirical focus, because of its inherent orientation toward practice,[5] and because of its abiding concern with the claims of reason and justice, however much those claims are systematically violated by capitalism, critical legal thought has much to contribute to the revivification of Marxist political theory. In particular, critical legal thought forces attention upon the need to conceive and anticipate, however rudimentarily, the institutional forms for political expression, collective decision-making, resource allocation, and dispute resolution which will someday constitute a free and democratic society — matters ordinarily postponed or ignored in the classical Marxist tradition. I will argue that the key to releasing this theoretical potential lies in transcending the traditional view of law (and the state

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11 *Law and Society Review* 571 (1977); Andrew Fraser, "The Legal Theory We Need Now," *Socialist Review*, Nos. 40-41 (July-October 1978); Peter Gabel, review of Dworkin's *Taking Rights Seriously*, 91 *Harvard Law Review* 302 (1977); "Intention and Structure in Contractual Conditions: Outline of a Method for Critical Legal Theory," 61 *Minnesota Law Review* 601 (1977); Douglas Hay, *et al.*, *Albion's Fatal Tree* (New York, 1975); Karl Klare, *op.cit.*; E.P. Thompson, *Whigs and Hunters: The Origin of the Black Act* (New York, 1975); Mark Tushnet, "A Marxist Analysis of American Law," *Marxist Perspectives*, No. 1 (Spring 1978); "Perspectives on the Development of American Law," 1977 *Wisconsin Law Review* 81 (1977).

4. There are many reasons why a Marxist legal culture has been slow to develop. As a group, political lawyers tend to be oriented toward the resolution of immediate, pressing practical issues, rather than toward theoretical work. The many distinguished radical and socialist lawyers who accomplished so much representing and serving the labor, civil rights, anti-war, women's and other popular movements over the generations had and have much to contribute to an understanding of the capitalist state, yet, understandably, their energies have been devoted first and foremost to grappling with immediate litigation problems. As a result, they have had little opportunity to develop alternative theoretical models for understanding the American legal process. Until recently, what existed of radical legal theory was a series of demonstrations that this or that statute or decision served the interests of a particular class or group. Although such demystifying critiques have an important place, the argument of this paper is that they are inadequate as a ground for Marxist jurisprudence. There are other reasons, which I am unable fully to explore here, for the underdevelopment of Marxist legal culture: the tendency of orthodox Marxism to treat law as a mere epiphenomenon and, hence, the lack of much serious writing on law within the Marxist tradition; the pragmatic orientation of lawyers as a group, by training and professional interest; and, perhaps, the more thoroughgoing and hegemonic consolidation of a Cold War perspective within law than in the social sciences, delaying an opening to the left in legal academic circles some five or ten years after radical sociology and economics caucuses began to flourish in the United States. See also Mark Tushnet, "Marxist Analysis," *op.cit.*, p. 96.

5. That is, the embeddedness of action-in-belief and of belief-in-action. See Roberto Unger, *Law in Modern Society* (New York, 1976), pp. 245-246. The term "legal practice" is not, except where the context requires, used in the narrow sense connoted by the phrase "practice of law." Rather, I use "practice" in the broadest sense of any social-world producing activity, as in Marx's concept of *praxis*. See Dick Howard, *The Marxian Legacy* (London, 1977), chapter 1. "Legal practice" (or "law-making" or "the legal process") thus comprehends the modes of thought characteristic of legal culture, the styles and patterns of consciousness by which lawyers perceive and resolve problems, the institutions, processes, and behaviors that together constitute the external manifestations of law, such as courts, agencies, police apparatuses, adjudication, legislation, contract, and so on, and, indeed, all human contacts with official and semi-official dispute-resolution processes. For example, in my paper, *op.cit.*, I argue that the great sit-down strikes of 1936-37 were, in effect, a part of the "legal process" that established collective bargaining in this country, as much as the action of Congress in passing the National Labor Relations Act. The rural poor who, through their collective action "enforced" a just price in the sale of grain, were, on E.P. Thompson's evidence, relying upon and participating in the legal culture of thier times; i.e., they were in some sense engaged in "legal practice" as that term is used here.

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generally) as mere instruments, buttresses or "retaining walls" of class power, and being able to conceive of law and politics more broadly as forms of practice by which the social order of capitalism is defined.

II. *Marxist Political Theory in Late Capitalism*

The social and political transformations of advanced capitalism have eroded the underpinnings of the classical Marxist view of the state, which is embodied in the familiar "base-superstructure" dichotomy, in which the state is seen as an instrument of class power and more or less responsive to the will of dominant economic actors; that is, as a "reflection" of the primary structure or "real foundation" of social life which is said to be located in the relations of production. The classical statement of this view is Marx's well-known dictum: "In the social production which men carry on they enter into definite relations that are indispensable and independent of their will; these relations of production correspond to a definite stage of development of their material powers of production. The sum total of these relations of production constitutes the economic structure of society — the real foundation, on which rise legal and political superstructures and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness. The mode of production in material life determines the general character of the social, political and spiritual processes of life."[6]

Without pausing to recapitulate the debates as to whether the theory is, as stated, defensible, and whether in light of his work as a whole it can be said that Marx actually held such a theory, it is coming to be common ground that the base-superstructure paradigm cannot tell us what is important to know about the state in advanced capitalist society — namely, *why* the capitalist state *is* a capitalist state. The model is deficient for several reasons:

(1) *Politicization of the "base":* The state in advanced capitalism systematically and pervasively intervenes in, and indeed, reshapes the sphere of private economic and social activity. The process of capital accumulation is now dependent upon and contoured by state policy. This has been true in a systematic sense since the 1940s, but the process of political "rationalization"[7] of private economic activity has been the trend since at least the turn of the century.[8] The state sets the ground rules of most economic transactions, directly regulates many significant industries, regulates the class struggle through labor laws, through its actions determines the size of the "social wage," provides the infrastructure of capital accumulation, manages the tempo of business activity and economic growth, takes measures directly and indirectly to maintain effective demand, and itself participates in the market as a massive business actor and employer. It is, in short, simply impossible to speak meaningfully of the "relations of production" in advanced capitalism without comprehending under that heading the role of the state, the relationships of state power to private economic

6. Karl Marx, "Preface" to *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy* (Chicago, 1904), p. 11.

7. See Gabriel Kolko, *The Triumph of Conservatism: A Reinterpretation of American History, 1900-1916* (Chicago, 1967), pp. 1-10.

8. Often this rationalization process can be traced to the initiative of leading coporate interests, but often that is an insufficient explanation. The role of popular initiative and class struggle and the independent interests and goals of state managers (often in conflict with those of much of the business community) have, until recently, been underplayed in what is otherwise one of the most fruitful first steps toward a critical theory of the state, the theory of "corporate liberalism." See Block, *op.cit.*, note 2, and Fred Block, "Beyond Corporate Liberalism," *Social Problems*, Vol. 24 (1977).

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activity.

(2) *Transformation of the "superstructure":* At the same time, the concerns and interests of private life are infused into the public domain, they become concerns of public policy. Labor-management disputes, the character of education, the distribution of income, the allocation of social entitlements to the poor, the nature of family life, in short, all important issues of social life, increasingly become the concerns of public policy, including issues of the most intimate kind. To pick just a few examples, and leaving aside such well-known matters as the Bakke case, in recent years the business of the United States Supreme Court has included such concerns as what medical procedures shall be available to poor women; the permissible length of policemen's hair and sideburns; where on an employer's premises employees may engage in private, off-duty conversations about labor unions; whether government may regulate family size by financially penalizing welfare recipients who have more than the prescribed number of children; what relationships or "lifestyles" must obtain between persons who wish to live in the same household; and even whether a rare species of fish known as the "snail darter" should be preserved at the expense of a $100 million public works project. Most politically involved people would, I suspect, be astonished to learn the scope of "private" activity scrutinized and regulated by public agencies that would be revealed by reading through a year's worth of Supreme Court opinions or federal administrative law decisions and rulings. As the state has increasingly assumed the burdens of maintaining consumer demand, managing employment levels and labor force attitudes, and mitigating the most extreme human consequences of unrestricted capital accumulation, almost all private concerns have become matters of state policy.[9]

(3) *Corporativism and bureaucracy:* The base-superstructure paradigm is of little use in analyzing the central phenomenon of corporativism in advanced capitalism — the ascendancy to (or cooptation into) semi-governmental power of hitherto "private" institutions such as corporations, labor unions, and universities, which plan and execute decisions affecting our individual and collective destinies. The repercussions within law of these developments are enormous. The separation between private and public law is collapsing,[10] and "state action" doctrine — that is, the theory of sovereignty[11] — is in a state of ideological chaos. The conception of "rights" in capitalist society, to the extent they exist at all, is increasingly being transformed from one of absolute entitlements possessed by individuals as against state power to one in which the individual has a narrower claim merely to have his or her interests "weighed" by authoritative agencies and-or represented reasonably and in good faith by large, bureaucratic corporativist entities over whose direction one has no real

9. I emphatically do not mean to imply that the expansion of the concerns of state eliminates private control of many or even most important social processes. Quite the contrary, the most serious decisions with social consequences, such as investment decisions and the content of collective bargaining contracts, remain largely under private control. The essential contradiction of advanced capitalism remains that between the social production and private appropriation of wealth. What is asserted is that a mutual interdependency develops between state power and the processes of capital accumulation, and that one cannot fully understand either process without appreciating the other. For more detailed discussion, see Block, *op.cit.*, note 1, and also Claus Offe and Volker Ronge, "Theses on the Theory of the State," *New German Critique*, No. 6(Fall 1976).

10. See generally Morton Horwitz, *Materials on American Legal History, 1890-Present* (Harvard Law School, 1976); Duncan Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of Classical Legal Thought, 1865-1940* (Unpublished manuscript).

11. See Laurence Tribe, *American Constitutional Law* (Mineola, N.Y., 1978), chapter 18.

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control.[12]

(4) *Culture and legitimation:* The base-superstructure model cannot do justice to the cultural and psychological underpinnings of state power, nor to the cultural function of the state in reproducing the social order of capitalism, nor indeed to the partial, but important, degree to which the forms and institutions of liberal, representative democracy represent the achievements of working class agitation. As Perry Anderson has written: "The existence of the parliamentary State thus constitutes the formal framework of all other ideological mechanisms of the ruling class. It provides the general code in which every specific message elsewhere is transmitted. The code is all the more powerful because the juridical rights of citizenship are not a mere mirage: on the contrary, the civic freedoms and suffrages of bourgeois democracy are a tangible reality, whose completion was historically in part the work of the labor movement itself, and whose loss would be a momentous defeat for the working class."[13]

The Marxist theory of the state has recently recognized a need to focus attention on the cultural mediation of class and state power and, in particular, the legitimation functions of the state. Yet we are just beginning to understand why particular cultural resonances flow from state action in concrete historical cases, and how the popular democratic aspirations which are reflected in the false (but only *partially* false) universality of the liberal state are repressed, deflected, and perverted by the institutional mechanisms of capitalism. Notwithstanding other achievements of 20th-century Marxism, it is disappointing that whereas the state is massively involved through law in the application of cultural, institutional and physical power in everyday life for purposes of the reproduction of the social relations of capitalism, very few concrete examinations of the impact and meaning of the legal process exist within Marxism, largely due to the tendency to see law as merely "epiphenomenal."

In sum, the "superstructure" theory of state power is simply inadequate to describe advanced capitalist politics. Indeed, any lingering desire to refurbish this model is fatally eroded by the recovery of the dialectical theory of praxis underlying Marx's work. The central themes of Marx's politics — the critique of the fracture of social and political life, between "bourgeois" and "citoyen," which is the hallmark of all liberal democratic theory and which inevitably masks the reality of domination in class society; the view that the capitalist state extracts the social and communal essence of people and returns their sociality in the form of atomization and domination;[14] the conception of freedom as the material and institutional arrangements permitting human self-actualization and self-expression and of human "right" as the right to community and communal control of the destiny of the species, to work as a mode of self-expression, indeed, the right to the "emancipation of the senses," to the realization of a fully human sensibility; in short, the notion of "socialism [as] a promulgation of human freedom across the entire existential space of the world"[15] — these themes are simply incompatible with a causal, instrumental conception of the relationship between consciousness and actuality which is the necessary conceptual corollary of the

12. See generally Note, "Specifying the Procedures Required by Due Process: Toward Limits on the Use of Interest Balancing," 88 *Harvard Law Review* 1510 (1975).

13. Perry Anderson, "The Antinomies of Antonio Gramsci," *New Left Review*, No. 100 (November 1976-January 1977), p. 28.

14. For this point, see Wolfe, *op.cit.*, note 1.

15. Perry Anderson, "Problems of Socialist Strategy," in Perry Anderson and Robin Blackburn, eds., *Towards Socialism* (Ithaca, N.Y., 1966), p. 289.

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superstructural or "reflective" theory of the state. Rather, Marx's politics depends on a dialectical theory of consciousness — a theory of human self-activity or objectification as social world-creating (within the pre-existing space of materiality); a conception of people as beings in relation to, and dependent on, others; a conception of the relationship of subject and object in which the subject derives its contents from objects and relationships external to it, but nevertheless one in which the subject shapes, changes, and gives meaning to objects in the process of coming to know them.

The obvious inability of the orthodox paradigm to absorb, much less explain, the politics of advanced capitalism, combined with recent efforts to achieve a critical reconstruction of Marx's ontology, have generated a number of creative responses within Marxist political theory. Notwithstanding very different theoretical starting points, much of this work has come to center on the concept of the "relative autonomy" of the state from the will of dominant economic actors.[16] Although unquestionably an advance, the relative autonomy formulation is incomplete as an explanation of the social and historical mechanisms by which class interest is converted into state policy, or of how the balance implied by "relative" is maintained. We thus far do not have a theory of the *practice* by which the state in capitalist society is reproduced as a capitalist state.

In my view, the central difficulty of Marxist political theory, even in its most sophisticated versions, is its residual insistence on seeing the state primarily as a *buttress* of class power, as the protector of long-run class interest, or, in Poulantzas' formulation, as "the factor of *reproduction* of the conditions of production of a system."[17] What is needed is a theory in which political action can also be conceptualized as *creating* or *articulating* class power. To be sure, politics "creates" class power only on the terrain of a historically pre-given social formation, but the dynamic element in the activity of the state must be seen as a *constitutive* component of the social totality.

III. *The Constitutive Theory of Law*

The initial theoretical operation is to free the Marxist theory of law from its determinist integument — i.e., the notion that law is a mere instrument of class power — and to conceive the legal process[18] as, at least in part, a manner in which class relationships are created and articulated, that is, to view law-making as a form of praxis. In Andrew Fraser's words, "against the view that the law is essentially an instrument of the dominant class...law must be [seen as] a central category in any theory of sociality within advanced capitalist societies."[19]

Consider two applications of this approach:

(a) A brilliant example, to the elegance of which I cannot do justice, is Douglas

16. Thus, the "relative autonomy" notion appears to be common ground between the otherwise radically distinct approaches of Ralph Miliband and Nicos Poulantzas in their famous debate. Compare Nicos Poulantzas, "The Problem of the Capitalist State," *New Left Review*, No. 58 (November-December 1969), pp. 73-74, with Ralph Miliband, "Poulantzas and the Capitalist State," *New Left Review*, No. 82 (November-December 1973), pp. 85 and 85n.

17. Poulantzas, *ibid.* Emphasis altered.

18. Again, the "legal process" or "law-making" is defined here in the broadest terms.

19. Andrew Fraser, "The Legal Theory We Need Now," *Socialist Review*, Nos. 40-41 (July-October 1978), p. 148. I have been strongly influenced by Fraser's work, which appeared in an earlier form as "Legal Theory and Legal Practice," *Arena*, Nos. 44-45 (Greensboro, Australia, 1976). I would advance the proposition quoted with respect to all capitalist social formations, not just advanced capitalism.

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Hay's description of the criminal law in 18th-century rural England.[20] Hay begins with a paradox: the 18th-century witnessed both an enormous expansion in the number of capital offenses, particularly offenses against property, and, at the same time, weak and declining enforcement of the law, frequent acquittal of offenders on highly technical grounds, and frequent pardons or commutations of the death sentence. Contemporary reformers argued, to little avail, that property could be better protected and crime more efficiently "managed" by a more serious commitment to detection of crime, to certainty in prosecution, and to certain, but graded, punishments to insure that juries would convict and that sentences would be executed.

The seemingly irrational resistance of the landed gentry to this sensible advice is explainable only when we adopt the perspective that the social function of criminal law was not the management of crime, but sustaining the moral authority of the gentry and creating a complex and richly articulated system of social relationships of personal dependency that constituted the structure of power. That is, criminal law not only served to reproduce the social order; in part, it also constituted and defined the social order.

Hay persuasively argues that the weaknesses and inconsistencies of the law were well-suited to fulfill this broader mission. Without reproducing his entire text, the most important facets of his description of the 18th century criminal process are:

(i) The extraordinary psychic power of the law, particularly the irrational spectacle and horrible ritual of capital proceedings, was exploited to create a community theater of terror;

(ii) The solicitude customarily extended to the accused, the absurd procedural formalism which allowed frequent escape from the gallows, the occasional conviction of a nobleman, and the occasional practice by the wealthy of financing a lawsuit brought by a poor retainer, were all carefully woven into a powerful cultural underpinning for the hegemonic presentation of class rule as a system of blind and equal justice (while at the same time this ideology, as well as the absence of a standing national police force, protected the gentry from the Crown);

(iii) The rules of criminal procedure (such as the prohibition on employment by accused felons of counsel to address the jury) were structured to make the character witness (a man of property to whom one would become, literally, indebted for life) central to the criminal defense; and,

(iv) The mercy and pardon power, which was *de facto* in private hands because of the system of private prosecution, pervaded the administration of the law, and mercy was dispensed in a personalistic, discretionary manner: "the manner in which a pardon was obtained made it an important element in 18th century social relaitons in three...ways. In the first place, the claims of class saved far more men who had been left to hang by the assize judge than did the claims of humanity. Again and again in petitions the magic words recur: 'his parents are respectable persons in Denbighshire'; his father is 'a respectable farmer'; his brother is 'a builder of character and eminence in London'.... Pardons also favored those with connections for another reason: mercy was part of the currency of patronage. Petitions were most effective from great men, and the common course for a plea to be passed up through increasingly higher levels of the social scale, between men bound together by the links of patronage

20. Douglas Hay, "Property, Authority and the Criminal Law," in Douglas Hay, Peter Linebaugh, John Rule, E.P. Thompson and Cal Winslow, eds., *Albion's Fatal Tree* (New York, 1975), pp. 17-63. The paragraphs that follow are drawn from Hay's essay.

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and obligation.... Beyond class favoritism and games of influence, the pardon had an equally important role to play in the ideology of mercy. The poor did not see the elaborate ramifications of interest and connection.... [N]o gentleman wished to admit too openly that justice itself was but another part of the system. Moreover, pardon-dealing went on at the highest levels only, well concealed from the eyes of the poor. Therefore the royal prerogative of mercy could be presented as something altogether more mysterious, more sacred and more absolute in its determinations. Pardons were presented as acts of grace rather than as favors to interests. At the lowest levels, within the immediate experience of the poor, pardons were indeed part of the tissue of paternalism, expressed in the most personal terms. The great majority of petitions for mercy were written by gentlemen on behalf of laborers. It was an important self-justification of the ruling class that once the poor had been chastised sufficiently to protect property, it was the duty of a gentleman to protect 'his' people."[21]

The genius of the English criminal procedure was to put the instruments of terror directly at the disposal of the dominant socio-economic actors, but under the guise of an impartial, determinate, and humane rule of law. But the ideological mystification is only one aspect of Hay's argument. The other and crucial point I draw from Hay is that the legal process contributed to the articulation of the vast configuration of relationships of personal dependency and the psychic and emotional penumbra that surrounded them which constituted the primary system of authority in rural England. *That is, the legal process was one of the primary forms, if not the primary form, of social practice through which the actual relationships embodying class power were created and articulated:* the ruling class's "political and social power was reinforced daily by bonds of obligation on one side and condescension on the other, as prosecutors, gentlemen and peers decided to invoke the law or agreed to show mercy. Discretion allowed a prosecutor to terrorize the petty thief and then command his gratitude, or at least the approval of his neighborhood as a man of compassion.... [T]he power of gentlemen and peers to punish or forgive worked in the same way to maintain the fabric of obedience, gratitude and deference. The law was important as gross coercion: it was equally important as ideology. Its majesty, justice and mercy helped to create the spirit of consent and submission, the 'mind-forged manacles,' which Blake saw binding the English poor."[22]

(b) A second example is provided by my own research on American labor law in the 1930s and 1940s, which attempts to resolve the difficulty for Marxist theory posed by New Deal labor law reform. The National Labor Relations Act of 1935 is portrayed in conventional liberal historiography as proof of the possibility of democratic reform within capitalism. In reaction, some left interpretations have portrayed it as the outcome of a decision by the most sophisticated representatives of the business community to promote collective bargaining so as to preserve the social order and forestall developments toward even more radical social change.[23] The former view fails to do justice to the massive extra-parliamentary struggle waged by the working class to enforce the legislation; nor does it confront the profoundly conservative implications of collective bargaining in co-opting, institutionalizing, and bureaucratizing the militant class struggle of the 1930s. The latter approach fails to confront the fact

21. *Ibid.*, pp. 44-47.
22. *Ibid.*, pp. 48-49.
23. See, e.g., G. William Domhoff, *The Higher Circles* (New York, 1970), pp. 233-249.

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that almost all forces in the business community, including those that would be expected to be associated with "corporate liberal reformism," bitterly and fiercely resisted the Act and were forced to obey its command (and, later, to find ways to shape it to their own ends) only by the extraordinary struggle of working people in the union organizing campaigns of the 1930s. In short, the Act must be seen in both its aspects, as a prospect or aspiration for democratic and, to some degree, anti-capitalist social change, as well as a buttress of the institutional system for state administration and containment of the class struggle.

A resolution of this complexity is to be found in many post-1930s developments: changing political conditions presented by the War and the Cold War; changes in the labor movement; and so on. But I argue that one of the important processes at work, beginning as early as 1937, was the relatively imaginative intervention of the National Labor Relations Board and the courts, particularly the U.S. Supreme Court, in interpreting and administering the NLRA. This intervention articulated and advanced certain crucial rights of workers and yet, at the same time, defused or "deradicalized" the latent anti-capitalist potential of the Act, thereby laying the cultural, and later the institutional foundations of the architecture of the post-War administered and regulated class struggle. Achieving this balance — progressive advancement of employee rights so as to relegitimate the capitalist state at a moment of extreme crisis, yet the articulation and structuring of these rights in a manner ultimately amenable to capitalist domination of the workplace — required no small quantum of intellectual and political effort and skill. This law-making, i.e., institution defining, effort was part of the vast political and planning enterprise which brought late capitalism into being. The legal process, particularly the law-making practice of the NLRB and the Supreme Court, not only served to "protect" capitalism in its moment of crisis, but contributed to defining what the character of capitalism would become and creating the institutional and social relationships of the late capitalist workplace.[24]

The chief analytical operation underlying the project of developing a "constitutive theory" of law, that is, the step of conceiving of law-making as in principle a form of objectification, is an analogue to the call within philosophical discussion for clarity on the distinction Marx made between "objectification" and "alienation." "Objectification," the ontological foundation of human freedom, is the process by which the subject, shaped by the material "substratum" of consciousness, embodies itself in products and relationships which form the social interworld, whereas "alienation" is the historically contingent social process by which objectification is so distorted and impeded that we are unable to experience and know ourselves as the authors of our objectifications or our destinies.[25] Though Marx's writing was primarily concerned with unmasking the alienated character of the work process in capitalist society, "labor" (as distinct from "capitalist wage-labor") was for him a metaphysical category expansive enough to encompass all forms of social practice, including legal practice.[26]

24. This argument is developed in some detail in my essay, *op.cit.*, note 2.

25. See Peter Berger and Stanley Pullberg, "Reification and the Sociological Critique of Consciousness," *New Left Review*, No. 35 (January-February 1966).

26. Cf. Herbert Marcuse, "The Foundation of Historical Materialism," in *Studies in Critical Philosophy* (Boston, 1972). In order to reach the political conclusions draw, *infra* part IV, I find it unnecessary here to enter the debate as to whether, contrary to my assertion in the text, Marx's concept of objectification was in fact narrowly restricted to the labor process proper to the exclusion of other forms of intersubjective practice, and that therefore Marx's theory is an inadequate ground upon which to construct a vision of post-revolutionary society.

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My argument is that we can conceive law-making as, *in theory*, a form of expressive social practice in which the community participates in shaping the moral, allocative, and adjudicatory texture of social life, but that in class society, this process is alienated. In history, law-making becomes a mode of domination, not freedom, because of its *repressive* function — its connection with official (class) violence; its *facilitative* function — its emphasis on the promotion of transactions desirable from the standpoint of reproducing capitalist domination in particular and the social order in general; and because of its *ideological* function — its presentation as just and fair that which is inequitable, cruel, and inhumane.[27] Indeed, what has been least appreciated by Marxism is that the distinctive *form* of legal practice in liberal capitalist culture, liberal legalism,[28] is itself an alienation. Because of its connection with official coercion; its purported (i.e., ideological) separation of morals and politics from judicial action; its overwhelming emphasis on the formal, adjudicatory model of dispute resolution; its impersonal, anti-participatory character; its insistence on the presentation of all moral and allocational judgments in the form of general, suprahistorical rules; its pervasive attempt to separate form and substance in legal decision-making; its control by experts socialized in elite institutions and distant from the lived reality of everyday life in capitalist society, and its exaltation of the claims of property over those of human dignity, it is inevitable that the *form* of liberal legalist justice must be a negation of the human spirit even when the impulse to justice forces its way into the *content* of particular legal decisions. Developing a vision adequate to the revolutionary project of constructing a free society imposes the obligation to unmask the nature and practice — including the form as well as the content — of

27. See Tushnet, "Perspectives," *op.cit.*, note 3, which develops these categories.

28. I mean by "liberal legalism" the particular historical incarnation of legalism ("the ethical attitude that holds moral conduct to be a matter of rule-following," see Judith Shklar, *Legalism* [Cambridge, Mass., 1964], p. 1), which characteristically serves as the institutional and philosophical foundation of the legitimacy of the legal order in capitalist societies. Its essential features are the commitment to general "democratically" promulgated rules, the equal treatment of all citizens before the law, and the radical separation of morals, politics and personality from judicial action. Liberal legalism also consists of a complex of social practices and institutions that complement and elaborate on its underlying jurisprudence. With respect to its modern Anglo-American form these include adherence to precedent, separation of the legislative (prospective) and judicial (retrospective) functions, the obligation to forumulate legal rules on a general basis (the notion of *ration decidendi*), adherence to complex procedural formalities, and the search for specialized methods of analysis ("legal reasoning"). The rise and elaboration of the ideology, practices and institutions of liberal legalism have been accompanied by the growth of a specialized, professional caste of experts trained in manipulating "legal reasoning" and the legal process.

Liberal legalist jurisprudence and its institutions are closely related to the classical liberal political tradition, exemplified in the work of Hobbes, Locke and Hume. The metaphysical underpinnings of liberal legalism are supplied by the central themes of that tradition: the notion that values are subjective and derive from personal desire, and that therefore ethical discourse is conducted profitably only in instrumental terms; the view that society is an artificial aggregation of autonomous individuals; the separation in political philosophy between public and private interest, between state and civil society; and a commitment to a formal or procedural rather than a substantive conception of justice.

On the connection between liberal legalism and the rise of capitalism, see Morton Horwitz, *The Transformation of American Law* (Cambridge, Mass., 1977); Franz Neumann, "The Change in the Function of Law in Modern Society," in *The Democratic and the Authoritarian State*, Herbert Marcuse, ed. (New York, 1957); and Roberto Unger, *Law in Modern Society*, *op.cit.* For the connection between liberal legalism and liberal metaphysics, see Duncan Kennedy, "Legal Formality," 2 *Journal of Legal Studies* 351 (1974); "Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication," 89 *Harvard Law Review* 1685 (1976); and Roberto Unger, *Knowledge and Politics* (New York, 1975).

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capitalist law-making, and to begin to conceive emancipatory alternatives in the legal as well as all other dimensions of life.

IV. *Political Consequences*

The transition from an instrumental to a constitutive theory of law entails several political consequences of importance to the socialist movement. E.P. Thompson has taken the lead in pointing to the first: the realization that the legal process cannot be treated by any serious movement for social change as a mere sham, but rather that it must be taken seriously as an enormously important aspect of social life and arena of social struggle; indeed, even from a critical perspective, legalism must be viewed as a great human achievement.[29] To treat law as mere sham is to dishonor centuries of struggle in which the poor and oppressed attempted to fill the law with humane content, to hold the law to its own pretensions to justice. Class struggle was expressed and mediated through the forms of law. Moreover, there is a difference, which Thompson implores us to remember, between the rule of law and the rule of absolute, arbitrary force. He movingly reminds us that the subordinated classes — 18th-century rural people clinging to communal, "reasonable use" conceptions of property rights in the produce of the royal forest; the rural poor who invoked the elaborate texture of customary consumer protection regulation as a moral basis for violent collective action to enforce a "just price" in the sale of grain;[30] the artisans and working people of London at the turn of the 19th century demanding freedoms of association as well as the conditions of a decent life,[31] the dominated and oppressed have often perceived their grievances in *legal* terms and articulated their needs and interests in terms of rights thought to be promised or owed by *law*. Frequently, they nourished the tree of liberty with their blood. "In fact, some of them had the impertinence, and the imperfect sense of historical perspective, to expect justice."[32] Thompson calls our attention to a hitherto historically anonymous English blacksmith named William "Vulcan" Gates, who was hanged under the Black Act of 1723 for deer stealing in a time of intense political disturbances. Gates was condemned under a provision of the statute permitting the Privy Council to "proclaim" an accused who if, after public notice of the proclamation did not surrender for trial within 40 days, was deemed convicted of a felony. On the day of his execution, Gates refused to cooperate with the ritual, in effect advancing the claim that since he was illiterate, he lacked the capacity to read the notice of his proclamation and accordingly his conviction was unjust.[33] To be sure, his execution would have been no less a crime of class justice even had there not been that defect in the proceedings against him. It is the task of critical legal thought, on all occasions, to unmask the role of law in buttressing class domination, to unmask its pretensions to fairness whenever, as if often or even usually the case, law serves to perpetuate injustice and, above all, to combat the illusion that legal solutions alone can be found to the social and political problems of class society. But in fashioning our vision of a free society, which for Marx is "the actual appropriation of the human essence through and for man. . . the complete and conscious restoration of

29. E.P. Thompson, "The Rule of Law," in *Whigs and Hunters, op.cit.*, note 3, pp. 258-269.

30. E.P. Thompson, "The Moral Economy of the English Crowd," *Past and Present*, No. 50 (February 1971).

31. E.P. Thompson, *The Making of the English Working Class* (New York, 1963).

32. Thompson, *Whigs and Hunters, op.cit.*, p. 268.

33. *Ibid.*, pp. 162, 173-75, 268.

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man to himself *within the total wealth of previous development*," and of which the "*entire movement of history is*...*both its actual genesis*...and also for its thinking awareness the conceived and conscious movement of its becoming,"[34] must we not take seriously, indeed prize, the historical process and humane cultural achievement which created in this illiterate blacksmith the capacity, in some small measure, to vindicate his own dignity by advancing this extraordinary claim to fair treatment? Must we not recognize that legal culture can and has provided a context and a moral basis for resistance to injustice? "If the law is evidently partial and unjust, then it will mask nothing, legitimize nothing, contribute nothing to any class' hegemony. The essential precondition for the effectiveness of law, in its function as ideology, is that it shall display an independence from gross manipulation and shall seem to be just. It cannot seem to be so without upholding its own logic and criteria of equity; indeed, on occasion, by actually *being* just."[35]

But I stop short of an uncritical endorsement of Thompson's views and in so doing point to a second political consequence. He writes that "the rule of law itself [is] an *unqualified* human good."[36] Yet once we discard the purely instrumental view of law as sham, the *form* of law is no longer a mere detail but a profound channeling mechanism in part through which legal practice in class society takes on its character as alienation.[37] While acknowledging the difference between arbitrary and unbounded state power, on the one hand, and the checks and inhibitions on domination imposed by the rule of law on the other, we need not be blind to the retrogresive character of the institutional and cultural practice embodied in the "rule of law ideal," i.e., liberal legalism. We must not confuse the concept of law with the historically specific forms that law assumed with the rise of capitalism. On the contrary, the focus on the regressive character of the form of law in capitalist society becomes an urgent priority.

Third, equally as urgent is the refusal to postpone the discussion of what forms of law-making and legal practice will characterize the free society of the future. The critical theory of law not only opens entry to, but demands inquiry into what forms of non-legalist dispute resolution, community-based, but providing institutional protection of individual autonomy and self-definition, will accompany the transition to post-capitalist society. Will mediation and arbitration take primacy over adjudication? Can community-based, "informal" justice replace separate legal institutions and the domination of the legal process by experts? What will be the role of experts, if any, in a free legal process? Is rule-formalism desirable or necessary to a free society? Need legal rules be formulated as abstract, suprahistorical norms? How does one fashion institutional guarantees for the protection of individual and collective opposition midst the transition to a form of social life in which the communal human essence and need are to be liberated and made governing principles? Is a conflict between autonomy and community inevitable in all forms of social organization, or can autonomy and community become bases of the meaning of each other? Most broadly, how does the character of the revolutionary process determine the nature of the political outcome? The very enterprise of critical legal thought poses to Marxist

34. Karl Marx,"Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts (1844)," In Lloyd Easton and Kurt Guddat, eds., *Writings of the Young Marx on Philosophy and Society* (Garden City, N.J., 1967), p. 304. Emphasis altered.

35. Thompson, *Whigs and Hunters, op.cit.*, p. 263.

36. *Ibid.*, p. 266. Emphasis added.

37. On this point, see particularly the work of Peter Gabel cited in note 3.

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political theory a spectrum of such questions about the institutional forms of socialist democracy, emphatically asserting that a conception of such institutions is *needed.* Socialist law cannot be the mere pouring of new content into the institutional forms of liberal legalism, nor, worse still, a mere change in the personnel of the state. The determinist tradition within Marxism, which equates law with instrumental domination, can lead to the projections of law into socialism in only one of two modes: (a) either the complete absence of law, a dangerous fantasy which denies the role of objectification as the ontological foundation of human freedom and can lead only to the arbitrary tyranny of Stalinism; or (b) as "socialist positivism," the conception of law as an instrument for the creation of what must, by its own definition, be "enlightened domination" through manipulating people toward "good" ends. A view which treats legal practice as inherently coercive and instrumental, as an alienated "otherness," cannot ground a theory of the institutional forms of an emancipated society.

Finally, the constitutive theory of law has implications for the model of work we, as lawyers and legal workers, adopt in our own practice (here the word is used in its narrower connotation). The purely instrumental pursuit of client interest cannot serve as an adequate model of political lawyering. We must begin to see our work, our relationships to our clients, our self-definition in counseling and in the courtroom, as itself part of the process of articulating and foreshadowing the legal forms of the future. The fact that we must live and work within alien institutions we do not control, which do not permit us collectively to guide our own destiny, ought not prevent us from conceiving of our own participation in the legal process to the extent possible as an experiment in the possibility of our freedom. This cannot but make us better, more sensitive and more political lawyers, and help us to avoid the long-term occupational hazards of "radical lawyering": the slide into reformism or cynicism.

I plead guilty to the charge of raising issues today while providing little guidance toward their resolution, but I am deeply committed to the necessity of the inquiry. As Lukács once wrote: we "must be able to comprehend the present as becoming.... Only he who is willing and whose mission it is to create the future can see the present in its concrete truth."[38]

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38. Georg Lukács, *History and Class Consciousness*, trans. Rodney Livingstone (London, 1971), p. 204.

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ON THE LATER LUKACS*

by Nicolas Tertulian

For Lukács, aesthetics and the philosophy of history were always closely connected. His *Theory of the Novel* analyzed the novel as an expression of the "epoch of complete guilt" (Fichte) and culminated in the aspiration for a "new world," of which Dostoevsky was to be the "new Homer." The hard lessons of history corrected the young Lukács' Utopianism and led him to modify his literary preferences: Balzac replaced Flaubert, Fielding replaced Sterne, Tolstoy replaced Dostoevsky.[1] The discovery of the complicated ruses of history, resulting in the breakdown of a rectilinear conception of historical progress, is the source of the cult of the "grand realism" in Lukács' aesthetics in the 1930's. Respect for the complex mediations of the historical process was the root of his opposition to the Stalin era's simplistic simlifications of literature, as well as his refusal to accept the reductive simplifications of historical process was the root of his opposition to the Stalin era's simplistic politicization of literature, as well as of his refusal to accept the reductive simplifications of avant-garde art.

A socio-historical explanation of the aesthetic and philosophical thought of the later Lukács, as it took shape in his two last great works, *Aesthetics* and *Ontology of Existence*, ought to begin with his ambivalent attitude toward the established political regimes in Eastern Europe. Lukács' aesthetic and philosophical elaborations bear the mark of a determined stand toward the reality of the Stalinist and post-Stalinist eras (as Adorno would say, they are "cryptograms"). On the political level, he sought to promote structural reforms through a constructive opposition within the social systems of "real existing socialism" while theoretically he wanted to be a spokesman of an effective de-Stalinization of these regimes.

Expelled from the Communist Party after the events of fall, 1956, during which he was Minister of Culture in the Imre Nagy government, he remained outside the Party for eleven years. Only in 1967 was he reinstated as a member. This is indicative of Lukács' ambivalence: he courageously expressed his opposition to Stalinist and neo-Stalinist policy, but he had no intention of cutting off all ties with the Party. In the spring of 1967, on the occasion of his reinstatement in the Party, Ernst Fischer wrote him an enthusiastic letter speaking of a "settlement of the Lukács case." Lukács' answer is typical in its reserve and prudence: "The settlement of the Lukács case seems to me a very positive thing if it means the beginning of a process of ideological regeneration, of which some signs have already appeared." But he also hastened to express his doubts, revealing with scarcely veiled transparency a skepticism tinged with impotence: "Of course, no one knows how real power relations are constituted today, or to what extent real Marxism can be assured a place in public life."[2] Some time later, replying to an English correspondent who had informed him that he would like to come to Budapest to learn about "real Marxism" at the university, Lukács advised him ardently: "Things are going very badly with the teaching of Marxism at our University. Under present conditions, no radical change can be envisaged in the

*Translated by David S. Parent.

1. An explicit testimony of this is to be found in a letter addressed to his old friend Bela Balazs, dated January 31, 1940, during their controversies in Moscow.

2. Letter dated November 22, 1967.

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foreseeable future."[3]

In the last years of his life, Lukács bitterly resented the contradiction between hopes for a powerful de-Stalinization of social life and the actions of conservative forces. Replying to Adam Schaff who, in tones close to despair, deplored the almost impossible situation created for Marxist thought in Poland at the end of 1968 (the period of the Moczar group's offensive), the aged Hungarian thinker did not hide his pessimism, and he found that Schaff's description confirmed his darkest worries: "Certainly...we know that today good news can hardly be expected from this part of the world."

Lukács' unqualified disapproval of the Czech invasion was not expressed publicly because of the position taken by his party. It is very significant that when Bertrand Russell sent him an appeal to sign a collective letter of protest against what had happened in Czechoslovakia in the fall of 1968, although he supported Russell's initiatives and actions with his personal diplomacy, Lukács refused to be associated with it, arguing that a just criticism of the Czech event risked being transformed, when Russell sent him the letter, into an instrument of the cold war. His November 4, 1968 reply reveals the same fundamental ambiguity of his position: his sincere wish for an authentic de-Stalinization, matched by unflagging caution not to compromise the cause of socialism. He obstinately sought a third way between relapses into Stalinism and the surrender of illusions concerning Communism. At the end of his letter, he told Russell that he intended to express his views on the "central problem" of "numerous current conflicts," i.e., on "the question of democratization" in a particular scientific book. He was referring to the manuscript entitled *Demokratieschrift* which, written by Lukács at that time, has remained unpublished.

Lukács' correspondence during the last twenty years of his life, the texts of which are classified in alphabetical order in voluminous folders in the Lukacs archives, is a first rate means for understanding his position. One often feels through his letters his ideological solitude and a resigned wisdom toward the unpopularity of a line of thought conscientiously opposed to the dominant trends in East and West. During the first conversation I had with Lukács in Budapest in October, 1965, he compared the situation of Marxists to that of the first Christians forced to descend into the catacombs. He deplored the enforced isolation or, more precisely, the boycott to which those who persisted in following the true line of Marxism were condemned. When Adam Schaff complained about the obstacles encountered by the development of an autonomous Marxist, Lukács profusely agreed with him and clearly outlined the fatal isolation surrounding authentic Marxist thought, by definition non-conformist and critical: "...(our activity) is connected with numerous disagreements and deceptions, etc...But this is inevitable. If we wish to make Marxism a living force once again, we must necessarily be unpopular, since we represent a third factor between the Stalinist traditions and Western philosophical prejudices. As Marxists...we cannot be astonished...that both camps are defensive and try to prevent, or at least to delay, the victory of truth."[4] Lukács sometimes sounded like a priest ("the victory of truth" is the kind of formulation one would expect from a believer or a missionary), but what must be emphasized is the obstinacy with which he underscored his position as an outsider to the political and ideological tendencies dominant in the two worlds. Some years later, he wrote an eloquent letter to a Soviet friend who had given him a vivid picture of the

3. Letter to Riggins, dated September 2, 1968.
4. Letter dated November 22, 1965.

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confused and complex ideological situation in his country: "Everything you write is very interesting and shows how confused the ideological fronts are today. This is true here as well as in the West. Here, I myself am regarded as a revisionist, while on the other side they try to transform me into a Stalinist. As long as the problem of the real nature of Marxism is not clarified theoretically, this situation cannot change. It must, above all, be established that Lenin was the real successor of Marx, while Stalin essentially represents an alienation of Marxism or, at best, its vulgarization. I am now trying, in a large book (*Ontology of Social Existence*), to clarify certain fundamental questions."[5]

Whenever the "Naphta legend" (according to which Lukács was Thomas Mann's model for the little Jesuit terrorist in *The Magic Mountain*) was mentioned, Lukács reacted ill-naturedly, not hesitating to regard the agitation around the suppoed identity Naphta-Lukács as a sort of cold war against his writings in order to compromise them at the very time when his thinking was beginning to gain an audience in certain Western countries. Learning that Melvin Lasky, in an article in *Encounter*, was reviving the Naphta-legend and attacking him just when three of his books were appearing in English translation, Lukács replied drily: "One can only be glad to have a Melvin Lasky as an enemy and not as a friend."[6] To Professor Podach of Heidelberg, Lukács wrote on the same day: "As far as the Naphta-affair is concerned, it is just an old literary rumor. Now that my books are becoming known everywhere, it is being dug up again. How much is true in that rumor I don't know, and I don't much care." In the letter to M. Lifschitz, however, he spoke in more qualified terms: "Since Thomas Mann always had the habit of using in his novels persons he knew, it is not out of the question that there is some truth to the whole story. Personally, I found that many of Naphta's external traits don't even have photographic accuracy; as to his ideas, Thomas Mann himself admits that they are his own invention."

Lukács devoted the last fifteen years of his life to writing his two great works, *Aesthetics* and *Ontology of Social Existence*. He began work on his *Aesthetics* before 1956 after finishing an introductory book on the subject of his opus magnum: *The Particular as a Central Category of Aesthetics*[7], but the work was interrupted by the 1956 events in Hungary. On August 2, 1956, he wrote to Bottigelli: "...the journey to Italy this spring, at the same time as the ideological struggles here at home, sidetracked me so much from the *Aesthetics* that I want to work all winter just on this book." He had no idea that he would spend that winter deported in Rumania. He was sent there along with Imre Nagy and other political activists of the 1956 Hungarian Revolution after having left the Yugoslavian Embassy where they had taken refuge.[8] Having arrived at this Rumanian sojourn in 1957, he set to work assiduously and in less than three years finished writing the manuscript of *Aesthetics* — a book of more than 1700 pages, which he was already in the process of revising by February 1960. During a conversation in Budapest, he admitted to me that, at first, after having finished writing it, he had trouble obtaining authorization to send the manuscript to his German editor. Publication in the Federal Republic of Germany was conditional on

5. Letter of February 15, 1969, to Igor Al...vitch.
6. Letter to Michael Lifschitz, dated August 8, 1964.
7. Published in Italian in 1957 by Editori Riuniti, with a preface datemarked Bucharest, December 1956.
8. In his autobiographical work, *Gelebtes Denken* [*Lived Thought*], written shortly before his death and still unpublished, Lukács called it a "gross error" to have fled to the Yugoslavian Embassy, probably because this act could have been interpreted as an admission of guilt.

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leaving his country, Hungary; that was at least the viewpoint of the party functionary who had read the manuscript. On Feburary 7, 1959, however, he had written to Bottigelli: "How long the road will be until publication, I of course don't know. I also waited ten years with *Hegel*" (a reference to his book *The Young Hegel*, which he finished in Moscow, as an emigrant, in 1938, but which could be published only ten years later in Berne and Vienna).

The publication of the *Aesthetics* in 1963 by Luchterhand Verlag was not received as enthusiastically as one could have expected. Even now, this two-volume work, the first attempt to formulate the principles of a Marxist aesthetics, has remained partly unknown or slightly analyzed in depth. George Steiner was one of the first to write a review of it in *Times Literary Supplement* (June, 1965), signalling its importance, yet not without sketching some reservations and principled objections. Lukács wrote a letter to him acknowledging receipt of the article, but he stated his conviction that an adequate discussion of his book remains a matter of the future: "So detailed a book needs an incubation period of several years." Ernst Fischer was among the few to share his enthusiasm concerning his *Aesthetics* when he received the book, and as he progressed with the reading, he did not hesitate to compare his *Aesthetics* with Hegel's, even if he already showed some reservations.[9] When in 1964 Fischer asked his older friend for news on the reception of his great work, Lukács answered that he had to date not noticed any "reasonable response" and added a curt remark betraying his annoyance: "What they are writing about it in Germany is a web of nonsense."[10]

Lukács had long been confronted with a paradoxical situation: while the works of his youth were often heaped with immoderate praise — especially by the Western intelligentsia (even the epithet "genial" was sometimes applied to the young Lukács) — the works of his mature period, including the *Aesthetics* and *Ontology* (the published fragments) in which he had invested his best intellectual energy, were gaining acceptance very slowly and with a great deal of difficulty. Lucien Goldmann, to choose a typical example, who did so much for the exegesis of the works of Lukács' youth, reacted to the publication of the *Aesthetics* with absolute indifference. It must be said that when he sent Lukács his book *The Hidden God* (which Lukács, moreover, was to review as a very interesting and valuable work), Goldmann received an extremely significant letter which implicitly rejected all of Goldmann's accounts of his works: "If I had died around 1924 and my unchanged soul had observed your literary activity from some beyond, it would be filled with a veritable gratitude at seeing you occupied so intensely with the works of my youth. But as I am not dead and for 34 years have been creating what must well be called my life's work and for you this work does not exist at all, it is hard for me as a living being whose interests are, of course, directed toward its own present activity, to take a stand on your reflection."[11]

Lukács' evaluation of his own works, as discernible from his letters, showed that he considered himself a thinker of a "transition period" whose theoretical work is inevitably marked by groping uncertainties. Far from having the confidence of a philosopher who proposes to totalize history in his monumental works (e.g., Hegel), he rejected the comparison with the latter which Fischer, impressed by the scale of the

9. He formulated these reservations explicitly in an article published in English translation in the special number devoted to Lukács by *The Philosophical Forum*, No. 3-4 (1973).

10. Letter of June 12, 1964.

11. This letter, mailed on October 1, 1959, is an excellent sample of the Lukácsian epistolary style of blending inflexibility and courtesy. It marked the end of relations between Lukács and Goldmann.

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synthesis attempted by Lukács' *Aesthetics*, had advanced. The idea that recurs in numerous letters of the last ten years of his life was that, after the long night of the Stalin era which had perverted and mutilated Marxist thought in its very structure, the fundamental categories of this though ought to be subjected to a radical re-examination and that his own mission was to be one of the pioneers of this "renaissance of Marxism" by his *Aesthetics* and *Ontology of Social Existence*. We even find self-critical statements, which are quite unusual since he never submitted to a serious critical test his aesthetic positions elaborated during the 30's, 40's or 50's, i.e., during the Stalin years when he was concerned with defending the "oppositional" nature of his position with regard to the official Stalin-Zhdanovist line: "We all disagree deeply with the schemas of our previous conception on art."[12] But this critique of dogmatism was always qualified by a disassociation from those who, in the same of the same sharp critique of Stalinism, seemed to be departing from the very foundation of Marxism: "If you think...of people as gifted as Kolakowski or Lefebvre, you can become clearly aware of this danger" (of course it is no longer possible to list these two names on the same plane today, so differently has their development been after Lukács' letter was written). To Fischer's letter on his *Aesthetics*, dated Vienna, June 5, 1964, which contained considerable eulogies of his work, he replied by showing willingness to accept objections and critiques — even though he disdainfully rejected those received up to that moment: "For all that, I am well aware that you will find some highly disputable matters in my book. That is why I am very eager to hear your doubts and your objections. The comparison with Hegel is, of course, very flattering, but also exaggerated. Apart from the difference of talents, Hegel was able to close an epoch, whereas my *Aesthetics* is not much more than the impulse of a new upsurge of Marxism."[13]

The different aesthetic conceptions of Lukács and Ernst Fischer deserve to be examined. Fischer became increasingly more sympathetic to the works of the literary and aesthetic avant-garde of the 20th century, giving great praise in his articles to such writers as Joyce, Musil or Beckett. Lukács intransigently defended his principled critique of these same authors, while trying in his letters to explain the profound reasons for a rigorous aesthetic stance, which exposed him to violent criticism and attack.[14] The basic concepts of Lukácsian aesthetics were those of *human integrality* (the "whole" man) and multidimensionality in the evocation of life. Having accepted that our era is a "transitional one," i.e., one of a deep crisis of old values of both the capitalist West and of Stalinist socialism, and of the uncertain gestation of new values, he sought to question authors and artists concerning how they dealt with this crisis in their works, and especially concerning how they mastered this feeling of crisis through intense labor rooted in what Lukács liked to call "the indestructability of the human substance." In 1958, Ernst Fischer published "Die Mystifikation der Wirklichkeit" in *Sinn und Form*, where he eulogized not only 19th century authors like Melville, or 20th century authors like Mayakovsky, Brecht, Lukács or O'Casey, as representatives of a literature impregnated with the humanist spirit, but also spoke of Musil as a "great writer" and of Joyce, Pound or Gottfried Benn as important artists and creators of enduring values. Lukács used this occasion to explain the subtle difference between them concerning aesthetic judgement in a letter dated November 2, 1958. His point of departure was a reflection on the many powerful dangers menacing man today. His focus was the literary image of this crisis: "The complication arises from the fact that

12. Letter to Fischer, dated January 23, 1961.
13. Letter to Fischer, dated June 12, 1964.
14. Cf. among other things Adorno's famous article in 1958 in *Der Monat*, "Erpresste Versöhnung."

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some distortions of the image of man appear also in a tragic manner, i.e., in persons who are seeking the good, and who suffer from these distortions, who subjectively believe they are fighting against them. I believe that the difference between us consists in the fact that — though I also understand all these motifs — I take fact and cause more intransigently for the integrity of *this image* [italics added] (such a difference exists between uns in our judgement on Musil)..." Lukács profited from the occasion to re-emphasize this keystone of his entire aesthetic thinking: the defense of human integrity, starting with the very demanding image of what constitutes the human substance. This had been the real target of the many attacks to which his little book *Against a Misunderstood Realism* (1958) — attacks which often raised the question of the total misunderstanding of his deepest thought.[15] "This incomprehension is something we simply will have to endure," he wrote to Ernst Fischer, taking a stance that will reappear frequently: that of a badly understood thinker.

Years later we find the same idea developed, this time in a much more extensive fashion, in a letter addressed to one of his privileged correspondents: the Italian Germanist Cesare Cases. In it he refers repeatedly to Musil, contrasting him with the author whom he always regarded as exemplary, Thomas Mann: "I believe that the generation of writers that is today considered most decisive has undergone more historical changes than any other before it (WWI, the 1917-18 revolutions, fascism, WWI, the turn of events that is beginning now), but very few authors have the principle *stirb und werde* (die and become) as Thomas Mann does. You have noticed in a remarkable way how Musil stopped short. But I don't know whether it wouldn't be possible to offer, from this viewpoint, a survey of this literature, i.e., to expose how the comprehension or incomprehension of a historical turning point acted on the artistic plane and where the causes of success and failure and found."[16] The warmth, if not enthusiasm, with which he received Solzhenitsyn's *A Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich* and his first two novels (*The First Circle* and *The Cancer Ward*), is explained by his conviction that for the first time the great historical crisis of Stalinism was finding its adequate literary expression. Ready to see Solzhenitsyn's work become the start of a possible rebirth of "socialist realism" (understood in the strict sense he liked to give it, totally opposed to the current usage), Lukács sought to caution one of his Soviet friends that, from an ideological viewpoint, Solzhenitsyn was a "plebeian democrat" and not at all a "Marxian Communist (in the good sense of the term)."[17]

Absorbed in writing his long theoretical works, Lukács responded very rarely to the many criticisms of his writings. When he had occasion to explain himself to his adversaries, he tended to do so with very brief remarks and by intentionally addressing great principles. Sartre's or Adorno's criticisms remained without a direct reply. He never commented in any detail on the writings of the Frankfurt School. His sparse remarks concerning one or another representative of this school in his correspondence are very useful for situating his thinking in relation to this important current of ideas. Even in his *Conversations* (with Kafler, Abendroth and Holz) he chose to polemically define the spirit of this school as that of a mere "secession" from within the German academy. His remarks in the 1962 preface to *The Theory of the Novel* concerning the conformist nature of Adorno's "non-conformism" are well known. In a letter to Cases on August 2, 1967, replying to a question concerning Adorno's "negative dialectics," the same

15. Adorno, for example, in the previously quoted article, found that Lukács involuntarily concedes a sort of "good conscience" to the Soviet position on this subject.
16. Letter dated January 5, 1966.
17. Letter dated February 15, 1969.

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idea resurfaces in a different formulation: "I have to this day not read Adorno's *Negative Dialectics*, though Agnes Heller too says that, in places, it is very interesting. I may say that I deeply detest this 'respectable' revolutionarism." Clearly, Lukács could never have any sympathy for Adorno's association of collective logic and "repressive identity." During one of my last visits to Lukács in the late 1960's, he was in the process of reading Adorno's *Negative Dialectics*. During our conversation, he stressed the radical divergence separating him from Adorno on so important a philosophical problem as that of *freedom*. "Adorno denies the essense of the free act: the fact that it is based on *alternatives*," were Lukács' approximate words. When I asked him to identify the text of Adorno's that justified this statement, he stood up from behind his desk and walked rapidly to his bookshelves where he pulled out *Negative Dialectics* and had me read on page 225 of the German edition a note at the bottom of the page, marked in green. Here I quote two sentences from the passage Lukács objected to: "The only person who would be free would be the one who had to bow to no alternative, and in effect it is one mark of liberty to refuse every alternative. Freedom means the critique and transformation of situations and not their ratification by decisions take within the framework of their constraining structure." Lukács' remark goes to the very foundation of his disagreement with Adorno. For him, every teleological act was rooted in objective causal series. The choice between precise alternatives was constitutive of every free act. While Adorno remained caught in the antinomy between the irreducibility of the particular and the repressive pressure of the "general" (for him a synonym for "collectivity") inevitably culminating in a very pessimistic view of history, Lukács remained convinced of the possibility of transcending negativity by means of the complicated ruses and countless mediations of history. A passage of *Negative Dialectics* dealing with death and denouncing positive discourse concerning the "meaning of life" was annotated by Lukács with a single word: "Semprun." (He was referring to Semprun's book *The Great Voyage* which he admired and loved to quote in support of one of his favorite ideas: non-resignation and non-capitulation to evil.)

Concerning Herbert Marcuse we find, in a letter addressed to Ernst Fischer (who had just written to Lukács that he had met Marcuse in Salzburg) a brief remark symptomatic of Lukács' attitude. Clearly, he had a great deal of sympathy for *One-Dimensional Man's* critique of late capitalist society, but strong reservations concerning the synthesis of Freud's metapsychology and Marxism: "The conversation with Marcuse must have been very interesting. What I have read of his is a mixture of truth and falsehood."[18]

As for Ernst Bloch, apart from the few letters exchanged between the old friends in the last period of their lives, one passage from a letter to Pocach of Heidelberg reflects the cooling of relations in the 1960's because of important philosophical and literary differences: "As concerns Bloch we were very close friends during my early youth. He is certainly a highly intelligent man and a good stylist. But I cannot express any interest in *The Principle of Hope*."[19]

Last, but not least, something should be said about the relations between Lukács and Brecht. Lukács did not agree with those who emphasized the aesthetic differences between himself and Brecht. Not surprisingly, and perhaps not without irritation, he was forced to recognize that a number of his friends regarded Brecht's texts about him

18. Letter dated November 2, 1966.
19. Letter dated January 13, 1964.

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as exploding his entire aesthetic thinking. He advised not to take too seriously what he called, in a letter to Cases, "the so-called Brecht-Lukács question: "I believe that each of us was so episodic a figure for the other's development that the rich literature on this relation resembles a Byzantine quarrel."[20] When he was informed of the revelations contained in Brecht's posthumous writings, where extremely violent comments were to be found concerning certain of his articles of the 1930's (they were speaking of a book by Helge Hutlberg on Brecht's aesthetic views), he treats the whole question with sovereign indifference: "As for my relation with Brecht, I must say that I have very little interest in what will be published about me in his posthumous writings."[21]

Often, in conversations, Lukács expressed great regret for never having been able to devote a critical study to Brecht's work. He readily admitted that the few pages dealing with Brecht in his book *Against a Misunderstood Realism* and which also figured in the preface of a new edition of his *Short History of the New German Literature* were altogether inadequate as substitutes for the analysis of an author whom he considered "the greatest realist dramatist of his time." To visitors who mentioned Brecht's criticisms of him, he liked to recall — based on the claim that there is much exaggeration in what is written about their differences — the visit Brecht paid him during his trip, through Moscow, for the United States in 1941. On this occasion Brecht told him that there are some people who try at all costs to magnify their differences and to sow discord between them, but that they both should oppose such thoughts and profess solidarity. On the other hand, it is unlikely that Lukács ever read the most virulent texts about him that were found among Brecht's papers. Similarly, he also liked to stress the very cordial relations between them in the poet's last years and the fact that, on Brecht's death, his widow asked him to provide a eulogy. [22]

Of course, all these biographical details and what Lukács thought of them do not minimize the aesthetic differences between him and Brecht. On the fact that these differences were not purely aesthetic but were rooted in their very different political positions in the 1930's, there is an explicit confirmation on Lukács' part, in a letter to Hans Mayer in 1961. Lukács recalled his opposition to the spirit of a speech delivered by Brecht in 1935 at the First Congress of Anti-Fascist Writers in Paris. There Brecht defended a class line based on the antagonism proletariat-bourgeoisie in the anti-Fascist struggle, while Lukács defended the "Popular Front," i.e., a broad alliance of democratic forces in the anti-Nazi struggle.

On the literary level, this translated into the opposition between Lukács' principle of the "organic configuration" of situations and persons based on respect for the articulations of reality without sacrificing the complexity of its mediations, and Brecht's principle of "didactic theater" in which the "effects of distancing" and "montage" were utilized programmatically to mark the author's stand. To the very end, Lukacs inflexibly defended his apparently paradoxical thesis that Brecht created major works, those of his last period, not by following, but despite his aesthetic program. A letter addressed to Cases, September 17, 1966, contains a revealing passage to this effect. He was beginning to suggest to his friend to write a critical study proving that the greatness of Brecht's plays (alluding evidently to those of his last period, starting with *Mother Courage*) was achieved by the "triumph of realism" independently of the

20. Letter dated November 17, 1966.

21. Letter of Feburary 20, 1967.

22. There is a letter by Helene H. Weigel dated Berlin, August 16, 1956, which reads as follows: "...I ask you as one of Brecht's closest friends to be present Thursday at about 9 o'clock in the Dorotheen cemetary on Chausseestrasse. In view of Brecht's desire that only his most intimate friends should be present, I ask you to keep absolute secrecy. Yours, [Helene Weigel]."

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author's intentions and programs. "That is to say that Brecht created great works not starting with his modernist theories, but against his theories. I have the habit of saying that with great poetic intuition Brecht shows us Mother Courage's daughter as *dumb*, so that *a priori* in the last superbly tragic scene of the play, any alienation effect has become impossible." Thus, Lukács was trying to discover, even in the works of an author considered by many to be completely his opposite, a confirmation of the integral accuracy of his aesthetic principles.

OTTO BAUER AND AUSTRO-MARXISM: A CONFERENCE REPORT*

by Sergio Amato

The November 10-12, 1978 International Symposium in Vienna commemorating the 40th anniversary of Otto Bauer's death was significant for two reasons. It was the first official initiative undertaken by the youth organization of the Austrial Social-Democratic Party (SPO) to evaluate the legacy of an intellectual who had been devoted to Marxism and the transition to socialism even when he led a mass social-democratic party.[1] Secondly, for the last three decades there has been a strange silence in internal political party debates regarding this prestigious personality[2] — a silence that can be explained only in light of German and Austrian social democracy's conviction during the 1950's and 1960's that Otto Bauer's role as mediator between social democracy and Bolshevism implied a pro-Soviet position.[3] The fact that Europa Verlag, a publisher linked with the SPO, only began to publish Bauer's complete works in 1975 is indicative of the prevailing attitude.[4]

*Translated by Vicky Totah.

1. This is clear not only from the address by the Minister for Scientific Research, Dr. Hertha Firnberg, but also from the not accidental coincidence of the symposium with the celebration of the 60th anniversay of the first Austrian republic. For this, see the special documents, "12. November 1918. Eine ordentliche Revolution," in the *Arbeiterzeitung* (the official organ of Austrian social democracy) No. 45 (November 11, 1978), pp. 1-9; and "Staat — aus Trümmern geboren," in *Kurier* (the principal daily paper), November 12, 1978, pp. 6-7.

2. This is exemplified by the presentation of Josef Hindels, leader of the leftist Austrian social-democratic movement and the only remaining intellectual of the Austromarxist school. In his bitter recollection of post-war conditions in which generations of party leadership were formed with no knowledge of Otto Bauer and Austrian Marxism, Hindels and the Austrian Marxist historian Otto Leichter argued that Bauer had tacitly been assigned the role of the "poor relative of Austrian social democracy." The author of *Was is Heute Links?* (Vienna, 1970), Hindels has also written a recent history of Austrian unions during the anti-fascist resistance; cf. his *Oesterreichische Gewerkschaften im Widerstand 1934-1938* (Vienna, Zurich, Munich, 1978).

3. On the polemical origins of the term "Austromarxism," coined during the war and used by conservatives to denounce the radical and pro-Soviet tendencies of the Austrian Social-Democratic Workers' Party (SDAP), cf. Bauer's "Austromarxismus," in *Arbeiterzeitung* (November 3, 1927), reprinted in H.J. Sandkühler and R. de la Vega, eds., *Die Krise der Weltwirtschaft, der Demokratie und des Sozialismus* (Frankfurt and Vienna, 1970), pp. 49-52 and, more generally, the important retrospective synthesis in Bauer's obituary for Max Adler, "Max Adler. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte des 'Austromarxismus'," in *Der Kampf*, IV (Prag, 1937), pp. 297-302; now reprinted in J. Braunthal, *Otto Bauer. Eine Auswahl aus seinem Lebenswerke* (Wien, 1961), pp. 228-236.

4. Cf. Otto Bauer, *Werkausgabe* (Wien-Zürich-München, 1975-1978) in seven volumes, five of which have already appeared. Of Bauer's work previously available, there were only *Ein-*

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The highly political nature of the Vienna symposium was a result of the type of participants and their contributions. After an introduction entitled "Otto Bauer and the Austrian Labor Movement" by Hindels, the discussion proceeded with reports by Detlev Albers on "Otto Bauer and the Concept of Integral Socialism"; Giacomo Marramao on "Democratic State and the 'Road to Socialism' in Bauer's Marxist Thought"; Fritz Weber on "Otto Bauer and Socialization," and Lucio Lombardo Radice on "Otto Bauer: His Meaning for the International Labor Movement."[5] The discussion sought to critically evaluate Bauer's theories and political proposals in terms of their impact on the international labor movement. Thus, it is not accidental that the participants' interest focused on Bauer's notion of the "third way" which would strive to overcome the dogmatic contrapositions of reform vs. revolution, movement vs. goal by re-examining and redefining "democracy" and "socialism" in a qualitatively different manner.[6]

These discussion topics, as well as the more general significance of the Vienna symposium, reflect the growing interest in Austromarxism even within conservative sectors. It has already led to a complete revision of the ideological presuppositions in terms of which the Austromarxist episode was interpreted by both Third International and social-democratic historiography. Using the concept of "treason" to explain the political shift of Austromarxism to a reformism reminiscent of the fatalistic "wait and see policy" of the Second International, Third International historiography has seen Bauer's "opportunistic" rejection of the dictatorship of the proletariat as well as his indifference toward the Hungarian Council Republic as all the more dangerous and mystifying because it was occluded by revolutionary terminology.[7] The

führung in die Volkswirtschaftslehre (Wien, 1956), and *Die österreichische Revolution* (Wien, 1965). For works on Otto Bauer, see O. Leichter, *Otto Bauer. Tragödie oder Triumph* (Wien, 1970); Y. Bourdet, *Otto Bauer et la Revolution* (Paris, 1968). As for general literature on the Austrian labor movement, besides H. Steiner, *Bibliographie zur Geschichte der Oesterreichischen Arbeiterbewegung*, 3 vols. (Wien-Frankfurt-Zürich, 1962-70), there is soon to appear a complete bibliography of theses and dissertations written during the last 60 years on the subject, edited by H. Maimann and R. Böhm, *Arbeitergeschichte und Arbeiterbewegung. Dissertationen und Diplomarbeiten in Oesterreich, 1918-1978*, with a preface by H. Firnberg.

5. Weber's contribution was a substitution for Eduard März's own contribution, "Zur ökonomischen Theorie Otto Bauer's."

6. For recent rediscoveries of Bauer's work, see Giacomo Marramao, *Austromarxismo e Socialismo di Sinistra fra le Due Guerre* (Milan, 1977); G.B. Gardineini, "Il Sistema Sovietico nel Dibattito degli Austromarxisti," in *Mondo Operaio*, No. 10 (1978), pp. 77-82; G.P. Chevènement, *Les Socialistes, les Communistes et les Autres* (Paris, 1977); and *Herforder Thesen zur Arbeit von Marxisten in der SPD [Entwurf]*, (Berlin, 1978). For the English discussion, see T. Bottomore and P. Goode, introduction to *Austromarxism* (Oxford, 1978).

7. On the divorce between theory and praxis, and on the reintroduction of evolutionism and social democratic revisionism against the theory of revolution as a violent break, see K. Radek, *Theorie und Praxis der 2¼ Internationale* (Hamburg, 1921); A. Thalheimer, "Die Auflösung des Austromarxismus," in *Unter dem Banner des Marxismus* I (1925-26), pp. 475-557 and II (1928), pp. 76-83; and L. Trockij, *La Mia Vita*, Italian trans. (Milano, 1933), p. 139, which provides the leitmotif soon to become the standard "Leninist" interpretation of Austromarxism. The stiffening of this interpretation into real pre-analytic sectarian assumptions can be seen in F. Stroebel, "Des Austromarxismus Glück und Ende," in *Periodikum für wissenschaftlichen Sozialismus*, Nr. 7 (1959), pp. 27ff, and in *Philosophischer Revisionismus* (Ostberlin, 1977), pp. 291ff. A better account of the traditional critical approach is to be found in H. Hautmann, *Die verlorene Räterepublik. Am Beispiel der kommunistischen Partei Deutschösterreichs* (Wien, 1971); H. Hautmann and R. Kropf, *Die österreichische Arbeiterbewegung vom Vormärz bis 1945. Sozialökonomische Ursprünge ihrer Ide logie und Politik* (Wien, 1974); H. Hautmann, *Geschichte der Rätebewegung in Oesterreich, 1918-1924* (Linz, 1974). Finally special mention should be made of part of the essay by R. Rosdolsky, "Die revolutionäre Situation in Oesterreich im Jahre 1918 und die Politik der Sozialdemokraten. Der österreichische Januarstreik 1918," in

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social-democrats also condemned Austromarxism, though from an opposite perspective, i.e., for its theoretical and propagandistic extremism. According to this interpretation, the *Politik der radikalen Phase* prevented the "natural" unfolding of a social praxis and politics similar to those of German social-democracy, and led the party and Austrian democracy to tragic defeat in February, 1934.[8] Both accounts explain the final defeat in terms of Austromarxism's split between theoretical radicalism and practical solutions. In so doing, both interpretations end up underestimating the *specificity* of the Austromarxist reponse to the crisis of Marxism and to the split within the international labor movement.

Karl Renner himself had laid the foundations for this social-democratic evaluation of the Austromarxist position in his political autobiography.[9] There he condemned Bauer's refusal to consider participation in a coalition government as the main reason for the defeat of the Austrian labor movement. This interpretation has had many followers. Thus, Leser's work[10] in particular is based on a ideal-typical confrontation of two political and ideological systems seen as mutually exclusive and represented by the radical Bauer who, by continually re-interpreting historical events, attempts to reconcile reality with an antiquated Marxist orthodoxy, and Renner, the "political scientist" more in Weber's and Kelsen's than in the Marxist tradition. Needless to add, Leser's presentation of Renner as the architect of modern, undogmatic social democracy has generated a heated debate within the Austrian social-democratic left. On the other hand, following the tradition of such exponents of Austrian *Linkssozialismus* as O. Leichter, J. Buttinger and W. Wisshaupt,[11] research over the last

Studien über revolutionäre Taktik. Zwei unveröffentlichte Arbeiten über die II. Internationale und die österreichische Sozialdemokratie (West Berlin, 1973), Part II, which, because of its remarkable critical notes on the implications of the tactical choices made by the Austrian social democracy in 1918, is to be listed among the most successful interpretations by the Third International left.

8. See A. Schunck and H.J. Steinberg, "Mit Wahlen und Waffen. Der Weg der österreichischen Sozialdemokratie in die Niederlage," in W. Huber and J. Schwerdtfeger, eds., *Frieden, Gewalt, Sozialismus. Studien zur Geschichte der sozialistischen Arbeiterbewegung* (Stuttgart, 1975), pp. 461ff.

9. K. Renner, *Von der ersten zur zweiten Republik* (Wien, 1953).

10. Cf. N.Leser, *Zwischen Reformismus und Bolschewismus. Der Austromarxismus als Theorie und Praxis* (Wien-Frankfurt-Zürich, 1968), especially Part I. A similar interpretation is provided by F. Kaufmann, *Sozialdemokratie in Oesterreich — Idee und Geschichte einer Partei von 1889 bis zur Gegenwart* (Wien-München, 1978), which bears the official stamp of approval in the form of an interview with Chancellor Bruno Kreisky in the appendix (pp. 523-531). In reiterating the traditional diagnosis which locates the "main error" of the Austrian Social-Democratic Labor Party in the leaving of the government coalition supported by Bauer in 1920, Kreisky notes how — in the face of a strong radicalization of large sectors of the population — this was the necessary price to pay to prevent the formation of a substantial Communist party. Even J. Hindels, in the Vienna symposium, ascribed to the Austromarxist SDAP leadership's ability to keep under control its own left wing the merit of having avoided in Austria the breaks known by the labor movements of other countries.

11. Cf. Pertinax (pseudonym of O. Leichter), *Oesterreich, 1934* (Zürich, 1935); O. Leichter, *Glanz und Ende der ersten Republik. Wie es zum österreichischen Bürgerkrieg kam* Wien-Köln-Stuttgart-Zürich, 1964), and *Zwischen zwei Diktaturen — Oesterrichs revolutionäre Sozialisten. 1934-1938* (Wien, 1968); J. Buttinger, *Am Beispiel Oesterreichs. Ein geschichtlicher Beitrag zur Krise der sozialistischen Bewegung* (Köln, 1953); W. Wisshaupt, *Wir kommen wieder. Eine Geschichte der revolutionären Sozialisten Oesterreichs, 1934;1938* (Wien, 1967). Buttinger's book (leader of the Austrian socialist revolutionaries during the underground movement) has had a particularly broad influence on the internal debate of the German student movement because of the critique it addressed from a militant viewpoint to the obstacles that the party's growing institutionalization and bureaucratization laid to the articulation of revolutionary issues in everyday political action.

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decade has tended to locate the strategic positions of O. Bauer, Renner, M. Adler and I. Seipel in the context of international power relations and to evaluate them in terms of their political and institutional impact.

The renewed interest in Austromarxism focuses on the reconstruction of these practical achievements which most fully explicate Austrian social-democracy's cultural dimension between the two world wars: from the social legislation — primarily in city planning and in industrial relations — promoted by the Minister F. Hanusch and by Vienna's mayor R. Seitz, to the important (and previously overlooked) reform of the elementary educational system enacted by the Minister Glökel and inspired by the concept of the *Arbeitsschule*, to which in 1926 Wittgenstein (then an elementary school teacher) contributed a suitable *Wörterbuch für Volksschulen*;[12] from the network of more than 1500 consumer cooperatives, youth, cultural and sports associations, to the perhaps unique experiences of feminist social-democratic organizations whose journals, *Die Frau* (monthly) and *Die Unzufriedene* (weekly) boasted an average distribution of 160,000 and 120,000 copies (more than half of which were sold in Vienna) and the *Republikanischer Schutzbund*.[13]

In addition to this specialized research, there is now underway a more engaged effort to rethink crucial theoretical and political issues. Among these, one can list the interplay, so typical of socialist middle-European thought, between the question of nationalities and the problem of class alliances, and the implications of Bauer's and Renner's different approaches;[14] the significance and limitations of the 1919-1920 socialization project attempted with the *Staatskommission für Sozialisierung* and the *Betriebsräte*;[15] and the original theorization of relations between economy-state-

12. Cf. W. Warren Bartley III, *Wittgenstein* (New York, 1973).

13. On social-democratic youth organizations, see H. Uitz, *Die österreichischen Kinderfreunde und roten Falken, 1908-1938. Beiträge zur sozialistischen Erziehung* (Wien-Salzburg, 1975), and W. Neugebauer, *Bauvolk der kommenden Welt. Geschichte der sozialistischen Jugendbewegung* (Wien-Zürich-München, 1975). On feminist social-democratic organizations, see I. Lafleur, *Linzer Parteiprogramm 1926 und Frauenfrage* (Allendale, Pa., 1975), and *Adelheid Popp. An Approach to Learning and Teaching Socialist Feminism* (Allendale, 1975), and the following contributions presented at the XIV International Congress of historians of working class movements, held at Linz from September 12-16, 1978, on the theme "The Woman in the Working Class Movement: 1900-1938;" M. Martiny, "Adelheid Popp: Hoffnungen und Enttäuschungen;" Ch. Vogt and W. Pleschberger, "Frauenemanzipation und Sozialistische Bewegung in Oesterreich. Kritische Bemerkungen zu parteiinternen Bedingungen der Frühgeschichte;" A.M. Hueller and H. Konrad, "Die Frau in der österreichischen Arbeiterbewegung, 1900-1918;" R. Kluesarits and F.G. Kürbisch, "Funktion und Bedeutung von Arbeiterinnenselbstdarstellungen." The work of I. Duczynska, *Der demokratische Bolscewik. Zur Theorie und Praxis der Gewalt* (München, 1975), called attention to the "democratic Bolshevik" Theodor Körner, where strategical efforts to bring about organizational decentralization and politicization of the *Schutzbund* sought to make it into a flexible structure penetrating the whole state apparatus and having more solid links with the masses, were an alternative to Julius Deutsch's rigidly centralizing and militaristic formulations which finally prevailed.

14. Cf. A Agnelli, *Questione Nazionale e Socialismo. Contributo allo Studio die Pensiero di K. Renner e O. Bauer* (Bologna, 1969), and "Socialismo e Problema della Nazionalita in Otto Bauer," in *Storia del Marxismo Contemporaneo* (Milan, 1977), which complements the work of R.A. Kann, *The Multinational Empire. Nationalism and National Reform in the Habsburg Monarch, 1848-1918*. 2 vols. (New York, 1950), and H. Mommsen, *Die Sozialdemokratie und die Nationalitätenfrage im Habsburgischen Vielvölkerstaat. Das Ringen um die supranationale Integration der Zisleithanischen Arbeiterbewegung, 1867-1907*, Vol. I (Wien, 1963).

15. A detailed examination of Bauer's socialization program as outlined in his *Der Weg zum Sozialismus* (Wien, 1919) and of the results obtained in particular sectors of the Austrian economy, has been provided by F. Weber at the Vienna symposium. Following Bauer's own account in *Die österreichische Revolution* (Wien, 1923) — which at the end of each chapter includes an accurate bibliography on the whole debate of these years — Weber shows how the failure of that program was a result firstly of the *Länder's* autonomistic resistance cleverly

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society and of the "change of the function" of traditional terms such as "democracy" and "dictatorship" in the process of transition to socialism.[16]

Alber's contribution to the Vienna symposium provided a positive evaluation of this renewal of interest in Austromarxism. He located the source of this interest in "two great new facts" of the last decade, which have raised once again for "the left-wing Marxist-oriented sector of social-democratic and socialist parties" the urgent problem of developing a strategy of democratic transition to socialism. On the one hand, there is the intensification of social conflicts and the change in international power relations which, with the 1970's crisis, marked the end of a period of economic prosperity and social peace. On the other hand, European social democracies find themselves confronted with the "productive challenge" elaborated by the Eurocommunist parties concerning essential themes such as the relation between democracy and socialism, the democratic transformation of the state, and the "possibility of imposing a new economic logic." Yet, today, in order to re-establish continuity with Bauer's theoretical and political work — "an undeniable link" between the flourishing period of the Marxist-oriented labor parties of the Second International and the large post-World War II social democracies where, on the whole, Marxist positions are relegated to a "marginal and barely tolerated minority role" — it is necessary to begin with the more mature synthesis found in Bauer's self-critical reflections written in exile, *Zwischen Zwei Weltkriegen* (1936) and in the notion of "integral socialism" that he formulated in that work. Bauer's attempt to synthesize the most progressive elements of the social-democratic tradition ("the irreplaceable cultural value of democracy, of individual rights, spiritual freedom, and collective self-determination"), and the communist one ("the tradition of proletarian revolutions"), although not unique,[17] constituted at that time "an enormous provocation." The division of the international labor movement into "reformists" and "revolutionaries" prevented "the development of that minimum and common theoretical and political knowledge which alone can allow the overcoming....of conflicts emerged over a fifteen year period."[18] The changes that have come about during the last 40 years have obviously rendered obsolete some aspects of Bauer's proposals. Yet, today these proposals seem easier to implement because communists and social-democrats no longer argue about the possibility of a peaceful and democratic road to socialism, but only concerning *how* to undertake it in industrialized capitalist societies. Albers concluded that, in this new context, the Linz program's call for the working class movement to develop an articulated leadership on social, cultural and ideological fronts,[19] and Gramsci's reflections on the concept of hegemony — both constituting radical departures from

instrumentalized by the owners' organizations and by the Social-Christian (whose exponent, Seipel, was the vice-president of the commission for socialization presided by Bauer).

16. For an account of the several elaborations of the concept of the "dictatorship of the proletariat" in Adler and Bauer, cf. I. Katsoulis, "Sozialismus und Staat. Demokratie, Revolution und Diktatur des Proletariats im Austromarxismus," in *Marburger Abhandlungen zur politischen Wissenschaft* XXVII (Meisenheim am Glan, 1978).

17. CF. the work of the group "Neu Beginnen" of 1933, now repbulished in K. Klotzbach, ed., *Drei Schriften aus dem Exil* (Berlin-Bonn-Bad Godesberg, 1974); the "Praga Manifesto" put out by the SPD leadership in exile (originally published in *Neues Vorwärts,* January 28, 1934); the united front platform of the Arbeiterkreis Revolutionärer Sozialisten, "Der Weg zum sozialistischen Deutschland," in *Zeitschrift für Sozialismus* I (1933-1934), pp. 375-409; and the notes concerning the politics of the communist alliance ratified by the VIII Congress of the Comintern (1935).

18. Cf. "Zwischen Zwei Weltkriegen?" in Otto Bauer, *Werkausgabe*, Vol. Iv., *op.cit.*, p. 307.

19. Cf. *Protokoll des sozialdemokratischen Parteitages, 1926* (Wien, 1926), p. 174, now also in H.J. Sandkühler and R. de la Vega, eds., *Austromarxismus, op.cit.*, p. 383.

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the respective social-democratic and communist traditions — can finally be implemented.

By carefully examining similarities and differences in Gramsci's and Bauer's accounts, Marramao sought to provide a warning against careless reconciliations.[20] From the very beginning, Austromarxism was forced into a non-dogmatic confrontation with the higher levels of the epistemological and cultural debates of the time (the neo-Kantianism of the Marburg school, the "Austrian school" of Menger, Böhm-Bawerk and Wieser, the "Wiener Kreis" of Carnap, Neurath and Schlick, the works of Wittgenstein, Weber and Kelsen) by the "rational kernel of Bernsteinian revisionism," i.e., the need to challenge the Kautskian vision of an objective natural unfolding of the capitalistic laws of development, and to evaluate more accurately the complications brought about by growing state interventionism. The result of this effort — as well as of the Gramscian one — was to rethink the role of intellectuals during the transition process in a way radically different from the traditional Second International thesis of growing proletarianization. At any rate, Bauer seems to have focused more on the complex transformations in the economic sphere and on specific problems in the philosophy of science, while Gramsci emphasized the political manifestations of class domination and developed the concept of the "organic intellectual" as a higher synthesis of specialized knowledge and political consciousness, analytic knowledge and comprehension of the socio-historical process as a whole. The two approaches converge in the primary role they both ascribe to the socialization of politics in the transition period. In both, this is a result of a somewhat reductive conception of the state as a secular and *direct* expression or a "condensation" (Gramsci) of power relations between classes. It is not accidental that during the 1924 polemic with Kelsen concerning Marxism and the state, Bauer restated (as Gramsci will also do later) the interpretive scheme of Bonapartism developed in the *18th Brumaire* and in *Class Struggle in France*. Thus, Bauer applied his theory of "equilibrium of class forces" to understand the political situation in Austria and Italy in the early 1920's. In light of such considerations, the causes for the final defeat have to be located not so much in "reformism" or in the "wait and see policy," but in the separation of the political and social moments and in the powerless fluctuation between parliamentary tactics and social radicalism resulting from Bauer's misguided attempt to defend democracy from the trench of a communitarian alternative workers' society.

Naturally, because of the diversity of viewpoints represented, the Symposium could not provide unequivocal answers to some of the more burning issues which emerged during the discussion. What can be learned from the failure of a strategy which, although different from that of Weimar social democracy, remained fast on "the statist hypothesis of a spontaneous metamorphosis of representative democracy into socialist democracy" (Marramao), even though it had clearly warned of the possibility of an authoritarian resolution of the "equilibrium of class forces." What is the meaning and the forseeable outcome of the statist tendencies which are reappearing in the leadership of some of the large European social democracies as well as in the Euro-communist parties themselves? Is it possible today to concretely involve in Bauer's process of "reciprocal learning" the leaders of countries of "real socialism"? These

20. Albers, on the other hand, did not avoid rushed overgeneralizations when, for example, he claimed that "among those elements which have certainly been transcended" in Bauer's work there is "the critique and the partial assumption of the philosophical perspective of neo-Kantianism," as a result of which he readily put aside the specifically epistemological (and non-ethical) importance of the Austromarxist reception of such "idealistic influences" and proposed instead their reconsideration in terms of contemporary methodological debates concerning social science and Marxist thought.

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themes which deal with the evaluation of the European left as a whole should not be merely restricted to an international symposium, but should find broader areas for theoretical reflection and political confrontation.

ON WITTGENSTEIN AND ETHICS: A REPLY TO LEVI

by Thomas Rudebush and William M. Berg

In his discussion of Wittgenstein's philosophy[1], Levi mentions two discrepancies in Wittgenstein's work. In an article published fifteen years ago[2] Levi discussed one of these discrepancies, the stylistic diversity of the *Tractatus* and the *Philosophical Investigations*. The other problem (although Levi sees that the two might well be related) is the apparant incongruences in the *Tractatus* between the first seventy pages of logical analysis and the final three pages of ethical statement. Based on his belief in the 'intimate relationship' between philosophy and the conditions of philosophizing, Levi attempts in "The Sources of Wittgenstein's Ethics" to account for the second discrepancy by positing a relationship between Wittgenstein's philosophy and a certain (controversial) fact about Wittgenstein's personal life.

We have no quarrel, as a rule, with the conception of there being an important relation between one's philosophy and the social and psychological situation in which that philosophy is developed. Nevertheless, we feel that Levi's well-crafted essay does not close the discussion on this topic in the case of Wittgenstein. Specifically, Levi's argument is misguided in two respects. First, we argue that his hypothesis about the role of homosexuality in Wittgenstein's life and work is at best contentious. Secondly, Levi erringly thinks that Wittgenstein's distinction between saying and showing relegates ethics to an inferior role in human experience. Because Wittgenstein held ethics to be of considerable importance in human experience, we find Levi's contention that Wittgenstein attempted to set limits on ethics in order to protect his own "guilt" to be untenable.

Levi's interest in Wittgenstein's personal life is influenced by two recent books: Janik and Toulmin's *Wittgenstein's Vienna,* which traces the influence of people like Karl Kraus, Arnold Schoenberg and Adolf Loos on Wittgenstein's ideas, and describes the cultural milieu of Vienna in that time period; and W. W. Bartley III's *Wittgenstein,* a major portion of which is devoted to examining Wittgenstein's "lost" years teaching elementary school in the Austrian mountains.[3]

Levi, however, directs our attention to Bartley's treatment (the only one in any depth) of Wittgenstein's homosexuality. Although Bartley's account has been

1. The following discussions are in response to Levi's "The Biographical Sources of Wittgenstein's Ethics," appearing in *Telos* 38 (Winter 1978-79). The printed version of that article contains two serious printing errors which garble the text. For those wishing to refer to the original in connection with what follows, these corrections should be made: (1) the top six lines on page 73 should follow immediately upon the bottom of page 71, and (2) the top six lines on page 71 should follow immediately upon the bottom of page 72.

2. "Wittgenstein as Dialectician," *Journal of Philosophy* (February 13, 1964), Vol. 56, No. 4.

3. Janik and Toulmin, *Wittgenstein's Vienna* (New York, 1973); Bartley, *Wittgenstein* (New York, 1973).

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criticized for being long on provocative descriptions and short on conclusive evidence,[4] it aroused no great surprise in intellectual circles, their common opinion having long suspected Wittgenstein of homosexuality.[5]

Levi's argument begins at this point: it is his view that, "As much of Wittgenstein's life activity was absorbed by the effort to construct an environment that would protect him from his threatening homosexual inclinations, so his moral philosophy was unconsciously constructed to protect himself against the moral condemnation which those inclinations might be expected to call out." Levi's project, given the hypothesis of homosexuality, is to show how this could affect Wittgenstein's philosophy.

Levi's first task is to establish that being a homosexual would be likely to affect Wittgenstein's philosophy, and he mentions as background the stifling bourgeois atmosphere of Vienna and post-Victorian England. But Levi's main evidence here seems to be Wittgenstein's letters to his life-long friend, Paul Engelmann, especially those that date from 1916 to 1925.[6] It should be clear that there is no direct evidence of homosexuality here. Rather, *given* the premise of homosexuality, Levi constructs out of the anguished and self-condemning tone of the letters a picture of a "guilty homosexual": "The operant word here is guilty."

The next step in Levi's argument is to show how this character of "guilty homosexuality" might affect Wittgenstein's ethics. Levi analyzes Wittgenstein's "Lecture on Ethics" (circa 1930),[7] mentioning first the distinction between relative and absolute value, and then the three experiences of absolute value: (1) wonder at the existence of the world, (2) the feeling of absolute safety, (3) and consciousness of guilt. In Levi's interpretation all three of these experiences are manifestations of Wittgenstein's guilty homosexuality, the third one being "obvious." The first experience is interpreted by Levi in light of another feeling that Wittgenstein reported to Engelmann (letter no. 33) "that of not being able to get over a particular fact," namely (for Levi) his homosexuality. The second experience, that of absolute safety, is seen as part of his concern "to shield himself from his most extreme tendencies toward promiscuously homosexual tendencies." Levi's main task is to explain *how* Wittgenstein tried to protect his guilty nature from the judgement of society; and Levi's explanation is by way of Wittgenstein's ethical philosophy.

Levi thinks that his hypothesis about Wittgenstein's homosexual guilty "leads to a really important point; to a new understanding of the significance of those enigmatic moral pronouncements of the last three pages of Wittgenstein's great first work — to which I should like to call the latent (and probably unconscious) moral strategy of the *Tractatus*." To show this moral strategy, Levi quotes Wittgenstein's statement (to one of the prospective publishers of the *Tractatus*) that the whole point of the book was ethical, "to set limits to the domain of the ethical from the inside." In Levi's interpretation "our question must be: why was Wittgenstein so compulsively anxious 'to set limits' to the domain of the ethical?" The answer is, "translated in the language of his need: 'there can be no moral judgement, no ethical condemnation within the competence of men'." Wittgenstein is out to protect his homosexuality from the judgment of society through the distinction of what can be said and what can only be shown, that is, between the world of facts and "the mystical." "The underlying

4. This lack of hard evidence is brought out in the exchange of letters between G.E.M. Anscombe and Bartley in the *Times Literary Supplement*. Anscombe asked (16 November, 1973) for names, dates, places and evidence of any kind, and Bartley refused (11 January, 1974), saying that he had to protect his sources.

5. George Steiner, "From the Vienna Woods," *The New Yorker* (July 23, 1977), p. 77.

6. Paul Engelmann, *Letters from Ludwig Wittgenstein* (London, 1967).

7. First published in the *Philosophical Review* (January, 1965).

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purpose of the first seventy pages of the *Tractatus* has been to transform the world of actual fact into a world of significant speech and this displacement of ontology by semantics has its ethical correlate. The denial of moral 'being' is accompanied by a vehement denial of the possibility of moral 'saying' — by the assertion of a doctrine of moral inexpressibility."[8]

In his interpretation of Wittgenstein's letters to Engelmann Levi attempts to establish that Wittgenstein's expressions of guilt were related to his homosexuality. "The letters are both highly personal and enigmatic. But one thing runs through them like a trail of blood — a deep consciousness of personal guilt." The letters are indeed "highly personal and enigmatic" in that they are generally only a paragraph long, and what they refer to is often ambiguous. Our interpretation of these pictures of Wittgenstein's state of mind is somewhat different. We propose that the expressions of guilt and despair are better explained by Wittgenstein's existential project of working out his ideas and getting them correctly understood. In order for Wittgenstein to live faithfully, it was necessary that his ideas be properly construed. This was a matter of both ethical and intellectual importance. Wittgenstein's letters do express a sense of crisis. This crisis, we believe, is not reducible to homosexual guilt.

Paul Engelmann reported that from 1916 to 1920 he often met with Wittgenstein to have long conversations. Their dialogue revolved around two topics. One was Wittgenstein's attempt to explain the *Tractatus* to Engelmann. After intensive study of Frege and several years with Russell learning their new linguistic philosophy, Wittgenstein had produced a work that neither of the two masters fully understood.[9] The years 1918-21, especially, were a time when Wittgenstein tried to get the *Tractatus* published several times. Eventually it was published in a journal only because it was prefaced by an introduction by Russell, which, though it hailed the work, ignored the ethical point of the whole thing, and consequently, Wittgenstein felt, misrepresented some of the logical points as well. Wittgenstein's letters reveal his torment over this lack of understanding and express his desire that the work be properly construed. Wittgenstein wrote, in letter no. 26, "How glad I would be to see you again soon! The active use of my reason which your presence makes has some kind of soothing effect on me." Engelmann describes the "even more important" second topic of the conversations as being "religious," although "I don't want to give a hard and fast definition here." We will let Engelmann himself explain what these conversations were about:[10] "If I am unhappy and know that my unhappiness reflects a gross discrepancy between myself and life as it is, I have solved nothing. . . so long as I have not achieved the supreme and crucial insight that that discrepancy is not the fault of life as it is, but

8. It should not altogether escape the reader's attention that this is substantially the same interpretation of the *Tractatus* that Bertrand Russell and the Vienna Circle gave, emphasizing Wittgenstein's disjunction of the world and the ethical. But Levi stresses the ethical, while Russell and the logical positivists stress the factual to the detriment of the ethical. We would like to prefigure our interpretation with a rather famous quote from Karl Kraus: "Adolph Loos and I — he literally and I grammatically — have done nothing more than show that there is a distinction between an urn and a chamber pot and that it is this distinction above all that provides culture with elbow room. The others, those who fail to make the distinction, are divided into those who use the urn as a chamber pot and those who use the chamber pot as an urn."

9. This was Wittgenstein's perception, as reported in Janik and Toulmin, Bartley and Engelmann. On the philosophical issues involved, see Rush Rhees, "Questions on Logical Inference," B. Vesey, ed., *Understanding Wittgenstein* (Cornell, 1976); and Peter Winch, "The Unity of Wittgenstein's Philosophy," in *Studies in the Philosophy of Wittgenstein* (London, 1968).

10. *Letters from Ludwig Wittgenstein, op.cit.*, pp. 75-77.

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of myself as I am.... The person who has achieved this insight and holds on to it, and who will at least try again and again throughout his life to live up to it is religious. He 'has the faith,' from which it does not follow by any means that he must use mythological concepts — self-created or handed down — to buttress and interpret his insight into the fundamental relationship between himself and human existence in general. If he depends on such concepts in order to stand by his faith, the reason may well lie in a weakness of the faith."

The themes of faith, ethics and religion that Engelmann remembers are evident in many of Wittgenstein's letters, especially letter no. 12, where Wittgenstein repeatedly states his "lack of decency." To understand what Wittgenstein is referring to it might help to consider some of the letter that Levi doesn't quote in his account: "I only mean that I am slightly clearer in my own mind about my lack of decency. If you tell me now that I have no faith, you are *perfectly right*, only I did not have it before either. It is plain, isn't it, that when a man wants, as it were, to invent a machine for becoming decent, such a man has no faith. But what am I to do?" This is interesting because it suggests that what Wittgenstein relates to his "lack of decency" is that he "has no faith," and this is to use "faith" in the sense that Engelmann reports, of being true to one's existence. The only way by which Wittgenstein can get out of his state is through doing philosophy, or "inventing a machine for being decent."

Let us consider another example from no. 23, which is also Levi's next example. Here Wittgenstein begins by sympathizing with Engelmann's own depression. Then he goes on to write, "Just how far I have gone downhill you can see from the fact that I have on several occasions contemplated taking my own life. Not from my despair about my own badness but for purely external reasons." Wittgenstein adds a postscript, as if to explain about these external reasons, "Normal human beings are a balm to me, and a torment at the same time."[11] This is a statement that could easily have come from the novel *Steppenwolf* by Hermann Hesse, Wittgenstein's contemporary. The hero in *Steppenwolf* is torn between visions of Apollonian reason and fits of blind passion, and trying to mediate between these extremes leads him to a (sometimes jealous) hatred of the bourgeoisie for their complacency, i.e., their ignorance of this tension. This is similar to Kierkegaard's identification of the crowd as untruth. We will say more about this similarity between Wittgenstein and existentialism a little later.

For now we would like to suggest that Wittgenstein's hopes for the *Tractatus*, and the difficulties in getting it published and correctly understood, are partly responsible for Wittgenstein's intense despair. Support for this interpretation can be found in no. 26 (1919): "If I cannot find a German publisher, Russell will have it printed in England. I beg you to let me know as soon as possible whether your efforts are likely to lead to any success at all.... I am in very low spirits these days. My relationship with my fellow men is all wrong, and I am completely in despair." This motivation can be seen also in the next example from Levi, no. 32, only the quote has to be extended to the end of the letter: "*I have sunk to the lowest point.* May you never be in that position! Shall I ever be able to raise myself up again? Well, we shall see....Reclam will not have my book. I don't care any more and that is a good thing. Write *soon*."

11. The address from No. 23 indicates that it was written at the family house of Wittgenstein's friend, A. Sjoegren, whose family had been friends for a long time with Wittgenstein's parents. Bartley reports that Sjoegren's mother fell in love with Wittgenstein during this period (p. 48). While this may sound slightly comical to us, it may have been the last straw for Wittgenstein in his attempts to come to terms with bourgeois Vienna. It was also about this time that Wittgenstein divested himself of the considerable fortune his father had left him.

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Connected with the despair about the fate of the *Tractatus* is Wittgenstein's further guilt about the value of his work. This can be seen by examining no. 33, of which Levi quotes a major portion dealing with "not being able to get over a particular fact." Levi talks at some length about how this particular fact is Wittgenstein's guilty homosexuality. However, this can be seen to be mistaken by considering the whole content of the letter. It begins by stating "as far as the merits of my case (i.e., the publication of the *Tractatus*) are concerned, I am beyond any outside help." The rest of the paragraph is filled with Wittgenstein's anguish and thoughts of suicide, as well as the state of not being able to get over a particular fact. Following the paragraph is one sentence which is apparently intended to conclude the expression of his feeling: "Of course it all boils down to the fact that I have no faith!" When one remembers what Engelmann reported as the sense of 'faith' for him and Wittgenstein, one can see what caused Wittgenstein's despair and guilt during this period: the failure to make his work understood, and a corresponding sense of alienation or lack of faith about the worth of his existence.

It should be noted that in Wittgenstein's next letter (no. 34, July 1920) he is still depressed over the failure of his book and concerned about the state of his "faith." He reported that he was "longing for some kind of regular work," and then announced his decision to spend his summer holiday working as a gardener. And it was not long after this that he decided to try teaching elementary school.

The reader should notice that our interpretation does not claim or assume that Wittgenstein was *not* a homosexual. We wish only to assert that even if he was, there is no warrant for the claim that this explains his "state of mind." Apart from Bartley's account there is at present no evidence about the extent to which Wittgenstein may have been tormented by homosexuality. In fact, M. O'C. Drury, a friend of Wittgenstein's for 20 years and a consulting psychiatrist, reported the following encounter with Wittgenstein: "On one occasion he insisted I should read a document in which he mentioned in detail those matters in his past life of which he was most ashamed. I can therefore state, from Wittgenstein's own testimony, that Mr. Bartley is in error when he supposes that Wittgenstein was at any time 'tormented by homosexual behavior'."[12]

In his "Lecture on Ethics," Wittgenstein provides three examples of how "absolute value" is different from "relative value," and he takes these examples to be characteristic of his own moral experience. Levi thinks these experiences are products of Wittgenstein's "guilty homosexuality." We will argue that these experiences are rooted in his life situation, and that they cannot be reduced to a single factor.

Levi compares Wittgenstein with Heidegger. "At first glance Wittgenstein's 'wonder at the existence of the world' seems a little like Heidegger's problem as to why anything should exist rather than nothing. But Heidegger's problem is . . . a problem of ontology, while for Wittgenstein the wonder at Existence is probably as much horror as wonder and . . . is of moral rather than metaphysical relevance." Levi goes on to posit that this wonder is really the "not being able to get over a particular fact": Wittgenstein's "guilty homosexuality."

Levi, however, does not provide us with an argument for why "wonder" is at least partly "horror." Rather, he allows his general interpretation to carry the point. Nor does he provide a detailed argument for why (or how) Wittgenstein's wonder at the world is reduced to "not being able to get over a particular fact." A problem for Levi is that the hypothesis that this particular fact is Wittgenstein's guilty homosexuality is based on the idea that wonder at the world is a matter of horror, while, at the same

12. *Times Literary Supplement*, 22 February 1974.

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time, the wonder-horror equivalence is predicated on the interpretation that "not being able to get over a particular fact" is a reflection of Wittgenstein's horror at his "guilty homosexuality." Neither of these two arguments establishes the contention that Wittgenstein was tormented by his homosexuality. Rather, they are derived from it.

Although Wittgenstein doesn't give many details about his experiences in the "Lecture," we think it is a good idea to begin from what he does say about the conception of wonder. Wittgenstein makes the following comments:[13] "The truth is that the scientific way of looking at a fact is not the way to look at it as a miracle. For imagine whatever fact you may, it is not miraculous in the absolute sense of that term. For we see that we have been using the word 'miracle' in a relative and an absolute sense. And I will now describe the experience of wondering at the existence of the world by saying: it is the experience of seeing the world as a miracle." Whatever Wittgenstein meant by "wonder at the existence of the world," it is safe to say that it has nothing to do with horror, although awesome might be appropriate. Also, Wittgenstein seems to take the character of the world as a whole and is not concerned with just a particular (albeit, constant) feature of the world.

This interpretation of the first experience can be aided by reference to the second feature, the experience of absolute safety. It should be noted that all three of these experiences are closely linked and are related by Wittgenstein to God (not just the last one as indicated by Levi). "For the first of them is...exactly what people were referring to when they said that God created the world; and the experience of absolute safety has been described by saying that we feel safe in the hands of God."[14] We can see immediately why the concern with safety is the 'paradigm of moral value' for Wittgenstein: we are doing what pleases God. Being safe is substantially the same as acting ethically.[15] Engelmann's comments on faith are again helpful here: when one acts with faith, i.e., is true to his existence, he is *absolutely* safe in the sense of having done all he can. Wittgenstein adds, "it's nonsense to say that I am safe whatever happens."[16] 'Safe' in this expression means *relatively* safe, that is, as we commonly use the term ("I'm safe from being hit by that truck"). But absolutely safe refers to ethical reward and punishment. Taking responsibility for one's actions in this sense stresses individual awareness; this is undoubtedly the source of Wittgenstein's individualism.

Levi states that Wittgenstein's third experience is so "obviously a consequence of his life situation that little more need be said about it here." Levi thinks its equally obvious that (the guilt) is deeply associated with the intermittent episodes of pessimism and depression." We agree with Levi on this, but only so long as it is understood that life situation includes more than just sexuality. In Wittgenstein's life his guilt and despair, especially in 1918-1920, was associated with his "lack of faith" about the worth of his existence and his frustration over the obstacles in the way of his self-expression. This frustration is especially true about the *Tractatus* because, Janik and Toulmin report, his family and Viennese friends thought of the book as "an ethical *deed*."[17] It appears to us that these experiences of guilt relate to Wittgenstein's feelings of ethical responsibility, and the notion of their being a "divine judgment" on his actions. Wittgenstein's experience of guilt is "described by the phrase that God disapproves of our conduct," and Wittgenstein adds nothing more about this in the "Lecture." But it

13. "Lectures on Ethics," p. 11.
14. *Ibid.*, p. 10.
15. On Wittgenstein's ethics see P. Winch, "Moral Integrity" and "Ethical Reward and Punishment," in *Ethics and Action* (London, 1973).
16. "Lecture on Ethics," p. 9.
17. *Wittgenstein's Vienna, op.cit.*, p. 28.

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seems clear what this divine disapproval means for Wittgenstein. His guilt is a product of his concern about his faith, or lack of it. The frustration of his ethical deed, i.e., the difficulty in publishing the *Tractatus,* led him to the question of whether philosophy is just "inventing a machine" or truly becoming faithful to one's existence. This guilty questioning led Wittgenstein to long for "real work" and to attempt to apply his ideas directly by getting involved in Austrian educational reform in the early 1920s.[18] Wittgenstein's notion of guilt in general signifies this kind of self-examination and recognition of responsibility for one's actions.

Levi compares Wittgenstein to Heidegger at one point, and we agree that it might be useful to study connections between Wittgenstein and existential philosophy. However, we think that a comparison between Wittgenstein and Sartre is more in order because Sartre has clear moral as well as ontological concerns. Wittgenstein's experience of the world as a miracle is similar to what Sartre termed an "adventure" in his early philosophical novel *Nausea.*[19] An adventure is the opposite of the nausea, the phenomenological dread of existence; it is a good or wonderful experience, where everything seems to go just right in the world. For both philosophers this wonder is a precondition of the possibility of authentic existence. The notion of an adventure also helps explain Wittgenstein's experience of absolute safety. Sartre breaks the notion of an 'adventure' into two parts: "privileged situations" or states of the world, and "perfect moments," or what one does with these situations. We are calling attention to a parallel between perfect moments and experiences of absolute safety.[20] " 'And the perfect moments? Where do they come in?' 'They come afterwards. First there are the annunciatory signs. Then the privileged situation slowly, majestically, comes into people's lives. Then the question of whether one wants to make a perfect moment out of it.' 'Yes,' I say. 'I understand. In each of these privileged situations there are certain acts which have to be done, certain attitudes to be taken, words which must be said — and other attitudes, other words are strictly prohibited. Is that it?'. . . . 'That's it,' she says. 'First you had to be plunged into something exceptional and feel that you were putting it in order. If all those conditions had been realized, the moment would have been perfect.' 'In fact it was a sort of work of art.' 'You've already said that,' she says with irritation. 'No: it was . . . a duty. You had to transform privileged situations into perfect moments. It was a moral question. Yes, you can laugh if you like: it was moral, I am not laughing at all."

There are many interesting parallels that could bear discussion here, including the identification of aesthetics and ethics. But we will confine ourselves here to mentioning the parallel between "absolute safety" and "perfect moments" considered as ethical responsibility.

When we consider Sartre's notion of nausea (the ethical, not the ontological part),[21] we find a description of extreme despair and self-questioning. The anguish that Sartre describes as resulting from the recognition of one's existential situation (i.e., one's ethical responsibility) is akin to Wittgenstein's 'lack of faith.'[22] So is the alienation from social others that is also involved. As Wittgenstein says: "I am not happy, and

18. Later, in England again, Wittgenstein came to see philosophy itself as a genuine activity.

19. Jean-Paul Sartre, *Nausea,* trans. by Lloyd Alexander (New York, 1964). See especially pp. 36-37, 56-57.

20. *Ibid.,* pp. 148-149.

21. Like "adventures" the nausea had two parts; one of these is a phenomenological description of the material, and the other is the human (ethical) implications of Sartre's phenomenological existentialism. We are considering the latter here.

22. Sartre's best description of the ethical implications of nausea comes with Roquentin's confrontation with the Self-Taught Man, *Nausea,* pp. 112-123.

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not because my rottenness troubles me, but within my rottenness. I suffer much from the human, or rather inhuman, beings with whom I live" (letter no. 50). For both Wittgenstein and Sartre, this alienation is present in their ethics as extreme individualism, and both share the notion that the agent is totally responsible for his or her actions.

According to Levi, Wittgenstein's homosexual guilt explains why he drew a distinction between what can be said and what can only be shown. The distinction is important for Wittgenstein's ethics because it is used "to set limits to the domain of the ethical from the inside — which is *the only way* it can be *rigorously* done." Levi's interpretation of the *Tractatus* explains how he sees the distinction between saying and showing: "There is a contingent world of facts which is valueless, and there is the sense of value which lies outside the actual world, and they are rationally incommensurate." Levi compares Wittgenstein to Plato and Kant, calls their views "two world theories," and states that the result of this is "the abolition of ethics at every human level." "The denial of moral 'being' is accompanied by a vehement denial of the possibility of moral 'saying' — by the assertion of the doctrine of moral inexpressibility." It is Levi's conclusion that Wittgenstein aimed to set limits to the ethical in order to escape the moral condemnation of society for his guilty homosexuality.

We believe that Levi's interpretation of this crucial distinction is misguided. A mistake that underlies Levi's account is his belief that Wittgenstein's theory of meaning has nothing to do with his ethics. This belief includes the view that there is a sharp disjunction between Wittgenstein's early and later views on logic and language.[23] As we noted earlier, this is the same view of Wittgenstein's work that was held by Russell and Carnap. This view holds in part that Wittgenstein's philosophy is divided into an emphasis on the meaning of words and a later emphasis on the use of words. However, this view has been shown to be a misunderstanding.[24] Wittgenstein's crucial task in the *Tractatus* as well as the *Investigations* is to describe *how* words can have sense. From the beginning he found problematic the traditional correspondence theory of meaning. In his later work he argued that words took on sense through their usage as "forms of life." In the *Tractatus* Wittgenstein had not yet reached this conclusion, although he had come to the preparatory idea that mathematical and linguistic concepts rely on general (socially understood) rules.[25] However, Wittgenstein's project remained the same throughout his life: to describe the groundwork of how words have sense. Appreciation of this point enables one to see how Wittgenstein's views on logic intertwined with his ethical position in the *Tractatus*.

Wittgenstein thought in the earlier work that linguistic concepts relate to objects through the notion of general rules. These rules specify how words refer, that is, how they have sense. Logic is the description of these general rules, but logic was not comprised of rules about the general rules: Wittgenstein did not conceive of logic as a metalanguage. Logic itself was not an ideally correct correspondence language; instead, logic was senseless, it was simply what is the case in terms of how words refer, and it showed itself through how linguistic rules were used. This is the distinction in logic between saying and showing in the *Tractatus*. (And in Wittgenstein's later work,

23. Levi says: "His logic of language could be as shifting as the winds of his philosophical perspective, but his ethical theory was anchored in the unchanging necessities of his life."

24. See P. Winch, "The Unity of Wittgenstein's Philosophy," *op.cit.*, and H. Ishiguro, "The Use and Reference of Names," in the same volume. Also R. Rhees, "Miss Anscombe on the *Tractatus*," in *Discussion on Wittgenstein* (London, 1970).

25. R. Rhees, "Questions on Logical Inferences," *op.cit.*, pp. 30-31.

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linguistic rules were predicated on social activity, and the *Lebensformen* were accepted as "the given.") Ethics was like logic for Wittgenstein in that it could not be said, because it is senseless. [26] This means the same thing as: ethics cannot be taught, it can only be *shown* or lived. Ethics, or the expression of absolute value, was posited in the "Lecture on Ethics" as being nonsensical. But this is not a pejorative term for Wittgenstein; like logic, ethics is all important for how rules (moral and linguistic) are used. But neither logic nor ethics can be formulated into meaningful (factual) statements as can linguistic rules and statements of relative value.

It is now clear why Levi's interpretation is mistaken. Levi thinks that the separation of facts and values means "the abolition of any ethics at the human level." But this associates the human level with just the factual realm, and this is clearly not what Wittgenstein says. The ethical, like the logical, can only be found in what is acted on: the ethical *is* the human level. (This is not to say that Wittgenstein thought the factual realm was not on the human level: the human level contains both factual and ethical standpoints.) [27] Levi's main hypothesis is also mistaken. The denial of moral "being," i.e., Wittgenstein's alleged guilty homosexuality, did not lead to his denial of moral "saying." Rather, Wittgenstein denied that there could be moral saying precisely because he thought that ethics could only be affirmed through one's moral being. Ethics cannot be said, it can only be shown. Wittgenstein's position is held in opposition both to those metaphysicians who think that values can be treated as facts, and to those, like the logical positivists, who think that it is only facts that are important to life. Wittgenstein's position is a mediation between subjectivists and objectivists, and his project can be seen as similar in at least that respect with existential phenomenology. Wittgenstein's biography confirms our interpretation. After the early failure of the *Tractatus,* Wittgenstein took it upon himself to prove his ethical worth through his involvement in educational reform. Bartley's account is particularly useful in describing how Wittgenstein gave up *writing* about philosophy and tried to *show* it by attempting to "get the peasantry out of the muck." [28] Although the enemies he made eventually forced him to get out of teaching school, Wittgenstein tried in this period to demonstrate how ethics was possible. The Mystical, both ethical and logical, is wrongly thought of as being *beyond* the world of human experience, instead the Mystical is *made manifest* in the world.

It has been Levi's argument to relate aspects of Wittgenstein's philosophy to his alleged "guilty homosexuality," with the suggestion that the latter in some sense explains the former. Levi thinks that the "discrepancies" he finds so "highly incongruous in an exact logician in the tradition of Frege and Russell" can be explained as a "consequence not of intellectual judgement but of biographical necessity." Levi's argument is of a hypothetical character: *if* Wittgenstein was a guilty homosexual, then we can explain such and such about his philosophy. Our critique has so far concentrated on both features, by showing that Levi's hypothesis is at best highly contentious, and by suggesting that Levi's interpretation of Wittgenstein's philosophy is misled by seeing it "in the tradition of Frege and Russell" rather than a questioning of that tradition. By way of conclusion we would like to consider directly the notion of explanation present in Levi's psycho-biography.

Levi quotes some remarks that Wittgenstein made about Freud, and suggests that

26. W.D. Hudson describes further the ethical distinction of saying and showing in *Wittgenstein and Religious Belief* (New York, 1975); cf. Part Three, "The Mystical."

27. There are clear similarities, and important differences, between Wittgenstein and Kant. See *The Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals,* especially section three.

28. Bartley, *Wittgenstein, op.cit.,* p. 117.

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Wittgenstein's life might be expressive of a tragic pattern after the manner of Wittgenstein's own comments about Freud and psychoanalysis. Levi's argument is itself "Freudian" in two separate respects: in the sense that sexual experiences are considered to be of primary importance in determining a subject's psychology; and in the idea that much of a subject's life is a manifestation of the subject's sexual psyche. One commentator expresses the second point as, "everything is what it is *and* another thing."[29] Levi's argument is like this: Wittgenstein's philosophy is what it is, and it is also a manifestation of his guilty homosexuality. A Freudian explanation holds that the former can be explained by the latter. We will use some of the many comments that Wittgenstein addressed to the two above features of Freudian explanation to evaluate Levi's interpretation of Wittgenstein's biography.

One of Wittgenstein's criticisms of Freud concerned the philosophy of mind. Wittgenstein rejected both dualism and behaviorialism: he tried not to reify the mental into an object, nor reject it as irrelevant to behavior. (There are again similarities to Sartre.)[30] Wittgenstein's position means that he must deny the notion of unconscious thoughts as a contradiction in terms. While Levi makes no claim to defend Freud's ontology, Levi does speak of guilt as "the latent (and probably unconscious) moral strategy of the *Tractatus*." Wittgenstein said of psychoanalytic explanations that they are "adopted because they have a peculiar charm. The picture of people having unconscious thoughts has a charm. The idea of an underworld, a secret cellar. Something hidden, uncanny....A lot of things one is ready to believe because they are uncanny." And on the sexual interpretation of a dream that Freud offered, Wittgenstein said: "The connections he makes interest people immensely.... It may be the fact that the explanation is extremely repellent that drives you to adopt it." The same could be said about Levi's explanation.

On the second point, Wittgenstein tried to make clear the sense in which unconscious sexual hypotheses might be said to explain or add new information about a person's life. Wittgenstein says: "The attraction of certain kinds of explanations is overwhelming. At a given time the attraction of a certain kind of explanation is greater than you can conceive. In particular, explanations of the kind 'this is really only this'." Wittgenstein is trying to point out the compulsive quality of Freudian-type explanations. "There is a strong tendency to say: 'We really can't get around the fact that this dream is really such and such'...and if someone says: 'Why do you say it is really this? Obviously it is not this at all,' it is in fact even difficult to see it as something else." One of Wittgenstein's points here is to question what is gained by saying that something "is really only this." For example, what does saying that the experience of absolute safety is "really" a product of Wittgenstein's urge to protect his homosexuality tell one about the experience? Rather than say anything about a phenomenon, explanations of this kind divert attention to a second (often hypothetical) phenomenon, and run the risk of missing what is meaningful about the phenomenon itself.

The above remarks are the context for the statements that Levi quotes and tries to apply to Wittgenstein himself. "Many people have, at some period, serious trouble in

29. For a discussion of Wittgenstein and Freud, see Frank Cioffi, "Wittgenstein's Freud," in *Studies in the Philosophy of Wittgenstein, op.cit.* All the quotes from Wittgenstein can be found in this article, as well as in C. Barrett, ed., *Lectures and Conversations with Ludwig Wittgenstein* (London, 1965), pp. 26, 27, 46, 47, 51.

30. The ideas that are similar are Sartre's notion of consciousness as intentionality and the nothingness that negates the material. See *The Transcendence of the Ego*, trans. by E. Williams and R. Kirkpatrick (New York, 1957). Sartre also shares the critique of Freud's philosophy of mind: how can there be unconscious consciousness? On Wittgenstein's philosophy of mind see John W. Cook, "Human Beings," in *Studies in the Philosophy of Wittgenstein, op.cit.*

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their lives....This is likely to appear as something nasty....And it may then be an immense relief that it can be shown that one's life has the pattern of a tragedy." This compulsive pattern is the psychoanalytic explanation, which may sometimes function as an aid to persons in forgetting their real crises. Often such an explanation seeks to reduce all the nastiness, loneliness and frustration that life sometimes has, to a single fact or pattern. This is the "charm" or "attraction" of such an explanation. In Levi's explanation the existential tension in Wittgenstein's life, devoted to working out of his philosophical ideas as it was, is reduced to the simple hypothesis of "guilty homosexuality."

Thus, Wittgenstein says, "if you are led by psychoanalysis to say that really you thought so and so, or that really your motive was so and so, this is not a matter of discovery but of persuasion." It has been the point of our reply to show why one should not be persuaded by Levi's interpretation. In our review we have also sketched the outlines of an alternative interpretation. Rather than reduce all of Wittgenstein's ethics to one explanatory pattern, we have tried to place Wittgenstein's philosophy in the context of his life situation. We have tried to argue that there is a complexity to his view on ethics that is not easily explained by his alleged "guilty homosexuality." A more complete understanding of Wittgenstein's ideas awaits a more fundamental understanding of the crises of Wittgenstein's life and philosophy and the social and historical conditions in which these are rooted.

WITTGENSTEIN AS ALIENATED JEW

by Steven S. Schwarzschild

Levi's "Biographical Sources of Wittgenstein's Ethics"[1] argues that Wittgenstein was a man deeply marked by "guilty homosexuality" and that this resulted in his philosophical expulsion of ultimate moral judgement from meaningful human discourse. Of course, as Levi himself points out, there are many additional considerations that could and should be brought to bear on this thesis. Levi, however, chooses to concentrate on Wittgenstein's individual psychology, largely leaving aside the sociological and historical factors in which, for example, Janik and Toulmin's work on *Wittgenstein's Vienna* concentrates. On the other hand, neither Levi nor *Wittgenstein's Vienna* deals with the role of Wittgenstein's typically alienated and uncomfortably acculturated Jewishness, to which Engelmann's *Letters* pays more adequate attention.[2] While homosexuality may have come "out of the closet" in our time, the subject of the "Jewishness" of alienated Jewish figures such as Wittgenstein remains hidden away.

The experience of World War I is well known to have been decisive for the young men of that generation. It was also decisive for those involved in the problematic of "the European-Jewish symbiosis."[3] Here the parallel of Wittgenstein and Franz

1. Albert W. Levi, "The Biographical Sources of Wittgenstein's Ethics," in *Telos*, No. 38 (Winter 1978-79), pp. 63-76.

2. For the Jewish background of Wittgenstein's family, cf. Bartley, *Wittgenstein* (New York, 1973), pp. 184-186, and Joseph Schaechter, "L. Wittgenstein (on the basis of writings from the estate of Paul Engelmann)" (Hebrew), p. 572. Unfortunately, I have been unable to locate the original place of publication of this important article, and I am forced to quote from a xerox copy of it at my disposal.

3. Cf. Steven S. Schwarzschild, *Franz Rosenzweig — Guide to Reversioners* (London, 1960),

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Rosenzweig is striking: both served in the armies of the Central Powers; both came from at least upper-middle-class, completely de-Judaized families; both discovered in the war that traditional academic philosophy could no longer cope with reality, and they pushed forward to a new "philosophy of language;" both wrote their respective one and only complete book, the *Tractatus* and *The Star of Redemption*[4] in the trenches. Wittgenstein read the Bible while in the army.[5] Later he became interested in the very translation of the Bible by Rosenzweig and Martin Buber that was to become famous.[6] On Feb. 24, 1995, he, like Walter Benjamin throughout his life-long failure, considered going to Palestine.[7] And in 1931, in the course of a whole series of meditations about Jewishness, Wittgenstein specifically speaks of himself as a typical Jew: "The greatest Jewish thinker is only a talent. (I, for example.)"[8]

Consider what might result if the full interaction of the three elements hitherto mentioned, Wittgenstein's psychology, his historical sociology, and his alienated Jewishness, were thoroughly explored in its impact on his philosopical work. Levi quotes George Steiner at one point, but he wisely does not repeat Steiner's suggestion

pp. 11-17, and my forthcoming "A Critique of Martin Buber's Political Philosophy," also Schaechter, *op.cit.*, p. 576.

4. Translated by William Hallo (New York, 1970).

5. Paul Engelmann, *Letters from L. Wittgenstein* (Oxford, 1967), 4.9.1917, and Schaechter, *op.cit.*, pp. 580, 586.

6. Engelmann, *op.cit.*, p. 111, and Bartley, *op.cit.*, p. 66.

7. Cf. Schaechter, *op.cit.*, p. 582. Cf. also D. Magnaniai, "Tolstoy and Wittgenstein as 'Imitatoren Christi'," *Abstracts,* Second International Wittgenstein Symposium, Austrian L. Wittgenstein Society (Vienna, 1977), pp. 61ff.: [E]thics [according to Wittgenstein] ... is a truth to which one testifies with one's life." Incidentally, neither Rosenzweig nor Benjamin finds mention in Janik and Toulmin's book.

8. Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Vermischte Bemerkungen*, selected and edited by G. v. Wright (Frankfurt, 1977), p. 43. The main point of this series of meditations appears to be that there are such things as national characters in history (in a very Spenglerian manner), that Jewishness is really incommensurable with European categories, and that Jews are not really creative but, so to speak, reproductive (a widespread notion in the growing anti-Semitic Europe of the first third of the 20th century). Generally it is noteworth how much attention is coming to be paid to the subject of Wittgenstein and religion. In the *Abstracts* of the Second International Wittgenstein Symposium, Vienna, 1977, for example, B. Riesterer designates Wittgenstein as a "religious existentialist." K. Salamun compares him with Buber. Janik himself discusses "Wittgenstein and Weininger," and U. Steinvorth points out that Wittgenstein belongs among a whole group of specifically Jewish intellectuals in the Vienna of the *fin de siecle* who "subverted" the cultural establishment. For this thesis see also the interesting and ambitious book of John Murray Cuddihy, *The Ordeal of Civility: Freud, Marx, Levi-Strauss and the Jewish Struggle with Modernity* (New York, 1974). To the latter description one ought to add again, of course, that "Jewish" here refers to people who were totally alienated from, ignorant of, and even hostile to Jewish culture but who were, nonetheless, somehow paradoxically classified by their environment as Jews and who then, not uncommonly, seriously contemplated suicide throughout their lives (viz. Wittgenstein), actually carried it out (viz. Weininger), or died even more "absurdly" (viz. Edith Stein). Schaechter puts some stress on Wittgenstein's enchantment with Franz Grillparzer (*loc.cit.*, p. 579) and with the notion (which he, however, does not connect with Grillparzer) of life as a dream. This latter notion reminds one immediately, of course, of Grillparzer's play "The Dream, A Life." It might, however, also be connected with Grillparzer's famous play, "The Jewess of Toledo." Here Rahel says at one point: "Bin ich doch selbst ein Traum nur einer Nacht." At the end of the play the king thinks of her, vitalistically, as reality: "Sie aber war die Wahrheit, ob verzerrt." One can, I suppose, take such pseudo-Freudian associations too far, but I wonder whether Wittgenstein did not conflate, as it were, his two "compatriots," the Viennese Grillparzer and the Jewess of Toledo, and identify his own vitality with them-him. (Acculturating Jews in the 19th and 20th centuries in Northern Europe — Heine, for example, and many others — tried to identify themselves with the "aristocratic" Sephardic, Southern-European tradition of "the golden age of the Spanish symbiosis"). Consider the antithetical bond between the Jewishly alienated Viennese and British contemporaries Wittgenstein and Freud.

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to the effect that alienated Jewishness is often characteristically expressed in modern literature in the form of homosexuality (for example, Proust's and possibly Kafka's sexual strains). Thus, homosexuality and alienated Jewishness converge again.

Levi is correct. As he points out, the image of the man and of the thinker Wittgenstein that emerges from this analysis is fundamentally different from the received, conventional image of him in most Anglo-American philosophical circles. Levi is right and these circles in our academic establishment wrong. Levi, however, is rather polite about it. I want to be a little blunter and to generalize a bit: how could one even expect a group of people whose lives and minds have been shaped almost exclusively in limitedly English-language culture[9] to sympathize with a man born into the tower of the Austro-Hungarian Babel and who, in the characteristic fashion of the uncomfortably acculturated modern Jew, has an alienated relation even to his native tongue?[10] Can people who have spent all their lives in the safe, bourgeois precincts of Cambridge and behind the protective walls of the wide Atlantic really understand the purposes of a sensitive intellectual, born by two Continental world wars, at least three radical revolutions, the violent dissolution of no fewer than two empires, fundamental cultural traumata, and so forth, all on his own, real back? And can professional academics, fully integrated into a Christian culture, realize what the questions are that agitate the uprooted mind of a lost Jew who is transfixed by Augustine and Kierkegaard while hearing the last echoes (and perhaps the first renewed soundings) of what Levi calls the ethics of the Judaic God?[11] In short, if you don't know what the questions are, how can you know what the answers mean?

This, incidentally, goes a long way toward answering the question that Levi, like Norman Malcolm, raises about Wittgenstein's religion. Though acculturated to Augustine, Kierkegaard, and Tolstoy, he is not a Christian. He is certainly not a pagan. He is also not a Jew, never having been inside a synagogue or taught a single Jewish text. He is, as Levi rightly says, "in suspense" — i.e., between two or more chairs in religion as he is in languages and, indeed, sexes. He is really the quintessentially alienated man and thus another almost perfect instance of the estranged Jew of 19th and 20th century Europe.

9. In checking some passages I ran across a number of accepted translations of Wittgenstein that are either plainly false or at least connotatively misleading. Even "be silent" distorts the active mood of "*schweigen*." Levi himself has "a go" at Anglo-American "dons" much blunter than mine in "Modern Cultural Roots of Analytic Philosophy," in *Journal of Chinese Philosophy* 6 (1979), pp. 15-35.

10. *Tractatus:* "Die Grenzen meiner Sprache bedeuten die Grenzen meiner Welt." Cf. Gustav Landauer, *Skepsis und Mystik*, pp. 5ff., as quoted in Ruth Link-Salingers, *G. Landauer -Philosopher of Utopia* (Indianapolis, 1977), p. 84: "Your word is (only) the grammar of your speech." Landauer, too, is a member of that group of brilliant, alienated Jews that largely constituted the intelligentsia of German-speaking Europe at the time of World War I. He was, among other things, a close collaborator of Fritz Mauthner, but Janik and Toulmin are not aware of him either. Cf. Gustav Landauer, *For Socialism* (St. Louis, 1978).

11. It would take too long to extrapolate Levi's paper beyond the point to which he takes it. For example, I believe that it can be shown that crypto-Jewish and generally ethical concerns permeate not only the *Tractatus* (as Wittgenstein himself makes clear in the passage which Levi quotes, as one out of many, and as Engelmann, Heller and others have pointed up), but also the *Investigations*. By "Jewish," I have to say again, one must mean in this context — i.e., with reference to the large bulk of acculturated Jewish writers in German-language culture in the 19th and 20th centuries — Jewish problematics with minimal Jewish historical vestiges, transmitted, if at all, often subliminally, through non-Jewish and even anti-Jewish sources. Cf. Steven S. Schwarzschild, "Karl Marx's Jewish Theory of Usury," in *Gesher*, Yeshiva University, 1978, pp. 39ff. Certainly what Levi rightly recognizes as Wittgenstein's ethicism is the single defining characteristic in the history of Jewish philosophy. Cf. Schwarzschild, "The Lure of Immanence...," *Tradition*, Spring-Summer 1967, pp. 70-99.

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Two qualifications must be added. One is that it is not to be inferred that one cannot understand Wittgenstein if one is a WASP. The other is that neither Levi nor I will argue that Wittgenstein is necessarily right either philosophically or historically. He is plainly wrong, for example, in inferring from the correct observation that values are not "in the world" that they are, therefore, entities beyond the reach of reason, in some mystical realm of the "silence" with which the *Tractatus* begins and ends or in the exclusive power of some divine judge.[12]

What Levi aptly calls Wittgenstein's "quixotic ethics" underlie, furthermore, the fact that Wittgenstein was the quintessentially "non-political man." *Investigations* 124 seems to go out of its way to contradict Marx's famous thesis on Feuerbach, that philosophy may no longer merely try to understand the world but must go on to change it, by declaring that philosophy "leaves everything as it is." It is also pre-Marxist to define the purpose of philosophy to give man peace ("where there is no peace ").[13]

Levi's account, however, raises some methodological problems. Levi claims that a psychological analysis of Wittgenstein in this instance, or sociological, historical, or other non-philosophical (i.e., extra-logical and extra-conceptual) analyses in analogous instances, are at the least highly desirable and perhaps even necessary for a proper philosophical understanding and evaluations of arguments. Although by means of the psychologico-historical method Levi has arrived at conclusions that are at least useful and in some ways true, this does not prove that his procedure is either required or even desirable.

That it is not necessary to proceed the way Levi does is relatively easy to demonstrate. The details of Wittgenstein's private life and of the social setting in which his mind was formed have begun to be brought to bear on Wittgenstein exegesis and extrapolations only in the last few years. When Erich Heller wrote his short study of Wittgenstein[14] that information was not available. Even so, Heller was able to demonstrate what the real name of the game was for Wittgenstein, exclusively on the basis of a careful and perceptive reading of Wittgenstein's published philosophical texts, without resort to private, psycho-biographic considerations.[15] When Levi claims

12. When Wittgenstein concludes that "ethics is transcendental" what he really means to say is that ethics is not transcendental but transcendent, although I wish he had really meant transcendental rather than transcendent. Cf., e.g., Abram Gideon, *Der Begriff Transcendental in Kants Kritik der reinen Vernunft* (Marburg, 1903); *Transzendent und Transzendental im Denken Kants.*, ed. N. Hinske (Darmstadt), Wege der Forschung, vol. CIV. Cf. Richard Heinrich, *Einbildung und Darstellung — Zum Kantianismus des frühen Wittgenstein* (Düsseldorf: Henn, 1977), p. 73: " 'Wittgenstein's Kantianism' is long since not a provocative association anymore." Cf. p. 10 re "transcendental" and *passim*. D.S. Shwayder, "Wittgenstein on Mathematics," in *Studies in the Philosophy of Wittgenstein*, ed. Peter Winch (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1969), p. 66: "Wittgenstein's philosophy was Kantian from beginning to end." Cf. pp. 75, 83, 89 re "transcendental" and *passim*.

13. *Investigations* 133. Actually Anscombe mistranslates this, too. It should be "rest" rather than "peace." Cf. Schaechter, *op.cit.*, pp. 575-579. The fuzzy and willful book by Hanna Fenichel Pitkin, *Wittgenstein and Justice* (Berkeley, 1972), p. 340, ends with an effort at blurring this conflict between Marx and Wittgenstein. Cf. Bartley's correct argument against Wittgenstein's view of the passivity of philosophy, *op.cit.*, pp. 171ff. Shwayder, *loc.cit.*, p. 70, elegantly shows that Wittgenstein's quietism even extends to his mathematics: "Wittgenstein's reluctance to deny anything and...his declared desire to leave mathematical results as they are;" cf. also p. 106.

14. "L. Wittgenstein: Unphilosophische Betrachtungen" (n.b. the adjective!), *Merkur* Heft 81 (1954), and in Wittgenstein, *Schriften, Beiheft mit Beiträgen...* (Frankfurt, 1960), and in English in *Encounter*, September 1959.

15. Indeed I, too, years ago wrote a study on the dialectic of speech and silence, before the

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that "only the general pattern of Wittgenstein's life discloses" the meaning of the end of the *Tractatus* and when he relies immediately thereafter on a private letter of Wittgenstein's to Ficker to make this point stick, he falls into the very error of Wittgenstein's Anglo-American epigones whom he sets out to criticize, namely, that error of disregarding the plain published words not only at the end but also in the preface to the *Tractatus*, where the author had given perfectly clear notice to the same effect in virtually the same words. Why then need we look for Wittgenstein's haunting ghosts in his private closets? In short, the difference between the philosophical image of Wittgenstein as drawn by his canonical Anglo-American exponents, on the one hand, and that drawn by the more perceptive and sensitive students of his total intellectual enterprise is due not to the fact that the latter, unlike the former, take into account in their interpretation the social history of ideas, but to the more careful and literate reading given to his texts by the latter.

One may want to go further and ask whether, in the frame of reference of philosophcal rather than historical purposes, it may not be positively harmful to arrive at even a correct understanding of a philosopher's thesis by means of the method Levi employed. In the first place, Wittgenstein himself certainly wanted to convince his students and readers that what he argued was correct "objectively," i.e., also people who were not and are not Jewishly alienated Austro-Hungarian homosexuals were expected by him to accept his theses (whatever these may have been at one time or another). Thus, Wittgenstein would not approve of dragging extraneous considerations appertaining to his own or anyone else's character and place in history into the process of understanding and evaluating his philosophical arguments. To this it might be replied that Wittgenstein could, of course, be wrong.

But then we must ask what strikes me as the last question that has to be raised in this connection: what is the bottom line of the kind of investigation that a historicist in philosophy carries out? Is it in our case that Wittgenstein's analysis of what language can and cannot do is valid only for someone born into a thoroughly assimilated Jewish background in pre-World War I Vienna, and that it is not valid for someone who does not feel profoundly guilty about his homosexuality? This surely would be an extremely

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personal life of Wittgenstein had been written about at all, in which I made the point of the transcendent importance of "silence" as the goal of Wittgenstein's analyses in the *Tractatus* — again simply on the basis of a careful interpretation of his public texts, without resort to his private life. Cf. "Speech and Silence before God," *Judaism*, X:3 (1961), pp. 195-204; and *Understanding Jewish Prayer*, ed. J. Petuchowski (New York, 1972), p. 169, note 23. Cf. also Jürgen Habermas, "Der deutsche Idealismus und die jüdische Philosophen," in *Philosophisch-Politische Profile* (Frankfurt, 1971), p. 49. To round out the record, *re* silence and the "unworldliness" of God and value, cf. Schaechter, *op.cit.*, pp. 578ff., 585, and Wittgenstein, *Vermischte Bemerkungen, op.cit.*, p. 15 (1929): "When something is good it is also divine. This, strangely, summarizes my ethic. Only that which is supernatural can express the supernatural." "Men cannot be led to the good; they can only be led somewhere. The good lies outside the realm of facts." Another Viennese contemporary of Wittgenstein's and Rosenzweig's closest associate, Martin Buber, who, however, overcame his initial and only minimal Jewish alienation (all three of them contributors, however differently, to "the linguistic turn" in modern philosophy), made the same move as Wittgenstein, to the effect that the unsayable is to be shown (*Tractatus*, 4.11f.). Buber says: "I appeal to nought but what everyone of you knows immediately about himself ... This is the boundary, this boundary I cannot break through," Rivka Horwitz, *Buber's Way to "I and Thou"...*, (Heidelbert: L. Schneider, 1978), p. 123. And I put it like this (cf. Schwarzschild, "Buber," *loc.cit.*, n. 24): "Buber insists on the centrality of language, but language cannot denote thou's. It can, on the other hand, be expected to circumlocute thou's — i.e., circle ittishly around them, use poetic locutions and neologisms in order to "awaken us from our (ittish) slumber," open the window (to use Buber's metaphor) and point to the thou ostentively, without denoting it. (Wittgenstein's "showing" is thus intimately linked to his "silence.")

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idiosyncratic mouse to be born of such a mountain of thought.

If Wittgenstein's work is to have any value to other people, then the psycho-socio-historiobiography of its author and his readers must be treated as, at best, of propadeutic importance. To be sure, we must try to find out as much as we can about what the words used and the rules according to which they have been put together meant at the time, in the place, and to the persons who employed them. As Hermann Cohen liked to say, we have to do our philology before we can go on to do our philosophy. But, having done so, we presumably avoid the genetic fallacy, and focus on the claims being made. We reach the text not from the context but the context from the text.

WITTGENSTEIN ONCE MORE: A RESPONSE TO CRITICS

by Albert W. Levi

Except for the quaint second half of Schwarzschild's piece, both "Wittgenstein as Alienated Jew" by Schwarzschild and "On Wittgenstein and Ethics: A Reply to Levi" by Rudebush and Berg subscribe to the principle that a man's life (as well as the epoch in which he lives) bears some relation to his ideas and can be a significant clue in their understanding.

One thinks of this principle as a commonplace method in the history of ideas, but unfortunately it has been fanatically resisted by some of Wittgenstein's literary executors and devoted followers. In a letter to Engelmann, Elizabeth Anscombe wrote: "If by pressing a button it could have been secured that people would not concern themselves with his personal life, I should have pressed the button."[1] Rush Rhees in a somewhat hysterical review of Bartley's *Wittgenstein* not only denies that anything we can learn about a writer's or artist's sex life will help us understand his work, but asserts "there are certain stories [such as the ascription of homosexuality] which it would be foul to relate or tell about somebody even if they were true. The word is foul."[2] He adds the word "obscene" for good measure: "obscene because of the kind of disrespect for the dead that it has. The *terrible* disrespect for the dead." With such unyielding reticence on the part of those close to Wittgenstein, one can only wonder what sort of candor we may expect from the promised Wittgenstein biography now in the hands of Bryan McGuiness.

What is apparent here is a category mistake. In *Tom Jones* Fielding says: "A person who prys into the characters of others with no other design but to discover their faults and to publish them to the world deserves the title of a slanderer." I agree. But to use biographical data in the interpretation of ideas is not slander but professional methodology. It is an attempt to make sense out of the texts.

These attempts can never be crowned with absolute certainty. They always imply the canons of mere probability. So when Rudebush and Berg say my "hypothesis about the role of homosexuality in Wittgenstein's life and work is at best contentious," this is obvious. Any "hypothesis" is "contentious," i.e., *disputable*. That is precisely why we call it a hypothesis! And their strategy is to offer an alternative hypothesis, also "contentious" and disputable. In fact, after due consideration, I find it less plausible and less credible than my own. To say why this is so requires a little intellectual auto-

1. Paul Engelmann, *Letters from Ludwig Wittgenstein* (Oxford, 1967), p. xiv.
2. "Wittgenstein," *The Human World*, No. 14 (February 1974), p. 71.

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biography. It involves knowing how I came to my hypothesis in the first place.

C.S. Pierce would have understood it.[3] It started with the irritation of doubt, with the uneasy conviction that something was radically wrong with what Wittgenstein was saying about ethics both in the *Tractatus* and the later "Lecture on Ethics." Why say (inexplicably) that the sense of the world lies *outside* the world? It seems to me immanent within it. Why find all value *outside* the facts? Value is *implicit in* men's actions and their judgement. In face of the long tradition of moral theory, of Aristotle's *Ethics* and Kant's *Lectures on Ethics*, it is absurd to say that there can be no ethical propositions, that ethics cannot be expressed, that "Ethics is transcendental." (Incidentally, here I entirely agree with Schwarzschild that, not sufficiently knowledgeable of Kant, Wittgenstein has used the wrong word — "transcendental" where he should have said "transcendent." But what a monstrous proposition that ethics is transcendent!) In short, Wittgenstein's mystical deontology is an affront to the naturalistic humanism of Aristotle and Dewey and others in this great tradition. The question continues to bother: how could Wittgenstein have arrived at such a quixotic doctrine? If there are no reasons (and he states no reasons), perhaps there are at least "causes." Something rather different from reasoning and presenting arguments seems to be going on here.

The later "Lecture on Ethics" is no better. Again, we have the reiteration that ethics is "supernatural." This is followed by Wittgenstein's *completely subjective* (pace Rudebush and Berg) definition of "absolute" ethical value. (He refers to "*my* experience par excellence" and continues: "As I have said before this is an entirely personal matter and others would find other examples more striking."[4]) And just here his personal apperceptions of absolute or ethical value are idiosyncratic and mystifying in the extreme. What is ethical about "wonder at the existence of the world?" How except in paranoid consciousness could the feeling of absolute safety be identified with the highest value? And why should guilt (which implies transgression) rather than obligation (which is the more neutral idea of duty) be the essence of the ethical? The context in which these attributions are made shows throughout Wittgenstein to be obsessed with "the great and elaborate allegory" of religion. Why this trans-natural reliance on one whose presuppositions are from those of orthodox religion? There is an extremity of feeling here which is less explanatory than itself in need of explanation. Let us call this Enigma 1.

I was uneasy with the moral stance of the *Tractatus* when I first read it carefully in 1937 and this uneasiness and puzzlement was only extended when I came across the "Lecture on Ethics" upon its publication in 1965. Two years later the *Letters from Ludwig Wittgenstein to Paul Engelmann* appeared, the first intimate glimpse of this elusive man, and one pondered what it revealed with growing excitement. From 1917 through 1925 runs one long dirge of self-accusation and guilt. He speaks of himself as "*schlecht,*" as a "*Schweinehund.*" He is even more explicit about his "*Unanständigkeit.*" To call oneself "bad" or "a swine" can have a generalized reference, but "*Unanständigkeit*" (indecency) has the same sexual connotation in German which it has in English. He obviously did not feel himself to be normal. "*Die normalen Menschen sind mir eine Wohltat, und eine Qual zugleich,*" he said.[5] "Normal human beings are a balm to me, and a torment at the same time." The entire collection seems haunted by the consciousness of sexual guilt and transgression. Why? Let us call this Enigma 2.

3. *Popular Science Monthly* (1877).
4. *Philosophical Review* (January 1965), p. 8.
5. Engelmann, *op.cit.*, p. 20.

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The last letter in the Engelmann series is anomolous, apart from the rest. it is dated 1937 — twelve years after the last letter in the 1916-1925 continuum. It comes from Cambridge and it speaks of the "confession" which Wittgenstein seems to have sent to Engelmann. What did this confession contain? Perhaps it would reveal something important about the sources of Wittgenstein's sexual guilt. Not knowing that the solution to the puzzle of "the confession" was already in the public domain, as late as October 1977 I wrote to Profession G.H. von Wright about the content of this confession. He was not able to enlighten me. "I have not seen Wittgenstein's confession," he wrote, "and I do not think that the written document has been preserved. I have heard about it from G.E. Moore and A. Sjögren, but I know no details of its contents." The solution to this mystery had already been published in *Encounter* in August, 1973, although I only came across it five years later. It occurs in "Wittgenstein: A Personal Memoir" by Fania Pascal, the woman who taught Russian to Wittgenstein and his young friend Francis Skinner in Cambridge, and who seems to have seen him quite often there between 1933 and 1941. The confession, it seems, made both to G.E. Moore and to Mrs. Pascal was of two "crimes" which Wittgenstein admitted. The first had to do with his being Jewish in origin, but being reluctant to admit it in England during the Hitler time; the second was a wrong he committed when he was a teacher in a village school in Austria where Wittgenstein taught between 1920 and 1926 — when he hit a little girl in his class and hurt her, although when she ran to the principal to complain, Wittgenstein denied that he had done it.

In 1973 appeared Bartley's book *Wittgenstein*, controversial, paradoxical, problematic. Its claimed access to Wittgenstein's dreams is highly questionable, and there are other matters of evidence cited by Bartley which seem flimsy and unconvincing, but here for the first time Wittgenstein's homosexuality was asserted and openly dealt with. That was both useful and suggestive, for it provided a needed clue to Enigma 2. It suggested that the anguish so clearly expressed in the letters to Engelmann was that of a guilty homosexual and thus is enabled a reconsideration of the last few pages of the *Tractatus* and of the "Lecture on Ethics" as the expression not of moral rationality but of unconscious guilt. Thus, Wittgenstein's ethics (and philosophy of religion), philosophically unconvincing, could at least be reasonably accounted for. Peirce's (and my) "irritation of doubt" could be resolved. Wittgenstein's ethics and philosophy of religion — so paradoxical, so unsatisfying, so deeply unconvincing — could now at least be *explained*. Can the history of ideas pretend to do more?

The logical structure of "The Biographical Sources of Wittgenstein's Ethics" is thus at least clear. Bartley's assertion of Wittgenstein's homosexuality provides an interpretation of *The Letters to Engelmann* for it resolves Wittgenstein's self-castigation and self-loathing into the consequences of *guilty* homosexuality. And this perception of Wittgenstein's extreme guilt feelings in turn explains his "transcendental" ethics as the unconscious attempt to outflank the moral condemnation of his fellow men, and the awe, guilt and deification of safety of the "Lecture on Ethics" as a consequence of his own dangerous moral dilemma. This logic must be stressed, for it constitutes the a priori in terms of which I evaluate the success of both Rudebush and Berg, and Schwarzschild as they criticize my work. Enigma 1 and Enigma 2 are the heart of the matter, and the question is: have Rudebush and Berg first and Schwarzschild second provided better resolutions to these enigmas than I myself managed to do? Let me turn briefly to the paper of Rudebush and Berg.

Enigma 2: Rudebush and Berg differ completely from me in their interpretation of Wittgenstein's letters to Engelmann. "We propose," they say, "that the expressions of

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guilt and despair are better explained by Wittgenstein's existential project of working out his ideas and getting them understood" and "one can see what caused Wittgenstein's despair and guilt during this period: the failure to make his work understood, and a corresponding sense of alienation or lack of faith about the worth of his existence."

This alternative reading is prima facie far-fetched and unconvincing. One might be in *despair* over one's failure to be understood; one could hardly feel *guilty* about it. The very language of the letters to Engelmann will not bear this extra burden. Imagine a man saying: I am having great trouble getting the *Tractatus* published. Neither Russell nor Frege really understands what I am trying to say. How bad I am! How rotten! What a swine! I can hardly live with my indecency!" The attempt to marry such a sentiment with such language is simply ludicrous.

I will not comment on Rudebush's and Berg's reading of these letters in detail. The single case of Number 26 can stand for all. Rudebush and Berg want to say that the first part of this letter is logically related to the last part, that *because* Wittgenstein could not find a German publisher for the *Tractatus, therefore* his relations with his fellow men had become all wrong. But anyone reading this letter and understanding how letters generally include separate and unrelated elements will see at once, I think, that the two parts of this letter which Rudebush and Berg take to be *causally* related, are, in fact, only related *casually*.

In concluding this section of their paper Rudebush and Berg present what they take to be the clinching argument that Wittgenstein was not tormented by his homosexuality. They quote Drury, "a friend of Wittgenstein's for twenty years and a consulting psychiatrist": "On one occasion he insisted I should read a document in which he mentioned in detail those matters in his past life in which he was most ashamed. I can therefore state, from Wittgenstein's own testimony, that Mr. Bartley is in error when he supposes that Wittgenstein was at any time 'tormented by homosexual behavior'."

But what a wild non-sequitur of Drury's! Because one confesses to X and X has been the case does not mean that because one did not confess to Y, Y is not the case. (In formal logic this would be called the simple formal fallacy of denying the antecedent: if X implies Y, it does *not* follow that Not-X implies Not-Y.) Any defense attorney who argued, "Since my client has confessed to committing robbery but not murder, it is obvious that he did not commit murder," would be laughed out of the courtroom. The document to which Drury refers is undoubtedly the same one which Wittgenstein sent to Engelmann — the "confession" which he also found compelled to make to G.E. Moore and Fania Pascal. As we have seen, it concerned his reluctance to admit his Jewishness and his striking of a little girl in his elementary class in Trattenbach. This, though painful and discreditable, was still not too painful to confess. But Wittgenstein's guilty homosexuality was not an external act; it was, as he thought, a deformation at the very core of his being. It *was* too painful to confess. What he confessed with such stubbornness only concealed what was for him truly beyond confession. One must remember that concealment was very close to the root of Wittgenstein's personality. Fania Pascal tells us something significant in this respect:[6] "I remember him picking up the volume of Grimm's tales and reading out with awe in his voice: *'Ach, wie gut dass niemand weiss Dass ich Rumpelstilzchen heiss.* Profound, profound,' he said. I liked Rumpelstilzchen, understood that the strength of the dwarf lay in his name being unknown to humans; but was unable to share Wittgenstein's vision."

6. *Encounter* (August 1975), p. 26.

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In the third section of their paper Rudebush and Berg question my transformation of Wittgenstein's "wonder at the existence of the world" into "horror" and my connection of it with the "not being able to get over a particular fact" (i.e., his own homosexuality) stated in the *Letters to Engelmann*. It may be misguided. But I am led here by analogy with a common experience of those newly conscious that they are dying or have been condemned to death by a mortal disease. Physicians and psychologists report that their first response is often a kind of wondering non-acceptance: "Why me?" which from "not being able to get over a particular fact" is soon transformed into a kind of "horror."

Much less defensible is their identification of Wittgenstein's "existential" crisis with the philosophy of Sartre. Of all existentialists, Sartre is the worst possible choice. Not only is he never referred to by Wittgenstein, but his existentialism is atheistic, cynical, without faith — the very last human qualities with which Wittgenstein would wish to identify. Also the philosophical link with existentialism ("We agree that it might be useful to study connections between Wittgenstein and existential philosophy") seems to me only tenable at a very superficial level. It is perhaps more psychologically than philosophically valid. Existentialism does stress the more extreme human situations and the more violent human emotions — dread, despair, self-contempt, guilt, bad conscience, anxiety, disgust, confrontation with nothingness, terror at the other's "look." Wittgenstein certainly experienced deeply some of these emotions, but they were for him less philosophical concepts that neurotic symptoms! We must not forget von Wright's statement:[7] "It is probably true that he lived on the border of mental illness." No, the existentialism to which Wittgenstein found himself drawn, those men whose works he mentions and in whom he found some human resonance, were Augustine, Kierkegaard and Tolstoy, not Heidegger and Sartre. I think it is much to the point that over and over again in the works of each one of these is the expression of a sinful or a guilty sexuality.

The fourth section of Rudebush's and Berg's piece is philosophically crucial. Unfortunately, it calls into question both the relation between Wittgenstein's earlier and his later work (the *Tractatus* and the *Philosophical Investigations*) and his whole theory of "the mystical" under which Wittgenstein's ethics can be subsumed. These issues are so large that I cannot possibly deal with them here except perhaps to repair a confusion or two.

Rudebush and Berg say: "A mistake that underlies Levi's account is his belief that Wittgenstein's theory of meaning has nothing to do with his ethics. This belief includes the view that there is a sharp disjunction between Wittgenstein's early and later views on logic and language...However, this view has been shown to be a misunderstanding." I nowhere say that Wittgenstein's theory of meaning has nothing to do with his ethics. But their relationship or possible relationship was not my theme. I have been concerned to examine the relation between Wittgenstein's sexual identity and his ethics and philosophy of religion because I could see an important bearing of the one upon the other. I have not claimed to find a similar relationship between his sexual identity and his theories of logic and language. (George Steiner in a passage which I quoted has indeed said that Wittgenstein's "personal temperament may indeed be relevant to his philosophy and especially to his treatment of human speech," but my own investigations have not taken this path.)

On the other hand, the claim of Rudebush and Berg that in my view "there is a

7. G.H. von Wright, "A Biographical Sketch," in Norman Malcolm, *Ludwig Wittgenstein: A Memoir* (London: Oxford University Press, 1962), p. 3.

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sharp disjunction between Wittgenstein's early and later views on logic and language is completely false. Precisely the opposite is true! In the well-known article, "Wittgenstein as Dialectician,"[8] written fifteen years ago, I expressly said about this seeming incongruity: "And yet this curious discrepancy in the work, this disjunctive strangeness between the *Tractatus* and the *Philosophical Investigations*, loses its point when we add to the picture the intermediate evidences of the *Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics*. For a close reading of this will show, I think, that the development of Wittgenstein's philosophy is closer to the paradigm of Russell than of Carnap (represents more, that is, a continuity than a disjunction); and that what we have here is an inherently dialectical mentality, momentarily stunned by the systematic vision with which for three decades *Principia Mathematica* had dazzled the European mind, until, rudely jarred awake again by the monstrous but cogent representations of Gödel, it could resume the dialectic that had always been the deepest direction of its spirit." When I said of Wittgenstein in the *Telos* article, "His logic of language could be as shifting as the winds of his philosophical perspective...," I was referring to precisely this point: that despite the dialectical bent which is the essential Wittgenstein, the *Tractatus* is under the logistic spell of Russell and Whitehead, thought subsequently weakened by Gödel's attack and completely repudiated by the time of the *Philosophical Investigations*.

Rudebush's and Berg's attempt to domesticate Wittgenstein's two-world ethics is heroic, but it will not wash. The statements, "There can be no ethical propositions" and "Ethics is transcendental" or "Ethics cannot be expressed" are too explicitly worded, too bold in their connotation to be faded out into a doctrine of moral immanence. Wittgenstein's created gap between "saying" and "showing" is too absolute to be resolved. But in fact this denial of substantive rationality in ethics is a fatal Achilles heel of Wittgenstein's ethical perception. Perhaps at this point alone one would appeal to G.E. Moore's plain doctrine of common sense. Of course there is *both* "showing" and "saying" in ethics. More simple-minded men call it the distinction between precept and example, and it is clear that ethics may be taught by either separately or by both together.

It is precisely Wittgenstein's over-sharp distinction between showing and telling which leads us astray — his insistence upon the moral either-or rather than the both-and. It is the same for aesthetics. The poet "tells" the landscape (states or evokes it propositionally in "colorful" words). The painter "shows" it by revealing it iconically as real color, as paint. Wordsworth tells. Constable shows. But they are deeply reciprocal activities and there is nothing to prevent one (like a Michelangelo, a Blake or an E.E. Cummings) from being both poet and painter at once. Here, ethics is like nature. There are moral acts and there are moral propositions about acts, just as there are moral particulars and moral universals, morally connotative verbal expressions and morally denotative actions. Ethics, therefore, can be *both* said and shown as any great moral figure like Socrates or Jesus has made abundantly clear. Wittgenstein's theory is in clear violation of common sense and the crucial question must continue to exercise his interested commentators: *Why*? I have suggested only one possibility.

I shall not say much about the brief last section of Rudebush's and Berg's paper which is on Freud; where they raise some question about my methodology and parrot some of Wittgenstein's own rather superficial strictures against Freud. Although my stance is not ideological in the narrow sense, it is true that my argument about Wittgenstein's ethics and philosophy of religion has a Freudian a priori: it takes for

8. *The Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. LXI, No. 4 (February 13, 1964). Reprinted in K.T. Fann, ed., *Ludwig Wittgenstein: The Man and His Philosophy* (Delta Books, 1967).

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granted both the doctrine of the unconscious and the idea that sexual identity has some importance in human life, human action and human belief. This latter notion, we may recall, is also Wittgenstein's. It is not merely Freud but he also who speaks of "some trouble, or with some problem which is a big thing in your life — as sex is, for instance."[9] Taking this idea of Wittgenstein's seriously, I have simply tried to explore its implications for Wittgenstein's own thought: assuming, like Hegel, the farflung interconnectedness of all things, with its consequence that if there is some sexual problem which "is a big thing in your life" it might naturally be expected to have some influence upon the content and the structure of your ideas. More than this I have not assumed.

Of course I believe that Freud is correct about the existence of unconscious motivation, not because, as Wittgenstein rather foolishly says, it has "a peculiar charm" or because it is "hidden, uncanny," but because the evidence which Freud presents of its potent agency in the psychopathology of everyday life, in the production of our dreams and in the formation of neurotic symptoms, seems to me to be overwhelming. If this is "persuasion," it is not the consequence of a bombastic rhetoric but of the presentation of evidence clearly conformable with our deeepest life-experience. In these matters Freud speaks with a richness, a depth and an authority which Wittgenstein completely lacks. So I hope I shall be pardoned if I freely acknowledge that I should be infintely happier with Freud's analysis of Wittgenstein than with Wittgenstein's analysis of Freud.

Schwarzschild's paper, "Wittgenstein as Alienated Jews" can be dealt with much more briefly than can that of Rudebush and Berg. Schwarzschild's paper is rather different, for except for its concluding section which raises important questions about the legitimacy of my methodology in the history of ideas, it constitutes rather an addendum than a critique. Schwarzschild's paper divides itself rather neatly into two equal parts. The first suggests that side by side with Wittgenstein's guilty homosexuality we must deal with his "typically alienated and uncomfortably acculturated Jewishness." At one point he even goes so far as to mention (although not to push) George Steiner's thesis "to the effect that alienated Jewishness is often characteristically expressed in modern literature in the form of homosexuality (e.g. Proust and Kafka)."

To all of this I have no objection. I am sympathetic to Schwarzschild's suggestion and wish him well in the elaboration and completion of the project of demonstration. Let me suggest some of the things which this must entail.

In the first place, in the context of Schwarzschild's usage, both the words "alienation" and "Jewishness" are highly ambiguous terms. Alienation, as I have shown elsewhere [10], is one of the great all-inclusive, global, evaluative concepts of our age, employed both as a measure of personal orientation and social criticism, and any serious employment of it requires a clear-cut definition of the exact sense in which it is being used. Schwarzschild has used the term to bear a considerable burden of his argument, but he has not precisely stated what he means.

"Jewishness" is even more difficult. What exactly is it? Is it something we think we are? Or something others think we are? Something our grandparents were and we have inherited? Is it a racial characteristic, a religious commitment, a social classification, a peculiar mind-slant? Can it be objectively identified? Or must it (as in the notorious cases of Herr Goebbels) always be the consequence of subjective judgement? These are the perennial questions. But they are not trivial. Clear answers must be given before

9. *Lectures and Conversations,* edited by Cyril Barrett (Oxford, 1970), p. 51.

10. See my "Existentialism and the Alienation of Man," in Edward N. Lee and Maurice Mandelbaum, eds., *Phenomenology and Existentialism* (Baltimore, 1967).

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we can in fact determine whether the pregnant phrase "alienated Jewishness" is applicable to Wittgenstein at all.

If the field of Judaic Studies is to be something more than that perpetual night in which all cows are black, the universal "Jewishness" must not only be defined, but its grades and nuances of application must also be clearly set forth. Schwarzschild makes much of the parallel between Wittgenstein and Franz Rosenzweig, but surely the profound "Jewishness" of Rosenzweig is a completely different dish of tea than the almost subliminal "Jewishness" of Wittgenstein. If "being Jewish" is a property anything like "being blue," then surely there must be different grades of Jewishness just as there are different shades of blue. The Jewishness of a Rosenzweig or a Freud is as palpable as the taste of salt on the tongue. The Jewishness of a Bergson or a Proust or a Wittgenstein is as ephemeral as a whiff of saffron from the Bouillabaisse.

The scholarly evidences of Rosenzweig's Jewishness are to be found in the books which he wrote, those of Freud in his Tuesday evenings at B'nai B'rith and the Jewish jokes in *Wit and the Unconscious*, that of Proust perhaps in his portraiture of Bloch and Nissim-Bernard in *A la recherche du temps perdu*. For Wittgenstein we must sift (like the laborious panning for gold) the pages of the *Vermischte Bemerkungen*, ponder the "Confession," meditate upon the correspondence with Engelmann who, by the way, seems to have been Wittgenstein's only Jewish friend. Then we can begin to flesh out Schwarzschild's skeletal remarks.

In concluding in this vein I have only one other question. Let us take the two concepts "guilty homosexual" and "alienated Jew" and ask ourselves: from the point of view of the history of ideas, which has had the more clearly explanatory power? I frankly do not know. I think I see a difference as these things were felt by Wittgenstein. For his Jewishness a subtle uneasiness, a twinge, a twilight touchiness, the faintest flick of nausea. For his homosexuality a blow between the eyes, a life-long anxiety, a searing pain in the psyche. I have tried very tentatively to explore the effect of this guilty homosexuality upon the actual content of Wittgenstein's philosophical ideas — upon his ethics and philosophy of religion. Does the concept of alienated Jewishness have a similar utility? Has it influenced Wittgenstein's philosophy? How?

Of course I do not know if Schwarzschild would want to pursue these investigations, nor, indeed, if he legitimately can if we are to take the last half of his paper at its face value. For it does seem to me that the first half of Schwarzschild's paper and its last half are in serious contradiction with one another. In the first half he seems to want to play the game which I propose, only substituting "alienated Jewishness" for "guilty homosexuality," while in the second half he objects that the game cannot legitimately be played at all! I am genuinely puzzled as to which represents Schwarzschild's deepest conviction. But at any rate, let me proceed to the briefest possible consideration of Schwarzschild's second half claim — briefest possible because the subject is too large for extended treatment here and because I have already dealt with the problem of method in the history of ideas elsewhere.[11]

In a nutshell, Schwarzschild claims that it is not necessary to bring psychological or sociological or historical considerations to bear on the interpretations of a philosopher's work, since the examination of the text, indeed, a "logical" examination of the text alone is all that is required. "Wittgenstein himself," he says, "certainly wanted to convince his students and readers that what he argued was correct 'objectively'." True, but is such a claim justified? I do not think so.

11. Most importantly in *Philosophy as Social Expression* (The University of Chicago Press, 1974), Chapter I: "Method in the History of Ideas" and secondarily in "De Interpretatione: Cognition and Context in the History of Ideas," *Critical Inquiry*, Vol. 3, No. 1 (Autumn, 1976).

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Schwarzschild is presenting a completely abstract, a completely utopian picture of how philosophers proceed — as if they were pure reasoning machines and not men of flesh and blood. In fact, many philosophers do not reason, do not present arguments at all — they simply assert. Moreover, when they *do* present arguments, it is often to veil the existence of completely non-rational motivatons at the heart of their philosophy. Not only Freud, but philosophers themselves have been well aware of this fact. David Hume, that master of common sense, asserted that "reason is the slave of the passions." That profound critic F.H. Bradley, a noted metaphysician himself, admitted that "metaphysics is the finding of bad reasons for what we believe upon instinct." One interested in the history of ideas might well be interested in those "passions" which lay at the foundation of Wittgenstein's "reasons," that "instinct" which governed his metaphysical pronouncements. Back of Schwarzschild's strictures lies an unfortunate overestimation of the *exclusively* rational element in philosophic discourse.

In my opinion, Schwarzschild also sets up much too exclusive a choice between the mere "careful and literate" reading of a philosopher's texts, on the one hand, and the careful psychological, sociological and historical examination of his ideas, on the other. Here again we must be governed not by the either-or, but by the both-and. Method in the history of ideas requires that we pay equal heed not to one thing, but to three: (1) the logical content of a philosopher's ideas, (2) to those unique elements contributed by the individual personality, the character and conduct of life of the philosopher and (3) the unique moment in time, the social and historical elements which formed the matrix of the philosophy's appearance. Only so shall we understand for philosophy the human and societal conditions which gave it actuality.

In his final plea, Schwarzschild asks that we "limit ourselves to the logic of the claims made on their evidentiary and pragmatic merits by means of text-immanent analysis." I fail to see why we need to take this vow of intellectual poverty. His final words are: "We reach the text not from the context, but the context from the text." Again, the exclusive distinction is spurious. The movement between them is inclusive, reciprocal and unending. Sometimes we read the context from the text and sometimes we read the text from the context. All that the history of ideas asserts is that text and context are bound together in one seamless web.

THE ACADEMY AND ITS DISCONTENTS

by Bernie Fels

For Temma Kaplan

Once upon a time in the 1960's, the universities and academies were denounced by the left as "ivory towers." Today this charge sounds like the utopian proposal it always was. The universities are less retreats for delicate scholars, dreamers and social misfits than motels where the delegates to the conference on self-advancement gather. To denounce the university as an ivory tower converts a feeble myth into a current apology. Schools and departments of business, management, agriculture, engineering, diplomacy and other sub-dependencies leave no doubt. Professional consulting and outside contracts are not foreign additions to pure scholarship but bread and butter. Nor does talk of the university's "ties" to an industrial-military complex grasp the reality. The university is as tied to society as the stomach is to the mouth.

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Before the nexus of cash and power, the humanities do not subsist as parks of disinterested scholarship; nor are the developers and real estate agents only from out of town. To be sure, the fat contracts and outside consulting are less available. Private corporations are not eager to cover the tab for luncheons on Chaucer or Andalusian anarchism. Yet, the same imperatives are at work. If the rewards are smaller, the scramble is just as intense. *Little fish like to eat as much as the big fish. Everywhere the* image, and reality, of the absent-minded scholarly professor is being phased out. The new models are as much at home in the airport as in the library. They examine grant applications as meticulously as old texts; and they research the pecking-order in the department more thoroughly than the disorder in the world.

The modern university bureaucracy gives the lie to Weber's ideas on rationalization. Nothing is rational, not even formally. Personal contacts, implicit agreements, intellectual kick-backs and back-scratching constitute its life and death: hiring and firing, promotion and tenure. The criteria of scholarship, teaching and reputation are preserved as mementoes from an era that took its dishonesty more seriously. As liberal sentiment and the state force its operations public and open, the real processes retreat; the more on the record, the less on it. The clubby intimacy of the old-boy network vaporizes into the telephoning network of calculating professionals. The charades of appointments and tenure lengthen; more jobs are listed, and more candidates considered as decisions shrink to tennis, appearances and mutual favors.

Long ago the principle of capitalism was identified as competition and its negation, monopoly. Enthusiasts of free enterprise want nothing better than to end it by divvying up markets or eliminating competitors. Newspaper reports of the mafia moving into "legitimate" business imply that business is benign, pacifist and competitive while suggesting the truth: legitimacy and illegitimacy are matters of power, not principle. The businessmen are displeased not by the language of territories and turfs, but by the foreign accents and competition. For both gangster businessmen and businessmen gangsters, *competition is an evil.*

The free market of ideas is rent by the same tendencies of competition and monopoly. Academies squeeze into the mall of knowledge and dream of buying the whole shopping center, or at least, bankrupting direct competitors. Intellectual cartels are constructed from wheeling and dealing in acknowledgements, appointments and favors. Everyone is out to give a colleague a bad turn, or a good one, depending on which facilitates more window displays. For those who have already transformed their intellectual push-carts into specialty stores, thought, and even effective teaching, are recognized as dangerous competition. The company union of mediocrity is the only bond between the clerks of knowledge, and provides the insurance to its members that outsiders remain outside.

In the modern academic bureaucracy, the administrator subs for, and sometimes is, the hit-man, and conveys the news about jobs not being renewed, tenure denied, or other-candidates-more-suitable. Power dissipates into inter-office memos and departmental letters. Face-to-face contact is taboo: the slightest gesture might betray that nothing is what it appears. As everything becomes more and more irrational, routinization and internal distances increase. The name of the game is pass the buck. The deception is so thick that the deceivers lie to themselves as well as to others. To figure it out not detectives but psychoanalysts are necessary, and futile.

To the plethora of new journals and fields a sociology of acknowledgements might be added. The guts of the academy spill out at the orifices. The typical academic monograph nowadays sports a fat wad of acknowledgements. Althusser is not required to read what is absent: everything is included. The acknowledgements are a short

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guide to foundations and favors rendered and anticipated. Not only Mom and Dad, the U.S. government and the Rockefellers are thanked for their beneficience, but all potential allies are named. It is not so much as the fishing is poor, but the competition is keener. The nets grow gargantuan. Anyone named might return the favor, second the promotion or approve the grant. In the fight for recognition nothing goes unrecognized. The multiplication of thanks tightens the web of security. Protection is purchased by appreciations, and footnotes of gratitude. Thought erodes to mutual congratulation. Criticism is reserved for select outsiders.

Reputation is the coin of advancement. Decades of propaganda, advertising and public relations have taken their toll. The validity of reputation was always open to manipulation; today it is closed to anything else. The scholar who forgets to cultivate his or her image will end by busing dishes. Endless sociological studies of the academy confirm the tautological nature of reputation. Where everything is skin-deep, mirrors are profound. Reputation is constituted out of reputation; to be reputable means to be cited and mentioned; to be cited and mentioned supposes reputation. Harvard departments regularly score high on academic evaluations measured by citations and grants; this is due to reputation and confirms it. Like advertising, everyone knows it's a fake, and buys the product anyway.

Reputation must be alert to a fundamental fraction of power: between the home department and the larger academic community. The internal dynamics of individual departments and the wider dynamics of reputation are not identical. Officially scholarship, reputation, publications and teaching are the criteria for appointment and advancement. Unofficially who fits in is more important than who stands out. The committees sift through the files with ears cocked as to who is friendly with whom. A national reputation, no matter how fraudulently obtained, counts for little next to the everyday realities of chit-chat and I-owe-yous.

The modern academic who fails to pack two kinds of grease, for internal and external use, will be found on the unemployment lines. The common fluid is the cultivation of contacts. Externally, the fiction of shared political and intellectual commitments, if not the reality, can be maintained. These count for naught in the local department. Neighbors in the hallway are more concerned about threats to their parking spaces than theories of the capitalist state. They value, and reward, reliable and understanding servants of the bureaucracy.

This fracture of power cuts deeply into the living plasma of leftists in the academy. This is rarely discussed; the assumption is that there is nothing to discuss. Leftists, so goes the reasoning, are an embattled minority with little clout in the academy. They are victims but never practitioners of power. Issues may arise when leftists lose jobs, promotions, or tenure. There are cases where reactionaries outnumber the progressives. What is necessary, then, is to express regrets, sign the petition, and wash the car.

Yet the left is not now nor was it ever a hapless victim of larger historical forces; it acts and collaborates as well as resists. Nor is the insignificance of the issue cause for the absence of discussion. It is the reverse: everyone is touched and tainted. No one is pure. Collaboration is the price of survival and success, and leftists are no exception. It is an occupational disease of living in an unfit society. If the fingers start pointing, there is no telling where it may end. Self-interest dictates silence or, at best, guarded whispers. This reasoning, and reality, make for collaboration, breeds it and perpetuates it. The academic left corrodes while awaiting the liberating armies that never come.

The complicity of leftists assumes the same form as in other academics; it respects

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the division of power between the department and the wider academic community. In the larger arena reputation is gained by the appearance, and sometimes the reality, of commitment to international revolution, the proletariat, feminism, and so on. Back from the conference on world revolution, other tactics are required. Brave exponents of revolution shuffle along as servants of departmental power. This is prudent, and clever, and cannot be faulted in principle. Yet it rapidly out-clevers itself and turns vicious. The disguise becomes reality. To secure his or her position, the left academic metes out the blows. The alibi of a nasty world has always made it nastier.

Reasons, public and private, are never lacking to propel left academics into active collaboration. In fact or fear the left is never distant from persecution, or at least unemployment by virtue of politics. The past is too recent, and is still the present. Anxiety yaps at the heels of even the most secure; nor does the struggle for existence end with tenure or air-conditioned offices. Achievement only lengthens the shadows where beyond the cold rays of recognition the fear of abandonment lurks. Those who were once proscribed — leftists, Jews, blacks and others — are haunted by fear of the hunt. When the door swings open for a moment, they rush in, twitching to hide their origins. Plastic surgery will fix what society disfigures; this is the fable that drives society backwards.

Mimicry is the primal form of defense. For butterflies, as well as their collectors, to blend in is not to get caught. For the hunted it includes a haircut and an abridged family name. As wisdom it is instinctual, and as obsolete as the concentration camps of the future. Those who were once exiled, or fear it, elevate mimicry into religion, and become its most devout practitioners, sniffing out sinners. It should be no surprise: if there are anti-Semitic Jews there are anti-left leftists; they recoil before identifying marks. They love leftists — at a distance; and call the police when any get closer.

The anti-left left counsels legitimacy in publications, journals and opinions. Legitimacy means mimicry. Leftists should look like rightists, blacks should pass as white, Jews as non-Jews, and so on. Survival and success are secured by sacrificing identity. The fear of extinction requires extinction. No one should know who you are, not even yourself. In the parade of life the left fools the troops by goose-stepping with them. To confirm its disguise it even ferrets out rebels. Late at night, with shades drawn, power-to-the-people salutes are perfected and checks written to aid the rebels.

No sympathy is forthcoming to those who by design or accident violate the code of legitimacy. Left critics of "blaming the victim" blame the victim. Leftists who stand out invite attention and arrest; and deserve their fate. They transgressed the first commandment of self-annihilation and should be annihalated. The logic ministers the guilt of alerting the sentries; it also has the ethos of success on its side. Since not everyone is incarcerated, those who are evidently failed. Regrettably, what is should be.

To orthodox Marxists, ethics and morality stink of revisionism, reformism, and Kant. Orthodox Marxism, however, stinks of immorality, brutality and Stalin; for this reason the question is worth reopening. There are no islands of purity, but nor is the sea a single hue. The alibi of a ruthless world for ruthlessness serves only up to a point; and the reminder that Engels owned a factory forgets he sustained Marx. Even the most complicit of left academics cannot be charged with criminal offences; stabs-in-the-back evince no blood. Yet courage and integrity cannot be hoarded for the barricades of the future; the arena is the offices and halls of the present. The slightest moves illuminate the whole. Michels suggested that left academics threaten the state only as competitors, but represent nothing else. Leftists who sell out leftists while selling themselves as revolutionaries fool only each other.

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REVIEWS:

Thomas McCarthy. *The Critical Theory of Jürgen Habermas.* Cambridge, Mass., 1979. 445 pages.

McCarthy's *The Critical Theory of Jürgen Habermas* argues that Habermas' "linguistic turn" is no "turn" at all. Rather, it is the gradual evolution of a program to rework the normative and theoretical foundations of critical theory of communicative competence. Now that the contours of Habermas' program over the last twenty years have come into focus, it is more appropriate to speak of a "procedural" rather than a "linguistic" turn, since the theory of communicative competence continues the tradition of proceduralism in ethics and politics first initiated by Thomas Hobbes.

In *Knowledge and Human Interests,* Habermas maintained that the "materialist reappropriation" of Hegel could not regress behind Hegel's critique of modern epistemology.[1] Materialism would further radicalize this critique by exhibiting the ideal of Absolute, or presuppositionless knowing, to be itself an illusion. From Hegel, the insight must be retained that the object as well as the subject of knowledge were formed through the history of the human species. With Kant and Marx, and against Hegel, it must be argued that the otherness of nature could not be eliminated. While the object of human cognition, even if historically and actively constituted, is not independent from the knower, the subject of knowledge is the human species, not a transcendental ego. The concrete interaction of this species with nature always retains the fixed structure of acting upon a material given to it in symbolically mediated, and normatively organized work processes. [2]

McCarthy notes that the project of *Knowledge and Human Interests* is vitiated by the ambiguity of Habermas' concept of the "cognitive-emancipatory interest of self-reflection" (91ff). According to him, within the context of radicalizing the critique of knowledge via the analysis of the tripartite cognitive interests, self-reflection is reflection on the subjective conditions of knowledge, "on the *a priori* constitution of the facts with which the objectifying sciences deal, and on the synthetic achievements of the knowing subject" (94). By establishing the link between the reproductive processes of the species through labor, interaction and the categorical framework of human cognition in the sciences, this radical critique of knowledge aims at freeing the "subject from dependence on hypostatized powers."[3] It criticizes "objectivism," or theory's subservience to a world of facts whose constitution is assumed to be independent of the activity of the knowing subject, by showing that the externality confronted by the human knower has been shaped by the activity of the human species in history. Insofar as philosophy frees itself from ontology and the illusions of pure theory, it shares this interest in emancipation with the materialist theory of knowledge. If philosophy turns "against its own illusions of pure theory the critique it directs at the objectivism of the sciences,"[4] and acknowledges its dependence on human action and experience, it can regain insight into the unity of reflection and the human interest in autonomy and responsibility. Once the illusions of objectivism are destroyed, humans will realize that they must determine their will in accordance with principles they themselves have generated, and whose meaning cannot be gleaned from the facts of the universe.

Critical sciences, like psychoanalysis and the Marxian critique of ideologies, are said

1. Jürgen Habermas, *Knowledge and Human Interest*, trans. by J. Shapiro (Boston, 1971), p. 7ff.
2. *Ibid.*, pp. 25-42.
3. *Ibid.*, p. 310.
4. *Ibid.*, p. 311.

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to share this interest in emancipation. Their goal is also to destroy the subject's subservience to hypostatized powers. The sciences of social action aim at producing knowledge of the law-like invariant regularities of social life. But a critical social science is "concerned with going beyond this goal to determine when theoretical statements grasp invariant regularities of social action as such, and when they express ideologically frozen relations of dependence that can in principle be transformed."[5] The critique of ideology and psychoanalysis distinguishes the invariant regularities of social life and identity formation from contingent relations of dependence and repression. These processes assume an objective power over individuals, only because their genesis, function and development are uncomprehended. By analyzing the formation of seemingly objective processes, psychoanalysis and the critique of ideologies "set off a process of reflection in the consciousness of those whom the laws are about." In the context of the critique of ideologies and psychoanalysis, concludes McCarthy, self-reflection "refers to a dialectic that takes the historical traces of supposed dialogue and reconstructs what has been repressed" (111).

These two concepts of self-reflection are not identical. Habermas failed to differentiate between them, because he claimed that "social theory from the viewpoint of the self-constitution of the species in the medium of social labor and class struggle is only possible as the self-reflection of the knowing subject." But, on the one hand, we are dealing with "philsophical reflection on the general presuppositions and conditions of valid knowledge and action" (94). On the other hand, self-reflection concerns "reflection on a specific formative history of a *particular* (individual or group) subject. Its goal is a restructuring of the subject's own action-orienting self-understanding through liberation from self-deception" (95).

The two senses of "reflection" correspond to the two-fold sense of "critique." As in the case of the "radicalization of the critique of knowledge," critical theory aims at providing general theoretical enlightenment. Its purpose is to analyze the origin, structure and logic of cognitive enterprises in the context of the general life-conditions of the species. In the case of the "critique of ideologies," however, the analysis is guided by an interest in emancipation, distinct from theoretical enlightenment. This emancipatory interest is partisan, and aims at uncovering the structures of power and ideology in society. Theoretical enlightenment discloses the general conditions of speech, action and cognition for the species as a whole, but emancipatory enlightenment addresses the formative process of a specific, historically situated social subject. Self-reflection via theoretical enlightenment may yield an "ethics of responsibility" or a "resumption of the dignity of European man" (Husserl). Self-reflection on the political, economic and cultural formation of a human group aims at disclosing the group's domination, repression and exploitation by another.

This conflation has led Habermas to distinguish subsequently the logic of critique from that of reconstruction. In his later writings, the materialist theory of knowledge takes the form of "reconstructing" the general conditions of action, experience and communication. The theories of communicative competence and of socialization are such reconstructions. They aim at making explicit the implicit presuppositions of action, experience and communication. According to McCarthy, once a categorical distinction is made between "critique" and "reconstruction," the "important question is whether this more differentiated statement still permits Habermas to maintain the relation of reason to emancipation on which he wished to base critical theory" (101). If only the vague promise of theoretical enlightenment results from the self-reflection of reason, then a critical theory aiming at emancipation can no longer justify its own stance

5. *Ibid.*, p. 310.

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on the basis of the immanent link bketween reason and human emancipation. McCarthy hastily adds: "If critique cannot be identified with the rigorous science of society envisaged by Orthodox Marxism, or grounded in the privileged insights of proletarian consciousness, then what is the normative-theoretical grounding of critique?" (107). The conclusion is that the reconstructive sciences of communicative competence, socialization and social evolution now have the task of providing the "legitimizing grounds" (*Rechtsgründe*) of critical theory.

A major failing of McCarthy's treatment of Habermas is his cursory, and at times inadequate, rendition of the history of critical theory.[6] By abstracting Habermas' development from this history. McCarthy provides a rigorous and lucid analysis, but one which ultimately remains confined to the hermetic self-understanding of much academic philosophy. McCarthy presents Habermas' project of grounding critical theory in terms of what can be called the "antinomies of post-Wittgensteinian analytical philosophy." On the one hand, there are the relativistic consequences of Peter Winch and his sympathizers, who argue that "philosophy leaves everything as is," and that neither the social scientist nor the philosopher can transcend the task of comprehending culture and society in their own terms toward a critical perspective (cf. 317ff). On the other hand, there is the epistemological self-righteousness of non-relativists for whom history is but a collection of facts, and who rest content with an ahistorical understanding of theoretical and normative rationality. The middle ground is occupied by those who, like Winch, accept the historicity and relativity of much of human existence, but would like to avoid the standardlessness of mere historicism. McCarthy addresses this last group in order to make plausible Habermas' overall project *to them.*

It is very odd that the task of grounding critical theory is presented in light of the antinomies of the analytical philosophy of our day. In fact, McCarthy introduces the theory of communicative competence "as being a new approach to a familiar task: to articulate and ground an expanded concept of rationality" (272ff). If critical theory needs to be grounded in "an expanded concept of rationality," it will be difficult to see what distinguishes Habermas' project from the attempt of John Rawls, who also bases social and political theory upon an expanded concept of "rational choice." Several writers have mentioned that the "ideal speech situation" bears more conceptual affinity with bourgeois contract methadologies than the Hegelian-Marxist conception of phenomenological critique, or the critique of ideologies."[7]

Yet, nothing would be more erroneous than to assume that the "ideal speech situation" alone is to be the ground norm of critical theory. For it is only theoretical discourse which is guided by the counterfactual norm of the "ideal speech situation." Practical discourse is governed by the equally counterfactual norm of "consensually articulable common needs." Both need to be further distinghished from the principle of "generalizable interests" which grounds Habermas' concept of legitimacy.

The ideal-speech situation is a meta-norm, defining the immanent presuppostions of

6. McCarthy's references to the *Dialectic of Enlightenment* are a case at hand (107). He discusses this text in the context of the development of critique into "negative dialectics." But there is no hint that the authors of the *Dialectic of Enlightenment* had accepted a Heideggerian version of *Verfallsgeschichte*. The concept, the very unit of Western logical thought, became the first instrument of domination by "destroying the fullness of being in making it present to thought" (cf. Michael Theuissen, *Gesellschaft und Geschichte. Zur Kritik der Kritischen Theorie* [Berlin, 1969], p. 18 and also "Introduction" by Adorno to *Zur Metakritik der Erkenntnistheorie*, translation in *Telos* 38 [Winter 1978-79]).

7. Cf. Richard Bernstein, *The Reconstruction of Social and Political Theory* (New York, 1978), and Habermas' reference to Rawls in "Legitimation Problems in the Modern State," in *Communication and the Evolution of Society*, trans. by T. McCarthy (Boston, 1979), p. 205.

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theoretical discourse aiming at the attainment of truth. It serves to distinguish *de facto* consensus from rationally motivated consensus.[8] In the latter case, all the constitutive elements of discourse can be subject to critical examination. A rationally motivated consensus entails freedom from all internal and external constraints except the "force of the argument" itself. The participants must be internally free to consent, as well as not being externally coerced to do so. There must be for all participants a symmetrical distribution of chances to select and to employ speech actions; an equality to assume dialogue roles. The idea of a rationally motivated consensus points to a communication free from distortions. The ideals of autonomy (freedom from external and internal constraints), equality (symmetry to participate in dialogue roles), and justice (recognition among equals of their equal rights to speech acts) are thereby anticipated and counterfactually posited (308-310).[9]

It is clear that a counterfactual norm, formulated under the constraints of discourse, cannot provide a *material* specification for the ideals of freedom, justice and equality. Any meaningful discussion of these ideals would entail references to certain contingent and material aspects of human existence. In fact, Habermas may concede that further material specification of norms would have to be based on the elimination of the constraints of discourse. But whether he intends to derive substantive, material norms from the procedural logic of theoretical discourse itself is an open question.

As becomes clear from McCarthy's analysis, the very meaning of "norm" for Habermas clarifies that the strategy cannot be one of moving from the logic of procedure to deduce material norms entailed by it. Norms, with the validation of which practical discourse is concerned, are defined as "intersubjectively binding reciprocal expectations of behavior which regulate legitimate chances for the satisfaction of needs" (313). Norms are not mere "oughts" or moral injunctions addressed to noumenal selves: they are rules regulating action. They provide individuals with socially sanctioned modes of need satisfaction. Such a mode of need satisfaction claims "legitimacy" for the specific distribution patterns it enjoins.

McCarthy is right in pointing out that this analysis of norms alone should serve to distinguish the principles of communicative ethics from Kantian morality (326ff). Norms are not maxims of choice by which rational selves should regulate their will, but they are rules of embodied patterns of social interaction which define the need satisfaction of individuals. Needs and desires are neither merely subjective, nor are they derived from an eternal repository of fixed human nature. They are socially shaped motivations, dependent on interpretations of what is good, what is possible and what can be attained: "we agree upon interpretations of needs," writes Habermas, "in the light of available information about the scope of what can be made and what can be achieved."[10] The guiding norm for practical discourse is the ideal of "consensual need atrticulation." Although this is a formal account not specifying the material content of needs and avoiding a dogmatic distinction between "true" and "false" needs, for Habermas the very process of institutionalizing consensual need articulation may develop new need interpretations and delegitimize older ones. Such discourse would disclose the ability of dominant legitimation frameworks to accommodate the ideals of the good life.

McCarthy provides a clear understanding of the specific mode of critique resulting from Habermas' theory of communicative competence. A discourse of domination

8. Habermas' discussion of the logic of "discourse" presupposes his consensual theory of truth. Cf. J. Habermas, *Wahrheitstheorien in Wirklichkeit und Reflexion: Festschrift für Walter Schultz* (Pfüllingen, 1973), pp. 211-265.

9. *Ibid.*, p. 239.

10. *Ibid.*, p. 254.

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would not allow the public articulation of the need interpretations of the dominated groups, or would preempt them into already available need interpretations. Ideologies are precisely such discourses which preempt, reinterpret and misarticulate the needs of dominated groups. The aim of critique is to demystify these frameworks of legitimacy which socialize individuals by providing them with value systems and norms through which to articulate needs. They also serve to justify institutional principles which regulate the individuals' access to the material and cultural means of need satisfaction.

Habermas, therefore, distinguished legitimacy from mere *de facto* consensus and the belief in legality. A claim to legitimacy is valid if it can be shown that it is in the public interest. Again, Habermas does not provide a material definition of the "general" or the "public" interest. He makes the counterfactual assumption that, if subject to a rigorous critique, existing systems of legitimacy cannot accommodate the norms of generality of interests.

The normative implications of Habermas' theory of communicative competence should thus be distinguished from like efforts to ground ethics on *a priori* concepts of rationality and meta-ethical procedural constraints. The tradition of modern political philosophy replaced the classical question of "the just and the good life" with the procedural question: under which conditions would individuals, given the material characteristics of human nature, consensually agree to accept a political system as legitimate? From Hobbes to Hegel, modern political philosophers have answered by developing the principles of natural right and the exchange of equivalents in the market place. It was argued that the procedural questions could only be satisfied by the material conditions specified in these two sets of principles. Of course, the derivation of an answer to this procedural question required the introduction of a set of material premises concerning human nature and rationality. The goal of bourgeois political theory has been to minimize these material presuppositions. In older theories of natural right, like those of Hobbes, Locke, Kant Rousseau and Hegel, the framing of the procedural question was preceded by theories of human nature, or moral agency, or the intersubjective structure of objective spirit. The trend in contemporary social and political theory is towards a procedural formalism. The only material presupposition of such formalism would be some minimal definition of "rational agency."[11]

Habermas accepts this procedural turn in social and political theory. However, neither the norms of "consensually articulated needs" nor the "suppressed generalizable interest" are intended to be mere thought-experiments. Discourse is a mode of communication — not a "state of nature" — into which we all step. All human communication takes place against the background of presuppositions whose fragility we only discover in situations of argument, conflict, crisis and personal and collective unhappiness. It would therefore be wrong to assume that discourse takes place only in a rarefied universe. Habermas remains faithful to the Hegelian ideal of not providing "blueprints" for social and political reality in the form of *a priori* normative models.[12]

11. Thus, it is John Rawl's explicit purpose to derive the principles of justice from the terms of an "original condition" among rational agents. These agents are under a "veil of ignorance" concerning their sex, age, race, color, personal status and social privileges. Rationality is defined by the commitment of these agents to choose the most efficient means to given ends, and by their acceptance of Pareto's optimality. The theory of justice answers the procedural question: what principles of material coexistence would such individuals agree to live by? John Rawls, *A Theory of Justice* (Massachusetts, 1971), pp. 19ff; pp. 67ff.

12. G.W.F. Hegel, *The Phenomenology of Mind*, trans. by John Baillie (New York, 1967), pp. 598ff. In his "Offensive Critical Theory: Reply to Honneth" in *Telos* 39 (Spring 1979), p. 69, Schmidt writes that Habermas "has at best provided a communicative reformulation of the 'juridical' component of political freedom (i.e., classical liberal negative freedom)." Schmidt's

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His intention is to radicalize the claims of procedural theories by raising the quesiton of norms which procedural theories claim to have satisfied (formal equality; rule of law; Pareto's optimality). Above all, norms for Habermas are not deductive principles, but rules embodied in the social and historical reality of human interaction.

As Habermas himself points out, however, the matter does not come to a close here: for "every general theory of justice remains peculiarly abstract in relation to the historical forms of legitimation...Is there an alternative to this historical injustice of general theories, on the one hand, and the standardlessness of mere historical understanding, on the other?"[13] To mitigate the historical injustice of theoretical *a priorism*, or the standardlessness of mere historicism is the task of the reconstructive sciences of socialization and social evolution. While the reconstructed theory of historical materialism shows that the modern state's legal-rational apparatus and the principle of democracy institutionalize, at the collective level, the rules of practical procedural discourse, in his theory of socialization, Habermas attempts to reconstruct the development of social identity on the level of universalistic ethical principles. The theory of communicative competence aims at completing the logic of this sequence for the individual and for the species by further radicalizing the bourgeois ideals of equality, justice, freedom and autonomy. But Habermas seems to have replaced the injustice done to history by theories of justice with the equal injustice of logicizing history, or of reducing it to an idealized content. The pitfalls of historicism are replaced by a widened gap between the self-understanding of historical agents and the unconscious logic of their development. According to McCarthy, "as the universalistic elements in the theories of communication and evolution have come to the fore, the situational and practical aspects of social inquiry have declined in systematic importance" (379). If one could suspend the doubt that such reconstruction offers metaphysical guarantees for a process which has no guarantees at all and accept the less problematical claim that they are merely frames of reference for intelligently demarcating the potentials for the future from the constrains of the past and the contradictions of the present, then one must ask whether critical theory can once more bridge the gap between the self-understanding of the present and the insights or illusions of reconstruction.

Although McCarthy is uneasy in viewing the growing distance between the hermeneutic intentions of situated reason and enlightenment through reconstruction, he has not adequately outlined the significance of the theory of communicative competence, either in relation to the past history of critical Marxism or with respect to the future of critical theory. Habermas' theory of communicative competence can also be presented as radicalizing the method of "immanent critique."[14]

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judgement is typical of the kinds of misunderstanding to which Habermas' political philosophy will be prey. The above discussions of need articulation, legitimacy and domination will make sufficiently clear that Habermas is not defending the "juridical" component of negative freedom. Clearly he is more interested in what is usually known as "positive freedom." His theory of communicative competence aims at expanding the sphere of democratic participation and decision making. Both liberals and conservatives would shrink in face of the Rousseauan overtones of the concept of "generalizable interest." The ideals of justice, equality, freedom and autonomy are not the property of theorists of "negative liberty." There was a time when Marxists and working class movements thought them worth fighting for. Cf. C.B. MacPherson's short but highly instructive book, *The Life and Times of Liberal Democracy* (New York, 1977).

13. Habermas, "Legitimation Problems in the Modern State," *op.cit.*, p. 205.

14. A passage in Habermas' essay, "Historical Materialism and the Development of Normative Structures" in *Communication and the Evolution of Society, op.cit.*, p. 96, clarifies the motivations behind Habermas' procedural turn. Though lengthy, the passage is worth quoting in full, since it is one of the clearest statements on the question: "from the beginning there was a lack of clarity concerning the normative foundations of Marxian social theory. This

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In the tradition of classical natural law, as taught by Plato, Aristotle and Aquinas, the fundamental problem of political philosophy is the actualization of a natural principle only possible for man in the human community. They agree that what distinguishes the "good life" from mere life is human excellence. But only within the political community can human excellence be attained. Why men (certainly not women) should abide by that which is highest in them is an ontological question: by nature and its order, everything that is tends to its perfection. Man must make this telos towards actualizing himself an immanent goal by adopting it as a conscious aim. With the rise of modern, non-teleological natural sciences, the ontological basis of former theories of natural law were destroyed. Because of its Hegelian heritage, however, which defended the unity of reason and actuality, Marxism owed more to the ontological tradition of natural law, than to modern natural right theories. While Marxism defended the possible future unity of reason and actuality, the modern tradition sharply distinguished the "is" from the "ought," actuality from reason and social existence from moral norms.

For Marxists, although it "exists" in the bourgeois public sphere, reason is not "actual." The method of immanent critique took the claims of the bourgeois public order to embody rationality and juxtaposed them to their actuality. In Adorno's words, the task of immanent critique is to transform "the concepts which it brings, as it were, from the outside, into what the object, left to itself seeks to be, and confront it with what it is. It must disssolve the rigidity of the temporally and spatially fixed object into a field of tension of the possible and the real."[15] But confronting "the object as it is" with what the object "left to itself seeks to be" presupposes that what is strives towards what ought to be. As Hegel had already discussed in the dialectic of essence and appearance, what is, is not mere illusion [*Schein*], but the appearance [*Erscheinung*] of essence.[16] Appearance discloses and conceals its essence at one and the same time. If it did not conceal essence, it would be mere illusion, and if it did not reveal it, it would not be appearance. Conversely, essence is not a mere beyond. It is embodied in the world through appearance. It is "the as yet non-existent actuality of what is."

Yet, this "declaredly materialistic appropriation of Hegel's *Logic*," which underlies the presuppositions of immanent critique from Marx to Adorno, has a less benign aspect: the as yet non-existent actuality of what is can be interpreted as the unfolding logic of the totality, or as being buried in the inevitable, but immanent, course of history. In the history of 20th century Marxism, this has led to well-known antinomies: the logic of social objectivity as opposed to the present illusory subjectivity of conscious-

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theory was not meant to renew the ontological claims of classical natural law, nor to vindicate the descriptive claims of nomological sciences; it was supposed to be 'critical' social theory but only to the extent that it could avoid the naturalistic fallacies of implicitly evaluative theories. Marx believed he had solved this problem with a *coup de main*; namely with a declaredly materialistic appropriation of Hegelian *Logic*. Of course, he did not have to occupy himself especially with this task; for his practical research purposes he could be content to take it at its word, and criticize immanently the normative content of bourgeois theories of modern natural law and political economy...In the meantime, bourgeois consciousness had become cynical; as the social sciences — especially legal positivism — neoclassical economics and present social theory show, it has been thoroughly emptied of its binding normative content. However, if...the bourgeois ideals have gone into retirement, there are no norms and values to which an immanent critique might appeal with (the expectation of) agreement. On the other hand, the melodies of ethical socialism have been played through with no result."

15. Theodor W. Adorno, "Sociology and Empirical Research," *The Positivist Dispute in German Sociology*, trans. Glyn Adey and David Frisby (New York, 1976), p. 69.

16. G.W.F. Hegel, *Hegel's Science of Logic*, trans. by A.V. Miller (New York, 1969), pp. 394-408; cf. also Habermas' contribution to the discussion between Popper and Adorno, "The Analytic Theory of Science and Dialectics," in *The Positivist Dispute, op.cit.*, pp. 131-162.

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ness. [17] The concept of "imputed class consciousness" was one of the more unfortunate attempts by which to mediate the logic of the social totality with the empirical illusions of proletarian consciousness.

Habermas' goal has been to recover the intersubjectivity of human groups from under the debris of the social totality. If intersubjective recognition could not be reduced to an aspect of laboring activity, then the growing mastery of nature could not be conflated with human emancipation either. With this distinction between labor and interaction, Habermas would discover yet a further presupposition of the method of immanent critique: the normative content of bourgeois theories of natural right from Hobbes to Hegel could not be reduced to the justification of the bourgeois domination of nature. Along with justifying the development of free exchange relations, which subjected neither the object to be exchanged nor the exchangers to any but formal norms — property and personality — the goal of bourgeois theories of natural right was to secure the legitimacy of the modern state. The modern paradigm of legitimacy and the system of contractually regulated exchange relations called the "market" coincide in their requirements. Both presuppose that the public rights of individuals are no longer defined by traditional status groups. The breakdown of the various corporate-communal structures of medieval society, and their subjection to a centralized public authority, privatized social life while emancipating the individual. This new form of public authority abstracts the individual from inequalities of birth, rank, local differences and status privileges. The market mechanism in which all human interactions are subject to the contractual pursuit of private interests also homogenizes and equalizes. The individual is wrenched from tradition and community and thrust into the pursuit of need satisfaction. Thus, in the emergent bourgeois public space, the "rationalization" of social relations meant: the subjection of social relations to formal, equal and uniform strictures of the rule of law, and the recognition of individuals as right-bearing persons free to exchange any and every material object appropriated through proper contractual transactions.

Since Lukács' conflation of the rationalization inherent in exchange relations and in the development of the modern state apparatus with commodification, this normative content of bourgeois law has been misunderstood. Habermas' attempt to rework the normative foundations of Marxism aims at correcting this mistake of the critical tradition: the universalistic content of the bourgeois public sphere cannot be understood via the terms of analysis developed in Lukács' *History and Class Consciousness* alone. For the development of relations of free exchange meant the development of norms of practical rationality as well. The theory of communicative competence is, therefore, an attempt to radicalize the presuppositions of the method of immanent critique which had remained unaware of the precise universalistic content of the norms it juxtaposed to actuality.

Unlike in the emergent public space of early bourgeois society, the unity of reason and actuality is not an immanent claim that late capitalism makes for itself. For "in the meantime, bourgeois consciousness has become cynical." Having replaced the universalistic claim of modern bourgeois natural law with legal positivism, administrative

17. Having inherited too much orthodox Marxist baggage, even Adorno and Horkheimer could not overcome these antinomies. They swing between the logic of the social totality and the demands of an unmediated subjectivity. Despite the studies on *Authority and the Family* they fail to replace their commitment to the logic of the social totality with the less than perfect insight of intermediate human groups. Social subjectivity is never really analyzed as intersubjectivity. Cf. Axel Honneth, "Communication and Reconciliation," *Telos* 39 (Spring 1979), p. 49ff, for a fuller explication of this problem.

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rationality and the ideology of the exchange of equivalents with the technocratic goal of steering the dysfunctions of the market place, the universalistic norms of bourgeois consciousness have receded into the background. Decisionism, voluntarism, and even the Popperian program of "critical rationalism" cannot justify their own commitment to rationality. Immanent critique cannot confront the actuality of the world with its claimed rationality, for there are not substantive norms in the public space of late capitalism, the critique of which would preserve their universalistic content while denouncing their particularistic realization. Neither can critique supply these universal norms in the form of ethical imperatives, for the melodies of ethical socialism have been played through. Habermas concludes: "A philosophical ethics...is possible today only if we can reconstruct general presuppositions of communication and procedures for justifying norms and values." [18] The task of immanent critique then shifts from an analysis of substantive norms to disclosing the presuppositions of procedures for justifying norms. While Habermas' motivations are clear — steering between the metaphysical dogmatism of revived natural law theories (Leo Strauss, Joachim Ritter), the cynicism of bourgeois consciousness and the moral optimism of Kantian socialism — whether the theory of communicative competence can serve as an immanent critique of late capitalism remains to be seen.

The altered character of the relation between state and civil society in late capitalism has been the dominant theme of Habermas' work. During liberal capitalism the institutional framework of society was embedded in the social relations governing the exchange of equivalents and the distribution of goods in the liberal market place. As the state apparatus intervenes to enable the continuing private appropriation of capital by assuming investment responsibilities in areas like housing, transportation, health and education; as the wage-labor-capital relationship loses its "natural" aspect, and is more and more subject to bargaining decisions in which the state plays a crucial role, Habermas argues that relations of production reassume a political character. The legitimation problems of late capitalism derive from having to control the expectations of the masses generated by the repoliticization of the public sphere at a point in which the institutional framework of society — the distribution of wealth, power, status and hierarchy — can no longer appeal to tradition and historical norms to justify itself.

It is not necessary to rehearse the details of Habermas' analysis of the legitimation crisis of advanced industrial democracies in order to observe that the counterfactual norms of "consensually articulated need interpretations" or the "suppressed generalizable interests" aim at furthering the immanent politicization of the public sphere of late capitalism. As McCarthy points out: "Habermas regards the repoliticization of the public sphere as the potentially most crisis-laden tendency in contemporary capitalist society" (385). Yet McCarthy also concludes on the pessimistic note that "...the initial situation of critical theory today is not unlike that in which the earlier members of the Frankfurt School found themselves after the emigration" (386), for there is no identifiable "agent of social transformation" (385) to whom critical theory can be addressed.

This pessimism is unwarranted. Had McCarthy been less insular in his presentation of Habermas' work, he could have viewed it as part of a growing collective effort to analyze the concrete ethical and political meaning of the formula that "socialism is the free association of socialized producers." In this context, two questions suggest themselves. First, could it be that the altered relation between state and civil society under late capitalism is transforming the foundations of the liberal rule of law and the concept of the public in such radical ways that the 18th century Rousseauean overtones of

18. "Historical Materialism and the Development of Normative Structures," in *Communication and the Evolution of Society, op.cit.*, p. 97.

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Habermas' concept of the "general interest" may be at odds with developing realities? Second, could it be that the personality structures of late capitalism, and especially the vicissitudes of the narcissistic personality, make it unlikely that communicative ethics can find emotional resonance today?

If the new corporatism of post-liberal societies, or what Habermas has referred to as the "refeudalization of the public space under late capitalism" is a plausible description of some aspects of the current situation [19], then we must think more concretely as to what "generalizable interests" would mean in institutional terms. Is Habermas' aim to revive the ideals of Kant's "republican constitution"? Kant envisaged an impersonal legal order and a constitutional government organized around the principles of the division of powers, presiding over a social order on the verge of its transition to an industrial, bourgeois society. The republican constitution regulated the social life of an ancien regime in which status groups still held public rights. Is there a sense in which the public order of late capitalism resembles more the aura of the ancient regime whose status groups have not yet become the social classes of capitalist society than the aura of the liberal market place regulated by anonymous rules of the exchange of equivalents?

Or, as the conservatives might argue, is the concept of "generalizable interests" a throwback to the ideals of Jacobinian democracy? An influential tradition of conservative thinkers from Jacob Talmon to Michael Oakeshott would argue that any attempt to concretize this ideal would lead to the authoritarian rule of one social group over another.[20] The myth of the "general interest," they claim, is best replaced either by the meticulous checks and balances of the separation of powers or by the invisible, but effective, wisdom of the spontaneous and non-centralized life of various social bodies.

Finally, what is likely to be the appeal of communicative ethics today? As Habermas discusses the decline of the bourgeois ideals of familial, vocational and civil privatism under late capitalism, critics like Christopher Lasch and Richard Sennet bemoan the rise of the "narcissistic personality" or the "fall of public man."[21] Despite the significant divergence between their analyses, both point to a psychic balance which has been dis-

19. In *Law and Modern Society* (London, 1976), Roberto Unger presents a thesis remarkably close to Habermas' analysis of capitalism. Post-liberal societies, according to Unger, are characterized by two phenomena which distinguish them from the liberal societies of the past faithful to the impersonal rule of law. In Western capitalist welfare democracies one observes a gradual approximation of state and civil society, and the emergence of a body of public law more corporatist than formal and impersonal in character. As the state reaches into society, and as the line between the public and the private spheres becomes blurred, society itself "generates institutions that rival the state in its power." These institutions take on many attributes formerly associated with the prerogatives of public bodies. As government assumes managerial responsibilities, it is forced to work in areas in which the complexity and multiplicity of factors that require decisions result in a new body of public law. The consequence is that administrative, corporate and labor law merge into a body of public legislation, compounded of state-authored rules, as well as privately sponsored regulations and practices. These two elements become inseparable. Unger concludes that this blurring of the line between public and private bodies, or the socialization of the state and the étatization of society, creates an order which bears more resemblance to corporatist social formations — be they feudal or fascist — than to the liberal ones of the past. The increased demands for corporatism, he points out, are "often associated with demands for the change of public and private organizations into democratic communities." While the right expresses its communitarian ideals by attacking "big government," the left urges a "reformist politics of participation." But in its left or right variants, these aspirations indicate that the impersonal, bourgeois public order is waning.

20. Cf. Jacob Talmon, *The Origins of Totalitarian Democracy* (New York, 1960); Michael Oakeshott, *Rationalism in Politics and Other Essays* (New York, 1960).

21. Richard Sennett, *The Fall of Public Man* (New York, 1977); Christopher Lasch, *The Culture of Narcissism* (New York, 1978), and Lasch, *Haven in a Heartless World* (New York, 1975).

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rupted: the precarious tension and antagonism, but also complementarity, between the public and the private, the political and the personal, seems to be disappearing. For Sennet the public has become privatized: public interaction has been transformed into psychic encounter, and conversation has become confusion. While it is not quite clear from Sennett's account how this privatization of the public has come about, Lasch argues that it is the overextension of the public represented by the commodity market and the army of experts bent on the further commodification of the private sphere which has destroyed private life and rendered it meaningless. The commodification of socialization in the family has destroyed the ego autonomy of the bourgeois individuals, rendering them into vulnerable, self-centered and dependent creatures. The narcissistic personality is a depoliticized individual consumed by anxiety and the fear of psychic and bodily well-being. Bent on private gratification and asssurance, they treat the public world with cynicism. For these individuals, "private vices" are much more important than "public virtues."

Habermas acknowledges that late capitalism may mean the end of "the European ideals of the dignity of man" — a reference to the disappearance of the autonomous personality type — but the plausibility of the logical developmental sequences offered by Piaget and Kohlberg has to be measured against this more powerful empirical evidence.

It would be an error to interpret Habermas' later work as reviving the melodies of ethical socialism, or to conflate it with the grandiose self-deceptions of theories of justice that claim to speak from "the standpoint of eternity." In closing McCarthy's book, one is reminded of a twist on the Gramscian formula: Habermas emerges not as a "pessimist of the intellect and optimist of the will," but "as an optimist of the intellect and pessimist of the will." To dissipate this tendency — undoubtedly powerful in Habermas' own work it is once again necessary to situate the theory of communicative competence in the self-understanding of the present. The road from reconstruction to situated critique is not blocked. By giving us an excellent analysis of the journey from situated reason to communicative competence, McCarthy has greatly facilitated our understanding of the snags that lie on the way back.

Seyla Ben Habib

Christopher Lasch. *The Culture of Narcissism: American Life in an Age of Diminishing Expectations.* New York: Norton, 1978.

Several times in the course of *The Culture of Narcissism* Christopher Lasch refers to Joseph Heller's novel *Something Happened.* There are few works of fiction that criticize the quality of American life in such a sustained manner. On page after page, we are given an endless array of forms of self-deception as well as treachery with others in the context of deteriorating conditions in the family and at work, especially inside the world of the corporation. *Something Happened* reflects Lasch's own concern with the malaise of contemporary America which is caught in the throes of economic crisis, political bankruptcy, intellectual torpor and social dislocation. His argument rests on his conviction that our way of life "is dying — the culture of competitive individualism, which in its decadence has carried the logic of individualism to the extreme of a war of all against all, the pursuit of happiness to the dead end of a narcissistic preoccupation with the self." In contrast to the American Adam of the 19th century, the rugged individualist who sought to shape the world through active engagement, the narcissist of the 20th

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century reveals his individuality in various forms of self-absorption and uses the world as a mirror.

Lasch is not alone in his beliefs. In recent years there have been several books and articles dealing with the social and political implications of narcissism in contemporary America.[1] *The Culture of Narcissism* is in part an attempt to integrate these studies into still another perspective by drawing upon the tradition of Marx and Freud. Lasch states that "the psychological patterns associated with pathological narcissism, which in less exaggerated form manifest themselves in so many patterns of American culture — in the fascination with fame and celebrity, the fear of competition, the inability to suspend disbelief, the shallowness and transitory quality of personal relations, the horror of death — originate in the peculiar structure of the American family, which in turn originates in changing modes of production" (p. 176).

Central to his argument is Lasch's reliance upon clinical formulations of narcissism drawn from a relatively orthodox Freudian perspective. No longer do clinicians find the obsessive or hysterical personality traits so characteristic of an earlier stage of the capitalistic order based upon work and the concomitant repression of sexuality. Rather today, in an era of consumption which depends heavily upon the demand for immediate gratification in an atmosphere of "restless, perpetually unsatisfied desire" (p. xvi), people complain of pervasive feelings of emptiness and lack of self-esteem.

This condition, Lasch states, can best be understood through reference to psychoanalytic theory, especially the work of Melanie Klein.[2] Klein believes that the child's inability to accept its feelings of rage, directed primarily toward the mother in the process of separation, can result in compensatory idealization which makes it impossible for him or her to view either parent realistically. The child searches to "reestablish earlier relationships by creating in his fantasies an omnipotent mother or father who merges with images of his own self" (p. 36). The initial rage the child feels toward the mother is projected on her, then internalized as an archaic image of a ravenous monster. Fearful of the mother now, the child idealizes her (and possibly the father as well) in the hope of being rescued. These internalized images can easily become self-images unless the process is eased with the child's growing awareness of reality, particularly of the mother's fallibility, the child's idealization of her should diminish and come "to be associated not with fantasies of infantile omnipotence, but with the ego's modest, growing mastery of its environment" (p. 171). Failing this, the positive images which have been internalized "fuse to form a defense against the bad representation of the self and of objects, similarly fused in the form of a harsh, punishing superego" (pp. 38-39). The child is then left with "a blind optimism," consisting as one grows older of fantasies of "wealth, beauty and omnipotence," together with the internalized images of the good parents, all of which gives rise to what Otto Kernberg calls "a grandiose conception of the self" (p. 39).[3] The individual constantly tries "to recreate in his unconscious fantasies the omniscience of early infancy and seeks to shore up his self-esteem by attaching himself to strong admired figures" (p. 171) or by finding an admiring audience.[4] Though he relies quite

1. Richard Sennett, *The Fall of Public Man* (New York, 1977); Edwin Schurr, *The Awareness Trap: Self-Absorption Instead of Social Change* (New York, 1976); Jim Hougan, *Decadence: Radical Nostalgia, Narcissism and Decline in the Seventies* (New York, 1975); Tom Wolfe, "The 'Me' Decade and the Third Great Awakening," *New York* (August 23, 1976), pp. 26-40; Peter Marin, "The New Narcissism," *Harper's* (October, 1975), pp. 45-50, 55-56.

2. See especially "The Oedipus Complex in the Light of Early Anxieties," (1945) in her *Contributions to Psychoanalysis* (New York, 1964), pp. 339-367.

3. *Borderline Conditions and Pathological Narcissism* (New York, 1975), p. 282. Here Lasch quotes Kernberg.

4. Here Lasch utilizes the work of Heinz Kohut, especially *The Analysis of the Self: A*

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heavily upon a clinical psychoanalytic formulation of narcissism, Lasch only hastily sketches the involved process by which all of this comes about.

Lasch presents much more elaborately the public manifestations of this problem. Narcissism, he states, is the psychological dimension of the individual's dependence upon the state, the corporation and other bureaucracies. Rarely encouraged to be self-sufficient, the individual is asked to rely upon a set of professional experts, who provide certified answers for every aspect of life, a process which unwittingly duplicates the conditions of infancy in which we are all helpless, dependent upon the responsiveness of the adult world.

In his chapter on "The Socialization of Reproduction," Lasch details the way professionals have taken over even the care and nurturance of children, once largely the province of the family.[5] Since the latter part of the 19th century, Americans have been repeatedly subjected to the view that outside agencies are indispensable in providing a sound set of principles to raise the young. In the 20th century this perspective has been codified: first by Behaviorists who advocated strict training, and then by Freudians who reacted by advancing ideas of permissiveness.[6] A counterreaction followed in an insistence that parents should respond to their own needs as well as to the child's, so that today we have a "new dogma," "the dogma of authenticity" (p. 164), revealed in such doctrines as "parent effectiveness training" which teaches the need to explore and express feelings. Lasch is less concerned with the validity of any of these views of child rearing than he is with the growing dependency of parents upon a set of formulae advanced by professionals.

Alert to the ways in which "this transfer of functions" mirrors the takeover of the workers' technical knowledge by modern management, itself a reflection of the larger shift within capitalism from handicraft to factory modes of production, Lasch describes the psychological repercussions of this process which contribute to the clinical picture of narcissism.

Parents, he says, have abdicated their authority, thereby making it difficult for children to identify with them. The father, in particular, is rarely available, since he is drawn to the work place, unlike his forebears who were rooted in the home. And when he is present, the father is reluctant, along with the mother, to exert authority. These conditions make it difficult, according to Lasch, for the superego to develop. He states that "the parents' failure to serve as models of disciplined self-restraint or to restrain the child does not mean that the child grows up without a superego. On the contrary, it encourages the development of a harsh and punitive superego based largely on archaic images of the parents, fused with grandiose self-images" (p. 178).

Moreover, virtually forced to raise the child alone, the mother often "attempts to become an ideal parent" (p. 173). Encouraged to rely upon instructions from without, she is driven to "perform" well with her offspring whose needs go unmet. Unfortunately, quite often this situation can become so painful for the child that he "refuses to acknowledge" the "disjunction" between "his mother's shallow, perfunctory care and her apparently undivided devotion" (p. 171); and the compensatory, idealized version of his mother, nourished by her suffocating ministrations, lives on in his unconscious untested by experience. The clinical picture which results, so characteristic of many

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Systematic Approach to the Psychoanalytic Treatment of Narcissistic Personality Disorders (New York: International Universities Press, 1971).

5. This argument is discussed more fully in Lasch's previous book, *Haven in a Heartless World: The Family Besieged* (New York, 1977).

6. Because of his opposition to permissiveness, Lasch calls the work of these Freudians 'debased versions" (p. 162) of psychoanalytic theory.

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descriptions of schizophrenia, is also apparent in milder form in narcissistic disorders where "regressive defenses, 'loss of the boundaries of the self,' delusions of omnipotence, and magical thinking appear" (p. 171).

This process is only intensified when the family tries to throw up a "charade of togetherness," an unfortunate response to the menacing world of work and politics. For the patterns described above are reinforced outside the home "not only through 'indulgent education' and general permissiveness but through advertising, demand creation, and the mass culture of hedonism" (p. 180). Just as in the family, where parents conceal their authority in a permissive atmosphere, in school and at work outside agencies rarely force strict compliance but cajole subordination by creating a "friendly, relaxed" climate in which everyone is encouraged to speak. According to Lasch, current attempts to humanize the work place are simply "therapeutic forms of social control" (p. 185) because authority is still delegated in a hierarchical manner. Ultimately authority loses any rational basis since individuals have difficulty locating the real source of power. Most people then subscribe to a distorted vision, "a grandiose idea of the opportunities open to all, together with an inflated opinion of their own capacities" (p. 186).

Lasch shows how this preoccupation with oneself as opposed to a concern with the social order is especially revealed in the changing nature of work, a transformation which is the result of the shifting emphasis from production to consumption under capitalism. He states quite bluntly that today "the happy hooker stands in place of Horatio Alger as the prototype of personal success" (p. 53). Self-preservation, sometimes disguised as hedonism, has become the goal of existence.

While the Puritan of the 16th and 17th centuries stressed the importance of socially useful work in his service to God, the Yankee of the 18th century turned to a secularized version of the Protestant Ethic in his notion of self-improvement. Yet if the importance of God began to wane, self-improvement meant more than moneymaking, which came to characterize the "cult of compulsive industry" in the 19th century and the promotion of the self through "winning images" in recent decades. More and more, personal achievement became less important than the way people projected themselves. A pleasing exterior, one that was likely to capture public attention and approval, was sought for, as the art of public relations became elevated in importance. Living in a highly competitive atmosphere, people came to be motivated by the desire to excite admiration and envy and not by the desire to produce something significant. In the 70's, Lasch suggests, still another transformation may be under way. For the desire to be "well liked" has given rise to a more ambiguous stance, exemplified by the prostitute who "craves admiration but scorns those who provide it and thus derives little gratification from her social successes" (p. 64). While the "ethic of achievement" has been replaced by the "ethic of pleasure," the career of the prostitute "more than any other reminds us that contemporary hedonism, of which she is the supreme symbol, originates not in the pursuit of pleasure but in a war of all against all, in which even the most intimate encounters become a form of mutual exploitation" (p. 65).

Today both private and public worlds, personal life as well as relations at work, are characterized by "the search for competitive advantage through emotional manipulation" (p. 65). The possibility for a genuine personal relationship is diminished since we carry with us "a sense of the self as a performer under the constant scrutiny of friends and strangers" (p. 90). A "protective shallowness" is cultivated, a "cynical detachment," designed to "manipulate the emotions of others" (p. 94) while protecting oneself from emotional injury.

According to Lasch, the current vogue of intimacy is merely a compensatory

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maneuver that conceals the desperation of ever finding it. Both the absence of meaningful work and the loss of a sense of community encourage people to turn to "relationships" as the primary, if not sole, means of satisfaction. In fact, men and women "demand from personal relations the richness and intensity of a religious experience" (p. 194). And yet the sexual combat that results is almost inevitable. For the "transformation of capitalism from its paternalistic and familial form to a managerial, corporate, bureaucratic system of almost total control" (p. 189) has eroded the old forms of chivalry. At the same time, sex has been liberated from its former constraints, so that the pursuit of pleasure has become an end in itself for women, whose rightful demands in so many spheres often result in an irrational response from men. Men, who no longer can rely so heavily upon the privileges of institutionalized male supremacy, justified in the past as protection, now "assert their domination more directly, in fantasies and occasionally in acts of raw violence" (p. 190). For they have come to view women as "voracious" and "insatiable," an easy catalyst for memories of the "possessive, suffocating, devouring and castrating mother" (p. 203) who is so prevalent in the fantasies of the narcissistic personality of our time.

Given these conditions, personal relationships are likely to fail. The "boundless rage," which is often experienced by both partners, can easily give way to a longing for emotional detachment. And if the individuals do not turn to promiscuity in which sex and feeling are strictly separated, the current vogue of "non-binding commitments" may be embraced which, though advanced by the "humanists," unwittingly provides ideological support for the depersonalization of sex since such emotions as jealousy and possessiveness are frowned upon. Lasch suggests that the "third force" advances an extremely superficial view of human experience, for the earliest entanglements of infancy are dealt with too quickly or not at all. Moreover, the call for "authenticity" by humanistic psychologists tends to mask a desperate struggle to experience emotion, a search "to beat sluggish flesh to life" (p. 10). In one of the more important passages in his book, Lasch states: "20th century peoples have erected so many psychological barriers against strong emotion, and have invested those defenses with so much of the energy derived from forbidden impulse, that they can no longer remember what is feels like to be inundated by desire. They tend, rather, to be consumed with rage, which derives from defenses against desire and gives rise in turn to new defenses against rage itself. Outwardly bland, submissive and sociable, they seethe with an inner anger for which a dense, overpopulated, bureaucratic society can devise few legitimate outlets" (p. 11).

Of all the ways that people may attempt to produce a "winning image," the "quest for authenticity" is perhaps the most duplicitous. For under this guise, forms of pseudo-mutuality are at times unwittingly exalted which make more genuine forms of emotional contact still more difficult. And yet we live in "a society of the spectacle" in which anything, including personal relationships, may be packaged. A vast advertising industry has been created that attempts to manipulate human needs by wrapping products in an attractive garb that often barely reflects some intrinsic value. Primarily appearance counts, particularly a "commodity's capacity to confer prestige — the illusion of prosperity and well-being" (p. 72). In this context, this "growth movement" advertises "new modes" of "healing" and "awareness," usually by extremely glib men who thrive on the dissatisfaction of their consumers, thereby encouraging in still another way the narcissistic tendencies which Lasch describes.

Only the old escape. Living in a society dedicated to the preservation of youth, the elderly population is not drawn as heavily into the world of consumption. Despite attempts by the humanistic psychologists to emphasize the "new ways of keeping busy" that lay ahead, all of which can provide corporate planners with an ideology to buttress

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the need for planned obsolescence, the elderly are defined primarily as "useless," condemned "to retire before they have exhausted their capacity for work" (p. 209). Since little value is placed on their experience, they are left without even one of the traditional consolations of aging, the sense that the future generations will perpetuate the spirit of one's life.

Lasch states that there is today an "irrational terror of old age and death" (p. 210) which "originates in the severance of the sense of historical continuity" (p. 213) and is closely tied to the emergence of the narcissistic personality. Charm, celebrity and power, the attributes so admired in today's narcissistic culture, tend to fade quickly with time. Without sufficient inner resources, especially a sense of the future, most Americans confront old age in despair. Medical proclamations by the prolongevity movement, which tries to convince people that aging is not inevitable, merely compound the problem by offering unrealistic hope (given existing remedies) and by suggesting a "grandiose vision of a technological utopia without old age" (p. 217).

The manner in which we deal with the problems of the elderly is one of the most glaring indications of the anxieties of our culture. Having lost interest in the future, Americans have also become uneasy about reproduction, frightened that they will be superseded. Given the concern with population growth and the less articulated fears about the quality of modern life, there are "widespread doubts," says Lasch, "about whether our society should reproduce itself at all" (p. 211). People tend to cling, sometimes desperately, to thoughts of preserving their youth, particularly their momentary well-being, and eliminating the ravages of old age.

It should be evident by now that the scope of *The Culture of Narcissism* is extremely broad. Intent upon exploring so much, Lasch easily opens himself to criticism, given the diversity of American life. What is generally an extremely penetrating analysis of major tendencies within American culture becomes at certain points a combative display of provocative speculations that either are pressed into his belief in the significance of narcissism or are barely welded together by his clinical preoccupations.

For instance, Lasch's discussion of literature is much too brief. Without really acknowledging the complexity of modernism, he isolates those features which point to an inability to take an interest in anything outside the self. Therefore, in fiction he notices that self-consciousness has risen to the degree that writers often describe the act of writing rather than the complex regions of the self or the external world. Ironic detachment, under the guise of vigilant self-awareness, is primarily the focus which suggests the various forms of emotional withdrawal so characteristic of contemporary life. And in his discussion of the theatre of the absurd, Lasch tends to be quite reductive when he states that the preoccupation with such motifs as emptiness and isolation in an environment often devoid of scenery, where time and place are often conspicuously vague, mirrors "the barren world of the borderline, his lack of faith in the growth or development of object relations...and above all his belief that the world consists of illusions" (p. 90). [7]

If his discussion of literature is far too narrow, his chapters on "The Degradation of Sport" and "Schooling and the New Illiteracy" seem far too broad. For the issue of narcissism recedes too much into the background as Lasch mounts still one more attack on other facets of American culture. As in his discussion of contemporary theatre, Lasch

7. Here Lasch tends to echo Lukács. In *Realism in Our Time*, Lukács simplistically criticizes writers like Franz Kafka, whose bleak vision mirrors the social dislocation caused by capitalist development. According to Lukács, Kafka is to be criticized for stressing the torturous nature of inner experience, and for not providing direction for a socialist future. Unlike Lukács, who at least acknowledges the value of "critical realists" like Kafka, Lasch tends to dismiss such modern literature because of its "narcissistic" preoccupations.

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emphasizes the manner in which spectator sports at their best can encourage a "suspension of disbelief" and can create an "illusion of reality" that in critical ways runs counter to the banality of everyday existence. Elements of risk, daring and uncertainty, generally eliminated by the requirements of corporate capitalism, are central to the performances of our best athletes, who uphold standards of competence and bravery. And yet, just as in the theatre where the illusion of reality has been dispelled by playwrights like Brecht and Pirandello, who are intent upon calling attention to the fictional character of the play, "the recent history of sports is the history of their steady submission to the demands of everyday reality" (p. 210). The need to produce a spectacle fully attuned to the requisites of the entertainment industry in which profit reigns supreme, erodes the passionate involvement of athletes and audience alike, turning sports into one more salable commodity.

According to Lasch, the contemporary radical critique of sports is misleading. Ex-professional athletes confine their criticism to militaristic values already "obsolete," given the demise of the blatant imperialist ideology and concomitant "cult of the strenuous life" (p. 113) advocated during the earlier part of the century. They err, says Lasch, when they glorify amateurism and equate spectatorship with passivity. And they err still again when they speak of sports as the "opiate of the masses," or a reflection of a predominantly sexist society that promotes competition among males.[8] Here Lasch fails to indicate the significance of the various elements of an indictment which he dismisses too quickly, stating that it "offends every principle of social analysis" (p. 115).

This is not to say that in this instance the contour of Lasch's argument is unconvincing. It is however, to suggest a major problem in his book which too often relies on the obliteration of the arguments of others and the supercilious propagation of his own point of view. When Lasch's observations are questionable, his tone seems to be even more inappropriate. For example, when he states that the "rivalry among teams, now drained of its capacity to call up local or regional loyalties, reduces itself (like the rivalry among business corporations) to a struggle for shares of the market" (p. 118), he ignores the obvious signs of vast local support in most cities for professional teams, support which becomes quite evident when a winning franchise decides to move. And his statement that "the professional athlete does not care whether his team wins or loses (since losers share in the pot) as long as it stays in business" (p. 118) is in need of still further qualification. If Lasch's knowledge of human desire may be suspect here, in this chapter he seems to depart from his earlier dependence on psychoanalytic theory. Emphasizing mainly the power of sports to stimulate our fantasy lives in which the sublimation of impulse, especially aggression, can take place, Lasch tends to inflate the significance of athletics; though "neither life nor death in itself,[sport] retains some lingering capacity to dramatize and clarify those experiences" (p. 119). And he departs even more from the kind of psychoanalytic rigor he upholds when he rather mystically suggests the ability of sport to transport us to a "higher realm of existence" (p. 123). Finally, when he states that "by entering imaginatively into the [world of the professional athlete], we experience in heightened form the pain of defeat and the triumph of persistence in the face of adversity" (p. 107), his thinking comes dangerously close to deteriorating into the clichés of the very media commentators he deplores.

As in his chapter on "The Degradation of Sport," Lasch essentially shelves his discussion of narcissism in his analysis of American schooling. Though he states that the

8. Lasch's critique centers in part on the willingness of many to replace competitive athletics "with a bland regimen of cooperative diversions" (p. 108). He states that "people today associate rivalry with boundless aggression and find it difficult to conceive of competition that does not lead directly to thoughts of murder" (p. 117).

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deterioration of the educational system "reflects the waning social demand for initiative, enterprise and the compulsion to achieve" (p. 126), he is only peripherally concerned with the ways in which the schools encourage the forms of self-absorption upon which he focuses so much attention throughout most of his book. His emphasis is on the erosion of standards of excellence derived from the classical education of the past which required the mastery of basic skills and encouraged the development of a critical intelligence. This kind of education has been undermined in advanced industrial society, where so many jobs demand submission to a routine that requires little, if any, creative endeavor. What we have today, says Lasch, from grade school through the university, is an atmosphere which tends to destroy students' capacity to think by cultivating a vacuous eclecticism under the slogan of "relevance." Education, like sport, has become a commodity, embodied in a "culinary image" which is "appropriate to the underlying ideal of enlightened consumption" (p. 153). And what has been dished out is a curriculum ill conceived as a totality and often devoid of real substance. Therefore, it is not surprising, according to Lasch, that "people increasingly find themselves unable to use language with ease and precision, to recall the basic facts of their country's history, to make logical deductions, to understand any but the most rudimentary written texts, or even to grasp their constitutional rights" (p. 128).

The democratization of education which began so promisingly early in the 19th century with the hope of extending to the mass of American people the ability to think critically as well as to work efficiently was undermined: first by the need to "Americanize" the large number of immigrants who came to this country, and then by the demands of industrialization which required a disciplined, subservient labor force. Toward the end of the century, schools began to stress forms of industrial education which emphasized manual training. And in the progressive period there was a proliferation of courses on homemaking, health and citizenship, along with the development of extracurricular activities, particularly athletic programs, all of which helped to weaken the traditional academic curriculum. Therefore, under the guise of educating students in an "integrated manner," the process of socializing the child came to be seen as important as stimulating intellectual growth, so that by the 1940's schools concentrated on what they actually called "life adjustment." Both intellectual and manual training were now deemed to be less important than the "inculcation of orderly habits" (p. 137). In the 50's and 60's, despite criticism directed at the trivialization of the high school curriculum, especially by those intent upon promoting the need for more scientists and high level technicians, students still failed to receive the kind of general education which might make them genuine citizens in a real democracy. The schools, says Lasch, "devoted increasing attention to the identification of able students and the discouragement of others" (p. 140). The civil rights movement, which helped to counteract this tendency initially by calling for equal education with a stress on the transmission of basic skills, was superseded by the Black Power movement which, in support of ethnic relevance, helped to promote the same lack of rigorous standards that characterized the operation of the schools they did not wish to integrate.

As in his discussion of sports, Lasch saves his most vitriolic attack for the cultural radicals of the 60's and 70's who would legitimize "a new erosion of standards in the name of pedagogical creativity" (p. 144). And once again the severity of his attack diverts attention from his legitimate concerns. Lumping together programs in black studies, women's studies and other forms of "consciousness raising," Lasch sees little value in these innovations. Failing to distinguish sufficiently between courses in black history (legitimately part of any sound curriculum) and the study and practice of witchcraft, he states much too flatly that such courses reflect either "a desire for an

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intellectually undemanding curriculum" or the narcissist's "inability to take an interest in anything beyond immediate experience" (pp. 148-149). Moreover, Lasch's criticism errs in its consideration of the extent to which these trends have inundated the university, which he calls a diffuse, shapeless and permissive institution that has absorbed the major currents of cultural modernism and reduced them to a watery blend, a mind-emptying ideology of cultural radicalism, personal fulfillment and creative alienation" (p. 151).

Significantly, it is the Left that receives the major thrust of Lasch's attack in *The Culture of Narcissism*.[9] Essentially he feels that radicals simply "reproduce" many of the worst aspects of the social order they criticize. Although he laments the passing of the political interests of the 60's and the return to "purely personal preoccupations," Lasch has very little praise for activists of the previous decade. For it is his belief that they came to mirror "the politics of unreality" of those in power, given the narcissistic emphasis on "theatre" and "dramatic gestures" (p. 82) rather than meaningful protest. Self-promotion of media stars, caused by and resulting in spurious forms of identification, often replaced a substantive politics. Without even mentioning those psychological studies of activists which suggest, contrary to popular stereotype, that the 60s' radicals were not primarily acting out childhood conflicts but were seriously interested in social change, Lasch rather simplistically holds up Susan Stern, a member of the Weathermen faction of SDS, as the prototype of dissidents of that era, many of whom were more interested in promoting "grandiose" visions of themselves than in working to ameliorate social and political conditions.[10]

With this perspective on the 60's, Lasch implies that the prospects for the future are quite bleak. He states that the mass media continue to be used by those in power to mask any semblance of reality by "making statements that sound authoritative without conveying any authoritative information" (p. 74). Consumption siphons off the desire to protest and even "turns alienation itself into a commodity" (p. 73).

Still, Lasch seeks "modest improvements in work and play," the restoration of "meaning and dignity to everyday life." He suggests that his goals cannot be implemented through piecemeal reform but by a structural transformation of American institutions which will allow people to have much more control over their lives. Lasch commits himself to a vague form of socialism in which a major step will be the creation of "communities of competence" (p. 235) through the resurrection of the moral force once associated with the work ethic. Interestingly, his proposal, which he never really elaborates and for which he offers no precedents, is in part a restatement in more political terms of the vision embraced by the SDS in the early 60's.

The call for "participatory democracy" by SDS was a response to an overly bureaucratized and professionalized society which eroded the possibility for individual initiative. In fact, the attempt to preserve a sense of individuality in the context of collective action was one of the more appealing ideas of the New Left. It is unfortunate that Lasch, whose most virulent criticism is aimed at 60s' radicals, should embrace a significant part of their vision without acknowledging the fact that he is doing so.

Fortunately, he is much more self-consciously indebted to the work of feminists, whose concern with issues dealing with personal life is a needed antidote to the "shallowness of the old socialist analysis, according to which a revolution in property relations would automatically revolutionize the relations between men and women"

9. In his previous work, Lasch has devoted much time to his attack on contemporary American radicalism. See especially *The Agony of the American Left* (New York, 1969).

10. For instance, see the work of Kenneth Kenniston, particularly *Young Radicals: Notes on Committed Youth* (New York, 1968).

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(p. 205). Yet there is virtually no praise offered without qualification in his book, so that Lasch also makes clear his affinity for a particular kind of feminism. Decrying the forms of accommodation which characterized the women's rights movement in the past when discussions of love and marriage were avoided, Lasch has little sympathy for such organizations as NOW which "today propose to improve woman's image, to show that feminism in no way threatens men, and to blame 'social conditions' or bad attitudes, not male supremacy, for the subordination of the female sex" (p. 198). Nor does he have much sympathy for certain militant feminists, especially radical lesbians, who in varying ways attempt to withdraw from a world run by men in the hopes of creating alternative institutions. Lasch condemns the "mere business with self-perpetuating make-work" that these organizations often encourage which does more to bolster the prestige and financial security of those involved than it does to produce the "illusory matriarchal utopia" (p. 199) that is often desired.[11]

Lasch's criticism here once again suggests that his analysis of American culture leaves little possibility for meaningful response. At one point in his book denigrating the narcissistic pursuits of the 70's, a heterogeneous blend of forms of "psychic self-improvement," Lasch arrogantly states that most people today have "no hope of improving their lives in any of the ways that matter" (p. 4). Ironically enough, in a later passage, he criticizes radical activists in the field of sports for their presumption to "understand the needs and interests of the masses better than the masses themselves" (p. 115). Of course, to be fair to Lasch, it is important to indicate that his criticism focuses not so much upon the "purely personal" pursuits (which are "harmless in themselves"), but upon "the rhetoric of authenticity and awareness" (pp. 4-5) in which they are wrapped.

Despite the fact that it is easy to appreciate his sense of the shallowness of this rhetoric, there is in Lasch's evaluation an unnecessary harshness that can be explained perhaps by examining the nature of his commitment to psychoanalytic theory. He fully believes in Freud's dictum that we should devote ourselves to "work and love," the proper "sublimations" of adulthood. However, Lasch's allegiance to the idea of self-restraint does not sufficiently embrace Freud's recognition of the painfully difficult process by which the ego is both formed and maintained.[12] Nor does Lasch have much feeling for the kind of sensitivity that might unnecessarily be lost as one begins to "master" the life of impulse.[13]

Therefore, it is not surprising that his use of psychoanalytic theory has resulted in a response from radicals and conservatives alike who have suggested that Lasch advocates

11. Here Lasch quotes Veronica Geng, "Requiem for the Women's Movement," *Harper's* (November 1976), p. 53.

12. In this context it is interesting to note that Lasch relies heavily on the work of Alexander Mitscherlich, especially *Society without the Father: A Contribution to Social Psychology*, trans. by Eric Mosbacher (New York, 1970). Mitscherlich provides Lasch with the basis for his discussion of the "absent father" and the decline of the superego. Throughout *Society without the Father*, Mitscherlich repeated refers to Freud's belief in the precariousness of the ego. In *Haven in a Heartless World*, Lasch tends to echo Mitscherlich's position. But in *The Culture of Narcissism*, Lasch is much less concerned with a possible reversion to barbarism in the future, an idea that is reiterated in *Society without the Father*. Instead, Lasch points to the manner in which our emotional lives have withered. At one point he says that "a reversion to savagery threatens [us] so little that [we] long precisely for a more vigorous instinction existence" (p. 11). I do not question the accuracy of Lasch's observation here, but his implicit belief in the ease with which self-discipline can be imposed.

13. Lasch makes no attempt to align himself with radical followers of Freud such as Norman O. Brown. In fact, he is critical of cultural radicals who favor "polymorphous" forms of self-expression which encourage permissiveness.

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a return to the ways of the past that would include a resurrection of the old "bourgeois family." Lasch himself praises the "old rich" who embody the remnants of bourgeois culture, unlike the new managerial elite who embrace the "therapeutic culture of narcisssism" (p. 218). Committed to inculcating "a certain toughness" as well as a sense of responsibility in their children, the "old rich" are willing to use their authority and to instill a sense of tradition. Yet Lasch deplores the forms of inequality which shaped so many aspects of the lives of the propertied elite in the past. He is particularly sensitive to the plight of women whose subordination then and now he calls intolerable.

What he asks for is an acknowledgement of "the justice of the central feminist demands," [14] as well as recognition by the women's movement that there are important values in the family, especially in the quality of care that can be provided for the young. He feels that under the best conditions the family can provide that rare blend of love and discipline which has informed the lives of children of the "old rich."[15] It is important to remember just how opposed he is to the contemporary version of the family in which the "absent father" and "suffocating mother" often hold sway.

This evaluation, however, is fully wedded to his commitment to a Freudian perspective which he accepts uncritically and views not as one model of human development, but essentially as the "science" it purports to be. While we can be grateful to Lasch, who, along with others quite recently, has tried to resurrect Freud in the face of the careless eclecticism of modern psychology, Lasch much too hastily lumps together as "pseudo-awareness" insights arrived at by means other than a rigorous psychoanalytic approach.[16]

Here still another problem arises. For, although Lasch deplores the fact that we have turned to experts to solve our personal problems, he commits himself to the psychoanalytic mode which has itself become thoroughly professionalized. One would think that, given his allegiance to the idea of developing "communities of competence," Lasch might have some nice things to say about the contemporary psychiatric self-help movement. But attempts in this area are also brushed aside as pseudo-therapy, part of the larger quest for "pseudo-awareness" that often drives people into therapeutic cults.

In addition, Lasch suggests that the self-help movement tends to embrace the work of the Neo- and Post-Freudians who have softened, if not eliminated, the irreconcilable antagonism between culture and instinct that is upheld in orthodox psychoanalytic theory. It is this antagonism that is often cited as the basis for developing opposition to established order. But even Freud, although he spoke of the need for society to become less repressive, indicated the importance of culture in taming instinctual life.[17] As Lasch acknowledges, the courts have been utilized in this process, thereby contributing to still another dilemma: the replacement of an ethical conception of individual responsibility with a therapeutic emphasis on illness. If this transformation is not occurring as swiftly as Lasch believes, Freudian theory can just as easily be called upon

14. *Haven in a Heartless World, op. cit.*, p. xvi.

15. In *Haven in a Heartless World*, p. 123, Lasch states that "without struggling with the ambivalent emotions aroused by the union of love and discipline in his parents, the child never masters his inner rage or his fear of authority. It is for this reason that children need parents, not professional nurses and counselors" (p. 123).

16. In this context, the work of Russell Jacoby is important. Lasch wrote a preface to Jacoby's book *Social Amnesia: A Critique of Contemporary Psychology from Adler to Laing* (Boston, 1975).

17. In this context, Paul Roazen indicates that the work of Melanie Klein has "thrived" in England, particularly among Burkean Conservatives, because of its emphasis on the importance of "social restraints" in limiting aggressiveness. See *Freud: Political and Social Thought* (New York, 1968), p. 210.

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as the work of the Neo- and Post-Freudians to exonerate an individual for the acts which he has committed.

Lasch's excesses here and elsewhere are unfortunate. In a book which is such a sweeping indictiment of American life, it might have been wiser for Lasch to delineate less caustically his differences with others whose vision in certain respects is close enough to his own to warrant consideration. For, if he has described quite provocatively that sad "spectacle" of "easy-going oppression" in which we live, where compulsive consumption as much as the degradation of work contribute to the growing helplessness of the individual faced with the power of the corporation and the state, he has given little support to that large number of people who are searching in various ways for alternatives to the bleakness of the present era.

Robert Ehrlich

Dominick LaCapra. *A Preface to Sartre*. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1978. 250 pages. $12.50.

Sartre's thought is routinely declared to have been surpassed by the ideas of this or that subsequently elevated figure. Sometimes, of course, these claims are made in good faith, but often one cannot escape the feeling that such reports are insufficiently grounded in an adequate understanding, or even an honest reading of the body of work that ostensibly has been left in the dust. Several of these "surpassing" vanguard spirts can be variously situated along a continuum of parricidal intent, for it can be shown that they owe to Sartre important, founding debts. The early Barthes made a fully acknowledged use of Sartre's theory of literature. And, before deciding that all attempts to arrive at a totalizing truth of an individual had reactionary implications, Barthes (in *Michelet par lui-même*) had adopted Sartre's method of psychoanalysis. Lacan has made use of Sartre's early Hegel- and Bergson-derived theory of alienation. The genesis of Foucault's studies of exclusion has been traced to Sartre's discovery of the social forces responsible for the labelling of Genet. It may not be too fanciful to entertain the possibility that Foucault's obsession with objectifying glances, with "the medical gaze," and with Bentham's panopticon, also owes something to Sartre. Even when it is quite clear that Sartre is not present as an influence, it can be shown that he has made many appearances as an ideal straw man. In the first volume of his history of sexuality we have the sense that Foucault is writing against Sartre's conception of "distinction," as well as against Reich and Marcuse. Derrida's *Glas* is clearly intended to function as an anti-*Saint Genet*. After Sartre had made of Genet a Hegelian picaro, demonstrating how his life fit patly into the developmental mold of Hegel's slave, Derrida ostentatiously refused to follow suit. Where Sartre forced Hegel and Genet together, Derrida divided his pages into two columns: Genet on one side, Hegel on the other. In so doing Derrida tells us that, unlike Sartre, he is declining to swallow up Genet into a magisterial, totalizing design. In *Glas*, Sartre appears as a tyrannical representative of a world of power who demands Genet's identification papers and forces him to pose for a time-lapse mug shot. Whether surpassed or not, Sartre remains important and unforgotten. As influence or critical foil, he haunts the thought of those who claim to be possessed of a large, more adequate vision.

One of the more useful things that can be done with Sartre today is to confront his

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thought with the ideas of those who have supposedly put him into eclipse. This is particularly desirable, because not since *The Savage Mind* has one of Sartre's enemies confronted him directly and systematically. This task, then, must be assumed by third parties. LaCapra has chosen to introduce the writings of Sartre with the aid of Jacques Derrida's deconstructive approach to a text. Derrida is hostile to an understanding that is geared to attempts to master the object of knowledge, to definitively fix meaning, to achieve comprehensive unity with the aid of teleological, totalizing interpretations, for such efforts at centering falsify reality, and are masks for a quest for power. He refuses the idea of the interpretive model that is transcendant to the text, for every work is its own model and each text must be understood in its pure difference. The use of models and the quest for specific meanings and origins issues in a domestication of the explosive energies of the infinitely multivalent text, and the masochistic impoverishment of the interpreter's possibilities. Such constricting methodologies are correlative expressions of bourgeois property, paternity and political oppression. The structure of a work can be revealed only on the condition that we have discovered its unconditionally unavailable ultimate meaning or ultimate cause. Derrida is hostile to Structuralism for it seeks to reveal the text as a spatial configuration seen from the perspective of an eternal present, thus falsely assimilating to itself the transcendent gaze of God. Derridean criticism makes no pretension to representation, for there is nothing to which interpretation must correspond: there is no final meaning to be seized. Such models are always faulty for reality overflows them, always leaving a remainder for which they cannot account. The decentered approach exposes the reader to the spectacle of the "joyous Nietzschean affirmation of the play of the world and the innocence of becoming."[1] Criticism is an exercise in the glorification of the uninhibited production of meaning and self-transcendence. There is far more to Derrida than this brutal account would suggest, but these are the components of his program that play the most active role in LaCapra's reading of Sartre.

LaCapra provokes a most appropriate clash, for there are moments of radical hostility to all forms of objectification in the early Sartre that are not entirely unrelated to some of Derrida's views. In Derrida Sartre is faced with an earlier avatar who has taken a heretical turn. The idea of such a collision is an excellent one, but the manner in which it is carried out here leads to difficulties. LaCapra introduces the writings of Sartre to those incompletely familiar with them. The idea of introducing the relatively well known and accessible Sartre in a shortish book through the far less accesssible pronouncements of Derrida is a curious one indeed. It forces the author to work with a very much stripped down, fragmentary account of Derrida's thought. The confrontation that is generated is of necessity a patchy and hit-and-run affair. We are asked to choose between a dimly lit, flattering cameo of Derrida, and a frontal, unforgiving view of Sartre. The reader is asked to buy something that very much resembles a pig in a poke. The choice that LaCapra seeks to provoke cannot be a confident one.

LaCapra's hope throughout is to show how Derrida's thought enables us to discover moments of excessive rigidity in Sartre, and to discover that Sartre's confident binary categories cannot pretend to account for all of reality. There are decentering tendencies in the early Sartre, but his writings are generally dominated by a centering approach to interpretation that bears a suspicious political freight. This centering movement causes Sartre to have a master-slave relationship with the object of knowledge, and involves him in a discourse of power. His works have reactionary implications of

1. Quoted by Jonathan Culler in *Structuralist Poetics* (Ithaca, N.Y., 1975), p. 247.

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which he is totally unaware: "What...threatens to escape him is the possibility that his own thought is reappropriated by the very traditions or institutions he explicitly rejects" (p. 24).

It is primarily in *Nausea* and *Being and Nothingness* that LaCapra finds the more salubrious decentering tendencies. In his chapter on the novel he shows convincingly that the book, because it is replete with moments of self-contestation, occupies an acentric position in Sartre's work. "*Nausea* is the most intense and sustained 'case' of critical deconstructive writing among Sartre's works" (p. 95). This is so, for "the text of *Nausea* erases traditional elements of the...novel while allowing them to remain legible through a praxis of deconstruction and double inscription — a praxis that cannot be reduced to one or the other of the 'opposites' involved, but must be seen in terms of their....interlapping interplay" (p. 101). LaCapra praises Sartre's early skepticism concerning the possibility of representation. He makes the excellent point that the Self-Taught man who is in the process of reading through the Bouville library in alphabetical order is not at all the opposite of the biographer Roquentin, but is rather his parodic alter-ego. In only slightly less of an arbitrary fashion, Roquentin is also seeking to impose an arbitrary order on reality. In the Self-Taught Man he finds his own vice pushed to an insane extreme. Sartre's first novel is beautifully amenable to a deconstructed reading, and LaCapra's pages are certainly among the best that have been written on *Nausea*. He also finds an appealing decentering moment in the description of the subjectivity-releasing project of irony described in *Being and Nothingness*. He ultimately regrets, however, that Sartre cannot demonstrate irony to be completely free from contamination by the appropriative, dominating tendency of the for-itself. He wishes that Sartre could have found in irony a project that has freedom at its origin and as its goal, a project that could be posed as an alternative to the desire to be God.

One of the most persistently recurring lines of LaCapra's argument is that Sartre resists ambiguous overlapping, or interplay, between his contrasting categories and refuses to envision the possibility of complementary relationships or possible syntheses. He makes very useful remarks on the early study of the imaginative where Sartre tells us that the imaginary is the negation of the real. LaCapra suggests that "the deadly dichotomies of Sartre's early theoretical works replicated and reinforced the traits of the dominant culture against which he was revolting in other ways. The ugliness of reality is accepted and sanctioned as an ontological given, as is the divorce from aesthetic considerations" (p. 60). He takes inadequate notice, however, of the fact that the resort of the imaginary is not necessarily escapist for Sartre. The negation of the real is, to be sure, the unconditional principle of all imagining, but the real can be negated in order to intensify our experience of it and heighten our ability concretely to confront abuses we find in the world. Because LaCapra does not fully realize this, he incorrectly tells us that Sartre is obliged to allow prose fiction as described in *What is Literature?* to escape from the early theory of the imagination. In reality the two works are effortlessly complementary.

Frequently LaCapra attacks with good reason an early Sartrean position, but then he takes no, or only very sketchy note of the fact that Sartre has subsequently modified his views. He complains that Sartre refuses to allow his biographical subjects to speak with their own voices, but the charge may also be levelled against him. In *What is Literature?* Sartre drives an inflexible wedge between the natures and functions of poetry and prose, but preferring to work with the easier target, he takes only slight notice of the fact that Sartre has since softened the lines between genres. In the course

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of his analysis of *Being and Nothingness* he complains of the rigidity of the distinction Sartre makes between the in-itself and the for-itself, but in his commentary on the *Critique* he does not observe that this distinction is blurred in the case of the practico-inert and reified man. He finds it inconsistent to say that freedom can be at once pure and total, and at the same time historically situated. Again, in the *Critique*, Sartre shows that he understands this, but characteristically LaCapra makes no notice of Sartre's flexibility. In the *Critique* he complains about Sartre's seeming equation of alterity and alienation, thus apparently making alienation into something that cannot be eradicated, but he declines to notice that in *L'Idiot de la famille* Sartre has backed off this position in a quite satisfactory manner.

The analysis of the *Critique* is crudely dismissive and disappointingly brief. LaCapra's main point here is that Sartre very much repeats the structures or problematic of *Being and Nothingness*. In his own support, he erroneously calls the practico-inert a simple substitution for the in-itself. While the in-itself is simply unconscious matter, the practico-inert is a field formed by the objectified choices of other men past and present that deviates my free choices. The author expresses bewilderment at Sartre's placing the *Search for a Method* before the main body of the *Critique*. The reason seems fairly obvious. It is here that Sartre explains how we may move from groups and totalizing forces to the individual who is totalized and who totalizes, from the universal to the singular universal. The prominent, opening place of the *Search* is designed to dramatize the idea that the lived experience of the individual must not be insulated or ignored in the midst of speculations involving broader historical categories. We are told that the Marxism of the *Critique* is suspect, but the author says nothing in support of his comment other than to resurrect the often repeated remark (first made by Clavel?) that Sartre's emphasis on scarcity is un-Marxist. This charge is easily dismissed with reference to the *Critique of the Gotha Program,* or to the passage in the third volume of *Capital* where Marx writes that the reign of freedom lies beyond the world of material production, and does not commence until that moment when work imposed by necessity and external finality will come to an end. Perhaps LaCapra's most serious error is his assertion that for Sartre scarcity has an ontological status. Although scarcity is the motor of history in the *Critique,* being the origin of class conflict, it is most definitely a historically contingent phenomenon, however stubborn it may be.

Sartre's biographies draw the author's most unrelieved displeasure. "Nowhere is the tendency of Sartre's pure and total freedom to become the ideological mask of a 'totalizing' logic of appropriation and surveillance more evident than in the project of an existentialist psychoanalysis" (p. 140). It is quite true that at times Sartre suppresses information that would place in question the thoroughness with which the imposed pattern succeeds. This is the case in *Baudelaire,* true, but only very rarely so in *L'Idiot de la famille.* LaCapra gives us no good examples of how these individuals overflow the imposed molds. The most furiously positivistic of Flaubertians have been hard put to come up with instances in *L'Idiot* where Sartre has been truly false to facts. We are told that "Sartre does not hesitate to use the categories of psychopathology to describe the plight of his subjects, but not to alleviate their responsibility" (p. 172). This is, of course, true in the case of *Baudelaire,* but totally false when applied to the biography of Flaubert. Gustave is forced into passivity; he is *constitutionally* unable to rise above the imposed role of family idiot. He has only one choice: to become the prince of the imaginary. There is no quesiton of responsibility. Flaubert is not condemned for his inability to act to overcome his imposed destiny. I do not

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understand how an honest reading of *L'Idiot de la famille* could result in the opposite impression. In the third volume of *L'Idiot*, Sartre makes the point that the frightened, post-1848 bourgeois sought to generate a pessimistic sadistic literature that would humiliate and demoralize man. The bourgeois wanted a literature that would communicate the idea that man is impossible, that man is nothing but the unfree martyr of Capital, and must gladly resign to being devoured in its service. Concerning this point LaCapra repeats a remark made by Jonathan Culler: "The reader would not be demoralized, after all, by a tale told from the point of view of an order which he could identify and adopt as his own" (p. 204). But Sartre's point is that to demoralize man as man, man as species, is not to demoralize man as bourgeois, but rather to energize and justify his existence. The bourgeois cannot be comfortable as bourgeois unless he knows that man is a hopeless being, and can be nothing other than the tool of forces outside his control. The account of *L'Idiot de la famille* is generally disappointing. It gives us little idea of the ambitions of the book, the ethical and epistemological issues it faces, and the nature of its relationship with Sartre's earlier works.

A particular remark with which I should like to take issue is the following: "The existential house of being becomes a panopticon in which the analyst plays a godlike game in his totalizing 'look' at the other" (p. 141). Here, apparently, LaCapra is bringing Foucault into his argument and equating Sartre's biographical enterprise with Bentham's project for an architectural solution to the surveillance needs of institutions. In his introduction to a French edition of Bentham's writings on the panopticon, Foucault says that there are two 18th century traditions of transparency: the Benthamite idea of the all-seeing gaze of power which cannot itself be seen or objectified, and Rousseau's dream of a world of mutual transparency in which men would all communicate directly and freely, and power would be dissolved.[2] When we read Sartre's biographies in the context of the entire body of his work, when we take notice of the ideal of translucidity found in the *Critique*, the project of mutual transparency agreed upon by Mathieu and Marcelle in *The Age of Reason,* and Sartre's 70th birthday remarks about a utopian world in which no man has secrets from another, it becomes apparent that an analogy with the model suggested by Rousseau would have been more appropriate. There is a dark side to these biographies, and LaCapra makes a valuable point when he warns us that Sartre engulfs his biographical subjects in a discourse of power. But his complaints are alarmist and pushed to the point of serious distortion.

The thing that most disturbed me about this book is the fact that the author does not face up to the most obvious issue that should emerge during the course of the confrontation he provokes. Sartre's life-long obsession has been the representation and analysis of alienation. Because Derrida rejects a mimetic objectifying view of literature and criticism, his is a thought that refuses concretely to engage the problem of alienation. Given this, which thinker is more likely to be playing into the hands of unjust power? LaCapra insists that Derrida's thought doesn't negate utopian hopes. Perhaps not, but it may very well be that it brings to an end the possibility of their realization.

Douglas Collins

2. *Le Panoptique* (Paris, 1977).

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Richard Gombin. *The Radical Tradition: A Study in Modern Revolutionary Thought*. Translated from the French by Rupert Swyer. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1979. 153 pages. $14.95 cloth.

I would like to open this review with a statement I have long waited to make, although it has nothing really to do with the book at hand. There are many people on the left who do not like intellectuals, including and especially leftist intellectuals. Nor do they care for theory, intellectual work, books by foreign authors, foreign words and words in English with too many syllables. In most instances they are not fond of thinking in any sense of the term. I have listened to many of their rantings, often with a patience they have not deserved. Well, I have had it and would now like to tell them one and all to eat shit.

Richard Gombin is not one of these people and he has written another very interesting, if now and then frustrating, book about the history of modern anit-authoritarian leftist ideas and struggles. *Telos* readers may be familiar with Gombin from his earlier little book, *The Origins of Modern Leftism* (English edition, 1975), a nice summation and synthesis of anti-Bolshevik leftist thought from 1917 through 1968, although like many good literary by-products of '68, that book is now inaccessible, having gone out of print not long after publication. I mention this earlier work because *The Radical Tradition*, while similar, contains a substantial and symptomatic reversal about which Gombin is annoyingly silent. Central to *The Origins of Modern Leftism* is its embrace of a critical Marxism. From Lukács and Korsch through Marcuse, Sartre, Lefebvre and the Situationists, Gombin traced a heritage of philosophical and sociological theorizing whose social-practical expressions he found in the Russian and Hungarian Soviets, the Dutch and German Council Committees, the Spanish revolutionary collectives and the "contestations" of 1968. In contrast, *The Radical Tradition* contains not a word about any critical Marxism. There yesterday, gone today. In its place, the first chapter presents a concise condemnation of Marxism *tout court* as an obstacle in radicalism's path.

Now, as everyone knows, we are living amidst a terribly frightening and extremely strange historical period. Among its strange aspects is the odd little fact that while Marxism in the West is gaining new recruits within an academic and generally depoliticized context, departures from the Marxian camp have simultaneously become fashionable, especially in Paris. Of course, these developments are neither contradictory nor as strange as they appear at first glance; there are good reasons for them which need not be spelled out here. But as regards departures from Marxism, the recent fashion has more than one shade and pattern. They range from the *nouvelle philosophie*, that Yves Saint-Laurent of social theory (examined in *Telos* by Tom Good, Eleni Mahaira-Odoni and others), to Castoriadis, who long before the new vogue insisted that to be revolutionary meant ceasing to be Marxist. On this spectrum, Richard Gombin's thinking is most closely akin to that of Castoriadis, but this is not really the point.

The point is that it may be the case that the idea of a critical Marxism was only one of the illusions of the past two decades, a dead-end detour taken by new generations of radicals in search of an adequate theory. I do not think this is quite right, but in any case it would be good to know why and in what sense Gombin believes this or something similar; to know what led him to reject Marxian "philosophical revisionism" he had not long ago endorsed. Based on what he says about other matters, Gombin could have said something interesting about this one. Doing so would have

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added more to the self-understanding of the radical tradition today.

Instead we get the attack on Marxism as a whole. And there is much to it; with different nuances, similar arguments have been presented in these pages and elsewhere by Bookchin, Castoriadis and others. But equally surely, it is based on simplifications and reductions of a wildly contradictory tradition. Marxism, Gombin contends, once had ties to radicalism but these were snapped first of all by Marx's positivism and scientism; then by his failure to develop a critique of the emergent "bureaucratic class," and finally by the "productivist" biases (the uncritical posture regarding industrial rationalization) of his thought which, when mixed with a propensity for "ideological imperialism," forged a powerful tool in the hands of new managerial strata within proletarian and socialist organizations. From Marx through classical social democracy to Leninism, Stalinism and Maoism, the truth of Marxism is that it aimed not at emancipation from wage slavery, but at the integration of the proletariat into state capitalism (pp. 1-5).

The argument serves two related points. One is now obvious: the radical tradition represents an alternative not only to Bolshevism (as asserted in *The Origins of Modern Leftism*), but to Marxism as well. The other is suggestive but left to dangle, awaiting completion. Gombin proposes that the century-long period during which the industrial proletariat "has been struggling to obtain integration into bourgeois civilization" is now at an end, and so therefore is Marxism. The industrial working class is "no longer hanging around the gate of market society, having gradually been absorbed from within." And the worker (excluding the migrant worker "who is obliged to fight the battle for integration all over again"), thanks to his own collective struggles and the evolution of the economy, "enjoys theoretically unlimited access to commodities." Now, finally, workers are in a position to reject and negate them. Meanwhile, Marxism, tainted from the start by authoritarianism, has been rendered obsolete with the passing of the age of integrative proletarian struggles and the emergence of new, really revolutionary possibilities.

As to the notion that the proletariat is at long last in a position to negate the commodity society: this is indeed the hope and it is evidently more tangible in Europe than in the U.S., where it is just as likely that the proletariat is in a worse position than ever to negate the world of commodities. Moreover, while Gombin's position here contains a nice cupful of post-1960's new leftism, it is unfortunately diluted by more than a drop of an older dogmatism about *the* proletariat as *the* destined revolutionary class. And the very mode of argument smacks of the Marxism it wants to dispense with: the same sociological reductions with which Engels pronounced the obsolescence of utopian socialism, or Plekhanov and Lenin that of the Russian populist tradition. Having haughtily dispatched so many other socialist ideas as the ideological drivel of reactionary groups, the Marxist tradition often deserves nothing less than what Gombin gives it: a swift kick as the ideology of an incipient managerial class. But Gombin is as wrong, if also as right, as Engels, Plekhanov and Lenin.

Nonetheless, Gombin knows that "the task of current radical theory is to express precisely" the potential negation of the world of commodities. And he is right that radicalism "represents a break with all sectoral revolts and half-hearted doctrines. It is born from first-hand experience of social conflicts, but a number of its elements can be traced back to the tradition of anti-authoritarian socialism" (p. 8). This tradition — "entirely stamped out by Stalinism, although even in the 19th century it was tending to be overshadowed by Marxism's monopoly of oppositional thought — is what Gombin wants to put on display in the service of its rejuvenation.

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The whole idea was generated by the movements of the 1960's. As Gombin writes: "At that moment a new generation of revolutionaries began to attract attention on Western Europe and North America (and, to a lesser extent, in Latin America): a generation which gave birth to the anti-authoritarian left in Germany, to generalized confrontation in France (with its recurrent outbreaks since May, 1968), the various hippy, yippy, freaks and Students for a Democratic Society movements in the United States, not to mention specific groups (women, racial or cultural minorities, homosexuals, etc.). For the last ten years or so, this generation has been stirring up convulsions throughout modern society that have seriously shaken what is conveniently known as Western Civilization, its political systems, its social and even its mental structures. It is seeking other frames of reference for its radicality than orthodox communism, which it looks on as being just as bogged down in exploitation and injustice as Western-style capitalism" (p. 11).

These experiences, Gombin appears to be saying, opened among other doors that of radical memory, allowing for a recall of the repressed: those historical movements and ideas which have been present before, during and after the better-known triumphs of "all those ideologies based on command and obedience." The full range of the repressed material cannot be recollected in one session, and Gombin deals with only three, but three significant, segments: the myths and realities of the Soviet State (1917-21); the radical tradition in Russia (up to the early 20th century); and Council Communism in Germany primarily, but also in England (the Shop Stewards movements), Italy and Hungary in the early 1920's. Although this slender volume has a typically outrageous price, it is worth reading for this material alone. With enthusiasm and clarity, Gombin pulls together a wide range of information (mostly from secondary sources: Anweiler, Bock, Broué *et.al.*), providing a good synthesis of the rich and often grim stories of radicalism in action and thought.

There is no need to repeat it, but two aspects are of special interest because they issue in significant problems. If, as previously mentioned, Gombin appears to have discarded critical Marxism, he has added something new since *The Origins of Modern Leftism:* the discussion of 19th century radicalism in Russia, the crux of which is a rehabilitation of Alexander Herzen as an important figure in the radical tradition. Describing him as an aristocratic radical, Gombin rightly sees in Herzen's Slavophilism the germs of an important critique of the West's commercialized modernity. On the other hand, he does not give enough emphasis to the component of social romanticism in Herzen; for example, to the impact of George Sand, whose ideas of the relations between love, passion and freedom played a vital role in Herzen's life and thought — as if this were all a bit *outré* even for radicalism. In fact, this is one of the dimensions of Herzen which binds him most closely to the present generation of the radical tradition. Readers seeking more plebian perspectives will enjoy the account of the fascinating Polish-born radical, Jan Waclaw Machaiski (1867-1926).

In detail, scope and analysis, Gombin's presentation of Council Communism goes well beyond the similar chapter in *The Origins of Modern Leftism.* Of special interest here is the critique with which the presentation concludes. In a nutshell, the positive and the negative: "In those dark years when the Third International stood out as the incarnation of revolutionary hopes, the councillists demystified this claim while starting from the same theoretical premises as the official communists." The problem Gombin locates is that ultimately the council communists were Marxists who, while they sought a purified version, tended to be narrowly deterministic, economistic and often dogmatic in their theoretical understanding of revolution. Most fatally, they

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upheld what might be called a totemism of the factory, which they saw as the basis of modern society, the locus of revolution, and the source of meaning in life. "The worker-controlled society advocated by the councillists," Gombin observes, "turns out to be an immense factory." All of this is "foreign to contemporary revolutionary thought," and discloses the partial character of council communism: its concepts "only really grasp one facet of human alienation [at the point of production], ignoring the other aspects, including the everyday life of the individual which lies at the heart of the radical critique." The vital moment of their legacy, which Gombin sketches well, remains their insistence that "the struggle for liberation from all constraints should be autonomous."

You can give me this kind of unabashed new leftism any day of the week. But then, from the whole picture arises a problem, which is neither Gombin's alone nor readily soluble. He is doubtless right in saying (p. 9) that "the alternative to authoritarian ideology is as old as this ideology itself." This is to encourage us, namely, that the converse is also true: the alternative to liberation is as old as the desire for liberation itself. And it — domination — is also historically more potent and continuous. Suspending for now the question of the projects and pitfalls facing radicalism in the near future, I want to touch briefly, by way of concluding, on the nature of its historicity.

It seems that, like the one or two scattered pages of happiness in Hegel's book of history, the great moments of collective experience in which emancipation is tasted and appears fully within reach — the moments of lived radicalism — are not just few, but very far between. Most of historical time is occupied by control, obedience, survival, fear and worse. Now and then come the ruptures, the radical moments which, thus far, have never endured, dissolving either in defeat or in the victory of the revolutionary leaders. The first part of the problem I see is: are there any bonds between the segmented moments of lived radicalism and, if so, of what do these bonds consist?

One response which deserves to be taken seriously is that this is not an important problem, to which there is in any case a prosaic answer: radicalism is a continuum. It may be defeated but its aspirations are never obliterated; they endure in the unvoiced yearnings of the oppressed as well as in the work of theorists no matter how marginal they may be. Another response, which must also be part of the picture, is offered by the neo-Marxist tradition and runs along these lines: human history is the history of human objectification (a putting-out into the world of creative powers and desires) which for the most part takes the form of alienation, but this in turn yields an expansion of human powers and needs, which at certain junctures provides the source for revolutions. In this view, then, history as alienation, domination and so forth, and history as revolutionary rupture, are parts of a single historical continuum whose final stage will be the giant revolution by the history of alienation itself.

But there seems to be an additional dimension which, until recently, neither neo-Marxist not Gombin's radicals have explored — although the German anarchist, Gustav Landauer, briefly mentioned by Gombin, is one who has; Ernst Bloch, not mentioned, another. It concerns the apparent fact that the moments of revolutionary rupture contain experiences, forms, symbols, moods *in common*, reaching across linear historical time, suggesting that, even as there may be progress, the revolutionary ruptures embody something primal, repetitive, something containing memory traces of a pre-conscious, pre-alienated life, as well as the *same* absolutely utopian visions of a life redeemed. I have in mind here the experiences constitutive of the early, spontaneous, autonomous phases of revolutionary ruptures (and I am well aware of the argument according to

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which hopes for total transformation issue in totalitarian results). In the fascinating final chapter of her *On Revolution*, Hannah Arendt has noted the nearly uncanny way in which, at their beginnings, revolutions seem to have conveyed *directly* to one another the messages of communitarian association and voluntary political assembly of all people. From the American revolution through Hungary, 1956 (and with some changes one could extend the picture backward and forward), she has referred to the spontaneous rediscovery of this "lost treasure."

Some restraint is called for: the treasure is never pure; the community and those who constitute it bear the slime from which they come. But restraint, too, may be part of the slime to be overcome. The community of the revolutionary rupture is, in the phrase of the early civil rights movement, a blessed community; to partake of it is to sense among other things love without limits. Both the neo-Marxists and the radicals are right: even this euphoric experience is bound to the concrete conditions which precede it; the conditions against which the community each time struggles for its life. But again, this does not entirely explain what appears to be the more strange continuum that unites these communities across and irrespective of linear historical time. I think it was considerations such as these that prompted Walter Benjamin, in connection with his philosophy of history, to say that the Messiah may appear at any moment and through any opening. There may be two histories after all: the one we know well and the other one. Gombin himself is modest about all of this. In short, he notes, radicalism "presents an alternative, playing out its role before history." *That* history is the history of alienation and domination. I believe that radicalism is also part of another and quite different history, to which Gombin's book is a contribution and about which we may be able to speak with more clarity when it belongs to everyone.

Paul Breines

Mark Poster. *Critical Theory of the Family.* New York: The Seabury Press, 1978. 205 pages.

Mark Poster is not alone among those concerned with critical theory to have recently become particularly preoccupied with questions of family, psychology and sexuality. Poster's new interest has roots in his own previous work. While treating 19th and 20th century French social theory at large, his studies of Restif de la Bretonne, Fourier and Existential Marxism were already dealing with matters of generation conflict, relations between sexuality, social control and freedom, and related problems of everyday life.

But his new book reflects a certain shift in gears. It is also an ambitious undertaking to examine not only the family as an institution, but prior theories of the family as well. The book's major segment reviews the most significant contributors to the field within five broad categories: Freud, the Marxists (Engels, Reich, Horkheimer, Marcuse); American ego psychology (Erikson and Parsons); the French structuralists (Lacan, Deleuze and Guattari), and communication theorists (Bateson *et. al.,* and Laing and Cooper). He finds them either too ideological (Parsons), ahistorical (Lacan, Bateson), or partial (Laing). In the two concluding chapters, Poster outlines a series of discontinuous family types derived from European history: the bourgeois family of the mid 19th century; the aristocratic family of the 16th and 17th centuries; the peasant

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family of the same period, and the working class family of the early industrial revolution. Granting that certain remnants of non-bourgeois family types survive today in various socio-economic and ethnic pockets, Poster argues that the contemporary family is a somewhat modified form of the 19th century bourgeois model, characterized by privacy, denial of the body, a restricted source of identification for children, internalized authority, and intense but ambivalent parent-child relations.

Poster's discussions of Freud and Parsons are the crucial ones: Freud because he is central to Poster's own model, and Parsons because his theory of the family is similar to Poster's. Poster points to three distorting elements in Freud's conceptualization of the family: "(1) a therapeutic practice based on curing the individual; (2) a miscomprehension of the individual and his relation to society; (3) a false concept of society" (p. 1). Thus, Freud's "dominant concepts are the individual personality and the psychoanalytically reduced social totality" (p. 1). According to Poster, Freud failed to see the child's development in interaction with parents, who are regarded as "simple mediators" (p. 5) or "unconscious agents" (p. 8). Further, Freud assumes a "natural sexuality" (p. 8) which all parents, not just Victorians, repress (p. 6), and the relative power of the genitals as naturally rather than socially constructed (pp. 6-7). But Freud's major shortcoming, in Poster's view, is his universalization of the conditions of 19th century bourgeois experience. Thus, Freud describes the Oedipus complex as universally applicable, thereby closing off the possibility that other cultures may not repeat the Oedipal experience, and depriving the Oedipal concept of specific socio-historical meanings. (p. 25).

Talcott Parsons, in Poster's argument, defined the evolution of civilization by the process of modernization, characterized by increasing specialization and differentiation of social institutions and functions. In this evolution, the family has been stripped of its pre-modern production and education functions, although its increased specialization as a socializing agent indicates not the collapse of the nuclear family, but its greater efficiency in maintaining the equilibrium that for Parsons emerges from the modernizing process.

Poster's handling of Freud and Parsons is of a piece. He regards both as having been reasonably successful in their efforts to describe the family life they respectively knew: the mid-19th century European bourgeois family, and the early to mid-20th century middle-class American family. As in his analysis of Freud, Poster criticizes Parsons for universalizing his model across history and cultures (p. 80), and for accepting, even glorifying, contemporary sex roles in which only the husband-father is able to connect the family (himself, wife-mother, and children) with society. This assumption insures Parson's claim that the modern nuclear family, specialized as a socializing agent, is the most efficient form of family organization. Parson's theories, Poster stresses, have had a substantial impact on sociologists and historians, who following his lead have sought the "fit" between family and society, "the parallel origins and ultimate congruence of industrial capitalist society with the nuclear family" (p. 83). But, as Poster argues, the nuclear family emerged before industrialization; nor did industrialization lead either immediately or at all social levels to the nuclear family. Hence, Poster rejects Parson's theories with their unitary view of social change, since "there can be no linear, continuous, homogeneous view of the history of the family, no one-to-one match between the economy and the family, and no privileging of the traits of the nuclear family as the index and standard for all others" (pp. 83-84).

These criticisms yield Poster's own contributions. The initial task of a theory of the family, he proposes, is to concentrate on the "precise determination of family structure

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by a set of categories" (p. 141). We cannot begin to approach the question of how or why family structure changes until we determine exactly what the family is at certain historical junctures. Thus, Poster rejects those models of family structure based on either the number of family members or the number of generations represented within it on the grounds that such information reveals nothing about the nature of family life and the relations among its members. To develop adequate categories of understanding family structure, Poster turns to Freudian psychology (p. 144ff). Through an examination of child-rearing within the family, he discovers important information regarding the emergence of both age and sex hierarchies.

Poster's main conclusion is simple though not insignificant: "Family history is now conceptualized as discontinuous, non-linear and non-homogeneous." Such an approach contrasts with the unitary, continuous and homogeneous models of patterns of family change, variously represented as movement from sociability toward privacy (Ariès); toward modernity (Shorter), or toward empathy (de Mause). As Poster sees matters, it is impossible to talk about *the* family, since within European history there are the four previously mentioned types of family structure, each with its own history, origin, forms of affective relations, and so forth (p. 197).

The mid-19th century bourgeois family is characterized by low fertility and mortality rates, and by an increasingly free choice of marriage patterns as the control of substantial wealth is replaced by salaried jobs as a source of income. Sex roles are rigid and children come to occupy an increasingly important place, with parent-child relations characterized by an historically novel intensity of emotion and intimacy. Another novelty, privacy, becomes a virtue; in certain respects, the family is increasingly separated from society. Children are breastfed by their mothers, whose occupation tends increasingly to be that of childcare. The anal stage of infant development is fraught with anxiety since the bourgeois fetish of cleanliness demands that children exchange body pleasure for parental love and approval. The bourgeois family is genitally repressive, horrified by childhood (or anybody's) masturbation, and energetically committed to the desexualization of children. The small size and relative isolation of this family type results in restricted sources of identification for children and in a scarcity of love objects (pp. 177-178).

The aristocratic family of the 16th and 17th centuries, like the peasant family of the same period, is characterized by high rates of fertility and mortality. Aristocratic marriage was primarily motivated by the desire to keep family holdings intact, having rather little to do with either love or sex; the choice of the marriage partner was a family, not an individual one. Women no less than men were considered sexual creatures and, by comparison to later bourgeois standards, sex itself was relatively open. Living space in the aristocratic household was not functionally differentiated into specific bedrooms, dining rooms and the like. Children often slept in the same rooms as the adults, and were thus witnesses to adult sexual activity. Sex roles were rigid and hierarchical, although aristocratic women were not primarily concerned with home management or child-rearing. Such activities were considered beneath their station. Children were generally raised by servants, not parents; they were normally sent to wetnurses as breastfeeding was viewed with some repulsion. There was minimal concern with toilet training since, compared to later standards, even adults were unconstrained in their performance of body activities. Since sexual life among adults was not secret and private, neither was there harsh repression of children's genital activity. Behavior was governed by norms of appropriate behavior rather than by the deep internalization of guilt characteristic of the bourgeois family of the later period.

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The distinguishing feature of the 16th and 17th century peasant family, in Poster's model, is the significance of the community, not only as a mediating factor between the family and larger society, but also as a mediation of the family's power over the individual. Social authority resides in the village community rather than in the individual father-husband. The mother's care of the child is supervised by the women of the village and, in general, individual women, though subordinate to their individual husbands, were also somewhat protected and supported by other women of the community.

Children were not the center of conjugal family life, but were circulated among families from a relatively young age as apprentices. They were either breastfed by their own mothers, or, if the family could afford it, sent out to a wetnurse. Toilet training was not tense and anxious as it would become in the bourgeois family and children's genital activity was not tightly controlled. Children were not taught to exchange body pleasure for parental love.

The working class family of the early industrial revolution retains certain elements of the peasant origins of the newly-formed proletariat, such as the strong influence of the community over the individual and the family, although this began to break down in the atomized urban environment. Until the advent of the family wage, women and children worked alongside men in the factories and factory discipline was learned by children in the workplace itself, rather than in the family. The industrial revolution created new forms of male dominance and effectively separated men and women into monosexual environments of the workplace and pub (the male domain) and the residence and community (the female sphere). Children tended to be breastfed by exhausted and malnourished mothers. Toilet training and genital control were lax, resulting in a psychic structure that was neither the anal compulsive, repressed personality of the bourgeois, nor the shame-oriented peasant.

Poster argues that the attainment of a family wage, along with the philanthropic zeal of middle class reformers, combine to produce within the working class a family structure increasingly organized around the bourgeois virtues of maternal care, domesticity and privacy. Yet, the triumph of bourgeois family structure became complete in certain parts of Europe only in the mid-20th century as suburban migration finally severed family-community ties that persisted in urban neighborhoods.

Poster follows the pattern of family development into the contemporary period, noting that certain groups (racial minorities and the impoverished) still retain non-bourgeois aspects of family life, especially with regard to child-rearing. He also notes developments which run counter to the exclusive domesticity of the private bourgeois family: the stimulation of consumption, changes in sexual behavior, and the development of modern contraception and abortion, theories of "permissive" child-rearing, and the women's movement. Yet, argues Poster, the bourgeois family structure of the 19th century survives with the privacy and isolation of the family unit, the continued legitimacy of romantic love, and the special place of the child within the family and the intimacy of parent-child relations. In spite of the decline in birth rate, high rates of divorce, day-care centers and somewhat less repressive attitudes toward childhood sexuality, Poster suggests that these basic structural features of the bourgeois family persist: the dependence of children for love and nurturance on only two adults, and the resulting intense ambivalence of the child's relation to the absolute power of the parents; the restriction of the couple's emotional and sexual needs to each other; sexual stereotyping and age hierarchies; the absence of links to the community and sociability; the internalization of authority; the domination of

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women and children — "all these *structural* features of the bourgeois family produce emotional effects which undermine the mutual recognition of people in the process of regulating their own affairs" (p. 202).

The virtues of Poster's study are its clarity in an area often beclouded by all sorts of specialized rhetoric; its stress on the discontinuous nature of family history, and the suggestive, if brief, survey it offers of the historical specificity of the four family types. Yet, there are four related problems in Poster's book: the absence of historical or immanent criticism of other family theories; limitations in his own conception of the family; resulting problems in his view of relations between family and society, and lastly, a lack of an emancipatory component in his "critical theory of the family."

In his critical survey of contending family theories, Poster's emphasis is on the need to situate the family in its socio-historical context. Ironically, however, his own analyses of Freud, Parsons, Marcuse, Erikson, Bateson, Lacan and others lack the historical specificity they require. Poster manages to connect the various theorists in a genealogy of ideas, but not through the socio-historical and ideological contexts in which each one was working. The case of Parsons is perhaps the most important. Neither his dominance nor his subsequent eclipse within American social science is explained in terms of the shifting ideological grounds that the social sciences have undergone in this country. Gouldner's *Coming Crisis of Western Sociology* is suggestive in this connection, and might usefully be consulted in an effort to historically contextualize not only the family, but its key theorists.

In his discussion of the emergence of family therapy out of developments in group therapy related to post-World War II needs to treat traumatized soldiers, and post-war developments in cybernetics, systems and communication theories, Poster does make some moves in the needed direction. But even in this instance, his discussion is based more on the conjunction of therapeutic and technical developments than upon a deeper exploration of their historical context and purposes. By contrast, Christopher Lasch's *Haven in a Heartless World,* though marred by nostalgia for an older patriarchal family, offers a forceful analysis of the roots and ideological functions of family sociology in connection with an attempted resolution of the crisis of the family in early 20th century America. Poster would have done better to be less concerned with how little or how much a particular theory approximates our presently constituted knowledge, and more with the extent to which family studies and theories are themselves constitutive elements in the processes of the family's decomposition and reconstitution. Given his introductory comment that "a critical theory, as I see it, is 'normative,' providing a basis for reform of the structure in question" (p. xix), it is ironic that Poster's treatment of family studies overlooks the constitutive and creative side of intellectual work. There is a scientific bias in Poster's methodology which undermines his nominal intent.

As to the second problem, his general conception of the family, Poster clearly avoids Parson's rigidity in writing about family as if every one contained two parents of the opposite sex and a child. His own conception is sufficiently open to take account of such contemporary phenomena as divorce, single-parent families, homosexual parents and so forth. Yet, his position remains narrow insofar as it continues to link affective life to blood or maritial ties (conjugality) and thus tends to overlook or minimize the importance of non-conjugal emotional relations.

To be sure, Poster is sensitive to feminist claims concerning the oppression of women within the modern family, their confinement to the domestic sphere and so on. But this sensitivity, like his recognition that not all families have two parents or two parents of the opposite sex, does not find its way into Poster's analytic framework. If it had, it

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might have led him to question the very concept of family itself, perhaps replacing it with the concept of "private life," which has the virtue of breaking the conjugal and consanguineous limits that are built into the concept of family. With the idea of private life, one no longer presupposes that sexuality, affective relations or child-rearing can legitimately be carried out only within the family as we know it. Conversely, it opens room to explore and advocate alternative arrangements for satisfying human needs and desires: affinity groups, communes, self-organized work cooperatives and the like.

Poster's adherence to the ultimately narrow concept of family results in two final problems in his book. First, it flaws his view of relations between individual and society, and then it prevents him from recognizing the liberatory possibilities of other, intermediary social groupings, which are rendered invisible since they are not quite part of either side of the polarized relation between family and society.

The essence of Poster's criticism of the family is that it *does not work:* it has proven incapable of meeting all the emotional and psychological needs which the family itself creates in individuals in the process of their psychic formation. Alternatively, I would suggest that what is significant about the modern family and what renders the nuclear family problematic is *the colonization of private life by the family form.* In modern society those mediating groups (neighborhood, community, women's friendship networks) which, according to Poster's models of family structure, had existed alongside and in some cases were more important than the conjugal family, have been progressively eliminated or reduced in their social importance. In effect, Poster's concession to the colonization of private life by the family form means a concession to the prevailing social division of labor between family and society within which productive and instrumental activities are arbitrarily assigned to the social (public) sphere, and affective, sexual and procreative activities to the family (private) sphere. The most important consequences of such a crude social and theoretical polarization is that the possibility of changing the way we live, either inside the family or outside of it, is largely stripped of significant dimensions. No change of family structure, as such, is likely to accomplish fundamental improvement in our lives (with regard to alienation, loneliness, possessiveness, jealousy, abuse, sexual repression, domination) as long as the social division of labor between family and society remains unaltered. As long as social-public life specifically excludes non-instrumental relations, the familly will remain the sole repository of affective life, and affective life in the "family" will remain alienated.

It would, incidentally, involve a miscategorization to propose that a challenge to the social division of labor between family and society, between affective life and instrumental life, could be assured through such minor adjustments as are currently under way in the *sexual* division of labor, as women take paid employment in increasing numbers, or sometimes even take "masculine" jobs. As it happens, even the sexual division of labor has not been reformed, but rather variegated by this process. The addition of paid work to women's "real" place within the sexual division of labor —home and family — has simply added to the division between women and men a further division between those women who work only inside the home and those who work both inside and outside the home, and has no significant impact on the social division of labor between private-affective life within the family and public-instrumental life outside of it.

As women enter the wage work force, deserting if only for part of the day the domestic sphere, they are compelled to undergo the same process of "neutering" that has resulted in the creation of the contemporary masculine personality characterized by withdrawal from the process of family life on a daily basis and a relationship to

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family life as a consumer of the nurturance that is ideally available there. Contemporary "egalitarianism" seeks to integrate the unequal (women) by changing them so that they may become identical to the equal (men); it fails to re-define the new parts within a whole, which would have to consist of access for men to the affective, "female" experiences in the home, family and elsewhere, that men, too, might perhaps develop a less instrumental, more nurturing, personality.

What is desirable is a fundamental recognition of the work process so that it might become more human by including those aspects of human life which had traditionally been defined not as human, but as exclusively *female*, and therefore have had no place within the sphere of work and production: procreation, affectivity and nurturance. In other words, social production must come to accommodate pregnancy, children, and the irrational spontaneity of emotional life which, as long as they are excluded from social and public life, will remain under the care of specialists, most likely women, in the fragile domain of the family. This humanization of work and the full development of the individual through interpersonal relations beyond present family forms could initially proceed from the development, reinforcement and expansion of whatever intermediary groups currently combining both instrumental and affective relations: affinity groups, cooperatives, communies, work collectives, communities of various sorts.

For all of Poster's interest in, and openness to, new ways of living, he offers no positive conception of social transformation. There is no substantial link in his writing between the present and the future other than the bare fact of dissatisfaction and unhappiness of individuals within the present family form. Poster has provided a valuable insight into the discontinuous history of the family, but a critical theory of the family that would be normative and provide some basis for the reformation of private, and therefore public, life, will require more than an awareness of the family's shortcomings. What is required in terms of family history is a detailed chronicle of the progressive polarization between private life and public life, in which the modern family is revealed as an alienated and colonized form that private life assumes in the present, and finally, the theoretical and practical rupture of the identity of affectivity with conjugality.

Susan Wheeler

Thomas Szasz. *Karl Kraus and the Soul Doctors.* Baton Rouge: Louisiana University Press, 1976.

Harry Zohn, ed. *In These Great Times: A Karl Kraus Reader.* Montreal, 1976.

Harry Zohn, ed. *Half-Truths and One-and-a-half Truths: Selected Aphorisms of Karl Kraus.* Montreal, 1976.

Frederick Ungar, ed. *No Compromise: Selected Writings of Karl Kraus.* New York: Frederick Ungar Publishing Co., 1977.

When I first became interested in Kraus more than 30 years ago, he was an exciting memory for a few Jewish refugees. Kraus was then frequently regarded as the greatest

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master of the German language, while literary histories almost never even mentioned him. In the late 1940s, Kraus' writings, chiefly *Die Fackel,* the journal he wrote and published from 1899 to 1934 (from 1911 on without other contributors) and the scanty, mostly pre-war secondary literature, were available in the Rare Book rooms of a few major university libraries and, usually, as very incomplete sets, in the homes of emigré Krausians.

Slowly, articles, dissertations and books began to appear. By the 1960s, students of *Germanistik* came to know who Kraus was. Yet he remained inaccessible to the monolingual American reader until the publication of the translations under review.

Born into a prosperous Jewish family in a small Bohemian town in 1874, Kraus lived in Vienna from the age of two. As many of his peers, he went to the university more to educate himself according to his inclinations that to learn a profession. By the time he began to publish *Die Fackel,* he had published in many journals, unsuccessfully attempted a career as an actor, and turned down the position of feuilletonist offered to him by Vienna's most prestigious newspaper, the *Neue Freie Presse.*

His life's activity consisted mostly of commenting on the world around him as he saw it through the press, and on the press itself as a business — especially that part of it dominated by Jews. But his interests changed, and so did his style and *Die Fackel*'s format. In the early years, one of Kraus' main interests was sexuality, and the way it was dealt with by the press. During World War I, the intensification of stupidity, greed and callousness in a society dominated by capital became the focus of his gigantic play, *Die letzten Tage der Menschheit* (*The Last Days of Mankind*) — a horrible-satirical document as well as a model for later playwrights. Its occasional Marxist terminology, however, should not be misunderstood: Kraus was not an ideological or philosophical thinker. When the Austrian Social Democrats' cultural politics came to coincide with those of the cultural establishment, Kraus did not hesitate to break with them.

While his constant theme was the criticism of his opponents' language, his own witty language accounted for much of his popularity. Kraus never presented any concrete suggestions for a better system. In fact, Kraus, who had written of world destruction and the last days of mankind, became speechless when the Nazis came to power in Germany. As has been frequently pointed out, events exceeded his satire. His last voluminous *Fackel* of 1934 and his posthumously published *Dritte Walpurgisnacht* (perhaps best translated as *Third Witches' Sabbath*) seem like the babblings of a broken man. When Kraus died in 1936, what remained of his earlier following did so largely out of loyalty to Kraus.

Most of the recent interest in Kraus is similar to the case of Benjamin and Adorno. For whatever reasons, the novel has not fared well in post-war West Germany. Thus, there has been a vacuum which has been filled by various other genres: by *Sachliteratur* (non-fiction), letters, memoirs and, strikingly, by the essay. Benjamin and Adorno knew each other and were interested in Kraus, while Kraus was not interested in them. Their Marxism can be considered at least a veneer: Kraus' was not even a flirtation. Benjamin spent a year writing a three-part piece entitled "Karl Kraus," in which poetic metaphors open to a variety of interpretations, with Kraus used as a starting point for the expression of his own misgivings about various aspects of the world.[1] In

1. In this work, some poetic images such as one comparing Kraus to Rumpelstiltskin are vivid, but bear little relation to the real Kraus. Occasionally, there is a well expressed comment on Kraus' work, such as that he "understands the word of the other in his own mouth as a *corpus delicti* and his own word as the judging one" or a clear expression of agreement with Kraus' sexist views of prohibition, love, and manliness. For the most part, however, the essay is a shapeless

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his letters, Benjamin's references to Kraus alternate between superlative praise and extreme disappointment. They include horror at Kraus' capitulation before Austro-fascism, as well as Benjamin's claim that this compelled him to study Kraus further.

Adorno's interest in Kraus seems to have been much less extensive. His essay, which bears the title of Kraus' volume *Sittlichkeit und Kriminalität* (*Morality and Crime*), states that Kraus' book — a critique of sexual morality, legislation and legal practice in the first decade of the 20th century — had retained its timeliness. In language less poetic and less clear than Benjamin's and Kraus', Adorno clumsily attempted to explain some of Kraus' most lucid passages.

I

The main purpose of Szasz's *Karl Kraus and the Soul Doctors* is to attack Freud and psychoanalysis. Szasz paints a picture in which Kraus and all who agreed with him appear white, while Freud and those who either criticized Kraus or were criticized by him appear black. In this simplistic scheme, moreover, translations from Kraus' work done by people with whom Szasz disagrees also land on the black side. After dozens of books and hundreds of articles have been written about Kraus, Szasz can publish his 100-page text, which not only presents Kraus' clever quips as a serious critique of Freud and the psychiatric establishment, but "overlooks" Kraus' view of women, Jews, language and other subjects. Finally, there is a section of "translations" of excerpts from Kraus' work, generally limited to his middle period, including jokes, puns, and sarcastic aphorisms about psychoanalysis and other subjects.

Although this book has nothing original to contribute, its distortions call for comment. It is Szasz's embarrassing superficiality coupled with arrogance that calls for a serious critique. There are no analyses of ideas or theories, only black and white divisions, adulation and hostility, errors and invectives. Szasz presents Kraus as a critic of psychiatry and psychoanalysis, which he was not (p. xiii) and systematically misunderstands Kraus' view of language. The author claims at least seven times that Kraus was not against psychoanalysis because Fritz Wittels psychoanalyzed him but that, in fact, Kraus' opposition *preceded* Wittels' text by two years. To Szasz, writers who deal with the history of psychoanalysis or with Kraus but fail to point out this detail are co-authors "of this mendacious pro-Freudian legend" (p. 26). But attacking Wittels is irrelevant, at least to the extent that Freud disapproved of Wittels' attack on Kraus. Since individual privacy was so basic to Kraus, it is plausible that he considered the attempt at analyzing him without his permission a particularly serious violation. The fact that he already disliked psychoanalysis is totally irrelevant.

According to Szasz, Wittels' analysis of Kraus was "an exercise in psychoanalytic denigration and defamation for which no special knowledge of the victim's personality is required — which can be applied to, or against, anyone and everyone" (p. 27). While Wittels' interpretation of Kraus' personality may be questionable, it is based on Kraus' unique activities and attitudes which Kraus himself either confirmed or never denied, and which thus could not be applied "to anyone and everyone."

Kraus disliked psychiatry for several reasons: its newness and its claim to be scientific, however, alone would have sufficed. The fact that psychiatrists and their clients were overwhelmingly Jewish and middle class also contributed to his distaste. Although Kraus ridiculed psychiatry and psychoanalysis — it is not clear if he actually

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mass of syntactically connected words, sprinkled with misunderstandings of some of Kraus' most essential positions. Reacting to Benjamin's work on Kraus, Gershom Scholem criticizes Benjamin's use of Marxist vocabulary in dealing with results gained independently of materialist methods.

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distinguished between the two — they never preoccupied him as intensely as, for example, World War I, the Jews, or the press. Without suggesting possible motives, Szasz suspects a sinister plot by Kraus scholars to prevent the public from knowing Kraus' rejection of psychoanalysis and criticizes those who do not discuss the topic.[2]

Szasz focuses on three points, none of which enlighten the reader about Kraus or soul doctors: his denial of the existence of mental illness, his denial of any positive contribution by Freud, and his own amazement that the world is not informed about Kraus' views of those subjects. Accordingly, "...a history of the formative years of psychoanalysis without Kraus...is like the cultural history of Europe during the French revolution without Edmund Burke, or the political history of America without the *Anti-Federalist Papers*, or the medical history of infectious diseases without Ignaz Semmelweis, or the contemporary history of Russia without Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn" (xii-xiii). There is nothing either in the extensive literature on Kraus or on the history of psychiatry that corroborates this view in the least. This is not all, nor the worst. *Only* Kraus kept his principles and practices uncontaminated. If scholars whom he believes to be enemies of Kraus (he knows only those who write in English) are always "wrong" and even their translations are bad (in Szasz's language "execrable"), Freud seems actually sinister: evil itself. What is hard to understand is how Kraus, whose works have always been available to German readers, remained unknown as the author of what Szasz calls "brilliant criticism of institutional psychiatry."[4]

Szasz quotes "authorities," but not in their areas of expertise. Here a general educational background would have been useful.[5] His reference to Egon Friedell is typical: having stated that Friedell held Kraus in the highest esteem, and that his views of Freud and psychoanalysis were probably influenced by Kraus, Szasz proceeds

2. This applies even to small publications such as Rollet's, devoted only to some aspects of Kraus. In this particular case, Szasz must be referring to the article by Edwin Rollett (not Erwin Rollet), "Karl Kraus" in *Oesterreichische Literaturgeschichte*, ed. Castle, vol. 3 (Vienna, 1934). Thus he criticizes Rudolph Binion's book on Lou Andreas Salomé: "although her interests besides psychoanalysis were literature and philosophy, Binion never mentioned Kraus" (p. 95). And why should she have? What Kraus had in common with Frau Lou is only that they were contemporaries, and that each occupied a marginal position in literature. As for philosophy, Kraus was as little concerned with it as an intellectual living in Vienna at that time could possibly be, and Frau Lou's chief connection with philosophy consisted in her friendship with Nietzsche.

3. Szasz throws invectives at all writings identified with the enemy. Margaret Mitcherlich's psycho-historical article, written on the occasion of Kraus' 100th birthday, "bespeaks an arrogant insensitivity bordering on stupidity."

4. There was, to be sure, one work in which Kraus expressed — in poetic form — his opposition to psychoanalysis at some length, namely *Traumstück*, a short play. But Szasz, apparently, knows it only from a misunderstood quotation by Heinrich Fischer. So he takes it for one of Kraus' "countless very thorough essays about the study of language." Kraus' essays about language incidentally did not "deal with its study" but attempted to analyze specific problems, and were not countless, but fitted into a very slender volume published after Kraus' death. Szasz piles unproven statements on unproven statements. Taking for granted that Kraus "in 1927 ... deserved more rather than less admiration than in 1906" in conjunction with Freud's ranking of Kraus in 1927 "at the very bottom of [his] ladder of esteem," Szasz concludes that "the disproportion of Freud's esteem testifies to Kraus' effectiveness in unmasking the great unmasker." How this is so remains unclear.

5. Thus, a detailed analysis of an extensive but irrelevant quotation by George Steiner (p. 98) followed by a lengthy passage by Szasz about Jonathan Swift (p. 99) shows, apart from extremely sloppy language, not only the irrelevance of both, but also factual misinformation about Kraus as well as about basic facts of modern European history. There is no evidence that Kraus derived his views of language from Fritz Mauthner. The passage which Szasz quotes from Mauthner's *Language and Psychology* expresses a view of language that is diametrically opposed to Kraus'. While to Kraus no relation closer than that between language and reality is possible, Mauthner, according to Szasz, believed that language "can never give us an insight into reality" (p. 47).

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to point out that they "constitute....the first fully articulated critique of psychoanalysis as a species of Jewish gnosticism, and as a collectivist-revolutionary movement against individualism, freedom and dignity." Even if one overlooks the individualistic rather than collectivist character of psychoanalysis, Friedell's remarks about Freud in his three-volume *History of Western Culture* (1927), while critical, do not mean what Szasz claims, nor do they contain any relevant reference to Kraus. In fact, Kraus is briefly mentioned only once. But even if Friedell's statements supported Szasz's views, why should the opinions of an actor who surprised his contemporaries by writing a stimulating, though extremely biased, history of culture be relevant in this context?

In addition to covering a large number of topics in his attempts to rescue Kraus' "suppressed" (read: non-existent) psychoanalytic *oeuvre* from oblivion and venting his inexhaustible rage on "the psychoanalytic establishment," Szasz also finds room in this small book to discuss several issues unrelated to his stated theme. Predictably, in spite of inner contradictions, he wants to show that Kraus was not anti-Semitic.[6] It is not true, however, that Kraus' decisiveness in "the matter of being converted to Catholicism made him a deviant from the social norms of his age and class." In taking that step, he was one of the many thousands of Jews in Austria who formally became Catholics but never gave evidence of concomitant beliefs. Kraus was as much and as little a Jew as most educated, middle-class Central European Jews of the time. In spite of his occasional metaphorical use of religious terminology, there is no evidence that Kraus ever turned toward religion which, according to Szasz, coincided with his turning against psychiatry.

Szasz's fantasies range from ascribing to Kraus fifteen warning references to Hitler before 1930, to feeling that "a civilized person's first obligation was to be civil." To his idiosyncratic picture of Kraus, Szasz adds another feature: his designation of Kraus as a "nobel rhetorician," as distinguished from Freud, a "base" one.

In his translations, which fill a third of the book, Szasz labors under the simplistic notion that they should only rarely be faithful, never literal, and that, if they only express the gist of his anti-psychoanalytic bias, *they will be right*. While they often provide an approximate idea of Kraus' meaning, in many instances they totally miss the point and lack the sparkle of Kraus' language. Szasz often translates with a general term where Kraus uses a specific one, or deviates from Kraus' meaning either when it suits his own bias or for no apparent reason. Often, he abbreviates and excludes whole clauses or sentences, although Kraus, who spent nights and days pondering over a comma, surely did not use extra words just to take up space.

Having stated that his own German has declined through decades of non-use, Szasz admits that he used translations by his relatives and a friend as the basis for his own renditions, which he describes as not "slavish," nor "verbatim." If the idea of translating from a language one does not fully know seems absurd, it is particularly so

6. Szasz explains Kraus' anti-Semitic reputation in terms of the fact that "the Jewish intellectual [why intellectual?] criterion for approval is based on the maxim 'If you are not with us, you are against us' " (p. 9). He does not see a conflict between his insistence that Kraus is not an anti-Semite and Kraus' strong praise of Otto Weininger's work, *Sex and Character* — the central theme of which is the claim that Jews are inferior because of their predominantly female characteristics. Szasz approvingly quotes and comments on Weininger, and does not miss the opportunity to lash out at Freud for defaming Weininger as crazy (p. 145). It is hard to understand how Szasz, whose interest in Kraus focused on the satirist's view of psychoanalysis and who implies he has studied Weininger's views of sexuality together with Kraus', should have totally misunderstood one of Kraus' most basic beliefs concerning relations between the sexes, i.e., that man's *Geist* is inspired by woman's sensuality, and thus could claim that "unlike Freud, Kraus did not want to derive spiritual values from natural drives" (p. 55).

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in the case of Kraus' work — especially his aphorisms. Although it has been argued that aphorisms, like poetry, are untranslatable, Harry Zohn and Frederick Ungar have shown that a very competent job can be done. To do justice to this section of Szasz's book, however, the length of a critique would have to exceed that of the book by about as much as the Talmud exceeds the length of the Ten Commandments.[7] If it were not for Kraus' near-obsession with misspellings, misprints and faulty punctuation, it would seem petty to point out that in Szas's book there are at least six of them on page 15 alone. At any rate, Szasz is unqualified to write this book because he does not know either Kraus or German, and is neither willing nor able to look beyond his own accustomed cave.[8]

II

As for the other works, Zohn's efforts are excellent. He is a superb translator of material requiring not only the mastery of the language but broad knowledge and subtlety.[9] His concise introductory essays present what is essential about Kraus. As I have argued elsewhere,[10] most Kraus scholars are too uncritical, and this is to some extent also true of Zohn. Thus, although as the editor of the excellent anthology of Austrian literature, *Der farbenvolle Untergang* (*The Colorful Sundown*), he gave feuilletons a prominent place, he does not take issue with Kraus' view of feuilletons summarized in *Half-Truths and One-and-a-half Truths* as "a deceitful mixture of

7. A few examples, however, will be necessary. Predictably, idiomatic expressions were troublesome. Thus, in "for this return trip...I volunteer as a coachman" (p. 114), Szasz misses the point because he obviously does not understand the idiomatic meaning of *Retourkutsche* in the original, i.e., getting back at someone verbally. In the case of Kraus' "Si duo faciunt idem, non est idem," the literal translation "if two do the same thing, it is not the same thing" is the only right one. Instead, Szasz, or one of his relatives, translates "if two do it, it becomes the same thing," which misses the point, as does his equally pointless alternate version: "it never becomes the same thing" (p. 115). If a literal translation is not necessarily the right one, a far-fetched one is not either. It is evidently to avoid literality at all cost that Szasz translates *Niedermann*, a proper name in a dream, as "vulgar person" (p. 118n). Actually Lowman — the literal translation of both components of the name — is more accurate, not only because "low" does not always mean "vulgar," and" does not have the generic meaning "man" has in English, but also because Lowman happens to be a proper name in English (p. 118). "Totschweiger" is translated with "Those Who Kill People by Keeping Silent about Them" (p. 84), when the actual meaning is less violent: "those who make believe people are dead by keeping silent about them;" *Seelenleben* (p. 104) does not, as Szasz believes, mean "soul" but "life of the soul."

8. As for Szasz's criticisms of my own book, which are, often with invectives, sprinkled throughout the book, they amount to a heavy concentration of unsubstantiated claims. While he is right that I consider anti-Semitism inexcusable — although I do not know how he gained this information — this is not true of "anti-psychologism" — a word Kraus scholars would hesitate to use. My "wrongheadedness" is, according to Szasz. also evidenced by my conviction that Freud was a great man, whose work must not be questioned (which I never claimed) and in my comment that Kraus "managed to live through that revolution of the science of the human mind, centered in Vienna, without the least understanding of its significance and cultural-historical implications." To Szasz, this is evidence that I am an admirer of Kraus (p. 94).

9. Only with regard to the "Selected Poems" translated by Max Knight and Karl F. Ross I would in a few instances suggest a smoother or more accurate translation. Since, contrary to Kraus' view, there is not automatic harmony between thought and verse, often no satisfactory translation is possible and should therefore not be attempted. *Mein Widerspruch* (*My Ambivalence*, pp. 148-149) is a case in point. An additional problem is presented by the deep differences in the sense of humor of different peoples, and by the necessity, in many cases, to be familiar with the circumstances which elicited a humorous remark. A factor that intensifies these problems with Kraus texts is that a point often hinges on one word, on its sound or double meaning. By contrast, a statement which conveys an intended meaning while literally expressing a paradox survives in the target language with its humorous effect intact.

10. Cf. my "Karl Kraus and his Critics," *Modern Austrian Literature*, 8:1-2 (1975).

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intellect and information, reportage and literature." Similarly, Kraus' collaboration with Hugo von Hofmannsthal, Richard Strauss and Max Reinhardt is not, as Zohn claims, of "dubious artistic and journalistic" value, and it is doubtful whether "the accuracy of Kraus' insight into human nature can be verified everyday" (p. 13).

With few exceptions, Kraus' aphorisms are not concise definitions of a general principle, but clever quips and concise expressions of flashes of insight. Like spices, they enliven a stew, but are unpalatable in heavy concentration. If encouraged by the applause of his public, Kraus decided to publish volumes of his aphorisms, this provided readers familiar with the context with an opportunity to re-experience the *bon mots*. With readers less acquainted with Kraus and his world, arid stretches appear between enjoyable quotable remarks.

Translations of aphorisms face additional problems: not only are English-speaking audiences likely to be strangers to the environment which produced them, but there is the greater problem of the differences in the senses of humor of different peoples. Thus, the three volumes which became known as Kraus' collected aphorisms contain, in addition to some genuine aphorisms, many long paragraphs merely stating opinions rather than illuminating flashes or well-encapsulated, pleasing truths. Most of these opinions, furthermore, deal with people that Kraus disliked. Similarly, Kraus' prejudices about women also appear in his aphorisms — although not as explicitly as in his essays (e.g., "Nothing is more unfathomable than a woman's superficiality," in *Half-Truths and One-and-a-half Truths*, p. 99). Since he considered women prostitutes by instinct, all would be well if prostitution were legalized. On the other hand, Kraus also felt that "A woman is occasionally quite a serviceable substitution for masturbation" (*ibid.*, p. 102).

Perhaps it was Zohn's main intention to present the kind of sketch of Kraus which actually emerges. If there is something in Kraus' life analogous to the faith around which other lives revolve, it is writing. We know this not only from the dozens of volumes of his printed work, but also from his correspondence. Thus, he writes: "To enjoy the work of another mind, I must first take a critical attitude toward it — transform reading, that is, into work. Which is why I shall more easily and more gladly write a book than read one" (*ibid.*, p. 35). Writing is equated with prayer: "When I take up my pen, nothing can happen to me. Fate, remember that!" (p. 46). In Zohn's words, "his writing is the rambling monologue of the worried man who talks incessantly to keep the demons at bay" (p. 19).

III

Ungar's edition of *No Compromise* would have pleased Kraus by its unpretentiousness. A cooperative effort of several translators including Ungar, it presents a clear picture of Kraus' writings in one volume. Except for a few minor mistakes, such as, e.g., that Kraus was born in Moravia and that Kraus was not an anti-Semite, Ungar does a good job. The selections consist of essays written before 1919, thus excluding the period when Kraus' language ceased to consist of easily traceable chains of reasoning. They also include well-selected "glossaries" reflecting Viennese mores; letters by Kraus or by the *Verlag die Fackel* (which was also Kraus'), and reprints from *Die Fackel* dealing with the libel suits against Kraus by journalists who enriched themselves by writing about the war.

A long section contains portions of Kraus' mammoth drama, *The Last Days of Mankind*, to which no translator could possibly do justice because of the multiplicity of dialects and idiosyncratic expressions in the original. The aphorism section, however, comes off like a somewhat faded reflection of the original. While Ungar's

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aphorisms express general truths more frequently than Zohn's, they occasionally fall flat because the allusions are unfamiliar to American readers. The last section includes some of Kraus' poems. Of these, the ones which were translated by Albert Bloch nearly 40 years ago are as good as the originals, while some of D.G. Wrights' attempts to improve them only result in a choppy prose. Unger has produced a labor of love: an unpretentious anthology of generally well chosen translations with a well balanced introduction.

At any rate, Kraus is still worth reading because of his respect for good, clear language, and his concern with right and wrong can influence receptive readers. This, however, is not true of Kraus' last phase, when his own language became incomprehensible and he began theorizing about it. He was often right when he criticized what the papers wrote, but when he began to see cosmic significance in his own comments, they became considerably less valuable. Kraus was prejudiced and an unsystematic thinker, although he did attack greed, pretentiousness, insensitivity, cowardice and lack of imagination. While after 1930 he himself abandoned his strict use of language, his earlier writings provide an important corrective to the subsequent cult of obscurity and a critical tool in unveiling the inhumanities of modern culture.

Wilma Iggers

José Maria Maravall. *Dictadura y disentimiento politico. Obreros y Estudiantes bajo el Franquismo*. Madrid: Alfaguara, 1978. 274 pages.

Although its social and cultural heritage persists, Francoism is over. After 1977, a new period began in Spain with a new constitution, a new parliament, and mayors democratically elected for the first time since 1933. The dictator's death was a break, but these other legal breaks are more significant. A difficult transitional stage, marked by popular struggles, repression and a rightist regrouping in order to survive, has melted into a new institutional framework of liberal-parliamentarian democracy, which has resulted in a "disenchantment" for large masses of the population that exceeded another type of dynamic, leftist future. In this context, it is finally possible to see Francoism in retrospect in order to understand how a blatant neo-fascist dictatorship could last so long and, most importantly, to draw appropriate lessons for the coming years. Such a dictatorship is not merely a limited national problem, but a phenomenon understandable only in terms of a broader set of economic, political and social problems. This is Maravall's point of departure.

A sociology professor at the Universities of Madrid and Oxford and a member of the Spanish Socialist Party, Maravall focuses on the two most important movements of the anti-Franco opposition — workers' and students' movements. He adopts three approaches: the socio-economic-institutional approach; another one which stresses the influence of the cultural and physical environments; and finally, one focusing on strategic and organizational needs. In this regard, Maravall's book falls in line with other works by non-Spanish authors such as Lockwood, Parkin, Kerr, Bulmer, Mallet, Wilson, Zald and Ash. The author employs considerable statistical materials, which he qualifies with other "qualitative" information obtained from in-depth interviews with representative samples of workers' and students' leaders. This makes the study not only well-structured, but also pleasant to read.

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In the introductory chapter, Maravall broadly characterizes the Spanish dictatorship as a non-democratic system of capitalist class domination. Such a comprehensiveness sometimes causes indecision, as, for example, when Maravall criticizes Friedrich's, Brzezinski's and Linz's theories, arguing that they move within a strictly political *continuum* of authoritarianism-totalitarianism which neglects other influencing angles when dealing with different non-democratic regimes. But later he relies on them when outlining the stages of Franco's dictatorship. The author is conscious that Francoism was not only "fascism" or "authoritarianism" or "reaction" or "dictatorial capitalist accumulation," but all of them together throughout its history, and consequently makes the effort to reach a synthesis. The effort is welcome, although it could have been somewhat more precise. A similar timidity appears in the critique of functional modernization theories maintaining that the political is an appendix of the technological.

The most interesting section is the one dealing with the students' movement. Here Maravall describes concrete mechanisms of student political socialization, such as the influence of liberal-minded families, reading, travels abroad, and peer interaction during the first months on campus. Non-Spanish readers will find very interesting Maravall's description of the boomerang effect of Franco's use of pseudo-leftist, *Falangist* (or "populist") are typified as "populist radicals," since they joined leftist organizations as a result of their "disenchantment" with official youth organizations. Maravall also discusses two more types of radical students — "consistent radicals" (people educated in oppositional environments for whom radicalism was a logical outcome) and "converted radicals" (people educated in conservative, Catholic milieux who became radical through self-reflection and interaction with other radicals at the university). As in every other country, Spain also experienced the battles between the Old and the New Left in the campuses. In this regard, Maravall shows how the peak years of the students' movement (mid and late 1960s) were characterized by the opposition between Communist-oriented factions and New Left groups — mainly the F.L.P. (Popular Liberation Front).

The chapters on the labor movement deal with long-range matters such as the problem of the relations between political parties and trade unions and the constant polemics between workers' council advocates and those emphasizing the primacy of organization. These questions are especially relevant in Spain, since they characterize the stage of underground consolidation of the labor movement beginning in the early sixties. The "veteran" socialist union, UGT (Workers' General Union) which had been virtually destroyed by repression, began to reorganize in the few zones (Asturias, Bilbao and Madrid). Its goal was to restore its former role as one of the two classical hegemonic unions during the 1930s (the other major union was the anarchist National Confederation of Labor, CNT). On the other hand, other workers' groups considered that the movement had to begin anew because of the dismantled situation, not from above, but from below, i.e., from emerging commissions within workplaces that would consolidate their strength and strategy through struggle. *Comisiones Obreras* (Workers' Commissions) were thus born. Notwithstanding the claim to being new, this group was soon strongly influenced by the Communist Party. Indeed, during Franco's last years, a frequent critique from the left was the communist leaders of the *Comisiones Obreras* such as Camacho and Sartorius hid their political perspective in order to preserve the main idea that gave birth to the union, i.e., its independence from any party (in opposition with UGT, which never hid its ties with the Socialist Party). *Comisiones Obreras* is now the leading union, followed by UGT, which, along with the parallel reorganization of the Socialist Party, began to have a substantial

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impact within the Spanish labor movement by the early 1970s.

In his analyses of the Spanish underground movement, Maravall outlines all the complex problems and debates within this movement. For example, *Comisiones Obreras* argued that presenting candidates to the manipulated official syndical elections was a means to gradually gain power. UGT, on the other hand, did not favor that indirect collaboration, reasoning that such a step helped to legitimate the dictatorship. On the whole, *Dictadura y Disentimiento Politico* constitutes a valuable contribution to an understanding of the Spanish social movements. Beginning with Eluard's beautiful motto which opens the work — *nous prendrons jour malgre la nuit* — Maravall combines the *pathos* that the memory of Franco's tunnel awakes in every progressive mind with a rigorous sociological standpoint. The result is a solid theoretical and political work.

Jose E. Rodriguez-Ibanez

Herbert I. Schiller. *Communication and Cultural Domination.* New York: M.E. Sharpe, Inc. 128 pages. $2.45. Distributed by Pantheon Books.

What is this thing called communcations? Communications is the mass media, and its apparatuses and its content. Communications is the network of wires and switches, light-beams and impulses, fibers and all kinds of other things by which modern corporations seek to oversee the channelling of order, information, knowledge and assorted other categories of messages. Communications is a consultant coming into a factory or business and designing a routing system which will institute "efficiency" *or* will facilitate "order" *or* will expediate "conflict resolution." Communications is an attempt to reconcile an increasingly universal market economy with the priorities of highly centralized corporate powers. It is a tool by which "developed" nations (or the corporate lords of the metropolis) seek to initiate "underdeveloped" nations (people on the periphery of the world market economy) into the acceptable terms of development. On a global scale, communications is a mechanism, a language, a system of belief, a way of generating "common understanding," which tends inevitably to reinforce the social relations of a capitalist world market. As "banking" is a euphemism for the routes by which monetary wealth is circulated, "communications" is a euphemism for the routing of informational wealth.

Here in the United States, however, communications is also the carrier of a fateful contradiction. On the one hand, as outlined briefly above, it is the mechanism of social and industrial order. It is the current-day embodiment of developments which find their roots early on in the 16th century where capitalists like the Fuggers of Augsburg circulated newssheets from port to port, passing requisite commercial intelligence. It is the embodiment of developments which gained further impetus from electricity; by the mid-1870's, the British empire was linked by a world-wide network of underwater telegraphic cables, insuring commerical and military cohesion. Methods of carrying information and money needed to be developed commensurate to the speed and intensity of industrial production and imperial trade. In its commitment to order, communications is likewise the contemporary, capital intensive expression of an impulse earlier defined by industrial psychology and scientific management.

At the other end of the contradiction, the most visible components of the communi-

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cations industries — the mass media — have been the public bearers of consumerized versions of the *good life*, and of the libertarian, individualistic, democratic ideals: ideals which seem to make *being an American* so special for so many. While non-corporate, autonomous voices are relatively muted in the United States of the 70's, the rights of free expression, free speech are hotly and vociferously championed by — insofar as they apply to — the corporate mass media. A spectacle of freedom, the ideology of social democracy is their property, and ultimately the legitimating propaganda of the corporate media.

It is this contradiction, and its application to the lives and aspirations of Third World people which is the subject of Herbert Schiller's recent book, *Communication and Cultural Domination*. Schiller asks the question: "Can image-making and image-disseminating enterprises, aligned with banking and industrial capital, justifiably be regarded as individuals with inalienable rights?"

For some years now, Herbert Schiller has been one of the most outspoken and widely read critics of media imperialism. His new book goes beyond his earlier volumes in many ways. In two prior works, *Mass Communications and American Empire* (New York: Augustus M. Kelly, 1969) and *The Mind Managers* (Boston: Beacon, 1973), Schiller offered a powerful vision of the ways in which American and multi-national corporations have assembled and consolidated the so-called "Free World's" access to information and imagery. In this new book, Schiller discusses the cultural impact of this consolidation on a global scale, and offers policy suggestions for the struggle against this impact.

The discussion of the impact of communications industries on the Third World is founded on a conviction that capitalism is not merely an "advanced" system of production, characterized by super-industrialization, capital intensity and the metropolis. For Schiller, industrialism isn't a *stage* toward which the rest of the world will deterministically gravitate. Rejecting such a vision of modernization, Schiller understands capitalism as a world market system which encompasses and assumes unequal development as a given. Drawing from the work of Immanuel Wallerstein (*The Modern World System*, New York: Academic Press, 1975), Schiller speaks of the capitalist world system as a "single market." Within that market there is a wide variance and disparity as to the nature and division of labor, "the modes of payment for labor," and the implementation of capital intensive technology. Central to Schiller's critique of cultural domination is the assumption that the terms and character of production "are determined in the core of that market and radiate outward." Unequal development is endemic to the system, to the perpetual detriment of those furthest from the core.

While Schiller presents this conception in a frustratingly sketchy fashion, he does make a forceful argument as to how this structure of economic imperialism also constitutes cultural plunder. With the *core* setting the terms for the world market, the communications industries within that market enforce a core-determined logic upon the cultures of the periphery. In Schiller's book, cultural modernization is revealed as but a euphemism for the systematic mangling of Third World cultures. The exports of the communications industries are poisoned candy. They present visions of development which could care less about the needs of heretofore imperialized peoples, and simultaneously work to destroy those cultural institutions by which these people can best understand and express their needs.

Beyond a presentation of the onslaught of communications in the Third World, Schiller's book deals effectively with the ethos of social democracy that permeates communications in the United States. According to Schiller, it is precisely the liberal

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ideal of a *free press* which, when transposed to the world market, provides the instrumentation for cultural domination. In an informative, historical account, Schiller shows how the principle of a "free-flow of information" has served as an essential cutting edge of American foreign policy since the early 1940's. The "free-flow" doctrine has been the "Open Door Policy" for the communications industries. As such, Schiller's account of the role of the communications industries provides an important expansion of historian William Appleman Williams' conception of "corporate liberalism," a policy by which expansionism is shrouded in the rhetoric and selective implementation of social democratic values. Since the communications industries (press, broadcasting, film and advertising in particular) have been key and conspicuous carriers of American corporate liberal ideology since the 1920's, this connection deserves further study and elaboration.

Schiller's telling critique of the "free-flow" policy is one that is shared by an increasingly loud voice from among the world's population. Witness shifts in the United Nations, and UNESCO in particular, from a celebration of "free-flow" in the 1940's and 50's, toward its more recent condemnation as the guiding principle of "cultural imperialism." Despite such shifts toward international criticism of the "free-flow" doctrine, it is still bed-rock to American foreign policy, and continues to be put forth in a tone of 18th century innocence.

While cultural domination is the mode for corporate communications everywhere (including, needless to say, in Western capitalist countries), Schiller's policy concerns are aimed primarily at those 90 plus countries that have attained political independence since World War II. He makes a strong plea for the development of independent national communications policies throughout the Third World. Aware that the critique of "free-flow" contains the possibility of nationally defined modes of cultural domination, he focuses on the need for policies which will ensure wide popular participation in communications decision making. Unfortunately, the writing here is too skeletal. The reader does not get much of a sense as to what these policies would look like. For example, after saying that national policy efforts should "be directed against the external, dominating network of media information," and at the same time "promote widespread popular participation," Schiller points us toward "guerilla and liberation techniques of community involvement" without a word about the content of those techniques or their more general applicability. At times his discussion of the ways in which American-produced media imagery embodies "powerful forms of cultural domination" is similarly cryptic, and could use considerable elaboration and examples.

This is not to argue with Schiller's thesis and the direction it takes. Rather, it is to raise a criticism with the writing of the book. It is too much of a short-hand. More presentation, interpretation and explanation of evidence would make Schiller's book more persuasive to those who need to be familiarized with the problems he is addressing. Even in an afterword, where Schiller offers the case study of Chile, and speaks of the connection between the "free-flow" doctrine and the overthrow of the Popular Unity government, the argument could bear more development in serving its intended, explanatory purpose.

These are the flaws in a book which is otherwise extremely important. *Communication and Cultural Domination* is a vital and political book which further expands the penetrating analysis of one of the world's foremost critics of the American media establishment and of the world information order.

Stuart Ewen

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SHORT JOURNAL REVIEWS:

CAPITAL AND CLASS, No. 5 (Summer 1978)

Conference of Socialist Economists, 55 Mount Pleasant, London WC1, England. $10 per year (3 issues). Since the journal is a continuation of the "Bulletin" of the Conference of Socialist Economists, most of the papers have to do with problems of economic analysis or political economy. The more important papers are: SIMON CLARKE, *"Capital, Fractions of Capital and the State: Neo-Marxist Analyses of the South African State."* A long review essay of left-wing writing on South Africa which criticizes functionalism and presents Clarke's views on who is right, whose insight needs following up, and what Marx meant by capital in general, fractions of capital, etc. I.I. RUBIN, *"Abstract Labor and Value in Marx's System."* A 1927 lecture by the now rediscovered and fashionable Soviet economist which declares that when both the analytical and dialectical methods are used, many apparent contradictions in Marx's writings on value theory vanish, and we recognize 'abstract universal labor as the content of value.' The reformulations lead to "an uninterrupted logical interrelation of all the categories listed" — a venerable objective in Marxist discourse. The continuing debates on the same set of concepts suggest, however, that the logical finality may be apparent to few besides the author. MARK HARRISON, *"The Soviet Economy in the 1920s and 1930s."* A good review of the current state of research in this area. In particular, it indicates that much valuable work has recently been published in the Soviet Union, which lends support to the "new orthodoxy" that collectivization of agriculture released little surplus used for accumulation but *was* a process of the transformation of the social relations of production which is itself an aspect of the Marxist notion of 'primary socialist accumulation.' There is an important bibliography that students of Soviet society shouldn't miss. PHILIP ARMSTRONG, ANDREW GLYN, JOHN HARRISON, *"The Defense of Value — A Reply to Ian Steedman."* This is by far the most valuable piece in this issue. It is, however, a discussion of high economic theory. The onslaught of Steedman fails, for the only weakness clearly demonstrated by the authors is Steedman's occasional assertion of more than is strictly warranted by his arguments. The other points have to do with epistemology, the role of approximate data which could be used by econometricians working within Marxian theory, aspects of Marxist theory that Steedman excludes from his discussion, the claim that Steedman's conception of Marxist economic theory is sterile and static, and assertions that Steedman's deficiencies can be overcome with the use of the very concepts in Marx that Steedman, in a logically impeccable examination, rejects. PB

CAPITAL AND CLASS, No. 6 (Fall 1978)

DAVID HENSON, *"Trade Unionism and the Struggle for Liberation in South Africa."* A long, readable analysis of recent politics in South Africa, which, unlike Clarke's paper in the previous issue, does contain much useful information about South Africa. A.T. AUMEERUDDY, B. LAUTIER, R.G. TORTAJADA, *"Labor Power and the State."* An inquiry into the foundation of the state in capitalist modes of production. It seeks to provide a necessary locus for the state and its involvement in the process of capitalist accumulation similar to the relation Marx established between rent and the class of rentiers in Volume III of *Capital*. But whereas Marx shows how rent can be located within the production and realization of surplus value using land, the authors argue that the reproduction of the laborers qua free wage-earners is not internal to the production and realization of surplus value but involves labor processes and control processes external to the capitalist production process, or the state. SUSAN HIMMELWEIT, SIMON MOHUN, *"The Anomalies of Capital."* This is an indirect review of Ian Steedman's *Marx after Sraffa*. Unlike Armstrong, Glyn and Harrison in No. 5 of *Capital and Class*, the authors avoid a frontal confrontation in defense of the labor theory of value by seeking to discover fallacies or sterilities in Steedman. On the contrary, they appear to grant that Steedman is virtually impregnable in what he has demonstrated, yet this is said to apply rather to a Ricardian conception of value theory, not Marx's. The argument is that Sraffa and Steedman have discovered difficulties in Ricardo and have corrected them in their recommendations so that the result is useful in exposing the inconsistencies and inadequacies of neo-classical economic analysis. Marx, however, is said to be quite different: richer, more thorough, and free of the confusions of Ricardo. It has to do with the role of 'abstract labor': a concept which, it is claimed, addresses the formulations or necessary conditions for there to be commodity production and Ricardo's economies. PB

*This section has been compoled by John Fekete, department of English, Trent, University, Peterborough, Ont. K9JFB1, Canada. The following have contributed reviews: Dick Howard, Larry Irons, John Keane, M.P. Moss, Peter Murphy, Harland Prechel, Greg Renault, Robert Rucher, Brian Singer, Susan Wheeler, and Nancy Wood.

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CRIME AND SOCIAL JUSTICE: ISSUES IN CRIMINOLOGY
Vol. 10 (Fall-Winter, 1978)

This journal emerged from the demise of the Berkeley School of Criminology several years ago. As a result, *Crime and Social Justice* and *Issues in Criminology* merged. This issue contains three highly interesting essays, two of which have direct relevance to critical theory: GEORGE RUSCHE, *"Labor Market and Penal Sanction: Thoughts on the Sociology of Criminal Justice."* Rusche's essay was originally submitted as a proposal for research to the Frankfurt Institute of Social Research in 1931 and appears for the first time in its English translation by Gerda Dinwiddie. It is here that the essential theme of Rusche's collaborated work with Otto Kirchheimer (*Punishment and Social Structure*) is formulated: "there is in all societies in which workers are scarce a tendency away from corporal punishment and the extermination of the criminal." Thus, Rusche is able to differentiate the development of punishment in the United States from that in Europe. "In America, punishment developed differently than in Europe because there was a greater demand for workers during mercantilism." IVAN JANKOVIC, *"Social Class and Criminal Sentencing."* Jankovic' work is largely a response to research by Chiricos and Waldo (A.S.R. 1975) on criminal sentencing purporting "that the socio-economic status of convicted criminal offenders is unrelated to the severity of the state's criminal sanction." Jankovic criticizes the study design of the Chiricos and Waldo research and concludes that "out of 26 studies mentioned in this paper, 23 have found some evidence that non-white and lower-class persons received harsher sentences than white and middle-class persons." JAMES GAROFALO, *"Radical Criminology and Criminal Justice: Points of Divergence and Contact."* Garofalo's research examines a problem which has plagued Marxian strands of criminology since their inception, the relation between the practice of criminal justice and radical criminology. Criminal justice is identified as the study of such day-to-day activities as police work and parole supervision by *experts* who suggest "how to improve them or even to replace them with other practices that will accomplish the same aims more effectively or efficiently." Garofalo notes that criminology which has been traditionally associated with academic sociology resembles criminal justice more and more as the latter develops. He is thus led to the question, "if we can view criminal justice as a branch of criminology, can we do the same with radical criminology and then interpret both of them as differing orientations within the same overall framework?" The answer he offers is negative, yet unconvincing. Rather than develop an epistemological connection between criminology and critical theory, Garofalo proffers the *political commitment* of radical criminologists to "offer a clear, radical alternative" to the present social control system. His claim that radical criminology is not a source of a renewed stage of rationalization of criminal justice and social institutions remains unsystematic. L.R.I.

CRITIQUE, No. 9 (Spring-Summer 1978)

31 Cleveden Road, Glasgow G12 0PH, Scotland. $5.50 per year. JEAN MONDS, *"Krivitsky and Stalin in the Spanish Civil War."* An historical account of Walter Krivitsky's role as an agent of Stalin during the Spanish Civil War is used as a vehicle to shed new light on Stalin's foreign policy. Stalin's intervention in Spain is presented as founded in his fear of diplomatic isolation, domestic problems and an interest in Spain's abundant gold resources. HILLEL TICKTIN, *"The Class Structure of the USSR and the Elite."* Ticktin's argument develops around the notion that the Soviet economy is not planned, rather it is constantly being redirected and reorganized. To have a planned economy, the surplus product must be controlled. In the USSR no one group has control of the surplus product, the elite has partial control and the party has partial control, placing the USSR in a transition stage between capitalism and socialism. In the final analysis, the class structure supported by a bureaucratically organized society must be broken down before socialism can develop. DONALD FILTZER, *"Preobrazhensky and the Problem of the Soviet Transition."* The author attempts to set straight the divergent interpretations of Preobrazhensky's view of the Soviet transition. ANDRE GUNDER FRANK, *"The Economics of Crisis and the Crisis of Economics."* Frank applies a Marxian critique of Keynesian economic theory, and demonstrates that Keynesian economics is unable to support its claim of economic control and achieve "fine tuning" of the economy. Because of their inadequate knowledge, Frank shows that economists have proven themselves incompetent in predicting future economic movements. In the second part of the article Frank argues that full employment in the 50's and 60's had little to do with Keynesianism, and suggests that the explanation for this lies in the new class relations of power brought about by fascism, social democracy and anti-communism and the ability of American capital to assert its power internationally. It is Frank's contention that economists have little idea of how to cope with the crisis of the 70's and future economic crises. HP

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ESPRIT, May 1978

Aside from the usual features of ESPRIT, this issue contains a long interview with *Serge July*, editor of the iconoclastic left daily, *Liberation*. Retracing the development of the newspaper out of May 1968, July shows it growth in self-understanding and its present attitudes. Jacques Caroux's short piece on the development of the world of the working class from autonomy to atomization is also worth reading. The major part of this issue is 110 pages introducing into France the Frankfurt School, including a translation of Horkheimer's *"The Jews and Europe,"* and selected letters of Benjamin. Olivier Mongin presents some interesting speculations about the relations between Mounier, founder of *Esprit* and the Frankfurt School of the 30's, mediated by Paul-Louis Landsberg. G. Raulet and G. Höhn present a bibliography tracing the introduction of the School into France and the misunderstandings to which it has given rise. Luce Giard (who edited this section) has two sensitive articles on the School in general and on Benjamin. Perhaps most important are the two articles by Mongin and Thibaud, attempting to show that the School's inability to conceive of the political in any but a Marxist framework forced their critique to pull up short before an historical engagement or practical translation of their theses. DH

ESPRIT (June, 1978)

This issue is given over to the phenomenon of "associations" and their implications for the development of a democratic polity. Its importance is first of all French, where this more "American" institution is less known — although, as the issue shows, quite developed in its own way. Put together by Jacques and Francoise Carous, one finds in these 80 pages useful information and addresses, some analysis, and interviews with activists in some of the typical associations, as well as a bibliography. The dangers of the phenomenon (e.g., bureaucratization through another layer of intermediaries or the middle class base of many associationist developments) are also stressed. Worth noting, in addition to *Esprit's* usual features, is an excellent debunking of revolutionary mythology in the case of Africa by Serge Thion. Asking commonsensically what it could possibly mean when, suddenly, a party or leader in the Third World proclaims itself "Marxist-Leninist," Thion goes on to analyze the social relations in fact prevailing in Mozambique, Rhodesia, South Africa, Somalia and Ethiopia. DH

ESPRIT (July-August, 1978)

The first 80 pages of this issue are given over to the topic of "cracks in totalitarianism and the seeds of democracy." Castoriadis reviews and summarizes his analyses of the Russian regime in a lucid presentation originally given at the Biennale de Venice of 1977. A. Smolar continues on this track, confronting the initial project of the Russian economy with its actuality. P. Kende and A. Puskas confront the problem of democracy in the east, while T. Meray returns to the implications of the Imre Nagy regime in Hungary of 1956. M. Rakovski asks whether Hungary is so different from the other East European situations, following which A. Heller and T. Mazowiecki take up in their separate articles the question of the future. Aside from the other regular features, worth noting are an extract from J-M Domenach's new book, *Ce que je crois* under the title *"God in History,"* and the debunking of the myth of the Trilateral Commission by P. Dimitras. Dimitras' article is interesting in that it shows the formation of this myth in France, for example the stress on the Huntington report on the dangers of democracy even though the two other reporters at that session of the Trilateral strongly disagree with Huntington. DH

ESPRIT (September, 1978)

Translation of an important essay by Richard Sklar, *"Class Domination on the African Continent,"* originally presented at a Congress of African and Latin American Studies in Houston, 1977. Sklar debunks usefully the third-worldist mythology, especially the center-periphery model and its implication that the Third World is a global proletariat. Concrete analyses of the different African developments show different types of elites or bourgeoisie. Sklar's claim is that the Third-Worldist analysis is not only analytically falsifying; worse, it neglects the concrete institutional possibilities of the continent, especially the potentiality of democratic development. Parallel to Sklar's analysis, Fanchelieu and Zafanolli retrace the past 10 years of Chinese developments in order to demonstrate the absurd results of a politics in which the state identifies itself with the people such that every bureaucratic quarrel takes on a manichean projection into the whole society. R. Domergue analyzes the history of the group and journal, *"Frères du monde,"* with an eye to understanding the secularization of Christian faith. How can this faith develop into a politics? is his question. A series of short book reviews take on critically the new literature around the supposed end of the family. Worth reading too is M. Ferrier's short essay on what she calls *"The National Pact to Segregate Youth"* in France. DH

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FEMINIST STUDIES, 4:3 (October, 1978)

RAYNA RAPP, *"Women, Religion and Archaic Civilization: An Introduction."* An overview of the first three articles which are themselves part of this issue's symposium topic: women and religion. ANNE BARSTOW, *"The Uses of Archeology for Women's History: James Mellaart's Work on the Neolithic Goddess at Catal Hüyük."* A spectacular site showing the existence of an urban civilization and institutionalized religion 3000 years *prior* to Sumer, in which women were probably interdependently sharing power and authority with men. SHERRY B. ORTNER, *"The Virgin and the State."* Places the development of the ideology of woman's purity with the rise of the state, especially in terms of changes in the family structure (patriarchy and men becoming responsible *for* the family vis-a-vis the larger system) and changes in marriage patterns (hypergamy: up-status marriage in a stratified state society). IRENE SILVERBLATT, *"Andean Women in the Inca Empire."* Research into the origins of women's oppression, especially in state formation and expansion. ANNE M. BOYLAN, *"Evangelical Womanhood in the 19th Century: The Role of Women in Sunday Schools."* The rise of women's organizations in the early 19th century occurred simultaneously with the new ideals of womanhood. The organizations were created by the women themselves; religion grew in importance as other options for women's usefulness declined. MARY DALY, *"Prelude to the First Passage."* This is an excerpt from Daly's *Gyn-Ecology: The Metaethics of Radical Feminism.* A "revolting hag" describes how "patriarchy is itself the prevailing religion of the entire planet..." Other articles: MARCIA YUDKIN, *"Transsexualism and Women: A Critical Perspective."* Examines the political aspect; views transsexuals as victims of society's insistence that one is either male or female and must "act accordingly." MARILYN HODER-SALMON, *"Collecting Scholars' Wives."* Prefaces of scholarly works are examined; overwhelmingly they praise the wifely attributes of graciousness and good cheer while having done the shit work. GAIL DICKERSIN, *"Notes on 19th Century Feminist Verse."* SONDRA STEIN, *"'Diving into the Wreck': A History of Our Own."* Reviews: *A Widening Sphere: Changing Roles of Victorian Women,* edited by Martha Vicinus, and *A Literature of Their Own: British Women Novelists from Brontë to Lessing,* by Elaine Showalter.

GN

HUMAN STUDIES, Vol. 1, No. 3 (July, 1978)

Ablex Publishing Corporation, 355 Chestnut St., Norwood, N.J. 07648. $15 per year, 4 issues. MILDRED BAKAN, *"Of Language, Work and Things."* A critique of Husserl's concept of intentionality vis Merleau-Ponty and Hegel. The notion of expectation is distinguished from anticipation such that in the latter case there is a place for the revision of intentions. The categories of language, work and things are interrelated and shown to be interdependent as well as the ground for the possibility of "intentionality." ELEANOR M. SHAPIRO, *"Perception and Dialectic."* A synthesis of Hegel and Merleau-Ponty such that the master-slave dialectic in the former is shown to be the structure of the phenomenology of perception for the latter. The act of perception is thus illustrated to be the result of oppositional forces within a field of possibilities such that one finally emerges as a "perceived object." MELVIN POLLNER, *"Constitutive and Mundane Versions of Labelling Theory."* A discussion of the problems regarding the sociological labelling of human behavior. The criteria of "objective definitions" vs. that of "community response" are both treated as problematic. The exemplary case is that of "deviance" and the author attempts to show that neither version of Labelling Theory can account for all aspects of the problem of labelling deviance. His solution is to have the mundane version (definitional) ground the constitutive, since the latter alone results in "total relativism."

IH

IDEOLOGY AND CONSCIOUSNESS, No. 1 (May, 1977)

1 Woburn Mansions, Torrington Place, London W.C.1. $6 for two issues. Subtitled "A Marxist Journal in the Theory and Practice of Psychology, Psychoanalysis, Linguistics, Semiotics," this journal's concerns are theoretical and its approach Althusserian. In spite of the problems associated with this form of Marxism, the journal's contributors indicate a sensitivity to a wide range of concerns which, together with their eagerness to appropriate recent French thought, has led them to move beyond Marxism in the more recent issues of the journal. EDITORIAL COLLECTIVE, *"Psychology, Ideology and the Human Subject."* An attempt to outline main issues in the analysis of ideology and consciousness, primarily through a critique of leading theorists. Convoluted and somewhat dated, this programmatic essay discusses: (1) problems for a theory of ideology, (2) the political and theoretical crisis in contemporary psychology, (3) Marxism and psychoanalysis, Reich to Lacan, (4) theoretical rejection of economism and reductionist thought, and (5) issues in the theory and practice of ideological struggle. DIANA ADLAM and COUZE VENN, *"Introduction to Irigaray."* *"Women's Exile: Interview with Luce*

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Irigaray." A Lacanian feminist discusses her theoretical position (the "language of the female"), her differences with Lacan (she has been expelled from L'école Freudienne), the feminist struggle in France, and women's mental illness in patriarchal society. CHRIS SINHA, *"Class, Language and Education."* Discussion of the concept of class relevant for education research, and the implications of the recent emphasis upon linguistics in education. GR

IDEOLOGY AND CONSCIOUSNESS, No. 2 (Autumn, 1977)

BARRY RICHARDS, *"Psychology, Prisons and Ideology: The Prison Department Psychological Service."* An examination of the repressive use of applied psychology by the British state which looks at the growth of the Prison Psychological Service, compares this growth to parallel developments in penal policy and management, similarly examines the relation between prison service work and prison objectives, and makes the link between behaviorist psychology and social engineering. NIKOLAS ROSE, *"Fetishism and Ideology: A Review of Theoretical Problems."* Rose argues that any attempt to base a theory of ideology on Marx's notion of fetishism will necessarily be theoretically incoherent and politically impotent. While the latter assertion is unsupported, the former is demonstrated by a rigorous reading of the three volumes of *Capital*; this crucial argument for Western Marxism is thus made in the most conservative, orthodox manner possible — as though the exegesis of texts were sufficient to account for the relevance of a concept of social analysis. ROGER WOODS, *"Discourse Analysis: The Work of Michel Pecheux."* This introduction to a theory of discourse which is an elaboration of Althusser's theory of ideology locates Pecheux's work in the context of other similar projects in France, summarizes the method (Automatic Analysis of Discourse) and raises some problems concerning his treatment of meaning. BRIAN ROBERTS, *"George Herbert Mead: The Theory and Practice of his Social Philosophy."* A critical introduction concerned to assess the relevance of Mead's "bourgeois" social psychology. COLIN GORDON, *"The Unconscious of Psychoanalysis: Robert Castel's 'Le Psychoanalysme: L'ordre Psychoanalytique et le Pouvoir'."* Extended review of the Foucaultian critique which denies the possibility of a radical use of psychoanalysis. GR

IDEOLOGY AND CONSCIOUSNESS, No. 3 (Spring, 1978)

MICHEL FOUCAULT, *"Politics and the Study of Discourse."* Translation of a 1968 article on the political pertinence of historical knowledge, the relation between politics and discourse, system and discontinuity. Foucault argues for replacing the notion of a totalizing history with a differentiated analysis, an analysis which treats discontinuity as the play of specific transformations. He defines a progressive politics as one which is historically specific in analysis, able to locate possibilities of transformation, which situates the subject in a wider field, and treats discourses as practice without asserting a sovereign point for the grounding of theory. THE MARXIST-FEMINIST LITERATURE COLLECTIVE, *"Women's Writing: Jane Eyre, Shirley Villette, Aurora Leigh."* Social practices and literary analysis in the issues of class and gender, as seen in four mid-19th century novels. FERRUCIO ROSSI-LONDI, *"Sign Systems and Social Reproduction."* Within the widest category of social reproduction, Rossi-Landi argues that sign systems mediate between the mode of production and ideological institutions to establish the consensus required for social stability. COUZE VENN and VALERIE WAKLERDINE, *"The Acquisition and Production of Knowledge: Piaget's Theory Reconsidered."* A self-righteous epistemological critique which sees Piaget's project as incompatible with Marxism. DIANA ADLAM and ANGIE SALFIELD, *"A Matter of Language."* Review of Coward and Ellis' *Language and Materialism*. STUART HALL and EDITORIAL COLLECTIVE, *"Debate: Psychology, Ideology and the Human Subject."* Critique and response concerning the editorial statement in *Ideology and Consciousness* No. 1. GR

IDEOLOGY AND CONSCIOUSNESS, No. 4 (Autumn, 1978)

MONIQUE PLAZA, *" 'Phallomorphic Power' and the Psychology of 'Woman': A Patriarchal Chain."* A detailed critique of the position of the French feminist Luce Irigaray (see the review of *I&C* No. 1 above) as contained in her books *Speculum* and *Ce sexe qui n'en pas un*. Plaza criticizes Irigaray's conception of the "eternal feminine," and questions the centrality of anatomy in psychoanalysis. She argues that, rather than provide a perspective which articulates women's specificity, Irigaray reproduces the identitarian logic of patriarchy, resulting in a neutralized feminism. COLIN GORDON, *"Introduction to Pasquino and Procalli."* The two following articles are located within emerging research projects utilizing the methods and insights of Foucault. Pasquino and Procalli's "genealogical analyses" of the discourses "police science" and "social economy" show the relation between a macrophysics of power, and the everyday ordering of the minute. PASQUALE PASQUINO, *"Theatrum Politicum: The Genealogy of Capital,*

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Police and the State of Prosperity." Behind capitalist genealogies which locate linear development with capital as prime mover, lies a polymorphous range of techniques of power. The notion "police science" prevalent through the 18th century encompasses a vast collection of means for regulating the public good (not merely the keeping of order). Power understood as an ensemble of functions concerned with both happiness and government — the "good police" of the social body — shows that the traditional opposition of "state versus civil society" mystifies relations of power in society. GIOVANNA PROCACCI, *"Social Economy and the Government of Poverty."* Negating the threats represented by pauperism's mobility, independence, and insubordination became a pretext for the development of techniques of control in financial institutions, hygiene, the family and education, whereby the poor were integrated into the social order. This series of institutions thus diffusely constituted "the politically responsible subject." DENISE RILEY, *"Developmental Psychology: Biology and Marxism."* RICK ANDERSON, *"Writing Sociology and the Politics of Speech."* DAVID MACEY, *"Review Article: Jacques Lacan."* GR

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY, Vol. 8, No. 3 (Fall, 1978)

M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 901 N. Broadway, White Plains, N.Y. 10603. $22.50 per year. HILDA SCOTT, *"Introduction."* Summarizes the issues dealing with women in politics. MARISA FERRARI-OCCHIONERO, *"Women in Italian Political Life."* A statistical description of such matters as proportions of women voting in elections, nominated for office, elected to office. It begins with a brief discussion of explanations (chiefly "socialization" and "structural opportunity") for women's non-participation in politics, but does not reflect on this vague stab at a theory anywhere else in the article. Concludes by claiming that "scanty structural opportunity" and "marginal interest" explain women's exclusion from politics; neither of these, however, is supported or mentioned in the description in the article. JANINE MOSSUZ-LAVAU and MARIETTE SINEAU, *"Sex, Social Environment, and Left-Wing Attitudes."* This report of survey findings from France argues that women's less frequent support of leftist parties is a product of their cultural deprivation. The authors anticipate future closure between men's and women's political attitudes as women's education and employment converges with men's. ELINA HAAVIO-MANNILA, *"Changes in Sex Roles in Politics as an Indicator of Structural Changes in Society."* This statistical analysis of electoral results in 20th century Finland purports to show a declining effect over time of regional cultural differences on the proportion of votes received by women running for public office. KARIN AHRLAND, *"'The Obligatory Women' in Committee Life."* The former president of Sweden's oldest women's rights organizations gives an extremely pedestrian description of the low numbers of women serving on parliamentary committees in Sweden. LENELOTTE VON BOTHMER, *"Women and Politics."* The author, an SPD member in the Federal Republic of Germany, discusses the tokenistic character of the provisions for women's political participation in the party and parliament. BEATRICE HALSAA ALBREKSTEN, *"Women's Political Activity."* A description of the level of women's participation in Norwegian politics is not captured by the narrow concepts used in much scholarly work or in daily life. Among her suggestions for promoting a "non-sexist concept of politics" is the abolition of the separation between private and political activity, thereby revealing the political character of everyday domestic life. MGL

NEW GERMAN CRITIQUE 15 (Fall 1978)

German Dept., Box 413, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, Milwaukee, Wisc. 53201. $6.00 per year (3 issues). DAVID BATHRICK, *"The Politics of Culture: Rudolf Bahro and Opposition in the GDR."* Argues through a summary analysis of oppositional movements in the Soviet bloc that a tradition of dialectical Marxism in the GDR has developed from Ernst Bloch through Rudolf Bahro. HUGH MOSLEY, *"The New Communist Opposition: Rudolf Bahro's Critique of the 'Really Existing Socialism'."* "The élan of Bahro's critique is based on an authentically commmunist position quite different from the basically liberal political critique of East European socialist countries that much of the American Left shares with anti-communist." *"Interview with Robert Havemann."* The author of *Dialectics without Dogma* discusses his left critique of GDR politics. AGNES HELLER, *"The Positivism Dispute as a Turning Point in German Post-War Theory."* In the positivism dispute, the younger Frankfurt generation (Habermas) has restored the "link with the values and traditions of democracy." WOLF LEPENIES, *"Norbert Elias: An Outsider Full of Unprejudiced Insight."* A descriptive assessment of Elias' sociology. ANDREAS WEHOWSKY, *"Making Ourselves More Flexible Than We Are. Reflections on Nobert Elias."* Elias' explanation of the internalization of shame neglects the medieval relationships of dependence from which the bourgeoisie had to free itself. SILVIA BOVENSCHEN, *"The Contemporary Witch, the Historical Witch and the Witch Myth."* The annihilation of

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magically gifted women took place as part of a process in which woman was "reduced to being a representative of the diffuse, non-identical world." IRMTRAUD MORGNER, *"Life and Adventures of Trobadora Beatriz."* Translation with commentary of a chapter from the 1974 GDR feminist novel ELISABETH ALEXANDER, *"Housework: Away from There."* Translation of two stories by the West German writer, plus reviews. PM

NEW LITERARY HISTORY 10:1 (Autumn, 1978)

The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, Md. 21218. $11 (3 issues). FR. D.E. SCHLEIERMACHER, *"The Hermeneutics: Outline of the 1819 Lectures,"* trans. with annotation by Jan Wojcik and Roland Haas. PETER SZONDI, *"Introduction to Literary Hermeneutics."* Under Dilthey's influence, hermeneutics has become a science of fundamental principles. Literary hermeneutics must revise this tendency to consider the aesthetic character of the text as a premise of interpretation itself. GUNTHER BUCK, *"The Structure of Hermeneutic Experience and the Problem of Tradition."* Traditional hermeneutics, developing a methodology from the natural sciences, has privileged the status of superior knowledge. A revision of this impasse would be an assimilation of the interpreter's horizon to that of the object of interpretation. ANTHONY SAVILE, *"Historicity and the Hermeneutic Circle."* Argues a historicist perspective that interpretation be inscribed under "the best available contemporary interpretation of those sensuously given signs the artist chooses as the material base of his work." CHARLES ALTIERI, *"The Hermeneutics of Literary Indeterminacy."* An attack on modernist theories of indeterminacy (Derrida) which argues that the critic must constitute the elements of actions in the text. Ultimately, Altieri's orientation is based on Kantian aesthetics. PAUL ALPERS, *"Empson on Pastoral."* A Leavisite assessment of Empson: he gives us "a sense of the strength, fullness and human reality of our ordinary gestures and expressions." MERLE BROWN, *"Poetic Listening."* The scientific desire for objectification and the fear of what cannot be interpreted undermine a genuine reading of poetry. RICHARD RORTY, *"Philosophy as a Kind of Writing."* Derrida must be seen as part of a tradition which orients truth horizontally, a culminating process of reinterpretation. DAVID COUZENS HOY, *"Hermeneutic Circularity, Indeterminacy, and Incommensurability."* Summary article. PM

OUR GENERATION 13:1 (Winter, 1979)

3981 Boulevard Saint-Laurent, Montreal, Quebec, Canada H2W 1Y5. $7.50 per year (4 issues). ARNOLD BENNETT, *"The Defeat of November 12 and the Future of the MCM."* A former city councillor with the Montreal Citizen's Movement (MCM) attempts to provide some understanding of the debacle of the November 1978 civic elections when the MCM was reduced from eighteen councillors to one. PEGGY DUFF, *"What You Don't Know about the Arms Race."* The Executive Secretary of the London-based International Confederation for Disarmament and Peace offers a chronology of events since the 1950's in the arms race and the disarmament process. F.H. KNELMAN, *Canadian Nuclear Energy — Who Needs It?"* An activist in the Canadian Coalition for Nuclear Responsibility reviews Canadian nuclear policy in the light of the threat from nuclear energy and the possibilities of non-nuclear alternatives. FRANK HARRISON, *"The Soviet Response to Anarchism."* Polemically reviews the past and present repression of anarchist and libertarian movements in Russia and challenges both statist ideology and the appallling extent to which social scientists in Russia promote this ideology in the face of glaring contradictions. JIM OVERTON and LEE SEYMOUR, *"Unemployment in Newfoundland: A Review Essay on The Report of the People's Commission on Unemployment."* An examination of the Labour Federation's Report by two community development activists, focusing on the limitations of what is described as social-democratic populism, and attempting to comment on the whole political process of which the Report was only a part. GLENN DROVER and ERIC SHRAGGE, *"Urban Struggle and Organizing Strategies."* As a result of their Montreal experiences, two urban activists argue for the importance of ideological struggle as the central focus of a community-based urban politics and criticizes the Alinsky model of urban confrontation for its short-term politics that fails to challenge the state ideologically. Also book reviews. JAF

THE OXFORD LITERARY REVIEW 3:1 (1978)

2 Marlborough Road, Oxford, OX1 4LP. $10 for three issues. Subtitled "Critical Analyses of Literary, Philosophical, Political and Psychoanalytic Theory," this journal is part of the British trend in socio-cultural criticism which has come to semiotics via Althusserian Marxism. *Theoretical Criticism* issue. PIERRE MACHEREY and ETIENNE BALIBAR, *"On Literature as an Ideological Form."* Althusser's famous essay on ideological state apparatuses provides the

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framework for an analysis of the domination-effect of bourgeois literary aesthetics. RICHARD KELLY, *"The Mnemonic Structuring of Medieval Literature."* The work of Frances Yates demonstrates the importance of self-conscious use of the imagination in the medieval appropriation of the classical tradition. MARK ROBINSON, *"Bloom Re-Viewed."* Harold Bloom's work is viewed in relation to deconstructionist, semiotic and psychoanalytic analyses of literature. IAN MCLEOD, *"Writing Biography: Sartre's Method."* The tradition of literary biography relying on the reified concept of "the author" is subverted by Sartre's existential biography. His writings on Baudelaire, Genet and Flaubert deconsecrate texts and demystify the figure of the creator by locating both in their socio-historical contexts. ANN WORDSWORTH, *"Brownings' Anxious Gaze."* An application of Lacan's concept of scopic drive to Browning's Dramatic Monologues. JOHN WHITEHEAD, *"The Value of Value Analysis."* Review of three books on Marx's theory of value. JEAN-FRANCOIS LYOTARD, *"A Lesson Concerning the Secret Nature of Language [Teacher's Manual]."* A fable demonstrating how the discourse of conspiracy and power continually undermines itself. JEAN-CLAUDE LEBENSZTEJN, *"Ground: I."* The first part of a three-part article questioning the assumptions of mainstream art history's taxonomy — the classification of art into "movements" and "styles." An excellent critique of conceptual domination.
GR

THE OXFORD LITERARY REVIEW 3:2 (1978)

Special issue on Jacques Derrida. (The editors of *OLR* seem unaware of the extent to which Derrida's critique of logocentrism conflicts directly with their Althusserian assumptions.) JEAN-LUC NANCY, *"Dum Scribo."* A deconstruction of Descartes' *Regulae ad directionem Ingenii,* which takes the form of the author's cogito reflecting upon the relation of the text to his other works. MAUD ELLMANN, *"Spacing Out: A Double Entendre on Mallarmé."* Romanticism's break with logos is said to occur with the establishment-subversion of a life-death polarity. STEPHANE MALLARME, *"Les 'blancs' en effect."* ANN WORDWORTH, *"Derrida and Criticism."* A discussion of two kinds of responses open to critics responding to the impact of Derrida and Lacan, humanistic reading or scientific infinitizing. VINCENT DESCOMBES, *"Variations on the Subject of the Encyclopaedic Book."* An examination of the incomplete totality represented by a book (using the example of an encyclopedia and supplements taken from *Of Grammatology*). Descombes suspects Derrida of merely instituting a higher logic of identity. KEVIN MULLIGAN, *"Inscriptions and Speaking's Place: Derrida and Wittgenstein."* Derrida's deconstruction of the metaphysics of speech reveals the problematic silences and metaphysical prejudices in Anglo-Saxon philosophy. MARK COUSINS, *"The Logic of Deconstruction."* A clear attempt to outline the forms of deconstruction in Derrida's critique of representative thought (its techniques of attention), as well as its effects (the separation of philosophical oppositions). Cousins argues that the paradoxical status of logocentricity — both a desire for, and the state of, a priori unity — threatens to return Derrida to circular representation's ambivalent politics of contemplative deconstruction. JACQUES DERRIDA, *"Speculations On Freud."* A close reading of *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* against *An Autobiographical Study* reveals that, while Freud strongly avoided establishing philosophical links to Nietzsche or Schopenhauer, his definition of the pleasure principle demonstrates use of "the speculative" regarding both the object of discourse and the operation of writing.
GR

THE PHILOSOPHICAL FORUM, Vol. VIII, Nos. 2,3,4

P.O. Box 247, Boston University Station, Boston, Mass. 02215. LAWRENCE S. SLEPELEVICH, *"The First Hegelians: An Introduction."* Presents a historical development of the Hegelian movement, beginning with Feuerbach and concluding with Karl Schmidt. LUDWIG FEUERBACH, *"My Starting Point in Philosophy."* Feuerbach argues that his encounter with philosophy was theistic and that, upon closer analysis, philosophy took man beyond the spirited realm of true philosophy which was the negation of philosophy. LUDWIG FEUERBACH, *"Loyalty Oaths."* Feuerbach's sworn statement to the German state. FREDERICK M. GORDON, *"The Contradictory Nature of Feuerbachian Humanism."* Argues that the humanist contradiction in Feuerbach's works can be explained in terms of a type of neurosis within the duality of religious belief. LUDWIG FEUERBACH, *"Letter to Bertha."* A personal letter expressing his concerns about her religion while showing satisfaction that she made the trip to Bruckberg. FREDERICK M. GORDON, *"The Debate Between Feuerbach and Stirner: An Introduction."* The debate which led to the disintegration of Feuerbach's philosophical position. MAX STIRNER, *"Stirner's Critics."* This is the original criticism that Stirner levelled against Feuerbach's humanism and against his epistemological arguments in *The Essence of Christianity*. LUDWIG FEUERBACH, *"The Essence of Christianity in Relation to the Ego*

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and Its Own." Rebuttal to Stirner's attack. Feuerbach thus relies upon his works as a source from which to defend them. HANS MARTIN SASS, *"Bruno Bauer's Critical Theory."* BRUNO BAUER, *"On Strategy, October, 1841."* Two short letters written to explain the need to publish some papers immediately. BRUNO BAUER, *"The Genus and The Crowd."* Bauer on the crowd as a fusion of competing interests. BRUNO BAUER, *"The Capacity of Present-Day Jews and Christians to Become Free."* On the notion of emancipation as a universal idea among Jews and Christians. HELMUT HIRSCH, *"The Ugly Marx: Analysis of an Outspoken Anti-Semite."* Argues that, taken as a whole, the works of Karl Marx are anti-Semitic in nature. EDGAR BAUER, *"Letter Out of Custody at Fortress Magdeburg, 1847."* EDGAR BAUER, *"On Stirner and Szeliga, 1882."* HENRI ARVON, *"Concerning Marx's Epistemological Break."* ANDREW FEENBERG, *"New Grounds for Revolution: The Early Marx in a Lukacsian Perspective."* Argues that Marx was seeking to make revolution possible by negating Hegel's theory of the state, so that his critique was quite similar to that of Lukács. L. BARONOVITCH, *"Two Appendices to a Doctoral Dissertation: Some New Light on the Origin of Karl Marx's Dissassociation from Bruno Bauer and the Young Hegelians."* Argues that methodology separated Marx from the Young Hegelians. H.M. SASS, *"The Concept of Revolution in Marx's Dissertation [The Non-Hegelian Origin of Karl Marx's Early Concept of Dialectics]."* Argues that the non-Hegelian Marxist dialectic emerges from a critique of conflict which seeks its resolution by means of revolution, not mediation. ANDREW LEVINE, *"Alienation as Heleronomy."* The author argues that there is a similarity between Marx's theory of alienation and Kant's theory of heleronomy along the lines of unfreedom. DAN GOLDSTICK AND FRANK CUNNINGHAM, *"Activism and Scientism in the Interpretation of Karl Marx's First and Third Thesis on Feuerbach."* The argument seeks to distinguish between Marx and Engels. L. BARONOVITCH, *"Marx's Theses on Feuerbach: From Real Humanism to Real Possibility."* Argues that the synthesis, a perspective of self-conscious criticism, was inherited from Bauer and Hess. Thus, the elimination of irrationalism by way of self-conscious criticism would inevitably deny spiritual power. ZVI ROSEN, *"The Attitude of Hess to French Socialism and His Plans for Publishing a Series of Socialist Writings with Marx and Engels."* Argues that French Socialist thought had significant impact upon Hess. JLS

PHILOSOPHY TODAY, Vol. 22, No. 4:4 (Winter 1978)

Messenger Press, Celina, Ohio 45822. $9 per year (4 issues). EDITH WYSCHOGROD, *"Death and Some Philosophies of Language."* Argues that linguistic limitations constitute what are taken to be "ontological" limitations in philosophy: the unspeakable is taken for the non-existent. Analyzes this problem via the early and later Wittgenstein and structuralism, as represented by Derrida and Foucault. Concludes that structuralism cannot locate death as a limit, but only as a subject of discourse. It is external to structural considerations. In the philosophy of language, however, death represents the disappearance of the transcendental subject, which is the non-linguistic basis of all language. ANN MARGARET SHARP, *"Simone Weil on Friendship."* A proposal for women's liberation to become a human liberation that would be against all forms of domination. It is argued that what is needed as a basis of social change and also as its telos is a model of "true friendship" which should be based upon mutual respect and the search for the good. BEN MIJUSKOVIC, *"Loneliness and Time Consciousness."* An analysis of the concept of "subjective temporality" in Leibniz, Kant, Bergson and Husserl, so as to illustrate a theme of "absolute isolation" of the subject from others. The author then turns to this theme in literature and gives selective examples from Montaigne, Defoe, Joyce and Wolfe. The style of "stream of consciousness" literature is claimed to be another symptom of the problem whereby self-consciousness, temporality and loneliness are intertwined. ROBERT L. ARRINGTON, *"Wittgenstein and Phenomenology."* Deals with the distance between these two perspectives via the work of Ricoeur and Natanson. The fundamental difference between phenomenology and ordinary language philosophy is shown to be the notion of eidetic knowledge and the possibility of the standpoint of a transcendental ego. The ordinary language philosophy of Wittgenstein has no place for such seminal aspects of phenomenology. RAMONA CORMIER, *"Silence in Philosophy and Literature."* A discussion of the emergence of the concept of silence in the 20th century, specifically in the work of Wittgenstein, Heidegger and Sartre in philosophy, and Beckett and Camus in literature. The author sees this trend as nihilistic and a result of "the pronouncement of God's death." This movement is described in positive terms so that the "lack of speech" is seen as a sign of change and rebellion that has yet to find its voice in explicit discourse. WILLIAM H. DAVIS, *"Do Instinctive Truths Incline Us Toward the Truth?"* The assumption is made that humans have "instinctive" beliefs that lead us toward knowledge as a tool for survival. The relation of these beliefs to Truth is considered irrelevant since the author sees no need for a con-

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cept of Absolute Truth. "Truth," he says, "is that which satisfies our needs" and the aim of philosophy should be to "provide a view of things" conducive to this end. HANS SIEGFRIED, *"Heidegger's Longest Day: 'Being and Time' and the Sciences."* An attempt is made to portray Heidegger's *Being and Time* as a treatise in the philosophy of science, in line with Feyerabend, Polanyi and Kuhn. The author quotes significant passages from the text where Heidegger himself makes this claim. Until the "being question" is solved, science cannot ground itself; thus ontological research must precede further scientific research so as to reveal that the latter is fundamentally a "way of being man," and thus cannot have an "in-itself" stance. LEON ROSENSTEIN, *"Heidegger and Plato, and the Good."* The similarities between Plato and Heidegger are illustrated around the following themes: a) concern with the individual in his "lived world," b) the attempt to uncover reality by "reawakening everyday thought," c) concern with the role of language and meaningfulness, and d) the role of ethics (what Plato termed the Good, Heidegger called Being). The author is clearly attempting to reconcile two opposing positions by emphasizing nebulous analogies and discarding the claims of Heidegger that the question of Being has now to be re-opened after the work of Plato has buried it for almost 2000 years. IH

POLITICAL THEORY 6:4 (November, 1978)

Sage Publications, Inc., 275 South Beverly Drive, Beverly Hills, Ca. 90212. $15 per year (4 issues). This issue is dedicated to Jean-Jacques Rousseau and commemorates the 200th anniversary of his death. TERENCE E. MARSHALL, *"Rousseau and Enlightenment."* Rousseau's attack on Enlightenment as a defense of morals against the corrosive influence of experimental science and skepticisim. Marshall believes Rousseau was searching for a foundation for morals in a concept of human nature not based on a Cartesian dualism or epicurean monism. Focuses on the contribution of myth, truth and philosophic irony as the basis of civic virtue and civil liberty in Rousseau's thought. NANNERL O. KEOHANE, *"The Masterpiece of Policy in Our Century: Rousseau on the Morality of the Enlightenment."* Relates elements in Rousseau to Montaigne and the Jansenists in an extended discussion of self-interest. Keohane's discussion of self-interest inexplicably confuses attributes of man in the state of nature with man in civil society. Fails, until the concluding remarks, to make the distinction that is clear in Rousseau between the "ought" and the "is," between the narrow self-interest of the individual and the true self-interest of the citizen. PATRICK RILEY, *"The General Will Before Rousseau."* Concept of the general will originated in the theological controversy about divine will, but had become politicized prior to Rousseau. Particular attention is given to Malebranche, and Riley credits Montesquieu with the secular conversion of the concept. Concludes with a refutation of the notion that the general will is an attack on individuality. RICHARD FRALIN, *"The Evolution of Rousseau's View of Representative Government."* Portrays Rousseau as ambivalent about representation, although changing "from passive acceptance in *Economie politique* to overt hostility in the *Contrat social* to grudging acceptance" in the *Considérations sur le gouvernement de Pologne*. Fralin concentrates on Rousseau's thought about political institutions rather than theoretical pronouncements. BENJAMIN R. BARBER and JANIS FORMAN, *"Introduction to Jean-Jacques Rousseau's 'Preface to Narcisse'."* JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, *"A Preface to 'Narcisse: or the lover of Himself'."* Reviews. RJ

PSYCHOANALYSIS AND CONTEMPORARY THOUGHT 1:3 (1978)

International Universities Press, 315 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10016. $30 per year (4 issues). JOHN P. MULLER and WILLIAM J. RICHARDSON, *"Toward Reading Lacan: Pages for a Notebook."* Introduction and first chapter to the forthcoming *Lacan Workbook: A Reader's Guide to Selected Texts*. The introduction sketches Lacan's treatment of the unconscious as a flow of signifiers by touching on the influences of Saussure, Jakobson, Kojeve's Hegel and Levi-Strauss on Lacan's ideas concerning unconscious processes, and desire. Chapter 1 briefly discusses the early essays "Beyond the 'Reality Principle'," (1936) and "The Family" (1938) prior to the larger discussion of Lacan's 1948 essay on "The Mirror Stage as Formative of the Function of the I as Revealed in Psychoanalytic Experience." The essay concerns the role of the image in the development of the subject, and its implications for the evolution of social experience (i.e., knowledge is paranoic). The discussion of the essay is followed by a detailed outline of the argument, which in turn is followed by a series of scholarly notes to the text (throughout references are provided for French and English editions). This is an extremely useful aid for those new to Lacan's hermetic style. HARTVIG DAHL, *"A New Psychoanalytic Model of Motivation: Emotions as Appetites and Messages."* EVELYN FOX KELLER, *"Gender and Science."* An excellent exploration of the interconnections between cognition and affect, as specifically evident in

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the sexual metaphors associated with thinking about science. Keller explores the mythical beliefs by which science acquires a gender, the images and metaphors at work in the sexualization of a thought process. Science is colored by patriarchal biases, and at the same time our notions of masculine or feminine are affected by prestige associated with science. GR

PSYCHOANALYSIS AND CONTEMPORARY THOUGHT 1:4 (1978)

R. PALOMBO, *"The Adaptive Function of Dreams."* GILBERT D. CHAITLIN, *"The Representation of Logical Relations in Dreams and the Nature of Primary Process."* Chaitlin argues for abandoning the rigid distinction between reality and pleasure principles, and adopting an individual-social developmental model which allows for the specificity of different ways of understanding, acknowledging that the measure of "sanity" varies widely even within the same culture, depending on the context. Implicit in his critique is an argument against rationalist reductionism in psychoanalysis; Chaitlin wants to drop the privilege accorded to reason in the hierarchy of psychic phenomena, along with the equation of primary process with wish fulfillment. Freud's dream interpretation especially reveals the projection of the rational into the unconscious; Chaitlin systematically demonstrates the absurdity of the schema asserting logical relations between dream thoughts, showing them to be not logical, but spatial and temporal relations. JOHN P. MULLER and WILLIAM J. RICHARDSON, *"Toward Reading Lacan: Pages for a Workbook."* Chapter 2 from the reader's guide discussed above. The discussion of the 1948 essay "Aggressivity in Psychoanalysis." GR

RADICAL SCIENCE JOURNAL 8 (1979)

9 Poland Street, London W1V 3DG, 3 Pounds for 3 issues; foreign orders add 60p. DAVID DICKSON, *"Science and Political Hegemony in the 17th century."* Analysis of how the emergence of science, particularly Bacon's *Novum Organum*, offers both "a method for achieving useful knowledge" and "a blueprint of capitalist labor process." WENDY HOLLWAY, *"Ideology and Medical Abortion."* Analysis of the way in which the procedures of abortion (general anaesthetic, unnecessary restrictions) transform abortion into an apparently serious and therefore more traumatic operation. PHILIP BOYS, *"Detente, Genetics and Social Theory."* Recent emphasis on genetic research in the USSR is used ideologically to undermine upward mobility and to justify the social status quo. Plus books reviews, short notes, exchanges. PM

SCIENCE AND SOCIETY 41:1 (Spring, 1978)

John Jay College, CUNY, Room 4331, W.59 Street, New York, N.Y. 10019. $10 per year (quarterly). FRANK T. FITZGERALD, *"A Critique of the Sovietization of Cuba Thesis."* A review of socialist construction in Cuba after the political-economic setback of 1970. Material incentives, paternalism and institutional participation are examined in light of the Sovietization thesis. GUGLIELONO CRIODI, *"Some Reflections on Marx, Sraffa and the Theory of Distribution."* The theory of distribution emphasizing the power structure of society and Sraffa's method of "closing" his system are reflected off Marx's role of power relationships. VERL F. HUNT, *"The Rise of Feudalism in Eastern Europe: A Critical Appraisal of the Wallerstein World-System Thesis."* Pirenne's thesis that the decline of feudalism was due to revival of trade and Wallerstein's thesis of world wide division of labor and the emergence of regional specialization are challenged as to their historical validity. SCOTT M. LASH, *"Productive Labor, Class Determination and Class Position."* Various Marxist writers such as E. Mandel, Ian Gough, James O'Connor, Arnaud Berthoud and Nicos Poulantzas are contrasted with Marx's position on social class and class determination. Also includes *"Communications: A Note on Soviet Psychology and Marxism," "A Comment on William Leogrande's Approach to the 'Young Marx',"* and book reviews and book notes. NW

SCREEN 19:4 (Winter 1978-79)

29 Old Compton Street, London W1V 5PL, England $18 per year (4 issues). PETER WOLLEN, *"Photography and Aesthetics."* Photography, within art, can re-open the questions of ideological reading and knowledge, and the relationship of information with "blocked knowledge and balked desire." COLIN MACCABE, *"The Discursive and the Ideological in Film."* An extended critique of Paul Willemen (*SCREEN* 19:1) stressing that "discourse is the term used to indicate that one cannot analyze the formal articulation of cinema independently of its political and ideological address." GEOFFREY NOWELL-SMITH, *"Television — Football — The World."* Television's representation of football has displaced the spectator's partisan point of view into impartiality. Analysis of the 1978 World Cup finals. MICK EATON, *"Television Situation*

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Comedy." Television situation comedy cannot be explained in terms of its antecedents (the variety sketch). An attempt to define its uniqueness through analyses of *Going Straight* and *Come Back, Mrs. Noah*. NOEL BURCH, *"Porter, or Ambivalence."* Edwin S. Porter is significant for his development of shots that undermined narrative closure at a time when it was beginning to establish itself. PM

SCREEN EDUCATION 29 (Winter 1978-79)

29 Old Compton Street, London W1V 5PL, England $10 per year (4 issues). SIMON FIRTH, ANGELA McROBBIE, *"Rock and Sexuality."* Argues that the ideology of music is not limited to the lyrics, but must be seen in the whole context of the constitution of sexuality. GREGG BLACHFORD, *"Looking at Pornography."* Pornography cannot simply be criticized in terms of its objectified images of sexuality. Gay pornography especially suggests "the possibility of reading images quite independently of the dominant ideology's view of sexuality." JO SPENCE, *"What Do People Do All Day?"* Although a "new woman's narrative" has produced more positive images of women in advertisements, images of production are still transformed into those of consumption, and therefore cannot "relate surface images to the structures within which their components are (invisibly) located." ROB MOORE, *"The Value of Reproduction."* Extended critique of Tapper and Salter's *Education and the Political Order*. GILL DAVIES, *"Teaching About Narrative."* Analyzes novels and film to develop a methodology to decode the realist narrative and "as *active* readers, uncover their latent ideological meanings." TONY STEVENS, *"Renovating English Literature."* Argues that Terence Hawkes' *Structuralism and Semiotics* fails to supersede the paradox of New Criticism which demands that the reader be open to language, but in a manner implying control over language. Plus reviews of Fiske and Hartley's *Reading Television*; Brunson and Morley's *Everyday Television: "Nationwide."* PM

SEMIOTEXT(E) 3:2 (1978)

522 Philosophy Hall, Columbia University, New York, N.Y. 10027. $7.50 for 3 issues. Issue theme: *Schizo-Culture*. A bewildering array of texts, interviews, poetry, illustrations and reprinted ads, often with two separate entries running in parallel columns down the same page. MICHEL FOUCAULT, *"The Eye of Power."* An interview on themes relevant to *Discipline and Punish*: the extent to which spatial arrangements are also political and economic forms; the notion of the transparent society as a link between Rousseau and Bentham. Foucault asserts that from the 19th century, power moved from state centralization to become involved in complicated and diffuse mechanisms; hence, Marxist notions of state ideological apparatuses, contradictions and simple struggles are obsolete. ROBERT WILSON, *"Interview."* Theatre based on language. FRANCOIS PERALDI, *"A Schizo and the Institution [A Non-Story]."* An example of radical psychiatry in France. EDDIE GRIFFIN, *"Breaking Men's Minds."* The use of behavior control techniques against prisoners. WENDY CLARKE, *"Love Tapes."* Video transcription of discussion on love. POLICE BAND, *"Antidisestablishment Totalitarianism."* Interview with loony one-mand band. ELI G. MESSINGER, *"Violence to the Brain."* Psychiatry and social control. DAVID COOPER, *"The Invention of Non-Psychiatry."* Cooper moves from anti-psychiatry to a broader concept of political struggle, locating personal within social domination. JEAN-FRANCOIS LYOTARD, *"On the Strength of the Weak."* Lyotard criticizes the politics of a discourse which relies upon a "magisterial" position of exteriority as a rationalist illusion of absolute philosophical grounds. The distinction between discourse and metadiscourse implies a political privilege as well as a theoretical one. Lyotard calls for non-identitarian praxis in discourse which emphasizes relativity and the specificity of discontinuous local effects, noting that "the idea that a radical political efficacy does not rest on truthfulness deserves consideration." GR

SIGNS: JOURNAL OF WOMEN IN CULTURE AND SOCIETY, 4:1 (Autumn 1978)

The University of Chicago Press, 5801 Ellis Avenue, Chicago, Ill. 60637. $15 yearly. Special Issue: Women, Science and Society. ADRIENNE L. ZIHLMAN, *"Women in Evolution. Part II: Subsistence and Social Organization among Early Hominids."* In contrast to the popular "hunting hypothesis" of human evolution (that meat hunting was the critical, defining innovation separating early humans from their ape ancestors), Zihlman develops alternate explanations for evolutionary innovations based on (female) gathering activity. DONNA HARAWAY, *"Animal Sociology and a Natural Economy of the Body Politic, Part I: A Political Physiology of Dominance."* An excellent analysis of animal sociology between World Wars I and II which reveals the ideological basis in varieties of functionalism and characterized by dominance. Haraway makes incisive comments about fetishized science, animal sociology which presumes

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animals to be "natural objects" unobscured by culture, and the ambiguous place of animals in relation to the human and natural sciences. DONNA HARAWAY, *"..., Part II: The Past is the Contested Zone: Human Nature and Theories of Production and Reproduction in Primate Behavior Studies."* Focuses on the categories of reproduction and production. The author traces four major positions on human history and human nature (Zuckerman, Rowell, Washburn, and Tanner and Zihlman), based on the concept of function and the autonomy of nature and culture, with a goal of defining universals of human nature as the foundations for culture. LOIS N. MAGNER, *"Women and the Scientific Idiom: Textual Episodes from Wollstonecraft, Fuller, Gilman and Firesteone."* Wollstonecraft's use of Newtonian mechanistic philosophy, Fuller's philosophy of transcendental idealism (stressing the duality of the nature of reality, and the precedence of the subjective world of ideas over the objective physical world), Gilman's social Darwinism, and Firestone's call for a quantum leap or revolution in reproductive technology — the author discusses the use of scientific idiom by these non-scientist feminists in the advancement of their ideas about sexual inequality. SALLY GREGORY KOHLSTEDT, *"In From the Periphery: American Women in Science, 1830-1880."* The status and activity of women scientists during the critical period of the professionalization of American science. HELEN H. LAMBERT, *"Biology and Equality: A Perspective on Sex Differences."* MARIAN LOEW, *"Sociobiology and Sex Differences."* Social theorists and feminists may not know much about science, but this article indicates that scientists — Loew is a chemist — may not know very much about social theory. The preceding article by Lambert, a biologist, is also unsophisticated compared to the excellent articles by historian of science Haraway in the same issue. MICHELE L. ALDRICH, *"Women in Science."* DOROTHY ROSENTHAL MANDELBAUM, *"Women in Medicine."* MARGARET W. ROSSITER, *"Sexual Segregation in the Sciences: Some Date and a Model."* ANNE M. BRISCOE, *"Phenomenon of the Seventies: The Women's Caucuses."* Women's caucuses within professional scientific associations. RUTH BLEIER, *"Bias in Biological and Human Sciences: Some Comments."* Now a neurophysiologist comments on sociobiology and sex differences. Book reviews, letters and archives. SW

SIGNS: JOURNAL OF WOMEN IN CULTURE AND SOCIETY, 4:2 (Winter 1978)

NANCY F. COTT, *"Passionlessness: An Interpretation of Victorian Sexual Ideology, 1790-1850."* The author traces the reversal of the dominant Anglo-American definition of women as being *especially* sexual that had prevailed from the 17th century into the 19th century view that women were less carnal and lustful than men; this is related to the rise of evangelical religion between the 1790's and 1830's. It is argued that "passionlessness" was not just a repressive ideology imposed on women, but rather was embraced by women themselves as a form of self-protection (as a defense against sexual advances when contraception and treatment for infection were ineffective) and social advancement (to retrieve their identity from sexual vulnerability and dependence). RUTH M. BLOCH, *"Untangling the Roots of Modern Sex Roles: A Survey of Four Centuries of Change."* The history of sex roles and sexual symbolism can be viewed as an interplay between two fundamentally different definitions of the social relations of the sexes, one of which stresses similarity, the other distinctiveness. The author challenges the unilinear, evolutionary views of long-term changes in the history of the family and sex roles, such as Marxism or modernization theory. It is argued that there has been a tension between similarity and distinctiveness of men and women historically, and though either may predominate at times, neither has altogether ever eclipsed the other. The author characterizes the 16th and 17th centuries as a period of hierarchy and similarity, and the 18th and 19th centuries as a period of polarization and distinctiveness. DOROTHY K. STEIN, *"Women to Burn: Suttee as a Normative Institution."* An interesting account of suttee (the practice of burning or burying women alive with their deceased husbands) and its connection to other social customs and institutions in India: child marriage, the prescribed austerity of a widow's life, its association with higher castes and its consequent prestige, notions of women's uncontrollable sexual nature, and the economic benefits to the priesthood, as well as the presumed spiritual benefits accruing to the deceased husband as well as the wife herself. The efforts of the British rules in India to control and eliminate suttee are described by the author as complicated by attitudes toward women which coincided with those that made suttee possible. VINA MAZUMDAR, *"Comment on Suttee."* DOLORES HAYDEN, *"Two Utopian Feminists and Their Campaigns for Kitchenless Houses."* The author discusses the careers of two utopian feminists, Marie Stevens Howland and Alice Constance Austin, who promoted innovative architectural concepts linked to proposals for domestic reform in their plans for the utopian socialist cities of Topolobampo, Mexico, and Llano del Rio, California; their plans dealt with some of the major issues of 20th century urban and suburban life and provide evidence of the contacts between communitarian socialists and feminist activists creating

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cooperative housekeeping projects in the U.S. and England. DAVID LEVERENZ, *"The Woman in Hamlet: An Interpersonal View."* *Hamlet* as "an ironic stifling of a hero's identity by structures of rule that no longer have legitimacy." CARROLL McC. PASTNER, *"Englishmen in Arabia: Encounters with Middle Eastern Women."* Three English authors on Arabia (Richard Burton, Charles Coughty and Harold Dickson) and their encounters and descriptions of Arabian women, which, the author argues, reveal much about the English attitude toward women in general. JAMES B. HARRISON, *"Men's Roles and Men's Lives."* Review essay. ROSE LAUB COSER, *"The Principle of Patriarchy: The Case of 'The Magic Flute'."* JUNE NASH, *"The Aztecs and the Ideology of Male Dominance."* KAREN SACKS, *"Women and Class Struggle in Sembene's 'God's Bits of Wood."* Book reviews, letters and archives. S.W.

SOCIAL PRAXIS, 4:3, 4:4

Atkinson College, York University, Downsview, Ontario, Canada. MICHAEL R. MARRUS, *"Zionism and the Idea of a Jewish State, 1896-1942."* Argues that the notion of a Zionist state was both reasonable and desirable, since the very nature of history pressed the state upon Zionism. BERNARD AVISHAI, *"The State of Zionism."* A historical exegesis of the development of the Zionist State through the various periods of Zionist development toward a state and nationalism. ITAMAR RABINOVICH, *"Religion and Nationalism in the Middle East: The Case of Lebanon."* Comments on the Lebanese civil war. HOWARD ADEBMAN, *"Perspectives on Nationalism."* Discusses nationalism in the context of Palestinian and Jewish conflict. JANICE GROSS STEIN, *"Canadian Foreign Policy in the Middle East After the October War."* Argues that Canadian foreign policy has redirected its interest and image from one of peacemaker to one of bilateral involvement based on economic interests. BLEMA STEINBERG, *"American and Soviet Conceptions of Peace in the Middle East, 1967-1976."* Argues that the very nature of the Middle East conflict rests upon the rivalry of the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. since the end of WWII. THOMAS VELK, *"The Petro-Dollar Market: How Does It Work? Can It Be Controlled?"* Argues that the religious, ethical, political and economic forces which were manifest as the underpinnings of the October War were the active agents of the Western petro-dollar crisis within the world capitalist market. J.L.S.

SOCIAL RESEARCH 45:3 (Autumn 1978)

New School for Social Research, 66 W. 12 St., New York, N.Y. 10011. Issue theme: Ideological Bias in Psychology. JOSEPH ADELSON, *"The Slippery Slope."* An introduction by the guest editor on the theme of this issue, the degree of advocacy in contemporary psychology, and a plea for value-neutral scholarship which involves a "determined tentativeness of conviction, a willingness to suspend belief in the face of disconfirming evidence." ALICIA F. LIEBERMAN, *"Psychology and Day Care."* Examines the history of the debate on day care in the U.S., arguing that the contrasting positions have not sprung from objective considerations as much as from deeply held beliefs of interested parties. DAVID GUTMANN, *"Psychology as Theology."* After distinguishing between science ("antinarcissistic") and religion ("Narcissistic"), the author condemns modern trends in psychotherapy as the "secular religion of our times." Especially noted are client-centered (Rogerian) techniques, encounter-therapy, and the pseudo-critical "theories" of Leary, Laing, etc., where insight is said to come not from training and critical examination of consciousness, but as "a truly religious conversion and the discovery of the inner potential for goodness." The conclusion is a call for a return to psychology "as a naturalistic science on the frontiers of reality." FRED BLOOM, *"Escape from Suffering: The Sentimentalization of Psychotherapy."* ROBERT T. HOGAN AND NICHOLAS P. EMLER, *"The Biases in Contemporary Social Psychology."* Analyzes contemporary theories of socialization and moral development, and argues that social psychological research has increasingly come to reflect the bias of American liberal ideology in its assumptions of individualism and rationalism. STANLEY ROTHMAN and S. ROBERT LICHTER, *"The Case of the Student Left."* Focuses on research on the personality traits of student activists in the 1960's which tended to support their basic "goodness" and superiority to conservative reactionaries (espeicically work by Keniston, Flacks, and Ronald Inglehart in Germany). Argues that assumptions and instruments of the researchers were biased so that radicals were almost by definition "humanitarian," "democratic," etc. Includes other work by the authors and by others which draws the opposite conclusions. P.A.

SUB-STANCE 20 (1978)

700 W. Badger Road, Suite 101, Madison, Wis. 53713. $10 per year (4 issues). Issue theme: *Focus on the Margins.* MICHEL FOUCAULT, *"The West and the Truth of Sex."* A discussion of the central theme contained in the recently published introduction to *History of Sexuality*, the

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relation of "true" discourse to sexual pleasure, and the function of power in (not limiting, but) binding coercion, pleasure and truth. Foucault proposes to trace the genealogy of the science of sex which replaced relations of erotic art, exploring how knowledge became organized around sex through religious, medical and social techniques — a project he calls "the outline of an analytic of power." JEAN-FRANCOIS LYOTARD, *"One of the Things at Stake in Women's Struggles."* Lyotard links the domination involved in male sexism to the primacy accorded to metatheoretical truth claims, arguing that the proper strategy for feminists is not a co-optative "virile" offensive, but a subversive, fragmenting non-centrism. Masculine imperialism dominates women by relegating them to the borders (the mother, other within hierarchy), or by making them homologues of men (the whore, identitarian sexuality); thus women disappear into capitalism's male cycle, and differences are neutralized. Lyotard thus attacks the constitutive discourse which links political phallocracy and philosophical metalanguage, by countering dominating power relations (in imperialism, sexual politics, and philosophy) with a de-centering non-finality. W.G. KUDSZUS, *"Reflections on the Double Bind of Literature and Psychopathology."* Literary and clinical "madness" are explored through a survey of some texts in communication analysis which bring together literary criticism and psychiatry. SANFORD S. AMES, *"Mint Madness: Surfeit and Purge in the Novels of Duras."* ANNIE PROTHIN, *"The Substantive Language of Yves Bonnefoy."* ROBERT CHUMBLEY, *"An Enormity for Flaubert: Exercises in Semiotic Foreplay."* FODELIEVE MERCKEN-SPAAS, *"Some Aspects of the Self and the Other in Rousseau and Sade."* A comparison-contrast of relevant themes in Rousseau's *Second Discourse* and Sade's *Philosophy of the Bedroom* shows that Sade relies upon an animal model for human relations, generating recurring static situations and fixed opposition between subject and object, while Rousseau uses a model of human education featuring evolution in relations which allow interchangeability in perspective. Exploring their different treatments of property, legal systems, sexual norms and language use, Spaas demonstrates that for Sade differences are insurmountable; people are either subject or object, while for Rousseau people are both at once, similarly and interchangeably subject and object. PHYLLIS ZUKERMAN, *"History, Fiction and Legend in Nerval's 'Angelique'."* JACK UNDANK, *"Sight and the Signifying: Metaphors [the Example of Diderot]."* CHARLES CARAMELLO, *"Flushing Out 'The Voice in the Closet'."* G.R.

THEORY AND SOCIETY, 6:2 (September, 1978)

Elsevier Scientific Publishing Co., Inc., 52 Vanderbilt Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10017. $21 per year. ALVIN W. GOULDNER, *"The New Class Project, I."* Gouldner sees all over the world the rise of a new class composed of both intellectuals and technical intelligentsia that enter into conflict with the groups already in control of society's economy. To understand this new class, he argues that we need 1) a theory of its distinctive language behavior; 2) a general theory of capital. Gouldner discusses five perspectives on the New Class, including his own. TODD GITLIN, *"Media Sociology: The Dominant Paradigm."* The dominating paradigm since World War II has been the one associated with Paul F. Lazarsfeld and his school, grounded in a predictive behaviorism and concerned only with short-term effects of the media. ALAN MACFARLANE, *"The Origins of English Individualism: Some Surprises."* Examines English social and economic structures between the 13th and 18th centuries, and argues that England was as capitalist in 1250 as in 1750. The concept of indivisible, individually held private property was present in England, though not in Europe, implying that the arguments of Marx and Weber in relation to England and the medieval period were wrong. Review articles: ADRIENNE HARRIS and EDWARD SHORTER, *"Besieging Lasch."* A heavily critical look at Lasch's book *Haven in a Heartless World: The Family Besieged."* ALAN WOLFE, *"Analyzing the Welfare State."* This is a review of Harold Wilensky's *The New Corporationism, Centralization and the Welfare State*, and Morris Janowitz' *Social Control of the Welfare State*. Janowitz suggests that the failure of the welfare state is a failure of social control. He advocates that we practice more self-restraint. Wilensky is addressing policy makers, and is not dealing with sociology. Both works are criticized for failing to consider alternatives and are regarded as failures by the reviewers. Also included are a number of short book reviews. R.E.R.

THEORY AND SOCIETY, 6:3 (November, 1978)

ROBERT McAULAY, *"Velikovsky and the Infrastructure of Science: The Metaphysics of a Close Encounter."* An examination of the infrastructure of science, the silent background of "world hypotheses," and "domain assumptions," that shape reception of social theories. This is presented with a historical discussion of the scientific community's organized refusal to accept Velikovsky's ideas as scientific, even when empirically supported, and the debate that surrounds

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his ideas. The debate is linked to the ideas of Mannheim and Lukács, and placed in the context of catastrophism and uniformitarianism as world hypotheses. ALVIN W. GOULDNER, *"The New Class Project, II."* A brief examination of the role of education, and the rise of the New Class. As the New Class' ascendancy to power is blocked, the result is their increased political activity and alienation. They turn to the family and the vanguard to handle the resulting anxieties. SHARON ZUKIN, *"The Problem of Social Class Under Socialism."* There has been a problem in discussing class in socialist societies owing to the discussion being incorrectly put in capitalistic terms. Zukin tries to avoid this problem by examining characteristics of pre-capitalist and socialist societies. Discussion focuses on the underlying structure that shapes social relations, the contradictions that engender class relations, and the practice that expresses, reflects, and reproduces class relations. WALTER L. ADAMSON, *"Beyond 'Reform or Revolution': Notes on Political Education in Gramsci, Habermas and Arendt."* Gramsci is seen as having transcended the "either reform or revolution" dilemma. Gramsci wanted a complete recomposition of society as a culturally integrated totality yielding the birth of a collective individual. The pivotal point for Gramsci is political education and it is here that Gramsci is weak. Adamson turns to Habermas' conception of ideal speech to try to overcome this weakness, and to Arendt with her conception of action. R.E.R.

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